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Temporal motivation theory (TMT) has been criticized for its static representation and neglect of the environment. In this paper, I develop goal sampling theory (GST) to appease these criticisms and extend our understanding of goal choices beyond momentary preferences and into dynamic updating and sampling behavior across time. GST draws from temporal motivational theory, sampling models of impression formation, and organizational theory on how the environment constrains behavior and situates aspects of each into a formal model of goal sampling. Doing so addresses the limitations of our prior thinking, introduces new concepts and predictions, and provides a mathematical framework that lends itself to computational modeling. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Raub and Snijders (1997) show that, under the assumption of S-shaped utility, conditions for cooperation in social dilemmas are more restrictive if outcomes represent losses than if outcomes represent gains. They neglected two interesting issues in their paper: conditions for cooperation in social dilemmas with both losses and gains as outcomes, and the effect of probability weighing on these conditions. In this paper it is shown that, under assumptions of Prospect Theory, conditions for cooperation are best if dilemmas include both positive and negative outcomes, and that these conditions improve with increasing loss aversion. Furthermore, it is shown that probability weighing can effect conditions to cooperate as well. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In a Markov chain model of a social process, interest often centers on the distribution of the population by state. One question, the stability question, is whether this distribution converges to an equilibrium value. For an ordinary Markov chain (a chain with constant transition probabilities), complete answers are available. For an interactive Markov chain (a chain which allows the transition probabilities governing each individual to depend on the locations by state of the rest of the population), few stability results are available. This paper presents new results. Roughly, the main result is that an interactive Markov chain with unique equilibrium will be stable if the chain satisfies a certain monotonicity property. The property is a generalization to interactive Markov chains of the standard definition of monotonicity for ordinary Markov chains. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The theory of decisional power of Hoede and Bakker is applied to representational systems in which all representatives of a certain group vote alike. An equivalent system is one in which a group is represented by one representative with a voting weight. The main theorem of this paper gives the optimal distribution of weights for such a system. As an example the distribution of seats in the european parliament of the european economic community is reconsidered. The effect of vetoes is discussed as well as other ways of voting towards inaction used for minority protection. The decrease in overall power is accompanied by a tendency towards greater equality of power. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper investigates bandwagon dynamics in social networks, using an extension of Granovetter's (1978) threshold model. The focus is on the pattern of social ties connecting actors with different participation thresholds. A benchmark model, in which actors' thresholds are similar to their neighbors' thresholds, is built from the principle of homophily. Computational experiments show that participation levels increase when network structure departs from pure homophily, such that actors have new neighbors with discrepant thresholds. Further increasing the heterogeneity of network neighbors causes the bandwagon effects to wane, however, suggesting that bandwagon dynamics are maximized when there is a balance of heterogeneity and homogeneity in social networks. This principle is consistent with insights from several empirical studies and consistent with the conclusions of other formal models. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In political systems and large organizations, ultimate decision makers are usually just a small subset of all actors in the social system, To arrive at acceptable decisions, decision makers have to take into account the preferences of other actors in the system. Typically preferences of more interested and more powerful actors are weighted heavier than those of less interested and powerful actors. This implies that the total average of an actor on the decision is determined by the combination of his power (his potential) and his interest (his willingness to mobilize his power). As the exact level of an actor's leverage is difficult to estimate for the other actors in the system, an actor is able to optimize his effects on outcomes of decisions by providing strategic information. In this papers, first an analytic solution is presented for the optimization of strategic leverage in collective decision making by one single actor. In this solution, the actor makes assumptions about the leverage other actors will show in decision making. Subsequently, the actor optimizes the outcomes of decisions by manipulating the distribution of his leverage over a set of issues. The analytic solution can be theoretically interpreted by decomposing the solution into three terms, the expected external leverage of the other actors on the issue, the evaluation of the deviance of the expected from the preferred outcome of the issue, and the restrictions on the distribution of leverage over the issues. The higher the expectation of the leverages the other actors will allocate to the issue, the less an actor is inclined to allocate leverage to the issue. The higher the evaluation of the deviance, the more an actor ts inclined to allocate leverage to the issue. This is restricted, however. by the required distribution of leverages over the issues. The researcher is able to manipulate these restrictions to investigate its consequences for the outcomes. In the next step, we investigate whether we can Find a Nash equilibrium if all actors optimize their leverage simultaneously. Under certain conditions, a Nash equilibrium can be found by an iterative process in which actors update their estimates on each other's leverages on the basis of what the other actors have shown in previous iterations. Application of the model to artificial data shows chat actors with strong preferences in the center have more possibilities to realize good outcomes than other actors. On the basis of an empirical application it is shown that a Nash equilibrium does not always arise after a large number of iterations unless actors have learning capabilities or arc severely restricted in their strategic behavior. