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Copyright of Journal of Politics in Latin America is the property of Sage Publications Inc. and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Journal of Politics in Latin America is the property of Sage Publications Inc. and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Journal of Politics in Latin America is the property of Sage Publications Inc. and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Journal of Politics in Latin America is the property of Sage Publications Inc. and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

We explore how the reception of remittances affects perceptions of the bilateral relationship between Mexico and the United States. Scholars have claimed that the economic benefits of the relationship with the US prevail over imperialistic concerns as a result of the asymmetry of power between the two countries. Empirical research shows that Latin American public opinion is indeed more supportive of the US than theory indicates. However, we identify two gaps in this literature. First, scholars have explored the determinants of generic expressions of sentiment toward the US, overlooking more concrete instances of cooperation between the two countries. Second, scholars have focused on trade and investment and have ignored how the material gains of emigration shape attitudes toward the US. The present paper fills these two gaps by using novel survey data on the bilateral relationship between Mexico and the US. On one hand, we find that while the reception of remittances correlates positively with good sentiments toward the US, the recipients of remittances are consistently more opposed to cooperation with the US in the fight against drug trafficking. We argue that this finding can be explained by the different nature of the migratory phenomenon, and the connection between anti-drug trafficking policies and the close scrutiny of illegal flows of money and people. En este artículo estudiamos cómo la recepción de remesas afecta las percepciones de la relación bilateral entre México y los Estados Unidos. Diversos autores afirman que los beneficios económicos de la relación con los Estados Unidos prevalecen sobre preocupaciones imperialistas, que resultan de la asimetría de poder entre los dos países. La investigación empírica muestra que la opinión pública latinoamericana valora con más entusiasmo a los Estados Unidos de lo que muchas teorías predicen. Identificamos dos temas poco explorados en esta literatura. Primero, los estudiosos del anti-americanismo se han centrado en entender sentimientos genéricos hacia los Estados Unidos, pasando por alto ejemplos más concretos de cooperación entre los dos países. Segundo, la mayoría de los autores se han focalizado en el comercio y en las inversiones ignorando de forma sistemática cómo los beneficios asociados a la emigración pueden moldear las actitudes hacia los Estados Unidos. Nuestro trabajo llena estos dos vacíos usando nuevos datos de opinión pública. Por un lado, encontramos que la recepción de remesas se correlaciona positivamente con sentimientos positivos hacia los Estados Unidos. Por otro lado, encontramos que los receptores de remesas se oponen a una mayor cooperación con los Estados Unidos en la lucha contra el tráfico de drogas. Nuestro argumento es que este resultado contradictorio tiene que ver con la naturaleza específica del fenómeno migratorio y con la conexión entre las políticas antidrogas y el escrutinio de los flujos ilegales de personas y de dinero. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Journal of Politics in Latin America is the property of Sage Publications Inc. and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Scholars of the world's most recent democratization processes have tended to focus on how national-level institutions have developed and how citizens have interpreted and responded to those developments. In this paper, we argue that the distinct subnational political environments that emerge from uneven national regime transitions are important determinants of how people view their political world. Specifically, we argue that citizens' experiences with and attitudes towards corruption are particularly influenced by the subnational political context in which those citizens live. We use survey data from across Mexico to test our theoretical expectations that a multi-party electoral context will heighten citizens' awareness of corruption as a governance issue, even as their chances of being victimized by corrupt behavior is reduced. Conversely, we posit that one-party electoral environments should facilitate a "business as usual" attitude toward corruption among government officials and citizens. As efforts to deepen democracy and improve governance continue across the developing world, our findings highlight the need to incorporate subnational political processes into efforts to understand and address such critical issues as corruption and its consequences. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Journal of Politics in Latin America is the property of Sage Publications Inc. and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Journal of Politics in Latin America is the property of Sage Publications Inc. and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Around the world, non-state armed actors have been linked to the illegal extraction of energy resources. This research note explores the case of Mexico. Anecdotal evidence suggests that criminal groups have been gaining control of energy infrastructure across the country. At the same time, oil tapping has been directly associated with criminal violence. Yet, there has not been a systematic effort to causally identify the relationship between illegal extraction and criminal violence. In this research note, we use the exogenous variation in international oil prices—as a measure of potential profits—to assess the effect of access to energy infrastructure on criminal-related violence. Our results show that increases in oil prices are associated with higher levels of homicide rates in municipalities with pipelines and in neighboring municipalities. Specifically, a standard price increase during this period is associated with approximately 20% more homicides per year in municipalities with gasoline pipelines. A locality-level analysis suggests a non-linear distance effect. Finally, we also explore criminal fragmentation as the mechanism connecting access to resources and violence. We find that access to pipelines is associated with higher presence of organized crime groups, but not necessarily with more fragmentation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Journal of Politics in Latin America is the property of Sage Publications Inc. and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Journal of Politics in Latin America is the property of Sage Publications Inc. and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Journal of Politics in Latin America is the property of Sage Publications Inc. and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Journal of Politics in Latin America is the property of Sage Publications Inc. and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Journal of Politics in Latin America is the property of Sage Publications Inc. and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

