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The article discusses the pursuit of justice by making reparation for past wrongs and particularly for wrongs done more than a generation ago, is not morally justifiable except in some special cases. For paying of reparations to be defensible, it must be possible to identify two kinds of agent, which is the victim of injustice, to whom reparation is owed and the perpetrator or the beneficiary of injustice who can be held accountable for the wrong or liable for the cost of restitution. According to the author, if there is no plausible justification for holding one part of society responsible for compensating another for injustices committed in the past, there is no warrant for calling upon the state to take any particular action.

The article focuses on the study on the uncertainty of justice on historical reparations. According to the author, the discussion shows that the uncertainty emerging from the methods for assessing the extent of injury and reparative content might not pose insurmountable problems for all historical injuries. The uncertainty challenge poses interesting difficulties to answering these questions. In facing these difficulties, the best strategy emphasizes the limits to a viable claim, by posing limits people can circumscribe uncertainty. These limitations and a clear understanding of the methods employed do not completely resolve the uncertainty challenge, but rather confine its scope, putting structures in place for resolution.