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A minimal social situation is a game-like situation in which there are two actors, each of them has two possible actions, and both evaluate the outcomes of their joint actions in terms of two categories (say, success and failure). By fixing actors and actions and varying payoffs the set of 256 'configurations' is obtained. This set decomposes into 43 'structural forms', or equivalence classes with respect to the relation of isoniorphism defined on it. This main theorem and other results concerning related configurations (minimal decision situations) are derived in this paper by means of certain tools of group theory. Some extensions to larger structures are proved in the Appendix. In the introductory section after a brief explanation of the meaning given to the terms structure and isomorphism in mathematics (Bourbaki) it is shown how these terms can be used to formalize the concept of social form. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

There are a lot of studies on commons dilemma. But few studies succeed to formulate it adequately. Moreover, although there are some situations where the dilemma does not occur, these studies focuses only the case that the dilemma does occur. In the present paper, we formulate the commons dilemma as an N-person game and examine what situations our formulation represents. We show that there are six regions with respect to the value decrement induced by one additional animal and that commons dilemma does not occur in some of these regions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

M. Olson argues that large groups are less successful than small groups in achieving their common goals. In this paper, some problems in his explanation of this proposition are examined. We show that this proposition cannot necessarily be deduced from his own mathematical model of rational decision-making. Incentives for some individuals to contribute to the achievement of the group goal can increase as the group size increases. Moreover, Olsons discussion of suboptimality of the achievement of the group goal cannot be derived from his mathematical model. Examination of these difficulties suggests that, in order to explain better the relation of group size to the achievement of group interests, we must take into account the interdependence among individual decision-makers. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper extends the Brownian motion model for a decision making process that was developed in (Romanow, 1984). Several of the assumptions of the basic model are relaxed here. It is no longer assumed that performance is always observed, but rather that observation is intermittent. Models are developed for several different data collection schemes. The original model allowed two choice alternatives. Here, a third choice is included by considering a model in which a Brownian motion may cross either of two mutually exclusive boundaries. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper develops a Brownian motion model for a decision making process in which action is taken when a threshold criterion level is reached. The model is developed with reference to career mobility: it provides an explanation of an important feature of promotion processes in internal labor markets. Performance evaluation is central in this process. It is assumed that a decision maker wants to take a predetermined action when he believes that a salient attribute level equals some predetermined standard. The true attribute value is unobservable, therefore the decision maker estimates it by observing behavior, rating it, and using a time average of the performance score as his estimate of the underlying attribute. The model generates an inverse Gaussian waiting time distribution for the time until action is taken. Data on executive careers is examined and the model is found to fit the data well in comparison with the fits of alternative duration models. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper investigates a situation of decision-making under risk in which an individual must select one of three actions. Substantively, an electoral example in which a citizen must decide how and whether to vote in a two-candidate election is used to illustrate the argument. Only the value of the consequences of one action, which is to abstain from voting, is known. The expected values of voting for either candidate must be estimated based upon a sample of information. Specifically, we are interested in how one may decide when to stop gathering information and the behavioral consequences of that choice for the voting decision. The dependence of the voting decision on the original ambiguity and magnitude of the expected utilities and on the costs of information is also explored. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Exchange theory has recently assumed an important place in sociological theory. However, exchange theory takes as its problem how resources are distributed among actors, and does not consider the allocation of resources towards producing different outcomes of events. This paper defines the problem of collective decisions as how a collectivity uses its resources to produce outcomes as a result of exchange and allocation. A model is presented that includes actors, events, and resources and their relationships in terms of interests, requirements, and control. The concepts are given a mathematical interpretation in an extension of Coleman's exchange model. This approach allows examination of the relationships between the individual and collective levels of analysis; it leads to the expectation of certain consistencies at the aggregate level; and it allows consideration of the consequences of changes in the ways resources may be used to affect event outcomes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper