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People take offence too easily and are encouraged to do so by, e.g., institutional harassment policies. 'Offensive' is sometimes equated with 'anything that offends someone', sometimes with a definitive list of specific behaviours. When is it justifiable to take offence? Distinctions need to be drawn: between offensive to the senses and to the mind; between meaning to offend, actually giving offence, and behaving in a manner likely to cause offence; between feeling upset and taking some formal action; between what is offensive to some, to all, and in itself. Comments are made on objectivity in moral judgements. Currently there is a failure to distinguish between what offends and what is objectively offensive. Practical consequences occur in terms of censorship and freedom of speech. Generalisations and jokes about identifiable groups or stereotypes are not inherently offensive. A distinction is drawn between being upset and being a victim. Taking offence is a supremely self-serving act. Current concern with offence trivialises morality and runs counter to basic principles of toleration, freedom and fairness.

A policy of inclusion may, in certain circumstances, be justified but inclusion is not an inherently moral principle. On occasion, the practice of inclusion may clearly offend against the principles of fairness. It is crucially important to distinguish between empirical arguments for inclusion and would-be moral arguments. That having been done, it is not clear that there are in general any compelling empirical arguments for a widespread policy of inclusion, and it is tolerably clear that inclusion is not morally incumbent upon us.

The essence of the argument in this article is threefold: that empirical questions about laws governing human activity do not have definitive answers; that certain conceptual questions do, and when they do they have important practical implications; but that many conceptual questions do not have definitive answers either. The argument is pursued by reference to Wilson's views on the nature and importance of philosophy, and to moral education by way of example. The conclusion drawn is that empirical research into education as such, and other specifically human activities, is misconceived. The reason that we still debate such questions as ''Can virtue be taught?'' is that they have no answer, but that does not mean that any view can equally well be adopted or that anything goes in every specific case. A better or worse understanding, a more or less efficacious response, can still be reached in particular cases. Such understanding is achieved through philosophy and the study of the humanities.

Socrates, as an Athenian living in the 5th century BC, belonged to a very different world from that of 20th century Britain. However, his moral example and thought do not therefore become foreign. This is not only because the West is, as a matter of fact, heir to the influence of Plato. It is also because morality, like science, knows no boundaries; although in both cases cultural factors will affect understanding, interpretation, implications etc., morality, like science, soccer or anything else must retain certain characteristics or become something different (rather than a different version of the same thing). Education is not the same thing as training, socialization, indoctrination, etc. This now familiar truth is in danger of losing its cutting edge. But people had better recognize the distinctions referred to by such terms and decide firmly what it is they want: do they in fact want moral education? Or is it rather effective training and socialization they require? I firmly champion moral ...