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Proportionality has long been considered a pillar of just war theory, requiring that the goods achieved in an action outweigh the collateral harms it causes. In this article, I argue that the in bello principle of proportionality cannot serve its intended function of limiting the destructiveness of actions during war. I illustrate the features of war that make the in bello proportionality constraint not merely impossible to follow, but perhaps even self-defeating. I conclude by suggesting ways in which theorists and policymakers concerned with justice in war might attempt to respond to this dilemma. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A recent empirical study has argued that experts in the ethics or the law of war cannot reach reasonable convergence on dilemmas regarding the number of civilian casualties who may be killed as a side effect of attacks on legitimate military targets. This article explores the philosophical implications of that study. We argue that the wide disagreement between experts on what in bello proportionality means in practice casts serious doubt on their ability to provide practical real-life guidance. We then suggest viewing in bello proportionality through the prism of virtue ethics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Is it coherent to defend nuclear deterrence from an ethical and just-war point of view, given the likely devastating effects of an actual nuclear exchange? This article holds that the salutary effects of successful deterrence are so substantial that, given the state of the world today, such deterrence does abide by the proportionality criterion of the just war tradition when considered against the direct political effects of deterrence, not the military effects of detonations. This article further explores why such salutary political effects are likely to remain viable in the twenty-first century, given both technical and political developments. The article also explores some of the main arguments against nuclear deterrence derived from the Cold War and considers to what extent they are relevant today. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article addresses what we owe to the civilians of a state with which we are militarily engaged. The old notion of noncombatant immunity needs to be rethought within the context of both human rights and into the postwar phase.No doubt, civilians will be killed in war. However, much more can be done during and after the fighting to protect civilians’ basic human rights from the ills of war. I argue for making belligerents accountableex postby requiring them to repair destroyed dual-purpose facilities that are essential for securing basic human rights of the civilian populace. I argue also that a belligerent’s targeting decisions should be reviewedex postby an impartial commission. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

According to just war theory, a resort to war is justified only if it satisfies the right intention condition. This article offers a critical examination of this condition, defending the thesis that, despite its venerable history as part of the just war tradition, it ought to be jettisoned. When properly understood, it turns out to be an unnecessary element ofjus ad bellum, adding nothing essential to our assessments of the justice of armed conflict. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

A widely accepted framework governs biomedical research and the practice of medicine in the civilian sector, but no such framework exists to guide the military in how it should treat its own personnel. Civilian bioethical principles are unsuitable because of fundamental differences between civilian and military core values. This paper proposes a framework for military bioethics. It begins by describing core military values, articulating how they differ from civilian goals and values, and explaining how these differences limit the ability of civilian bioethical principles to govern military biomedicine. The paper then puts forward a set of more appropriate principles for the military and discusses how these principles apply in three main areas of controversy within military bioethics: the use of military personnel as research subjects; the deployment use of biomedical agents; and the obligations of military physicians toward their own troops. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

I argue that the criterion of just cause is not independent of proportionality and other valid jusad bellumcriteria. One cannot know whether there is a just cause without knowing whether the other (valid) criteria (apart from ‘right intention’) are satisfied. The advantage of this account is that it is applicable to all wars, even to wars where nobody will be killed or where the enemy has not committed a rights violation but can be justifiably warred against anyway. This account also avoids the inefficiency of having proportionality considerations come up at two different points: in a separate criterion of just cause and in the criterion of proportionality proper. ‘Right intention’, the subjective element of the justification of a war, on the other hand, is not to be subsumed under the criterion of just cause: there can be a just cause without anybody knowing it. Conversely, however, the subjective element requires that those responsible for waging the war do know that the justifying objective conditions are fulfilled. This is in one sense more demanding than traditional just war theory; in another sense, however, it is less demanding: nobody needs to intend to fight for a ‘just aim’. I conclude the article by summing up the practical implications of my account. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

