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The study of literature needs a kind of justification that it currently does not appear to have. It needs a justification that can articulate its role in relation to democratic social and political values, and it needs to do so in ways that are able to distinguish those from the economic motives and the interests of science that also drive culture, and ultimately it needs to do so in relation to a very changed global order. The historical picture reveals that while literature has long been looked to as a source for the transmission of cultural values, it has also been without a very solid set of well‐articulated principles to justify its role within higher education. This lack is attributable (1) to the divergence between 'college' and 'university' institutional models; (2) to the framing of the value of literature in relation to science rather than independently; and (3) to the fact that literature provides resources for practical reasoning (phronēsis), reasoning about what to do, rather than knowledge of facts or of universal laws. The stresses under which democratic ideals currently find themselves further challenge those who would advocate for the teaching of literature as part of higher education to identify a more expanded range of capacities that literary education can support than was the case up until the end of the 20th century. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article analyses utopian and dystopian literature and its role in political education in order to make the case for imparting a 'utopian aspiration' that nurtures hope for the pursuit of political ideals. I note an 'anti‐utopian' theme in both literature and political philosophy, a theme that emerges in a particularly fascinating pair of works in the dystopian canon, Orwell's 1984 and Zamyatin's We. I argue that Zamyatin's story provides a more nuanced and valuable approach to the problem of political ideals and their potential for harm than the bleak message favoured by Orwell. Utopian and dystopian themes, I contend, can offer an invaluable orientation in political critique and practice if they nourish a utopian aspiration. The idea of hope for the new is a vital part of our political education, which is too easily dismissed by critics who purport to proffer more 'realistic' views. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Sociologists exploring educational injustice often focus on socio-economic segregation as a central measure of injustice. The comprehensive ideal, furthermore, has the idea of socio-economic integration built into it. The current paper argues that socio-economic segregation is valuable only insofar as it serves other, more fundamental values. This matters because sometimes policy-makers will find themselves facing trade-offs between increasing integration and promoting the other, more fundamental values that underpin the value of integration. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Common schooling and multicultural education intuitively seem to be mutually reinforcing and possibly even mutually necessary: each is motivated by and/or serves the aims of promoting social justice and equality, common civic membership, and mutual respect and understanding, among other goals. An examination of the practical relationship between the two, however, reveals that neither one is a necessary or sufficient condition for achieving the other; in fact, each may in fairly common circumstances make the other harder to achieve. In other words, there is no direct instrumental relationship between multicultural education and common schools. Nor is there a clear expressive relationship between the two. Although common schools may serve as explicit, public symbols of our multicultural civic commitment to diversity, mutual respect and egalitarian inclusiveness, many demographically common schools neglect or even betray multicultural ideals, while many restricted entry and even segregated schools may express these ideals better than most comprehensive and integrated schools. Hence, while multicultural education and common schooling do intuitively stand for similar, mutually reinforcing ideals, in practice they may be linked more closely in the confusions and dilemmas of implementation they both raise than in their mutual realisation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In reaction to Doret De Ruyter's recent defence of the importance of ideals in education, I advocate cautiousness in three respects. First, I explain the importance of distinguishing ideals more sharply from goals by demonstrating the problems of considering ideals even approximately realisable. Second, I substantiate my doubts about their indispensability in human motivation, and question the desirability of encouraging the motivational use of ideals. Third, I question whether ideals could or should be ‘passed on’ in education, drawing attention to their non-objective, personally created nature. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]