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On the basis of a study of American, British and Canadian records, this article examines the relationship of France to the negotiation of the North Atlantic Treaty from the perspective of the ‘ABC’ countries, particularly Canada. How did the perceived vulnerability of France influence the approach of the members of the ‘North Atlantic Triangle’ to the justification, timing and contents of the proposed pact? How did France's inclusion in Western Union and its exclusion from the preliminary talks in the Pentagon affect American, British and Canadian attitudes to the development of the draft alternatively known as the ‘Pentagon Paper’ or the ‘State Department Draft’? These questions are addressed, as well as the impact on the later ambassadorial talks of France's priority to immediate rearmament and its determination to include the departments of Algeria within the defensive perimeter of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. Finally, the article assesses the extent to which France and its requirements influenced the policies and actions of the Canadian government throughout the negotiation of the North Atlantic Treaty. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Could a growing transatlantic rift regarding the use of military force outside Europe propel the political break-up of Canada? The first part of the paper argues that, in addition to its liberal-democratic values, Canada's bicultural national identity accounts for much of its Atlanticist international security policy. The second part of the paper examines the prevalence of this Atlanticist strategic culture in the face of two contemporary cases of transatlantic (dis)unity, the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, in order to assess the potentially disruptive nature of transatlantic discord on Canada's political unity. It finds, somewhat counter-intuitively, that transatlantic unity - rather than disunity - could more probably generate national unity crises in Canada in the event of continuing 'out-of-area' military operations undertaken by NATO allies. This is mainly because of a growing tendency among Quebec's sovereignist political elites' to mobilise Quebecers' distinct attitudes regarding overseas military expeditions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Canada's self-image in world affairs has been as a bold internationalist, with its status and responsibility as a middle power and its role as a mediator emphasised. Assessments highlight the transformation of Canada's international relations after the Second World War and contrast its engagement in the United Nations with its performance at the League of Nations. Curiously, these appraisals ignore Canada's first term on the UN Security Council (1948-1949), particularly its response to crises which challenged world peace and the UN's authority. From an examination of unpublished and published papers in Canada, the United States, and the United Kingdom, this article contends that Canada's performance did not correspond with the popular image of its role in world affairs, nor did the government take advantage of this exceptional opportunity to demonstrate its international commitment. Moreover, it also shied away from taking a leading part in advocating the ideals and objectives of the western alliance. Instead, it preferred to play a supporting role as the divisions of the cold war deepened. When the UN Security Council dealt with controversies and clashes, Canada followed the lead of the United States and the United Kingdom, and its priority was to maintain a common outlook and approach within the North Atlantic Triangle. Canada's early post-war foreign policy, as evident in its first term on the UN Security Council, seems remarkably consistent with its longstanding concerns and priorities in world affairs and considerably less indicative of any significant departure in approach or policies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines the negotiation, implementation and impact of the four-year contract for delivery of Canadian wheat to Britain (July 1946). The notion of such an agreement was controversial within government and industry, not only in Canada and the United Kingdom but also in the United States. This assessment concludes that, in spite of its negative reputation, especially in Canada, the wheat contract met the principal aims of both sides. For the Canadian government especially this episode interwove many of its anxieties and ambitions in an uncertain financial, commercial and political situation after the Second World War. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

What is the American strategy for developing non-treaty defence and security agreements with Canada and other partners? Kimball's 2017 Canadian–US defence and security agreement (DSA) data tested a rationalist institutionalist model of agreement institutionalization. This research examines DSA diffusion comparing US DS cooperation with competitors and partners from 1955 to 2005. Non-treaty cooperation via exchanges of diplomatic notes/letters, memoranda of understanding, etc., require legislative notification but not approval. Those arrangements permit the flexibility, speed, and adaptation necessary in defence project management (i.e. NORAD, Eurofighter, F-35). For states with limited budgets, bilateral defence contracting with the USA is more efficient economically, than unilateral provision, but partnering incurs risks (entrapment, abandonment, burden-sharing, etc.). This research contributes to the literature on transatlantic relations by reflecting upon patterns of US cooperation with Canada, other partners as well as main competitors. It closes with recommendations based on anticipated changes to polarity and the defence cooperation status quo. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

There has been an emphasis on runaway slave advertisements in Quebec's eighteenth-century newspapers as part of the recovery of Canada's marginalised slaveholding past. However, as a close and holistic reading of the newspapers shows, the advertisements circulated alongside a higher number of texts relating to slavery in the wider Americas. The editors of the Quebec Gazette and the Montreal Gazette reprinted texts first published in Britain and France during the international slave-trade debates and from these they constructed a coherent local anti-slave-trade sentiment. Editors placed runaway slave advertisements alongside a general anti-slave-trade sentiment, and these contradictory texts circulated alongside one another. Canadian newspapers, their editors and readers were far more engaged with transatlantic slave-trade debates than has previously been understood. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In early 1960s Canada one question dominated political debate and discourse in the areas of foreign and security policy – whether or not Canadian armed forces would adopt nuclear weapon roles in North America and Europe. By focusing mainly on groups and individuals within civil society, the following analysis portrays a deeply divided Canada. On the one hand, supporters of liberal internationalism believed that acquiring nuclear weapons would make Canada a less effective and influential international actor and make nuclear war more likely, while on the other hand, conservative internationalists took the opposite position – that by assuming nuclear roles Canada’s international influence and effectiveness would increase and nuclear war would be less likely. In other words, the nuclear acquisition debate exposed deep divisions in Canadian society between those who viewed their country as either a ‘soft’ or a ‘hard’ middle power. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

After the long domination of economic and collective action theories, the literature on the political aspects of Allied burden-sharing is growing. This article analyses the politics of fair-share in NATO from the perspective of Canadian officials during the first burden-sharing debates in 1949–1952. I focus on sense-making and, through an interpretive methodology, I reconstruct the Canadian discourse on fair-share. This article shows that for Canada sharing NATO’s burden was not only a matter of technicality or realist considerations; in order to make NATO burden-sharing work, the allies needed to balance three dimensions of collective defence burden: military, economic, and moral. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Anna Ross (1848–1933), an heir of the Covenanters, used her pen and Bible teaching to promote Convenanter sensibilities in Canada. The rise of biblical higher criticism changed the theological landscape Anna Ross' defence of the Covenanter heritage revolved around the Bible as the Word of God. Faced with this new challenge Ross reformed the Covenanter tradition to speak to a new time and set of issues. While in continuity with the holy heritage Ross consciously enlarged its call. This expansion allowed her to find in the Covenanter heritage answers to the challenges of natural disasters and the proper treatment of immigrants, making her a covenanting incarnation of the Presbyterian Everywoman. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article notes the dearth of reference to the South African War in the growing literature on Canada's participation in the Great War. It argues a case for assessing the military and civilian legacy of the South African War upon Canada's management and experience of the Great War, its mobilisation, leadership, behaviour and perceptions; suggesting that the South African conflict had a greater influence upon Canada's response to the Great War than historians have assumed, an influence out of proportion to Canada's relatively limited contribution to the South African War. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

At the Cold War's close, Canada was NATO's 'odd man out', contributing relatively little to western defence. Today, Canada is the third-largest contributor of combat forces to NATO's efforts in Afghanistan. Canada got into Afghanistan partly as an alternative to getting into Iraq. But fighting the Taliban also serves the Canadian national interest in combating terrorism and has dovetailed well with recent efforts to 'transform' the Canadian military and use it more effectively in overseas development efforts. However, the Canadian commitment to Afghanistan beyond the current February 2009 deadline is in doubt. Public support for the combat dimension of the Afghanistan operations remains weak. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]