According to US government statements, drones succeed in killing terrorists while minimizing the risk to noncombatants, thus suggesting that they satisfy thejus in belloproportionality criterion. Scholars, however, are divided on whether drones are truly proportionate. What does it really mean to say drones are, or are not, proportionate? How are we to judge the proportionality of the CIA's drone program? We expose the fallacy of drone proponents who claim they are proportionate by repudiating what we call proportionality relativism – the use of impertinent comparisons to argue that drones are proportionate because they cause less collateral damage than other uses of force. We then analyze the existing data on drone strikes to expose problematic differences in how the US military and the CIA understand proportionality balancing. Finally, we employ what Walzer calls the category ofjus ad vim– the just use of force short of war – to assess the ethics of drones.Jus ad vimdemands a stricter relationship between the use of force short of war and thejus in belloprinciples of proportionality and discrimination, as well as human rights concerns of civilians not usually considered in the proportionality calculus, that severely restricts the scope of proportionality balancing. Assessing the CIA's use of drones in Pakistan according to this standard casts a dark shadow on claims that CIA drones are proportional. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

For many years after its introduction in the early 1990s, the cyberwar concept - which outlined a new mode of conflict that would emphasize disruption of information systems and flows - was given little credence. Over the past several years, however, cyberwars of both irregular and somewhat more conventional types have erupted (e.g., see respectively Estonia in 2007 and Georgia in 2008). Global awareness of cyberwar has risen sharply, and many nation-states are preparing their defenses, as well as their capabilities for mounting offensive operations. The American military's declaration in 2011 that cyberspace is a 'warfighting domain' highlights a need to explore the ethical implications and nuances of cyberwar. This article finds that classic jus ad bellum constructs come under great pressure from cyberwar, while jus in bello concerns may prove more manageable. Another key theme is that disproportionate attention is given to the notion of employing cyberwar 'strategically' (i.e., to strike directly at other nations' infrastructures), where its use is less likely to achieve 'victory' and is more problematic ethically. Instead, a focus on the application of cyberwar techniques in battle may lead to shorter, less bloody, 'more ethical' conflicts. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Certain methods and weapons are traditionally considered to be ‘mala in se’, i.e. evil in themselves. Examples are mass rape campaigns and land mines. This article examines different interpretations of the principle that belligerents ought not to use such means. Some interpretations are reductionist in the sense that they see the principle as an instance of other principles regulating conduct in war (jus in bello), namely the principles of discrimination and proportionality. I suggest a horizontal and a vertical dimension of the latter. Resort to violence can then be unjustified if (1) the persons are notliableto be attacked because they bear no (or not enough) responsibility for the relevant threat, (2) theamountof harm is disproportionate compared to what can be achieved by the resort to violent force, or (3) thekindof harm is disproportionate by making individual persons suffer in ways that no one should have to endure. I defend theverticaldimension of proportionality as a key to understanding the principle ofmala in seand consider whether it leads to anabsoluteprohibition against such means. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The increasing prevalence of armed drones in the conduct of military operations has generated robust debate. Among legal scholars, the crux of the dispute generally pits those who herald the new technology's unparalleled precision against those who view such newfound capabilities as an inducement to employ excessive force. Largely overlooked in the discussion over how drone strikes can be accomplished lawfully is a more fundamental question: Can a model of warfare that eschews any risk of harm to one party be squared with the ethical framework that informs the law of war? This matter has less to do with the technology per se than with a policy orientation that utilizes such technology as a strategy in itself, as opposed to one military tool in a larger arsenal. A corollary to the incongruity of riskless warfare is to query whether the ensuing breakdown of ethical and legal norms unwittingly encourages the very instability that the law of war attempts to control, thereby endangering the civilian populations of all parties to the conflict. While other authors have previously addressed the challenges posed by asymmetry to the law of armed conflict in different formats, this article explores these issues through a hypothetical scenario and seeks to elucidate some of the potential ramifications of the pursuit of physical impunity in war. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Contemporary English and Chinese scholars alike have interpreted Sunzi's Art of War as advocating amoralism in warfare. That charge has a long history in pre-modern China and has not been fully refuted. This essay argues that the alleged amoral Machiavellianism is more appropriate for ancient Qin military thought than for Sunzi. The third chapter of Sunzi's treatise contains a distinctive moral perspective that cannot be found in the military thought of the state of Qin, which succeeded in defeating all other states in the Period of the Warring States. Such a moral perspective contains both ad bellum and in bello norms. I submit that my interpretation of Sunzi's warfare ethics can provide an important resource for the People's Liberation Army of China to construct full-scale just war ethics that is similar to Western understandings. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This article lays a theoretical foundation the perspective of international law for applying the principle of proportionality of cause in modern just war theory. It proposes an analytical framework for measuring proportionality based on general tort law, filtered through the international law of state responsibility. It proposes assessing the use of force as a proportionate (or disproportionate) remediation for an injury (present or future) caused by another state that is in breach of its legal obligations. The article then applies this approach to the problems of anticipatory self-defense and humanitarian intervention. