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The ACA created a new type of nonprofit health insurance entity, the "Consumer Operated and Oriented Plan" ("co-op"). Most of the newly created co-ops soon lost money, and only 4 of the original 23 remain. We interviewed key stakeholders and conducted in-depth case studies of 3 of these co-ops. We discovered that politicians and regulators made it unlikely the program could succeed, that most of the co-ops did not have the management capacity to overcome these political obstacles, and that even those with good managers lacked the needed fiscal resilience. We also considered lessons suggested for those proposing a newly created "public option." The main one is that a successful public option requires a supportive political environment, strong management, and significant fiscal capacity, none of which comes easily. A better route may be a quasi-public option in which the government subcontracts the operation of its newly created plan to a private firm. Although it is uncertain whether federal regulators have the capacity to hold such private for-profit firms accountable, pragmatism suggests that a combination of public-sector regulation and private-sector implementation may be the most direct path toward a US version of affordable universal coverage., (Copyright © 2020 by Duke University Press.)

The development of professional policy analysis was driven by a desire to apply "science" to policy decisions, but the vision of apolitical policy analysis is as unattainable today as it was at the inception of the field. While there is powerful evidence that schemes to "get around" politics are futile, they never seem to lose their popularity. The contemporary enthusiasm for health technology assessment and comparative-effectiveness research extends these efforts to find technical, bureaucratic fixes to the problem of health care costs. As the benefits and costs of health care continue to grow, so too will the search for analytic evidence and insights. It is important to recognize that the goal of these efforts should not be to eliminate but rather to enrich political deliberations that govern what societies pay for and get from their health care systems.

As the challenges of maintaining (or, in the US case, attaining) affordable universal coverage multiply, the debate about what constitutes "real" reform intensifies in Western health care systems. The reality of reform, however, lies in the eyes of myriad beholders who variously enshrine consumer responsibility, changes in payment systems, reorganization, and other strategies -- or some encompassing combination of all of the above -- as the essential ingredient(s). This debate, increasingly informed by the agendas of health services researchers and health policy analysts, arguably serves as much or more to becloud as to clarify the practical options policy makers face and remains severely imbalanced with respect to the institutional sectors on which it concentrates, the fields of knowledge on which it draws, and the roles it envisions for markets and the state.

Health inequalities and user financial incentives to encourage health-related behavior change are two topical issues in the health policy discourse, and this article attempts to combine the two; namely, we try to address whether the latter can be used to reduce the former in the contexts of the United Kingdom and the United States. Payments for some aspects of medical adherence may offer a promising way to address, to some extent, inequalities in health and health care in both countries. However, payments for more sustained behavior change, such as that associated with smoking cessation and weight loss, have thus far shown little long-term effect, although more research that tests the effectiveness of different incentive mechanism designs, informed by the findings of behavioral economics, ought to be undertaken. Many practical, political, ethical, and ideological objections can be waged against user financial incentives in health, and this article reviews a number of them, but the justifiability of and limits to these incentives require more academic and public discourse so as to gain a better understanding of the circumstances in which they can legitimately be used.

The 2010 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (P.L. 111-148), or ACA, requires that U.S. citizens either purchase health insurance or pay a fine. To offset the financial burden for lower-income households, it also provides subsidies to ensure that health insurance premiums are affordable. However, relatively little work has been done on how such affordability standards should be set. The existing literature on affordability is not grounded in social norms and has methodological and theoretical flaws. To address these issues, we developed a series of hypothetical vignettes in which individual and household sociodemographic characteristics were varied. We then convened a panel of eighteen experts with extensive experience in affordability standards to evaluate the extent to which each vignette character could afford to pay for one of two health insurance plans. The panel varied with respect to political ideology and discipline. We find that there was considerable disagreement about how affordability is defined. There was also disagreement about what might be included in an affordability standard, with substantive debate surrounding whether savings, debt, education, or single parenthood is relevant. There was also substantial variation in experts' assessed affordability scores. Nevertheless, median expert affordability assessments were not far from those of ACA.

We are at the beginning of an era in which the pressure to secure the biggest possible "bang" for the health care "buck" is perhaps higher than it ever has been, on both sides of the Atlantic, and within the health policy discourse, incentives, for both professionals and patients, are occupying an increasingly prominent position. In this article, we consider issues related to motivating the professional and the patient to perform targeted actions, drawing on some of the evidence that has thus far been reported on experiences in the United Kingdom and the United States, and we present an admittedly somewhat speculative taxonomy of hypothesized effectiveness for some of the different methods by which each of these two broad types of incentives can be offered. We go on to summarize some of the problems of, and objections to, the use of incentives in health and health care, such as those relating to motivational crowding and gaming, but we conclude by positing that, following appropriate consideration, caution, and methodological and empirical investigation, health-related incentives, at least in some contexts, may contribute positively to the social good.

Path dependence, a model first advanced to explain puzzles in the diffusion of technology, has lately won allegiance among analysts of the politics of public policy, including health care policy. Though the central premise of the model--that past events and decisions shape options for innovation in the present and future--is indisputable (indeed path dependence is, so to speak, too shallow to be false), the approach, at least as applied to health policy, suffers from ambiguities that undercut its claims to illuminate policy projects such as managed care, on which this article focuses. Because path dependence adds little more than marginal value to familiar images of the politics of policy--incrementalism, for one--analysts might do well to put it on the back burner and pursue instead "thick descriptions" that help them to distinguish different degrees of openness to exogenous change among diverse policy arenas.

