Search

This paper argues that social choice from among more than two feasible alternatives should not be based on social choice from two-alternative subsets. It considers in some detail the case where one alternative ties or beats every other alternative on the basis of simple majorities, and raises the question of whether such an alternative should be chosen. A condition of 'stochastic unanimity', introduced in this context, is shown to be incompatible with the simple majority rule when it can apply. This new condition plus a consideration of ties leads into a brief discussion of the use of individual expected utility in social choice theory. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines Caplow's model of coalitions in the triad and identifies several shortcomings. Retaining the basic structure of Caplow's arguments, it recasts the problem as one of interdependent rational decision making. The reformulation allows increased generality in several directions, including a more general notion of strength, relaxation of the additivity assumption about strength, and the adoption of probabilistic choice to allow predictions about the relative frequencies of the various coalitions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper presents a synthesis of the necessary and sufficient restrictions that insure a transitive group preference if majority rule is the aggregation procedure. We show the equivalence between transitivity and an extension of the condition of Condorcet which states that if an alternative receives a majority over every other, then it should be the social choice. This extension is equivalent to finding a solution to a system of linear inequalities. We use these inequalities to demonstrate that the recent work on restrictions of voter preferences can be derived from this Extended Condorcet Condition. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Markov chains with stationary transition probabilities have not proved satisfactory as a model of human mobility. A modification of this simple model is the 'duration specific' chain incorporating the axiom of cumulative inertia: the longer a person has been in a state the less likely he is to leave it. Such a process is a Markov chain with a denumerably infinite number of states, specifying both location and duration of time in the location. Here we suggest that a finite upper bound be placed on duration, thus making the process into a finite state Markov chain. Analytic representations of the equilibrium distribution of the process are obtained under two conditions: (a) the maximum duration is an absorbing state, for all locations; and (b) the maximum duration is non-absorbing. In the former case the chain is absorbing, in the latter it is regular. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]