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper reflects on the highly contested Israeli restrictions on the importation of civilian goods into the Gaza Strip, with reference to a wide range of principled questions within military ethics regarding sieges, sanctions and blockades. Beginning with Israel's unilateral withdrawal from the Gaza Strip and culminating in its recent easing of sanctions, the paper attempts to bring out the central issues of principle embedded in the political polemic: unilaterally terminated occupation; the responsibilities of a former, though recent, occupier; the semantic distinction between siege and sanction and their respective ramifications; harm to civilians; necessity and proportionality. Overall, it argues in the specific case that Israel's restrictions on Gaza were not indefensible from the start as a first attempt to halt terrorism while avoiding full-scale conflict. In view of their ineffectiveness in achieving these goals, however, the harm they inflicted on civilians increasingly proved unnecessary and therefore excessive. There could then be no justification for continuing to restrict the flow of civilian goods into Gaza, as Israel itself eventually recognized. Nonetheless, Israel retains the right to search and regulate the passage of all relief supplies into Gaza, whether by land or by sea, as well as to secure its own borders for the safety of its citizens. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Plans to automate killing by using robots armed with lethal weapons have been a prominent feature of most US military forces' roadmaps since 2004. The idea is to have a staged move from 'man-in-the-loop' to 'man-on-the-loop' to full autonomy. While this may result in considerable military advantages, the policy raises ethical concerns with regard to potential breaches of International Humanitarian Law, including the Principle of Distinction and the Principle of Proportionality. Current applications of remote piloted robot planes or drones offer lessons about how automated weapons platforms could be misused by extending the range of legally questionable, targeted killings by security and intelligence forces. Moreover, the alleged moral disengagement by remote pilots will only be exacerbated by the use of autonomous robots. Leaders in the international community need to address the difficult legal and moral issues now, before the current mass proliferation of development reaches fruition. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Most contemporary conflicts can be characterized as 'wars or conflicts amongst the people'. International military forces deployed in such conflicts are confronted with complex operational environments where the distinction between combatants and non-combatants is often impossible to make. At the same time, there is a moral requirement imposed on Western coalition forces to perform in a humane manner and to keep casualties to a minimum. Non-lethal weapons are expected to enable military forces to accomplish their mission without having to kill or destroy. The extent to which these weapons meet that promise in real world conditions is the subject of debate. A defence technology assessment of non-lethal weapons is proposed that validates their utility and moral implications by considering the user, the weapon and the target in the context of the deployment situation. It will be illustrated that the technical parameters of the non-lethal weapons are no guarantee that the weapons will perform as intended as the user and target introduce many factors of uncertainty in real world situations. Although such uncertainties undermine the moral acceptability of non-lethal weapons, it is argued that the principle of non-lethality is compliant with the Just War Tradition principle of proportionality. The principles of non-combatant immunity and discrimination need to be re-calibrated given the human-centricity of many military intervention operations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Both radical rebellion and humanitarian intervention aim to defend citizens against tyranny and human rights abuses at the hands of their government. The only difference is that rebellion is waged by the oppressed subjects themselves, while humanitarian intervention is carried out by foreigners on their behalf. In this paper, it is argued that the prudential constraints on war (last resort, probability of success, and proportionality) impose tighter restrictions on, or demand more of, humanitarian interveners than they do of rebels. Specifically, I argue that rebels enjoy exemptions from the success principle that do not apply to humanitarians, and that rebels are not constrained by the foreseen mediated consequences of their actions - consequences that are interceded by the agency of other parties. The same cannot be said for intervening states. If this is right, then it is possible for a humanitarian intervention to fall short of the prudential conditions of legitimate war despite being expected to accomplish no less, and to cost no more, than a rebellion which is rightly judged to satisfy these conditions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This essay argues that the best starting point for discussions of the Principle of Discrimination (PD) is its most basic formulation: In wartime, certain enemy subjects should receive better treatment than others. Other formulations of the PD - in particular, those centered on the concept of noncombatant immunity - have sought to identify a single criterion that can be used as the basis for sorting enemy subjects into two (and only two) classes. However, a historical and legal analysis of the principle indicates that three distinct criteria - the conduct of individuals, their status, and their guilt or innocence - have all been seen as relevant for determining the appropriate treatment of the enemy. In this essay, I formulate an expanded version of the PD, which calls for the proportionate treatment of enemy subjects based on evaluations of all three of these criteria. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Following the Second Lebanon War (2006), the United Nations condemned Israel's use of cluster bombs and attacks on convoys as disproportionate. But the term 'proportionality' is ill defined, and disproportionate harm is often confused with unnecessary and intentional harm. Cluster bombs, for example, highlight unnecessary and intentional harm, not disproportionality. Attacks on convoys, however, may be disproportionate if harm to noncombatants is unintentional and necessary but excessive. 'Excessive' can be defined with an algorithm that compares enemy civilian deaths with the compatriot lives saved, or by a 'gut feeling' that an ordinary and sensible person has when the limits of proportionality are breached. Regardless of definition, disproportionate harm always poses a danger in asymmetrical conflicts where it is often difficult to distinguish combatants from noncombatants. In this environment, non-lethal weapons may offer parties to the conflict the capacity to gain their military objectives without causing disproportionate harm. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