When do presidents delegate policy-making authority to their foreign ministries? And is foreign policy unique in this respect? We posit that six international, national, and personal factors determine the opportunity and motivation of presidents to delegate, and then analyse the cases of Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico in 1946–2015. By applying fuzzy-set qualitative comparative analysis, we find that four combinations of factors are sufficient paths to delegation: (1) international stability and elite consensus on foreign policy; (2) international stability, right-wing president, and low diplomatic professionalisation; (3) international stability, right-wing president, and low presidential expertise on foreign policy; or (4) absence of authoritarianism combined with elite consensus on foreign policy and right-wing president. Our study of foreign ministries reinforces some of the main findings of the scholarly literature on other ministries, thus challenging the view of foreign policy-making as different from domestic policy areas. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This research conducted list experiments to estimate the percentage of respondents who received electoral gifts during the 2015 legislative and the 2015 and 2017 subnational campaigns in Mexico. Consistent with recent studies on sensitive survey techniques, our research finds that list experiments seem to methodologically work better among more sophisticated voters (e.g. those with higher levels of education). Such findings suggest that previous studies that rely on list experiments tend to underestimate the percentage of voters who receive electoral gifts since this technique tends to work better among respondents who are, in fact, least likely to be targeted by clientelistic strategies. Given levels of education in the region, we suggest that research solely relying on list experiments approach its empirical findings with caution. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The formulation of theories and hypotheses is done at the level of concepts. These concepts are often tested by operationalizing them using survey questions. However, measurement errors make it impossible for survey questions to measure the concepts of interest perfectly. In order to correct for measurement errors, information is needed about their size, or the size of their complement, the quality. For the USA and Europe, a lot is already known about the quality of questions, but this has not yet been studied in some other parts of the world. In this paper, we use a multitrait-multimethod approach to estimate the quality of 27 questions in Mexico and Colombia. These initial results on quality for Central and Latin American countries show quality estimates that are relatively similar in terms of their relationships with the scale characteristics to what has been observed in the USA and Europe.

Copyright of Journal of Politics in Latin America is the property of Sage Publications Inc. and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Journal of Politics in Latin America is the property of Sage Publications Inc. and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Federalism is widely lauded for its ability to manage deep social divisions and promote efficient policy in democratic systems, but it has been criticized for its impact on party system nationalization. In this paper, we explore the role of formal and informal institutions on party system nationalization in the Mexican political system, focusing on legislative politics. In Mexico, an end of one-party rule transformed the nature of center–periphery relations, empowering subnational actors and giving them incentives to act on the national stage. Using an original dataset, we show that these changes resulted in national parties dividing along state lines on policy decisions, and that the magnitude of these divisions depends primarily on 1) the informal centralization of career resources, 2) the extent to which parties are ideological and programmatic, and 3) the personal vote incentives of electoral rules.El federalismo es reconocido como un sistema capaz de manejar divisiones sociales y promover políticas eficientes en los sistemas democráticos. Este artículo examina el sistema político mexicano y explora el papel de las instituciones formales e informales en la nacionalización del sistema de partidos, particularmente en la dinámica legislativa. El fin del sistema de partido dominante en México transformó la relación entre el centro y la periferia, empoderando a los actores subnacionales y concediéndoles incentivos en la arena nacional. Utilizando una base de datos original, este artículo demuestra que esos cambios son el resultado de fragmentaciones estatales dentro de los partidos nacionales. La magnitud de estas fracturas dependen de 1) la centralización informal de las carreras políticas de los diputados, 2) la relevancia de la ideología dentro de cada partido, y 3) los incentivos del sistema electoral para que exista el voto personal.

In this paper we analyze the effect of criminal violence on electoral participation in Mexico. Many scholars have studied the origins of criminal violence, as well as the success or failure of contemporary regimes in dealing with it. However, few have studied how it affects voter turnout. Following recent findings in the behavioral subfield, we hypothesize that as criminal violence increases, citizens abandon public channels of participation and take refuge in their private spheres. Using longitudinal and geostatistical tools to analyze Mexican municipalities in the last decade, we find that the level of electoral turnout is lower in the most violent regions of the country. In the final section, we use survey data to confirm that citizens exposed to high levels of criminal violence are less likely to vote.En este artículo, analizamos el efecto de la violencia criminal sobre la participación electoral en México. Muchos investigadores estudiaron las causas de la violencia criminal y la respuesta de los diferentes gobiernos frente a este problema. Sin embargo, pocos estudios analizan el impacto de la violencia criminal sobre la participación en las elecciones. Siguiendo algunos hallazgos recientes en la literatura de comportamiento político, argumentamos que cuando la violencia criminal aumenta, los ciudadanos abandonan espacios públicos de participación y se refugian en la esfera privada. Usando métodos geoestadísticos para analizar las municipalidades en México en la ultima década, demostramos que la participación electoral es más baja en las regiones más violentas del país. En la última sección, usamos datos de una encuesta reciente para confirmar que ciudadanos expuestos a niveles altos de criminalidad tienen menos probabilidades de votar.

