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Do voters tolerate undemocratic behavior by politicians with whom they share partisanship or policy preferences? I answer this question employing conjoint experiments in the United States, the United Kingdom, the Czech Republic, Mexico, and South Korea. Theoretically, I distinguish between a hypothesis based on social psychological partisan attachments and Downsian hypotheses based on spatial policy preferences. In all five countries, I find that partisanship does not suppress the negative effects of undemocratic behavior on voting intentions, whereas policy agreement between voters and candidates even increases punishment of undemocratic behavior. However, partisanship has much stronger direct influences on voting intentions than policy agreement and especially undemocratic behavior. The findings suggest that voters have a harder time setting aside their partisan attachments than their policy preferences for democracy. But most importantly, citizens are not completely blinded by either partisanship or policy agreement when facing undemocratic politicians. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Advocates of the instant-runoff voting system (IRV) often argue that it is less susceptible to strategic voting than plurality. Is this true? More generally, how should we define and measure a voting system's susceptibility to strategic voting? Previous research in this area is unsatisfying, partly because it ignores the uncertainty voters face when they vote; we introduce a better approach. We find that, when beliefs are precise and other voters are expected to vote sincerely, more voters would benefit from voting strategically in IRV than in plurality (contrary to what advocates suggest). The anticipated benefit for these voters is small, however, and for the average voter the benefit of taking strategy into account is many times larger in plurality than IRV—especially when beliefs are imprecise or voters expect other voters to behave strategically. The methods we introduce can be used to study other properties of voting systems when voters are strategic. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Responsible parties are conventionally defined as those capable of announcing their legislative goals and then passing them on the strength of their own members' votes. In this article, I consider why UK majority parties have closely approximated these conditions for responsibility since the 1880s, while US majority parties have never approximated them closely. I provide the first systematic evidence on when the British opposition began to offer across-the-board opposition to the government's agenda and when the government became able to pass bills using only its own members' votes. I also explore the role that leaders' control of the legislative agenda and their followers' nominations played in these developments. I attribute US parties' inability to mimic their British counterparts to different costs of defending bill passage coalitions against "weakest-link" attacks. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article considers how much harm is justified in reaching immigration goals. Political philosophers generally overlook this question, focusing on states' rights to exclude immigrants in general, rather than which means of exclusion are justified. For example, even if excluding migrants during pandemics is justified, shooting at migrants is not. We argue that harm in immigration enforcement must be proportional. Whether harm is proportional depends on levels of harm migrants experience relative to harm immigration controls avert, whether migrants are forced to migrate, and whether harm is instigated by a state versus a nonstate actor. We further demonstrate that this claim is supported in a sample of UK and US citizens, including among those opposed to increasing migration. Drawing on an original experiment, novel in evaluating whether public opinions are consistent with the requirements of immigration justice, we demonstrate that opinions are consistent with the subprinciples of proportionality we present. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]