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Nonprofit organizations may predominate when output quality is difficult to monitor. Hospital care has this characteristic. This study compared program cost and quality of care for Medicare patients hospitalized following onset of four common conditions by hospital ownership. Payments on behalf of Medicare patients admitted to for-profit hospitals during the first 6 months following a health shock were higher than for those admitted to other hospitals. With quality measured in terms of survival, changes in functional and cognitive status, and living arrangements, we found no differences in outcomes by hospital ownership. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study uses both risk-risk and risk-dollar approaches to assess intangible health losses associated with multiple sclerosis (MS). Using an estimation approach that adjusts for potential perceptional biases that may effect the expressed risk tradeoffs, we estimated parameters of the utility function of persons with and without MS as well as the degree of subjects" overestimation of the probability of obtaining MS. The sample included subjects from the general population and persons with MS. We found that marginal utility of income is lower in the state with MS than without it. However, the difference in marginal in two states was greater for persons without MS than for those with the disease. Persons with MS overestimated the probability of acquiring MS to a greater extent than did persons within MS. Correcting for overestimation of this probability, the value of intangible loss of a statistical case of MS derived from responses of the general population was US$350,000 to US$500.000. Persons with MS were willing to pay somewhat more than this (D80,118,J17). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In sum, although fixed dollar subsidies have the great virtue of ferreting out cross subsidies, society may not be satisfied with the results. The scenario described by Marquis is only one of many. People seem to want lifetime insurance offering low premiums if things go bad rather than premiums that change annually as health outcomes are realized [see, e.g., Light (1992)]. But nondiversible risk may be too great for a market in life contracts to exist.

This study examines alternative classification approaches for setting medical malpractice insurance premiums. Insurers generally form risk classification categories on factors other than the physician's own loss experience. Our analysis of such classification approaches indicates different but no more categories than now used. An actuarially-fair premium-setting scheme based on the frequency and severity of the individual physician's losses would substantially penalize adverse experience. Alternatively, premiums could be set for groups of physicians, such as hospital medical staffs. Our simulations suggest that even staffs at rather small hospitals may be large enough to be experience-rated.

This study investigates the effects of tax, regulatory, and reimbursement policies and other factors exogenous to the health insurance market on the relative price (to commercial insurers) paid by Blue Cross plans for hospital care, their administrative expense and accounting profits, premiums, and ultimately Blue Cross market share. We specify and estimate a simultaneous equation model to assess interrelationships among these variables. We conclude that premium tax advantages enjoyed by the Blues have virtually no effect on the Blues' premiums or their market shares. A Blue Cross plans' market share has a positive effect on the discount it obtains from hospitals as does coverage of Blue Shield charges by a state-mandated rate-setting plan. An upper bound on the effect on the Blue Cross market share of covering Blue Cross under rate-setting but excluding the commercials from such coverage is seven percentage points. Tests for administrative slack in the operation of Blue Cross plans yield mixed results.

This article investigates the impact of unions on the wages of hospital workers. Our OLS findings agree with previous OLS studies--unions increase registered nurses' (RNs) wages by five percent and by about eight to ten percent for other hospital workers. By contrast, we find (after correcting for selectivity bias in hospital unionization status) a direct union effect of about twenty percent on RN wages and in excess of thirty percent on wages of other hospital workers. While the results based on selectivity bias adjustments make us uneasy, we do not reject them out-of-hand. We also find indirect union effects (up to five percent) by other unionized occupations within a hospital and up to ten percent by other unionized hospitals in the local labor market. Prospective reimbursement programs have a negative impact on the wages of hospital workers but are only significant for non-unionized occupations. Our three empirical tests of monopsony all reject the view that monopsony is a factor in hospital wage-setting. Even considering the large union effects (based on selectivity bias adjustment), we conclude that unions have been a minor contributor to hospital cost inflation.

The study presents an empirical analysis of the diffusion patterns of five surgical procedures. Roles of payer mix, regulatory policies, physician diffusion, competition among hospitals, and various hospital characteristics such as size and the spread of technologies are examined. The principal data base is a time series cross-section of 521 hospitals based on discharge abstracts sent to the Commission on Professional and Hospital Activities. Results on the whole are consistent with a framework used to study innovations in other contexts in which the decisions of whether to innovate and timing depend on anticipated streams of returns and cost. Innovation tends to be more likely to occur in markets in which the more generous payers predominate. But the marginal effects of payer mix are small compared to effects of location and hospital characteristics, such as size and teaching status. Hospital rate-setting sometimes retarded diffusion. Certificate of need programs did not.

This paper provides estimates of the cost of equity and debt capital to for-profit and non-profit hospitals in the U.S. for the years 1972-83. The cost of equity is estimated using, alternatively, the Capital Asset Pricing Model and Arbitrage Pricing Theory. We find that the cost of equity capital, using either model, substantially exceeded anticipated inflation. The cost of debt capital was much lower. Accounting for the corporate tax shield on debt and capital paybacks by cost-based insurers lowered the net cost of capital to hospitals.