Search

We show how to correct the analytic tableaux system from the paper Olkhovikov and Wansing (Journal of Philosophical Logic, 47(2), 259–279, 2018).

We formulate a Hilbert-style axiomatic system and a tableau calculus for the STIT-based logic of imagination recently proposed in Wansing (2015). Completeness of the axiom system is shown by the method of canonical models; completeness of the tableau system is also shown by using standard methods.

Curry’s paradox is well known. The original version employed a conditional connective, and is not forthcoming if the conditional does not satisfy contraction. A newer version uses a validity predicate, instead of a conditional, and is not forthcoming if validity does not satisfy structural contraction. But there is a variation of the paradox which uses “external validity” (that is, essentially, preservation of theoremhood). And since external validity contracts, one might expect the appropriate version of the Curry paradox to be inescapable. In this paper we show that this is not the case. We consider two ways of formalising the notion of external validity, and show that in both of these the paradox is not forthcoming without the appropriate forms of contraction.

The trilattice \(\textit{SIXTEEN}_3\) is a natural generalization of the well-known bilattice \(\textit{FOUR}_2\). Cut-free, sound and complete sequent calculi for truth entailment and falsity entailment in \(\textit{SIXTEEN}_3\) are presented.

Many logical systems are such that the addition of Prior's binary connective \({\tt tonk}\) to them leads to triviality, see [1, 8]. Since \({\tt tonk}\) is given by some introduction and elimination rules in natural deduction or sequent rules in Gentzen's sequent calculus, the unwanted effects of adding \({\tt tonk}\) show that some kind of restriction has to be imposed on the acceptable operational inferences rules, in particular if these rules are regarded as definitions of the operations concerned. In this paper, a number of simple observations is made showing that the unwanted phenomenon exemplified by \({\tt tonk}\) in some logics also occurs in contexts in which \({\tt tonk}\)is acceptable. In fact, in any non-trivial context, the acceptance of arbitrary introduction rules for logical operations permits operations leading to triviality. Connectives that in all non-trivial contexts lead to triviality will be called non-trivially trivializing connectives.

In Belnap’s useful 4-valued logic, the set 2={T,F} of classical truth values is generalized to the set 4=℘(2)={∅,{T},{F},{T,F}}. In the present paper, we argue in favor of extending this process to the set 16=℘(4) (and beyond). It turns out that this generalization is well-motivated and leads from the bilattice FOUR2 with an information and a truth-and-falsity ordering to another algebraic structure, namely the trilattice SIXTEEN3 with an information ordering together with a truth ordering and a (distinct) falsity ordering. Interestingly, the logics generated separately by the algebraic operations under the truth order and under the falsity order in SIXTEEN3 coincide with the logic of FOUR2, namely first degree entailment. This observation may be taken as a further indication of the significance of first degree entailment. In the present setting, however, it becomes rather natural to consider also logical systems in the language obtained by combining the vocabulary of the logic of the truth order and the falsity order. We semantically define the logics of the two orderings in the extended language and in both cases axiomatize a certain fragment comprising three unary operations: a negation, an involution, and their combination. We also suggest two other definitions of logics in the full language, including a bi-consequence system. In other words, in addition to presenting first degree entailment as a useful 16-valued logic, we define further useful 16-valued logics for reasoning about truth and (non-)falsity. We expect these logics to be an interesting and useful instrument in information processing, especially when we deal with a net of hierarchically interconnected computers. We also briefly discuss Arieli’s and Avron’s notion of a logical bilattice and state a number of open problems for future research.

The knowability paradox is an instance of a remarkable reasoning pattern (actually, a pair of such patterns), in the course of which an occurrence of the possibility operator, the diamond, disappears. In the present paper, it is pointed out how the unwanted disappearance of the diamond may be escaped. The emphasis is not laid on a discussion of the contentious premise of the knowability paradox, namely that all truths are possibly known, but on how from this assumption the conclusion is derived that all truths are, in fact, known. Nevertheless, the solution offered is in the spirit of the constructivist attitude usually maintained by defenders of the anti-realist premise. In order to avoid the paradoxical reasoning, a paraconsistent constructive relevant modal epistemic logic with strong negation is defined semantically. The system is axiomatized and shown to be complete.