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The article discusses social practice theory of personal ideals and the social dimensions of the emotions of pride and shame. Topics include how a commitment to living in accordance with our own ideals is a commitment to a social practice, how the feeling of interpersonal superiority that follows pride is a failure to cognitively appreciate the social basis of one's personal ideals and sociality objections to personal ideal accounts of shame and pride.

The article discusses the relationship between the moral ideal of impartiality based on the veil of ignorance and the position of prioritarianism. It argues a study that aims to provide a more detailed analysis of the relationship among impartiality, priority, justice, and the veil of ignorance based on the assumption that justice is prioritarian. The author's argument shows that the non-prioritarian conclusions reached by many theories of justice rely on complex reasoning.

The article presents a social-psychological analysis on the racist value judgments. The authors argue that racist value judgments convey beliefs which are objectively false. They also note that these judgments has a content which is imprecise in principle and rational assessment. They added that their position reacts to a view that the judgments could be offensive to the mind and cuts across several metaethical debates. They further revealed that the notion of objective which they opppose in the claim that racist value judgments are false beliefs imply the idea of the falseness of racist beliefs.

This article reports on the underlying ideals of democracy and how they relate to the legitimate determination of the territorial boundaries of a democracy. The author asserts that democratic determinations of boundaries appear to presuppose precisely what they are meant to resolve. The author identifies with many theorists who feel that the principles that underpin democracy are the most important principles in political philosophy. Also, the author argues that democratic theory has a significant amount to say about legitimate territorial boundaries by having recourse to the principles that underpin the justification of democratic decision making.

This article explores a feminist separatist vision that is compatible with a feminist justice ideal described by James Sterba in his book, Justice for Here and Now. Sterba's chapter on feminist justice is remarkable for its appreciation of the pervasiveness and seriousness of violence against women and for its will to propose constructive measures to reduce and eliminate that violence. The article propose alternatives to some of Sterba's family restructuring proposals for implementing his androgynous ideal. The ideal is compatible with a variety in personal styles but insists only that when it comes to moral character traits, differences of sex are irrelevant. Truly and fundamentally desirable human traits should be equally accessible to all human beings, and the truly human virtues should be equally expected of all human beings, at least in the sense that no one is excluded in advance simply because of gender. Sterba presents his androgynous ideal as, if not a compromise, then at least intermediate between two extreme views, which he rejects. One extreme is the negative view of feminism as simply an emancipation of women from traditional roles in order that they may be free to develop in ways hitherto encouraged only in men. The other is the positive view of feminism as basically a celebration of female superiority.