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Temporal motivation theory (TMT) has been criticized for its static representation and neglect of the environment. In this paper, I develop goal sampling theory (GST) to appease these criticisms and extend our understanding of goal choices beyond momentary preferences and into dynamic updating and sampling behavior across time. GST draws from temporal motivational theory, sampling models of impression formation, and organizational theory on how the environment constrains behavior and situates aspects of each into a formal model of goal sampling. Doing so addresses the limitations of our prior thinking, introduces new concepts and predictions, and provides a mathematical framework that lends itself to computational modeling. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Raub and Snijders (1997) show that, under the assumption of S-shaped utility, conditions for cooperation in social dilemmas are more restrictive if outcomes represent losses than if outcomes represent gains. They neglected two interesting issues in their paper: conditions for cooperation in social dilemmas with both losses and gains as outcomes, and the effect of probability weighing on these conditions. In this paper it is shown that, under assumptions of Prospect Theory, conditions for cooperation are best if dilemmas include both positive and negative outcomes, and that these conditions improve with increasing loss aversion. Furthermore, it is shown that probability weighing can effect conditions to cooperate as well. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper investigates bandwagon dynamics in social networks, using an extension of Granovetter's (1978) threshold model. The focus is on the pattern of social ties connecting actors with different participation thresholds. A benchmark model, in which actors' thresholds are similar to their neighbors' thresholds, is built from the principle of homophily. Computational experiments show that participation levels increase when network structure departs from pure homophily, such that actors have new neighbors with discrepant thresholds. Further increasing the heterogeneity of network neighbors causes the bandwagon effects to wane, however, suggesting that bandwagon dynamics are maximized when there is a balance of heterogeneity and homogeneity in social networks. This principle is consistent with insights from several empirical studies and consistent with the conclusions of other formal models. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In political systems and large organizations, ultimate decision makers are usually just a small subset of all actors in the social system, To arrive at acceptable decisions, decision makers have to take into account the preferences of other actors in the system. Typically preferences of more interested and more powerful actors are weighted heavier than those of less interested and powerful actors. This implies that the total average of an actor on the decision is determined by the combination of his power (his potential) and his interest (his willingness to mobilize his power). As the exact level of an actor's leverage is difficult to estimate for the other actors in the system, an actor is able to optimize his effects on outcomes of decisions by providing strategic information. In this papers, first an analytic solution is presented for the optimization of strategic leverage in collective decision making by one single actor. In this solution, the actor makes assumptions about the leverage other actors will show in decision making. Subsequently, the actor optimizes the outcomes of decisions by manipulating the distribution of his leverage over a set of issues. The analytic solution can be theoretically interpreted by decomposing the solution into three terms, the expected external leverage of the other actors on the issue, the evaluation of the deviance of the expected from the preferred outcome of the issue, and the restrictions on the distribution of leverage over the issues. The higher the expectation of the leverages the other actors will allocate to the issue, the less an actor is inclined to allocate leverage to the issue. The higher the evaluation of the deviance, the more an actor ts inclined to allocate leverage to the issue. This is restricted, however. by the required distribution of leverages over the issues. The researcher is able to manipulate these restrictions to investigate its consequences for the outcomes. In the next step, we investigate whether we can Find a Nash equilibrium if all actors optimize their leverage simultaneously. Under certain conditions, a Nash equilibrium can be found by an iterative process in which actors update their estimates on each other's leverages on the basis of what the other actors have shown in previous iterations. Application of the model to artificial data shows chat actors with strong preferences in the center have more possibilities to realize good outcomes than other actors. On the basis of an empirical application it is shown that a Nash equilibrium does not always arise after a large number of iterations unless actors have learning capabilities or arc severely restricted in their strategic behavior. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In a Markov chain model of a social process, interest often centers on the distribution of the population by state. One question, the stability question, is whether this distribution converges to an equilibrium value. For an ordinary Markov chain (a chain with constant transition probabilities), complete answers are available. For an interactive Markov chain (a chain which allows the transition probabilities governing each individual to depend on the locations by state of the rest of the population), few stability results are available. This paper presents new results. Roughly, the main result is that an interactive Markov chain with unique equilibrium will be stable if the chain satisfies a certain monotonicity property. The property is a generalization to interactive Markov chains of the standard definition of monotonicity for ordinary Markov chains. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A minimal social situation is a game-like situation in which there are two actors, each of them has two possible actions, and both evaluate the outcomes of their joint actions in terms of two categories (say, success and failure). By fixing actors and actions and varying payoffs the set of 256 'configurations' is obtained. This set decomposes into 43 'structural forms', or equivalence classes with respect to the relation of isoniorphism defined on it. This main theorem and other results concerning related configurations (minimal decision situations) are derived in this paper by means of certain tools of group theory. Some extensions to larger structures are proved in the Appendix. In the introductory section after a brief explanation of the meaning given to the terms structure and isomorphism in mathematics (Bourbaki) it is shown how these terms can be used to formalize the concept of social form. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

