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The increasing acceptance of lesbian couples in medically assisted reproduction has led to new, unusual requests. This paper discusses the request for egg transfer from one partner to the other. In the first part, different analogies (egg donation, embryo donation, surrogacy and mitochondrial replacement) are made in order to find out whether one of these can help us determine whether this procedure is acceptable. It is shown that there are major difficulties with all analogies. In the second part, two balances are developed between the medical risks and costs of in vitro fertilisation (IVF) and intrauterine insemination on the one hand and the medical risks of IVF and the psychosocial benefits on the other hand. The final conclusion is that the disadvantages of the procedure can be compensated by the psychosocial advantages and thus can be accepted. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Julian Savulescu has given clear expression to a principle--that of "procreative beneficence"--which underlies the thought of many contemporary writers on bioethics. The principle of procreative beneficence (PPB) holds that parents or single reproducers are at least prima facie obliged to select the child, out of a range of possible children they might have, who will be likely to lead the best life. My aim in this paper is to argue that prospective parents, just by dint of their being prospective parents, are in fact not obliged to act on PPB. That is, there is something about their filling the role of prospective parents that exempts them from selecting the child with the best life. I urge that it is more realistic to view prospective parents as bound by a principle of acceptable outlook, which holds that they ought not to select children whose lives will contain an unacceptable amount of suffering. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Although use of assisted reproduction techniques was examined by an ad hoc act in 2004 in Italy, there are many opposing views about ethical and economic implications of the technologies dealing with infertility and sterility problems. In this paper, the authors examine a recent judge's decision that ordered the removal and subsequent adoption of a 1-year-old child because her parents were considered too old to be parents. The couple had had recourse to heterologous artificial insemination abroad and decided to give birth in Italy. The judgement deals with and discusses the complex issue of the right to procreate in order to balance the opportunities offered by scientific progress with the unborn child's condition. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper focuses on one objection to the use of reproductive genetic technologies (RGTs): the argument known as the expressivist objection. According to this argument, the choice to use reproductive genetic technologies to prevent the birth of individuals with disabilities is an expression of disvalue for existing people with disability. Many have been persuaded by this impassioned perspective. This paper shows that this argument is misguided and so does not constitute a sound objection to the use of RGTs to prevent disability in future children. It first identifies some responses to the objection that may be sound but not completely convincing to proponents of the expressivist position. It then describes a thought experiment designed to demonstrate more clearly that choosing to use RGTs to prevent disability in future children does not convey a negative message about people who have disabilities. After describing a decision that clearly does not send such a message, the paper walks through a series of cases and shows how, despite differences that might seem to be morally relevant, each is morally equivalent to the previous one with respect to the extent that it expresses disvalue for such individuals. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since 2000, 11 human uterine transplantation procedures (UTx) have been performed across Europe and Asia. Five of these have, to date, resulted in pregnancy and four live births have now been recorded. The most significant obstacles to the availability of UTx are presently scientific and technical, relating to the safety and efficacy of the procedure itself. However, if and when such obstacles are overcome, the most likely barriers to its availability will be social and financial in nature, relating in particular to the ability and willingness of patients, insurers or the state to pay. Thus, publicly funded healthcare systems such as the UK's National Health Service (NHS) will eventually have to decide whether UTx should be funded. With this in mind, we seek to provide an answer to the question of whether there exist any compelling reasons for the state not to fund UTx. The paper proceeds as follows. It assumes, at least for the sake of argument, that UTx will become sufficiently safe and cost-effective to be a candidate for funding and then asks, given that, what objections to funding there might be. Three main arguments are considered and ultimately rejected as providing insufficient reason to withhold funding for UTx. The first two are broad in their scope and offer an opportunity to reflect on wider issues about funding for infertility treatment in general. The third is narrower in scope and could, in certain forms, apply to UTx but not other assisted reproductive technologies (ARTs). The first argument suggests that UTx should not be publicly funded because doing so would be inconsistent with governments' obligations to prevent climate change and environmental pollution. The second claims that UTx does not treat a disorder and is not medically necessary. Finally, the third asserts that funding for UTx should be denied because of the availability of alternatives such as adoption and surrogacy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Human reproductive cloning (HRC) has not yet resulted in any live births. There has been widespread condemnation of the practice in both the scientific world and the public sphere, and many countries explicitly outlaw the practice. Concerns about the procedure range from uncertainties about its physical safety to questions about the psychological well-being of clones. Yet, key aspects such as the philosophical implications of harm to future entities and a comparison with established reproductive technologies such as in vitro fertilization (IVF) are often overlooked in discussions about HRC. Furthermore, there are people who are willing to use the technology. Several scientists have been outspoken in their intent to pursue HRC. The importance of concerns about the physical safety of children created by HRC and comparisons with concerns about the safety of IVF are discussed. A model to be used to determine when it is acceptable to use HRC and other new assisted reproductive technologies, balancing reproductive freedom and safety concerns, is proposed. Justifications underpinning potential applications of HRC are discussed, and it is determined that these are highly analogous to rationalizations used to justify IVF treatment. It is concluded that people wishing to conceive using HRC should have a prima facie negative right to do so. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Addresses the broader ethical and scientific issues surrounding the debate over human cloning. Developments towards therapeutic cloning; Problems associated with using nuclear transfer in humnas as a research tool; Challenges overlooked by some supporters of human cloning in their writing for the general public.

