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Workers under 50 on average will spend 10-20% of their future hours working. So, assuming they value leisure time at the wage rate, the value of their lives is 5-10 times their future lifetime earnings. This value is close to values of life estimated by compensating wage differentials or willingness to pay. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Flat capitation (uniform prospective payments) makes enrolling healthy enrollees profitable to health plans. Plans with relatively generous benefits may attract the sick and fail through a premium spiral. We simulate a model of idealized managed competition to explore the effect on market performance of alternatives to flat capitation such as severity-adjusted capitation and reduced supply-side cost-sharing. In our model flat capitation causes severe market problems. Severity adjustment and to a lesser extent reduced supply-side cost-sharing improve market performance, but outcomes are efficient only in cases in which people bear the marginal costs of their choices. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

US hospital prices are rising again after years of limited growth. We analyze trends in hospital prices during a period of significant price growth (1999-2003) to assess whether hospitals that are part of multi-hospital systems were able to increase their prices faster than non-system hospitals. We find hospitals that were members of multi-hospital systems were able to increase their prices substantially more than comparable non-systems hospitals (34% for large systems and 17% for small systems). Further, we find that the systems effect is not confined to hospitals that have other system member hospitals in their local markets. One possible explanation is that hospitals belonging to non-local multi-hospital systems have improved their bargaining position vis-à-vis health plans.

Has the nature of hospital competition changed from a medical arms race in which hospitals compete for patients by offering their doctors high quality services to a price war for the patients of payors? This paper uses time-series cross-sectional methods on California hospital discharge data from 1986-1994 to show the association of hospital prices with measures of market concentration changed steadily over this period, with prices now higher in less competitive areas, even for non-profit hospitals. Regression results are used to simulate the price impact of hypothetical hospital mergers.

This paper analyzes claims data from the RAND Insurance Experiment, which were grouped into episodes of treatment. The insurance plans in the experiment have coinsurance and a cap on out-of-pocket spending. Using new statistical techniques to adjust for the increased sickliness of those who exceed the cap, the effects of coinsurance on cost per episode and number of episodes are estimated. Cost sharing reduced the number of episodes but had little effect on cost per episode. People in the experiment responded myopically as their current insurance status changed through the year. The price elasticity of spending was about -0.2 throughout the range of coinsurance studied. When data permit it, the study of episodes complements analyses of annual medical spending by revealing more about how decisions to spend are made within the year.

As part of the prospective payment system, the government pays 'outlier' payments for especially long or expensive cases. These payments can be viewed as insurance for the hospital against excessive losses. They mitigate problems of access and underprovision of care for the sickest patients, and provide additional payments to the hospitals that take care of them, thereby making payments to hospitals more equitable. This paper characterizes the outlier payment formulae that minimize risk for hospitals under any fixed constraints on the sum of outlier payments and minimum hospital coinsurance rate. We then simulate per-case payments for a policy that did not include any outlier payments, the current outlier policy, and several other policies that minimize risk subject to different coinsurance constraints. The current outlier policy achieves each of its goals to at least some extent, but more insurance could be provided without lessening attainment of the other goals. We also discuss some problems with the implementation of the current policy, such as its reliance on day outliers.

Observational studies of demand for mental health services showed much greater use by those with more generous insurance, but this difference may have been due to adverse selection, rather than in response to price. This paper avoids the adverse selection problem by using data from a randomized trial, the RAND Health Insurance Experiment (HIE). Participating families were randomly assigned to insurance plans that either provided free care or were a mixture of first dollar coinsurance and free care after a cap on out-of-pocket spending was reached. We estimate that separate effects of coinsurance and the cap on the demand for episodes of outpatient mental health services. We find that outpatient mental health use is more responsive to price than is outpatient medical use, but not as responsive as most observational studies have indicated. Those with no insurance coverage would spend about one-quarter as much on mental health care as they would with free care. Coinsurance reduces the number of episodes of treatment, but has only a small effect on the duration and intensity of use within episodes. Users appear to anticipate exceeding the cap, and spend at more than the free rate after they do so.