One of the traditional requirements of jus in bello is that military action should be proportionate in the loss and injury caused to troops to the military objectives it secures. However, the ‘overwhelming force’ applied in two Gulf Wars has been criticised as disproportionate. This article suggests a criterion for judging whether force is proportionate by considering what those who enter the profession of arms might be expected to tolerate or to undertake. A tacit agreement between troops on each side is postulated, breaches of which count as unfair conduct, including cases of the disproportionate use of force. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We are grateful to Professors Nick Fotion, Bashshar Haydar and David L. Perry for their illuminating discussions of our paper, ‘Military ethics of fighting terror: An Israeli perspective’, published in the present issue of the Journal of Military Ethics. We also thank the editors of the Journal for allowing us to add the present response. Professors Fotion, Haydar and Perry raise many significant issues. We will, however, presently address just a few of them, leaving the discussion of the other interesting points to other occasions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Despite its preeminent position in the just war tradition, the concept of proportionality is not well understood by military leaders. Especially lacking is a realization that there are four distinct types of proportionality. In determining whether a particular resort to war is just, national leaders must consider the proportionality of the conflict, i.e., balance the expected gain or just redress against the total harm likely to be inflicted by the impending armed action. This proportionality consideration is called jus ad bellum proportionality. The second type of proportionality discussed is a continuing re-evaluation of the proportionality, taking into account the changing situation. The last true proportionality discussed is a consideration of hostile action taking during a conflict, or jus in bello proportionality. This consideration weighs the expected military gain of a particular action against the collateral damage and injuries that are expected from the act. Finally, the fourth category addressed is 'political proportionality', which is not a true proportionality consideration, but is rather self-interested deliberation on the possible political and military outcomes of actions. In some instances, it could be referred to as a measured response. A better understanding of proportionality in all its forms will help military leaders to give appropriate and moral advice on the potential resort to war, as well as on the conduct of military actions in war. The recent US war with Iraq in the spring of 2003 in defiance of the wishes of the majority of the UN Security Council, and especially with the potential for high noncombatant casualties in Baghdad, makes a discussion of the proper conduct of war even more poignant. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

While the origin and development of the just war tradition until the early modern period blended concerns, ideas, and practices from the moral, legal, political, and military spheres, from the mid-seventeenth century until the mid-twentieth it largely disappeared as a conscious source of moral reflection about war and its restraint. Beginning in the 1960s, however, American theologian Paul Ramsey initiated a recovery of just war thinking in a series of writings applying the principles of discrimination and proportionality, ideas he traced both to Augustinian theology and to natural law, to the debate over nuclear weapons and later to the Vietnam War. Ramsey's work directly engaged both theological and policy debate over military force, initiating lines of reflection that have since developed further and become increasingly institutionalized. This brief essay examines the nature of Ramsey's just war thought and its influence over the last 40 years. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]