M. Olson argues that large groups are less successful than small groups in achieving their common goals. In this paper, some problems in his explanation of this proposition are examined. We show that this proposition cannot necessarily be deduced from his own mathematical model of rational decision-making. Incentives for some individuals to contribute to the achievement of the group goal can increase as the group size increases. Moreover, Olsons discussion of suboptimality of the achievement of the group goal cannot be derived from his mathematical model. Examination of these difficulties suggests that, in order to explain better the relation of group size to the achievement of group interests, we must take into account the interdependence among individual decision-makers. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

There are a lot of studies on commons dilemma. But few studies succeed to formulate it adequately. Moreover, although there are some situations where the dilemma does not occur, these studies focuses only the case that the dilemma does occur. In the present paper, we formulate the commons dilemma as an N-person game and examine what situations our formulation represents. We show that there are six regions with respect to the value decrement induced by one additional animal and that commons dilemma does not occur in some of these regions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The theory of decisional power of Hoede and Bakker is applied to representational systems in which all representatives of a certain group vote alike. An equivalent system is one in which a group is represented by one representative with a voting weight. The main theorem of this paper gives the optimal distribution of weights for such a system. As an example the distribution of seats in the european parliament of the european economic community is reconsidered. The effect of vetoes is discussed as well as other ways of voting towards inaction used for minority protection. The decrease in overall power is accompanied by a tendency towards greater equality of power. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper extends the Brownian motion model for a decision making process that was developed in (Romanow, 1984). Several of the assumptions of the basic model are relaxed here. It is no longer assumed that performance is always observed, but rather that observation is intermittent. Models are developed for several different data collection schemes. The original model allowed two choice alternatives. Here, a third choice is included by considering a model in which a Brownian motion may cross either of two mutually exclusive boundaries. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper develops a Brownian motion model for a decision making process in which action is taken when a threshold criterion level is reached. The model is developed with reference to career mobility: it provides an explanation of an important feature of promotion processes in internal labor markets. Performance evaluation is central in this process. It is assumed that a decision maker wants to take a predetermined action when he believes that a salient attribute level equals some predetermined standard. The true attribute value is unobservable, therefore the decision maker estimates it by observing behavior, rating it, and using a time average of the performance score as his estimate of the underlying attribute. The model generates an inverse Gaussian waiting time distribution for the time until action is taken. Data on executive careers is examined and the model is found to fit the data well in comparison with the fits of alternative duration models. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper investigates a situation of decision-making under risk in which an individual must select one of three actions. Substantively, an electoral example in which a citizen must decide how and whether to vote in a two-candidate election is used to illustrate the argument. Only the value of the consequences of one action, which is to abstain from voting, is known. The expected values of voting for either candidate must be estimated based upon a sample of information. Specifically, we are interested in how one may decide when to stop gathering information and the behavioral consequences of that choice for the voting decision. The dependence of the voting decision on the original ambiguity and magnitude of the expected utilities and on the costs of information is also explored. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Exchange theory has recently assumed an important place in sociological theory. However, exchange theory takes as its problem how resources are distributed among actors, and does not consider the allocation of resources towards producing different outcomes of events. This paper defines the problem of collective decisions as how a collectivity uses its resources to produce outcomes as a result of exchange and allocation. A model is presented that includes actors, events, and resources and their relationships in terms of interests, requirements, and control. The concepts are given a mathematical interpretation in an extension of Coleman's exchange model. This approach allows examination of the relationships between the individual and collective levels of analysis; it leads to the expectation of certain consistencies at the aggregate level; and it allows consideration of the consequences of changes in the ways resources may be used to affect event outcomes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper focuses on the effect of performance evaluations on expectations about future performances: given a situation where two persons know the evaluations they receive at each step of a series of performances, a process model is proposed to account for changes in their expectations as a function of the given evaluations. The approach consists of looking at the problem as a special case of information processing, and of using Bayes' theorem for the construction of the model. Thus, instead of asking about the effect on a person's expectations of a certain evaluation, we ask how a piece of evidence affects the subjective probability attached to a given hypothesis. A few illustrative runs are presented and discussed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper, consisting of two parts, presents an analysis of the current state of Markov model building for intragenerational occupational mobility. Part 1 examined models of careers; Part 2 analyzes models of continuously operative job systems. In Part 2 we find considerable predictive power for the simple MC model of personnel flows and the job vacancy chain model. Major analytical work has extended in two primary directions: the theoretical conceptualization of job vacancies to further explicate the underlying causal structure of mobility and the use of control theory to shift the focus to manpower decision making and policy formulation. Moreover, the diversity, of job systems in which the models have been tested points to their general applicability. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]