focuses on the effect of performance evaluations on expectations about future performances: given a situation where two persons know the evaluations they receive at each step of a series of performances, a process model is proposed to account for changes in their expectations as a function of the given evaluations. The approach consists of looking at the problem as a special case of information processing, and of using Bayes' theorem for the construction of the model. Thus, instead of asking about the effect on a person's expectations of a certain evaluation, we ask how a piece of evidence affects the subjective probability attached to a given hypothesis. A few illustrative runs are presented and discussed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper, consisting of two parts, presents an analysis of the current state of Markov model building for intragenerational occupational mobility. Part 1 examined models of careers; Part 2 analyzes models of continuously operative job systems. In Part 2 we find considerable predictive power for the simple MC model of personnel flows and the job vacancy chain model. Major analytical work has extended in two primary directions: the theoretical conceptualization of job vacancies to further explicate the underlying causal structure of mobility and the use of control theory to shift the focus to manpower decision making and policy formulation. Moreover, the diversity, of job systems in which the models have been tested points to their general applicability. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A structural and algebraic theory of power in negatively connected exchange networks can be deduced from a few simple and plausible assumptions about how individuals make decisions. The model generates a set of equations. A typology of exchange networks follows from characteristics of the solution to these equations. There are four possibilities: the equations have a unique solution in which some positions have all the power; the equations have a unique solution in which all positions have equal power; the equations have an infinity of solutions, in which case power is undetermined by structural considerations; the equations have no solution, in which case power should be unstable. Various extensions of the model are proposed to deal with a wider variety of conditions than are normally examined in experiments on exchange networks. With little or no modification, the model can predict power when exchange relations are unequal in value, when positions vary in the number of exchanges in which they can participate, and when three or more participants are required for a transaction to occur. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The process of opinion formation leading to collective behavior in large groups is modeled with a probabilistic and statistical mechanical theory of micro-sociological behavior. By assuming that the probability of making a given decision is proportional to the number of people who have made the same decision, this theory of micro- interactions predicts the manner in which individuals will respond to groups, how groups will respond to individuals, and how minorities and majorities will respond to each other. In particular. the theory accurately predicts observations of chivalry, tip sizes, conformity, and gawking in groups. Guided by intuition of social behavior and analogies with physical theories, social forces and social temperatures have also been introduced as concepts relevant to group interactions. These parameters significantly improve the theory's fit to empirical data. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The research tested Laing and Morrison's myopic and hyperopic models for sequential, three-person coalition games when the goal is maximizing rank position. The myopic model assumes that people behave as if the present trial were the last, while the hyperopic model assumes that people behave as if the coalition formed on the present trial will continue forever. The experiment involved three different planning horizon conditions: an indefinite number of trials (the condition specified by Laing and Morrison for their models), one trial remaining, and eight trials remaining. Four different accumulated point totals were used: 300-250-50, 350-150-100, 250-200-150, and 225-200-175. In general, the myopic model was more successful than the hyperopic model, though neither model was especially accurate. Changes in the myopic model were proposed, and the difficulties in developing a theory of social decision making involving long range planning were discussed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A distinction is made between implicit and explicit group overlap in sociological data, and literature is briefly reviewed in terms of this distinction. The conclusion is drawn that for implicit overlap, the method of data analysis should use continuous input, while yielding output in a discrete form of (possibly overlapping) subsets. Such a method of clustering (ADCLUS) is presented briefly and is applied to the communication structure of a biomedical area of specialization. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We consider a model where the criminal decision of each individual is affected by not only her own characteristics, but also by the characteristics of her friends (contextual effects). We determine who the key player is, i.e., the criminal who once removed generates the highest reduction in total crime in the network. We propose a new measure, the contextual intercentrality measure, that generalizes the one proposed by Ballester, Calvó-Armengol, and Zenou (2006) by taking into account the change in contextual effects following the removal of the key player. We also provide an example showing that the key player can be different whether contextual effects are taken into account or not. This means that the planner may target the wrong person if it ignores the effect of the “context” when removing a criminal from a network. