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The relationship between ideology and learning remains insufficiently theorized and sparsely investigated in the learning sciences. Drawing on Stuart Hall's theorization of ideology, Judith Butler's notion of the (un)grievability of lives, and Sara Ahmed's construct of stickiness, we illustrate how insights from critical social theory are indispensable to understanding processes of learning and how perspectives from the learning sciences can enrich critical social theory. Through the analysis of a classroom discussion on the use of militarized drones in an undergraduate engineering ethics course, we show how ideological convergence among participants constructed locally significant categories of "civilian," "terrorist," and (un)grievability, which narrowed the possible trajectories for students' disciplinary learning in engineering and engineering ethics. Our analysis also shows that fleeting moments of ideological expansion offered opportunities for new learning; however, most of these instances of possibility were not sustained through the classroom discussion. We explicate how ideological convergences and expansions, as interactional achievements, profoundly matter for disciplinary learning and students' identities. In conclusion, we explore the implications of our findings for broader contexts of learning and for the field of the learning sciences.

Some researchers, including B. K. Hofer and P. R. Pintrich (1997) and W. A. Sandoval (2005), argue for defining "personal epistemology" as views about the nature of knowledge and knowing but not views about the nature of learning. Others continue using a more expansive definition of "personal epistemology" that includes views about learning. I argue that the scope of personal epistemology should not be decided entirely a priori. If people's views about the nature of knowing and knowledge turn out to be separable from (despite being intertwined with) their views about the nature of learning, then it makes sense to define 2 separate areas of study corresponding to those 2 separable sets of psychological constructs. From some theoretical perspectives, however, empirical results may support the interpretation that views about knowledge are inseparably entangled with views about learning. In that case, excluding views about learning from personal epistemology obscures rather than elucidates the content and cognitive structure of students' views. To be clear, I do not think the community should decide, now, to etch "views about the nature of learning" into the definition of "personal epistemology". I argue instead that it is more productive "not" to converge on a definition until further empirical and theoretical progress points us toward the best way to "cut up [nature]...along its natural joints" (Plato, 1995, p. 64). (Contains 2 footnotes.)

Explores connections between naive epistemology and everyday instructional practice. Reviews examples of naive epistemologies as made up of fine-grained, context-sensitive resources. Presents strategies designed to help students tap those resources for learning introductory physics. Reflects on this work as an example of interplay between two modes of inquiry into student thinking, that of instruction and formal research on learning. (Author/KHR)

The relationship between ideology and learning remains insufficiently theorized and sparsely investigated in the learning sciences. Drawing on Stuart Hall’s theorization of ideology, Judith Butler’s notion of the (un)grievability of lives, and Sara Ahmed’s construct of stickiness, we illustrate how insights from critical social theory are indispensable to understanding processes of learning and how perspectives from the learning sciences can enrich critical social theory. Through the analysis of a classroom discussion on the use of militarized drones in an undergraduate engineering ethics course, we show how ideological convergence among participants constructed locally significant categories of “civilian,” “terrorist,” and (un)grievability, which narrowed the possible trajectories for students’ disciplinary learning in engineering and engineering ethics. Our analysis also shows that fleeting moments of ideological expansion offered opportunities for new learning; however, most of these instances of possibility were not sustained through the classroom discussion. We explicate how ideological convergences and expansions, as interactional achievements, profoundly matter for disciplinary learning and students’ identities. In conclusion, we explore the implications of our findings for broader contexts of learning and for the field of the learning sciences. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]