This essay develops a framework for thinking about the moral basis for the commodification of human reproductive materials. It argues that selling and buying gametes and genes is morally acceptable although there should not be a market for zygotes, embryos, or genomes. Also a market in gametes and genes should be regulated in order to address concerns about the adverse social consequences of commodification. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

It has been suggested that future application of stem-cell derived gametes (SCD-gametes) might lead to the possibility for same-sex couples to have genetically related children. Still, for this to become possible, the technique of gamete derivation and techniques of reprogramming somatic cells to a pluripotent state (directly or via somatic cell nuclear transfer) would have to be perfected. Moreover, egg cells would have to be derived from male cells and sperm cells from female cells, which is believed to be particularly difficult, if not impossible. We suggest a more plausible scenario to provide same-sex couples with the possibility to parent a child who is genetically related to both parents. Although technical feasibility is an advantage (also in terms of safety), disadvantages are that cooperation of a donor of the opposite sex is still required and that the partners are genetically linked to the resulting child in a different degree. However, since in our scenario the donor's genetic contribution would not outweigh any of the parents' genetic contribution, this alternative route may ease the fear for a possible parental claim by the donor. Like many other applications in the field of infertility treatment, the goal to create SCD-gametes for reproductive purposes is largely based on the high value attributed to genetic parenthood. Although we believe that genetic relatedness is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for 'good' parenthood, we do believe that many people may consider our scenario a welcome alternative. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