Government and organized criminal groups co-exist in uneasy equilibrium. Criminal groups adjust their behavior as a function of their own goals and resources in relation to inter-group cooperation and conflict, dynamic markets, and public policies; governments adjust their behavior according to shifting perceptions of the benefits offered, threats posed, and strategies adopted by criminal groups. When governments attempt to control or repress their activities, criminal groups employ various tools and instruments that might be grouped into three categories: evasion, corruption, and confrontation. The paper draws on recent cases from Brazil and Mexico with respect to tactical and strategic choices by governments and criminal groups, seeking to address three broad questions. What factors disrupt the state-criminal group equilibrium? Under what circumstances do disruptions produce significant levels of violence (as opposed to evasion or corruption)? What are the implications for the quality of democracy as criminal groups violently confront the state? El crimen organizado y el gobierno coexisten en un equilibrio sumamente delicado. En función de sus recursos y objetivos, los grupos criminales ajustan su comportamiento en base a las dinámicas del mercado, las políticas públicas y el grado de cooperación o conflicto con otros grupos delictivos. El gobierno, por su parte, actúa de acuerdo al cambio en la percepción de amenazas, beneficios y estrategias adoptadas por el crimen organizado. De tal forma, cuando el gobierno intenta controlar o reprimir actividades ilícitas, los grupos criminales emplean diversos mecanismos que pueden catalogarse en las siguientes categorías: evasión, corrupción y confrontación. El artículo se basa en las tácticas y estrategias adoptadas por el gobierno y los grupos criminales durante casos recientes en Brasil y México, a fin de responder las siguientes tres preguntas ¿Qué factores interrumpen el equilibrio entre gobierno y crimen organizado? ¿Bajo qué circunstancias incrementa la violencia significativamente (a diferencia de la corrupción o la evasión)? ¿Cuáles son las implicaciones para la calidad de la democracia una vez que los grupos criminales se enfrentan violentamente al Estado?

Copyright of Journal of Politics in Latin America is the property of Sage Publications Inc. and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Journal of Politics in Latin America is the property of Sage Publications Inc. and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Journal of Politics in Latin America is the property of Sage Publications Inc. and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Journal of Politics in Latin America is the property of Sage Publications Inc. and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

How do subnational authoritarian enclaves emerge (or survive) in a democratic transition at the federal level? How can they endure large-scale social protests, like the one that shook Oaxaca in 2006? While federal tolerance for subnational authoritarian practices is a necessary condition, it is insufficient in itself to explain why subnational political systems sustain and eventually reproduce authoritarian practices in the first place. In this article, therefore, I focus on the internal dimension of subnational authoritarianism. I argue that, because of its reliance on two distinct sources of legitimacy, Oaxaca's neo-patrimonial domination system was able to respond to the formal democratizing pressures emanating from the federal transition without losing its authoritarian nature. This process of hybridization transformed Oaxacan institutions, but left social structures and the political dynamics that emerge from them - the sources of subnational authoritarianism - almost intact. By exploring the evolution of neo-patrimonialism and hybridization in Oaxaca from a theoretical perspective, I address the issues of change and continuity in the emergence of subnational authoritarian enclaves, in Mexico and elsewhere. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article studies the continued existence of subnational undemocratic regimes in Argentina and Mexico, two countries that have recently experienced national democratization. The first part of the article offers a conceptualization of subnational democracy and measures its territorial extension across all subnational units. The second part explores a common, albeit not systematically tested explanation about subnational undemocratic regime continuity, namely, that these regimes persist because they meet national incumbents' strategic political needs. This claim is tested using statistical analyses to contrast patterns of spending across undemocratic subnational units during the presidencies of Menem (1989-1999), De la Rúa (2000-2001), Duhalde (2002), and Kirchner (2003-2007) in Argentina, and Fox (2000-2006) in Mexico. Contradicting conventional wisdom, the results show that presidents only reproduce a handful of subnational undemocratic regimes, as not all of them can meet presidential needs. In addition, the results reveal that the strategic calculation of presidents regarding this reproduction is dictated by factors that have been largely overlooked by the literature. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]