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Cooperation norms often emerge in situations, where the long term collective benefits help to overcome short run individual interests, for instance in repeated Prisoner's Dilemma (PD) situations. Often, however, there are different paths to cooperation, benefiting different kinds of actors to different degrees. This leads to payoff asymmetries even in the state of cooperation, and consequently can give rise to normative conflicts about which norms should be in place. This norm coordination problem will be modeled as a Battle of the Sexes game (BoS) with different degrees of asymmetry in payoffs. I combine the PD and the BoS to the 3 × 3 Battle of the Prisoner's Dilemma (BOPD) with several asymmetric cooperative and 1 noncooperative equilibria. Game theoretical and “behavioral” predictions are derived about the kind of norms that are likely to emerge under different shadows of the future and degrees of asymmetry and tested in a lab experiment. The experimental data show that game theory fairly well predicts the basic main effects of the experimental manipulations but “behavioral” predictions perform better in describing the equilibrium selection process of emerging norms. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Structural balance theory forms the foundation for a generalized blockmodel method useful for delineating the structure of signed social one-mode networks for social actors (for example, people or nations). Heider's unit formation relation was dropped. We re-examine structural balance by formulating Heider's unit formation relations as signed two-mode data. Just as generalized blockmodeling has been extended to analyze two-mode unsigned data, we extend it to analyze signed two-mode network data and provide a formalization of the extension. The blockmodel structure for signed two-mode networks has positive and negative blocks, defined in terms of different partitions of rows and columns. These signed blocks can be located anywhere in the block model. We provide a motivating example and then use the new blockmodel type to delineate the voting patterns of the Supreme Court justices for all of their nonunanimous decisions for the 2006-07 term. Interpretations are presented together with a statement of further problems meriting attention for partitioning signed two-mode data. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The decision to marry is one of the most critical decisions in young ladies' lives where wrong choices may have adverse effects. This study investigates this issue in developing countries using the small state of Kuwait as a manageable case study. This research utilizes the analytical hierarchy process (AHP) due to the multiplicity of objectives. Women from different ethnic, religious, and residential backgrounds were surveyed. The problem considers eight criteria and four alternatives (male candidates). It was found from the study that the most preferred criteria are personality, followed by marital status and religious status, respectively. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We are strongly supportive of Fossett's theoretical approach and modeling methodology, which uses computational methods to perform thought experiments that generate compelling insights into the enigma of persistent residential segregation in the U.S. We also agree with his theoretical results, which challenge the prevailing view among demographers that institutional discrimination is the essential cause. However, we think he did not go far enough. Fossett limited his analysis to a narrow region of the parameter space that corresponded to conditions observed in one city at one time. This precludes generalization to other times and places and exploration of theoretically motivated “what if” scenarios that trespass beyond the Detroit city limits. When we extended the parameter space, we noticed two interesting results. First, Fossett's “paradox of weak minority preferences” requires qualification. Disproportionate in-group preferences among minorities are indeed segregation-promoting, not integration-promoting, but they generally have less impact on segregation than the in-group preferences of the majority. Second, not only are exclusionary practices and institutional discrimination not necessary for segregation (as Fossett demonstrates), we show that in certain regions of the parameter space they are not even sufficient . [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Network ties are thought to be concurrent—one can “have” many friends at once, for instance—but their concrete enactment is largely serial and episodic, guided by priorities that steer a person from one encounter to the next. Further, dyadic encounters require that two people be simultaneously available to interact, creating the need for coordinated scheduling. Here I study the consequences of scheduling for network diffusion, using a computer simulation that interposes a scheduling process between a pre-existing network and instances of contagion. The pace and extent of diffusion are shown to depend upon the interaction of network topology, contagion rule (on first-contact versus at some threshold), and whether actors try to remedy past scheduling imperfections. Scheduling turns central actors into diffusion bottlenecks, but can also trigger early adoption by giving actors false readings on the status of their network alters. The implications of scheduling extend beyond diffusion, to other outcomes such as decision-making, as well as to network evolution. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Using dimes and pennies on a checkerboard, Schelling (1971, 1978) studied the link between residential preferences and segregational neighborhood patterns. While his approach clearly has methodological advantages in studying the dynamics of residential segregation, Schelling's checkerboard model has never been rigorously analyzed. We propose an extension of the Schelling model that incorporates economic variables. Using techniques recently developed in stochastic evolutionary game theory, we mathematically characterize the model's long-term dynamics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