There is a clear discrepancy in the way those who request medical assistance in pursuit of their reproductive choices are treated. On the one hand, women who request a sterilisation are urged to consider possible future regrets and are sometimes refused treatment in anticipation of such regrets. This is despite the fact that for all age ranges, the majority of women undergoing a sterilisation do not regret the decision. Moreover, women who are voluntarily childless are likely to have a happier and more gratifying life than parents. On the other hand, women who request fertility treatment are not urged to second guess their desire for parenthood. Although the fact that the probability of regret is expected to be higher in the former case than in the latter justifies this difference in treatment to a certain extent, the gap between the two different approaches is wider than it ought to be if we also take future well-being into consideration, instead of focussing exclusively on anticipated decision regret. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Third-party reproduction is a growing field, and an increasing body of literature considers the ethics of embryo donation. Due to the psychosocial complexities that generally accompany the donation and/or use of donor embryos, psychologists can play a pivotal role in these specialised fertility cases. While laws in the USA are in place to regulate the medical procedures involved in embryo donation, only unenforceable guidelines exist for psychologists specialising in fertility cases. The presentation of this case study aims to: (1) clarify the ethical concerns that fertility psychologists should consider in similar situations by assessing whether American Society of Reproductive Medicine (ASRM) and the American Psychological Association (APA) guidelines compete or complement one another within this case of embryo donation and (2) consider the interests, obligations and rights of all parties involved. Several principles, standards and guidelines that must be considered are described. Overall, the APA Ethics Code and the ASRM Guidelines appear to complement one another for most aspects of this case. Fertility psychologists should consider the clinical implications of the interests, rights and duties of all involved parties, including themselves. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Through the use of assisted reproductive technologies (ARTs), multiple children are born adding to worldwide carbon emissions. Evaluating the ethics of offering reproductive services against its overall harm to the environment makes unregulated ARTs unjustified, yet the ART business can move towards sustainability as a part of the larger green bioethics movement. By integrating ecological ethos into the ART industry, climate change can be mitigated and the conversation about consumption can become a broader public discourse. Although the impact of naturally made children on the environment is undeniable, I will focus on the ART industry as an anthropogenic source of carbon emissions which lead to climate change. The ART industry is an often overlooked source of environmental degradation and decidedly different from natural reproduction as fertility centres provide a service for a fee and therefore can be subject to economic, policy and bioethical scrutiny. In this article, I will provide a brief background on the current state of human-driven climate change before suggesting two conservationist strategies that can be employed in the ART business. First, endorsing a carbon capping programme that limits the carbon emissions of ART businesses will be proposed. Second, I will recommend that policymakers eliminate funded ARTs for those who are not biologically infertile. I will conclude the article by urging policymakers and all those concerned with climate change to consider the effects of the reproductive technologies industry in light of climate change and move towards sustainability. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Bioconservative commentators argue that parents should not take steps to modify the genetics of their children even in the name of enhancement because of the damage they predict for values, identities and relationships. Some commentators have even said that adults should not modify themselves through genetic interventions. One commentator worries that genetic modifications chosen by adults for themselves will undermine moral agency, lead to less valuable experiences and fracture people's sense of self. These worries are not justified, however, since the effects of modification will not undo moral agency as such. Adults can still have valuable experiences, even if some prior choices no longer seem meaningful. Changes at the genetic level will not always, either, alienate people from their own sense of self. On the contrary, genetic modifications can help amplify choice, enrich lives and consolidate identities. Ultimately, there is no moral requirement that people value their contingent genetic endowment to the exclusion of changes important to them in their future genetic identities. Through weighing risks and benefits, adults also have the power to consent to -- and assume the risks of -- genetic modifications for themselves in a way not possible in prenatal genetic interventions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Increasing globalisation and advances in artificial reproductive techniques have opened up a whole new range of possibilities for infertile couples across the globe. Inter-country gestational surrogacy with monetary remuneration is one of the products of medical tourism meeting in vitro fertilisation embryo transfer. Filled with potential, it has also been a hot topic of discussion in legal and bioethics spheres. Fears of exploitation and breach of autonomy have sprung from the current situation, where there is no international regulation of surrogacy agreements -- only a web of conflicting national laws that generates loopholes and removes safeguards for both the surrogate and commissioning couple. This article argues the need for evidence-based international laws and regulations as the only way to resolve both the ethical and legal issues around commercial surrogacy. In addition, a Hague Convention on inter-country surrogacy agreements is proposed to resolve the muddled state of affairs and enable commercial surrogacy to demonstrate its full potential. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Human reproductive cloning provides the possibility of genetically related children for persons for whom present technologies are ineffective. I argue that the desire for genetically related children is not, by itself, a sufficient reason to engage in human reproductive cloning. I show this by arguing that the value underlying the desire for genetically related children implies a tension between the parent and the future child. This tension stems from an instance of a deprivation and violates a general principle of reasons for deprivation. Alternative considerations, such as a right to procreative autonomy, do not appear helpful in making the case for human reproductive cloning merely on the basis of the desire for genetically related children. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses moral and political obstacle in human embryonic stem cell research (HESC). The first obstacle to consensus is that HESC research typically requires the destruction of human embryos in order to develop stem cell lines on which research can be done. The second obstacle to consensus is opposition to human cloning. Some HESC research involves therapeutic or research cloning, specifically somatic cell nuclear transfer, which is used in the development of stem cell lines.

In Australia and other countries, certain groups of women have traditionally been denied access to assisted reproductive technologies (ARTs). These typically are single heterosexual women, lesbians, poor women, and those whose ability to rear children is questioned, particularly women with certain disabilities or who are older. The arguments used to justify selection of women for ARTs are most often based on issues such as scarcity of resources, and absence of infertility (in lesbians and single women), or on social concerns: that it "goes against nature"; particular women might not make good mothers; unconventional families are not socially acceptable; or that children of older mothers might be orphaned at an early age. The social, medical, legal, and ethical reasoning that has traditionally promoted this lack of equity in access to ARTs, and whether the criteria used for client deselection are ethically appropriate in any particular case, are explored by this review. In addition, the issues of distribution and just "gatekeeping" practices associated with these sensitive medical services are examined. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Discusses critical issues in fetal ovary transplantation. Emotional repercussions for fetal mothers; Wisdom of procreational rights as opposed to the global population crisis.

The article offers news briefs related to medical ethics in Great Britain. The British Government has voted against the abolition of the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority (HFEA) and Human Tissue Authority (HTA). The Report of the Mid Staffordshire NHS Foundation Trust Public Inquiry has been published which aims to identify causes of appalling patient care from 2005 to 2008. "Prospect" magazine has released a special report about the impact of demographic changes on public funds.

Recently, several claims have been made that free provision of in vitro fertilisation (IVF) will boost our economy. This is premised on the assumption that people provide more in terms of tax and insurance than they consume in resources, leaving an overall gain. Even where these 'replacement' people are created by means of IVF, it is argued that the costs involved are easily offset by the financial contribution we can expect IVF-conceived adults to make to our economy. However, although it may be true that the creation of a new person constitutes an overall financial gain to the state, I question the degree to which the arithmetic involved is as simple as the reports suggest. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]