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What is the American strategy for developing non-treaty defence and security agreements with Canada and other partners? Kimball's 2017 Canadian–US defence and security agreement (DSA) data tested a rationalist institutionalist model of agreement institutionalization. This research examines DSA diffusion comparing US DS cooperation with competitors and partners from 1955 to 2005. Non-treaty cooperation via exchanges of diplomatic notes/letters, memoranda of understanding, etc., require legislative notification but not approval. Those arrangements permit the flexibility, speed, and adaptation necessary in defence project management (i.e. NORAD, Eurofighter, F-35). For states with limited budgets, bilateral defence contracting with the USA is more efficient economically, than unilateral provision, but partnering incurs risks (entrapment, abandonment, burden-sharing, etc.). This research contributes to the literature on transatlantic relations by reflecting upon patterns of US cooperation with Canada, other partners as well as main competitors. It closes with recommendations based on anticipated changes to polarity and the defence cooperation status quo. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

There has been an emphasis on runaway slave advertisements in Quebec's eighteenth-century newspapers as part of the recovery of Canada's marginalised slaveholding past. However, as a close and holistic reading of the newspapers shows, the advertisements circulated alongside a higher number of texts relating to slavery in the wider Americas. The editors of the Quebec Gazette and the Montreal Gazette reprinted texts first published in Britain and France during the international slave-trade debates and from these they constructed a coherent local anti-slave-trade sentiment. Editors placed runaway slave advertisements alongside a general anti-slave-trade sentiment, and these contradictory texts circulated alongside one another. Canadian newspapers, their editors and readers were far more engaged with transatlantic slave-trade debates than has previously been understood. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In early 1960s Canada one question dominated political debate and discourse in the areas of foreign and security policy – whether or not Canadian armed forces would adopt nuclear weapon roles in North America and Europe. By focusing mainly on groups and individuals within civil society, the following analysis portrays a deeply divided Canada. On the one hand, supporters of liberal internationalism believed that acquiring nuclear weapons would make Canada a less effective and influential international actor and make nuclear war more likely, while on the other hand, conservative internationalists took the opposite position – that by assuming nuclear roles Canada’s international influence and effectiveness would increase and nuclear war would be less likely. In other words, the nuclear acquisition debate exposed deep divisions in Canadian society between those who viewed their country as either a ‘soft’ or a ‘hard’ middle power. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

After the long domination of economic and collective action theories, the literature on the political aspects of Allied burden-sharing is growing. This article analyses the politics of fair-share in NATO from the perspective of Canadian officials during the first burden-sharing debates in 1949–1952. I focus on sense-making and, through an interpretive methodology, I reconstruct the Canadian discourse on fair-share. This article shows that for Canada sharing NATO’s burden was not only a matter of technicality or realist considerations; in order to make NATO burden-sharing work, the allies needed to balance three dimensions of collective defence burden: military, economic, and moral. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]