French (1977), Harary (1959), and Abelson (1964) initiated a prominent line of social influence models to explain social norms or collective decisions from the structure of influence networks. These models fail to generate unstable decision dynamics, a phenomenon that can be observed in collective decision-making. To capture instability, we assume that decision-makers raise their level of salience to reduce expected losses from decision-outcomes. Our model generates persistently unstable outcome patterns under conditions related to the social network and to intolerance for expected losses. A 6-actor example reveals stable outcomes for low intolerance, complex oscillations for intermediate levels of intolerance, and simple and regular oscillation for high intolerance. We discuss implications for the predictability of collective decision-making. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Emphasizing the social effect of contribution to pollution is not very effective persuasion to prevent pollution. In order to explain why this is the case, we use our modified version of Umino's (1985, 1990) social dilemma model of pollution to investigate how individuals perception of the harm of pollution affects the process and the outcome of their social decision-making. Our modified model introduces the assumption that each individuals perception of the harm of pollution is subject to Fechner's law. We show that the temptation for people to pollute the environment is independent of the actual amount of the harm created by a polluter but is dependent on the number of others who would contribute to pollution. We also examine the Pareto-optimality of the three possible equilibria in our model to find that people may perceive the problem of pollution as an N-person chicken game rather than an N-person prisoners dilemma. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

It is proposed that the decision making process is intrinsically formulative in nature; i.e., for the individual the crux of the process is in the development of a frame, a knowledge base, that can be used to make the decision, rather than the evaluation of the alternatives per se. A two stage model of decision making is forwarded. In the first stage the individual develops his frame. This is the critical, formulative, stage and dependent on the socio-cultural environment. In the second stage the individual makes a decision by evaluating his frame. This stage is mechanical, evaluative, and determined by the frame formulated during the first stage. A consequence of the basic thesis is that the social and cognitive processes can not be decoupled if we are to understand decision making behavior. However, there are few methods currently available that allow the researcher to look at the relationship between the social and the cognitive process. Herein, a set of methods that permit the researcher to look at this relationship are described and then applied to a particular case study. On the social side these methods are based on a network representation of social structure. On the cognitive side these methods are based on a set of semantic models of human knowledge. A set of cognitive models for representing information are presented - these include frames, maps, and knowledge bases. A set of programs, Frame Technology, for coding, manipulating, and analyzing frames, based on these models, are briefly described. The relationship between social structure and individual cognitive formulations for a group of undergraduates at MIT formulating the problem of selecting a new tutor is then examined using these programs. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this study, cultural, economic as well as certain crucial demo- graphic factors are considered as the determinants for projecting the average family size in rural India. We use the Analytic Hierarchy Process to analyze influences of the factors which enter implicitly in a rural couples decision-making to determine the number of children they want to have as time goes by. We did not attempt to make distinctions among the regional differences in rural India. The outcome projected in our analysis compares favor- ably with the results of other demographic studies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

One of the most popular individual choice models is the multinomial logit model (MLM). The basic hypothesis of the MLM is that an individual chooses an alternative among a set of alternatives avail- able to him by comparing the utilities of all the choices. The MLM is, however, limited in its usefulness because it doesn't account for the effects of the time factor and the social interactions between individuals. This work describes a dynamic extension of the MLM that allows for such interactions. The new model is formulated as an interactive continuous-time Markov process, and is approximated, for a large population, by a deterministic system. Some possible consequences of the interaction phenomena are discussed with a special binary choice model. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The concept of decisional power is introduced and compared with other measures for power like those of Shapley-Shubik, Banzhaf and Dahl. The sum of the powers of all actors in a social network is maximal for certain structures of the network. These structures are called completely democratic. Completely democratic structures are characterized. In every network dictator sets are present. These can be found by use of Boole polynomials. Decisional power turns out to have both a causal aspect and a utility aspect and to allow for variations that express the power over other persons as well as the power in a certain state of the network. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Approval voting, in contrast, allows voters to cast one vote for as many candidates as they deem acceptable for each office. As in other single ballot elections, the candidate for each office with the most votes is declared the winner, regardless of whether or not he or she receives votes from a majority. Under approval voting, however, the odds increase that winners in multicandidate elections will in fact receive votes from majorities of voters or that the winners will be condorcet candidates, that is, candidates who would win pairwise contests against any of their rivals. Moreover, approval voting encourages citizens to vote sincerely rather than strategically, as they can vote for all acceptable candidates, citizens need not abandon a more favored candidate for a less favored candidate just to prevent the election of their least favorite candidate. Even though approval voting is touted as a solution to the problem of electing candidates with majority support in multicandidate fields, most of the formal discussion and most of the examples are based upon voting in small groups.