The venerable but amorphous concept of stewardship has lately gained prominence in discussions of public policy and management and is sometimes offered as a "strategy" with a distinctive potential to mobilize effective public leadership in the service of broad social missions. In this article we explore how stewardship may be useful to the theory and practice of mental health policy, and, reciprocally, how examples from mental health policy may elucidate the dynamics of stewardship. After examining its key political ingredients--authority, advocacy, and analysis--we discuss the practical challenges in moving stewardship from moral inspiration to institutional reality.

Native American youth suffer disproportionately from a range of adverse health conditions. Empowering youth leaders to work on community-based solutions has proved effective in reducing tobacco use and gun violence and is now emerging as a promising approach to improving fitness and health. This article, based on direct observation and interviews with key informants, examines the implementation of a Robert Wood Johnson Foundation-funded project that gave tribal youth councils minigrants to design and run diverse projects that encourage physical activity in their communities. The article highlights the institutional challenges that confront health-promotion strategies for disadvantaged populations. Unless they take proper account of organizational, political, environmental, and cultural forces, funders' interventions have limited chances for success and sustainability.

The recent decline, indeed perhaps dismantling, of managed care is sometimes treated as both consequence and cause of the political reempowerment of medical providers, whose professional dominance managed care had challenged. Drawing evidence from Round III of the Community Tracking Study of the Center for Studying Health System Change, this article reviews the politics of four "arenas" of managed care regulation--prompt payment, mandated benefits, external appeals, and financial solvency--and concludes that the power of providers is contingent on patterns of coalition and conflict that differ across the discrete arenas. The zero-sum connotations of the "de" and "re" empowerment of providers under managed care fail to capture the subtlety of providers' search for fresh cultural, economic, and political resources in shifting policy contexts.

American health care reformers, who often look to other nations for models of desirable health systems, are often surprised nowadays by cross-national infatuation with health policy innovations minted in the United States. American innovations appeal to policy makers abroad as they struggle with cost pressures, distinguish knowledge about how health systems work, and deal with changing images of what constitutes good public policy. These strategems are adapted, not adopted; however, the premises and practices with which other nations follow American directions differ deeply from those in the United States. Ironically, even cross-national experiments may end up offering instructive policy "rules" to the exceptionalist United States.

For more than a decade students of health policy have predicted a revolution waged by corporate purchasers of health care who would rise in demand of public policy cures for increasing and burdensome health care costs. This forecast has been largely disappointed, however, as the business sector has remained oddly diffident in its demands for health policy reform. There are three reasons for business's reticence--the economic stakes of the corporate sector in health reform are uncertain, organizational encumbrances hamper business activism in this arena, and ideological convictions make business wary of governmental solutions. Although business is sometimes said to manipulate the policy process for its own material ends, in the health sphere the most likely road to reform may reverse this image: a newly activist federal government may have to mobilize business support for reforms that advance both corporate interests and larger social goals.

This article explores the changing corporate culture of New York's Blue Cross and Blue Shield plan in its first fifty years. As the plan grew, corporate culture evolved over four sequential phases: the plan first had the character of an experiment, then that of a movement, a business, and, most recently, a corporate agglomerate. Accompanying this evolution has been an identity crisis, as the need to adapt to a turbulent environment has challenged the plan's settled understanding of its core values, namely, voluntarism, community, and cooperation.

The ranks of the medically uninsured have grown significantly in recent years, but no consensus on a policy solution has emerged. After summarizing the characteristics of the uninsured population, this paper reviews diverse policy responses and their troubled political prospects.

For two decades administrators of Medicare have tried to reconcile the competing goals adopted by the program's political creators--meeting obligations to the beneficiaries of a social insurance system, maintaining peace with and the participation of providers, and protecting the federal budget. Administrative efforts to balance these objectives have evolved in three phases. The search of the late 1960s for measures to placate providers and win consensus among them, gave way in the early and mid-1970s to new organizations and programs (Professional Standards Review Organizations, capital expenditure review, and others) that would impose controls on the program at the state and local levels, which in turn have yielded to more centralized and direct strategies, notably the prospective payment system adopted in 1983. The new federal activism may be initiating a period of "technocratic corporatism," in which administrators and providers will engage in increasingly structured negotiations over the details of reimbursement policies.

Beginning in 1982 the Reagan administration tried to impose federal regulations (based on the civil rights approach of Section 504) on the medical treatment of handicapped newborns in the nation's hospitals. After issuing three sets of regulations, the administration found itself rebuffed by the courts and in ill repute with providers and parts of the public, especially after its widely publicized intervention in the case of Baby Jane Doe illustrated the pitfalls of federal regulation in complex medical decisions. Congress, however, soon enacted legislation employing different means to protect handicapped newborns. The episode offers insights into the dynamics of the U.S. system of separated powers, the limitations of the "civil rights" approach, and the importance of negotiating structures for the resolution of private moral dilemmas with public implications.

A brief review of the last decade or so of developments in health politics, policy and law suggests that health is no longer a field of mere "dynamics without change." Responding not only to economic strains but also to new conceptual challenges to the assumptions of the traditional medical model, in the 1970s and 1980s policy makers have launched various competitive and regulatory programs aimed mainly at containing costs. These interventions, however, have mainly sought savings through reductions in waste and inappropriate utilization; they have done little about deeper cost-increasing forces such as demographic trends, technology, and personnel patterns. Nor have these innovations on the cost side of the policy ledger been matched by action on the benefit side. Such changes await reconceptualization of the practical meaning of social justice and of the role of government in the health field.