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This paper investigates bandwagon dynamics in social networks, using an extension of Granovetter's (1978) threshold model. The focus is on the pattern of social ties connecting actors with different participation thresholds. A benchmark model, in which actors' thresholds are similar to their neighbors' thresholds, is built from the principle of homophily. Computational experiments show that participation levels increase when network structure departs from pure homophily, such that actors have new neighbors with discrepant thresholds. Further increasing the heterogeneity of network neighbors causes the bandwagon effects to wane, however, suggesting that bandwagon dynamics are maximized when there is a balance of heterogeneity and homogeneity in social networks. This principle is consistent with insights from several empirical studies and consistent with the conclusions of other formal models. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A minimal social situation is a game-like situation in which there are two actors, each of them has two possible actions, and both evaluate the outcomes of their joint actions in terms of two categories (say, success and failure). By fixing actors and actions and varying payoffs the set of 256 'configurations' is obtained. This set decomposes into 43 'structural forms', or equivalence classes with respect to the relation of isoniorphism defined on it. This main theorem and other results concerning related configurations (minimal decision situations) are derived in this paper by means of certain tools of group theory. Some extensions to larger structures are proved in the Appendix. In the introductory section after a brief explanation of the meaning given to the terms structure and isomorphism in mathematics (Bourbaki) it is shown how these terms can be used to formalize the concept of social form. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

There are a lot of studies on commons dilemma. But few studies succeed to formulate it adequately. Moreover, although there are some situations where the dilemma does not occur, these studies focuses only the case that the dilemma does occur. In the present paper, we formulate the commons dilemma as an N-person game and examine what situations our formulation represents. We show that there are six regions with respect to the value decrement induced by one additional animal and that commons dilemma does not occur in some of these regions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

M. Olson argues that large groups are less successful than small groups in achieving their common goals. In this paper, some problems in his explanation of this proposition are examined. We show that this proposition cannot necessarily be deduced from his own mathematical model of rational decision-making. Incentives for some individuals to contribute to the achievement of the group goal can increase as the group size increases. Moreover, Olsons discussion of suboptimality of the achievement of the group goal cannot be derived from his mathematical model. Examination of these difficulties suggests that, in order to explain better the relation of group size to the achievement of group interests, we must take into account the interdependence among individual decision-makers. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper develops a Brownian motion model for a decision making process in which action is taken when a threshold criterion level is reached. The model is developed with reference to career mobility: it provides an explanation of an important feature of promotion processes in internal labor markets. Performance evaluation is central in this process. It is assumed that a decision maker wants to take a predetermined action when he believes that a salient attribute level equals some predetermined standard. The true attribute value is unobservable, therefore the decision maker estimates it by observing behavior, rating it, and using a time average of the performance score as his estimate of the underlying attribute. The model generates an inverse Gaussian waiting time distribution for the time until action is taken. Data on executive careers is examined and the model is found to fit the data well in comparison with the fits of alternative duration models. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Exchange theory has recently assumed an important place in sociological theory. However, exchange theory takes as its problem how resources are distributed among actors, and does not consider the allocation of resources towards producing different outcomes of events. This paper defines the problem of collective decisions as how a collectivity uses its resources to produce outcomes as a result of exchange and allocation. A model is presented that includes actors, events, and resources and their relationships in terms of interests, requirements, and control. The concepts are given a mathematical interpretation in an extension of Coleman's exchange model. This approach allows examination of the relationships between the individual and collective levels of analysis; it leads to the expectation of certain consistencies at the aggregate level; and it allows consideration of the consequences of changes in the ways resources may be used to affect event outcomes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]