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We study competing hospitals' incentives for quality provision in a dynamic setting where healthcare is an experience good. In our model, the utility a patient derives from choosing a particular provider depends on a subjective component specific to the match between the patient and the provider, which can only be learned through experience. We find that the experience-good nature of healthcare can either reinforce or dampen the demand responsiveness to quality and the hospitals' incentives for quality provision, depending on two key factors: the shape of the distribution of match-specific utilities and the cost relationship between quality provision and treatment volume. We establish conditions under which ignoring the experience dimension of healthcare leads to inaccurate assessments of the competitiveness of hospital markets., (Copyright © 2024 The Author(s). Published by Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.)

Policymakers are increasingly interested in reducing healthcare costs and inefficiencies through innovative payment strategies. These strategies may have heterogeneous impacts across geographic areas, potentially reducing or exacerbating geographic variation in healthcare spending. In this paper, we exploit a major payment reform for home health care to examine whether reductions in reimbursement lead to differential changes in treatment intensity and provider costs depending on the level of competition in a market. Using Medicare claims, we find that while providers in more competitive markets had higher average costs in the pre-reform period, these markets experienced larger proportional reductions in treatment intensity and costs after the reform relative to less competitive markets. This led to a convergence in spending across geographic areas. We find that much of the reduction in provider costs is driven by greater exit of "high-cost" providers in more competitive markets.

Integration of health care services has been promoted in several countries to improve the quality and coordination of care. We investigate the effects of such integration in a model where providers compete on quality to attract patients under regulated prices. We identify countervailing effects of integration on quality of care. While integration makes coordination of care more profitable for providers due to bundled payments, it also softens competition as patient choice is restricted. We also identify circumstances due to asymmetries across providers and/or services under which integration either increases or reduces the quality of services provided. In the absence of synergies, integration generally leads to increases in quality for some services and reductions for others. The corresponding effect on health benefits depends largely on whether integration leads to quality dispersion or convergence across services. If the softening of competition effect is weak, integration is likely to improve quality and patient outcomes., (Copyright © 2024 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.)

We provide a model where hospitals compete on quality under fixed prices to investigate how hospital competition affects (i) quality differences between hospitals, and as a result, (ii) health inequalities across hospitals and patient severities. The answer to the first question is ambiguous and depends on factors related to both demand and supply of health care. Whether competition increases or reduces health inequalities depends on the type and measure of inequality. Health inequalities due to the postcode lottery are more likely to decrease if the marginal health gains from quality decrease at a higher rate, whereas health inequalities between high- and low-severity patients decrease if patient composition effects are sufficiently small. We also investigate the effect of competition on health inequalities as measured by the Gini and the Generalised Gini coefficients, and highlight differences compared to the simpler dispersion measures. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Many competitive health insurance markets adjust payments to participating health plans according to their enrollees' risk - including based on diagnostic information. We investigate responses of German health plans to the introduction of morbidity-based risk adjustment in the Statutory Health Insurance in 2009, which triggers payments based on "validated" diagnoses by providers. Using the regulator's data from office-based physicians, we estimate a difference-in-difference analysis of the change in the share and number of validated diagnoses for ICD codes that are inside or outside the risk adjustment but are otherwise similar. We find a differential increase in the share of validated diagnoses of 2.6 and 3.6 percentage points (3-4%) between 2008 and 2013. This increase appears to originate from both a shift from not-validated toward validated diagnoses and an increase in the number of such diagnoses. Overall, our results indicate that plans were successful in influencing physicians' coding practices in a way that could lead to higher payments. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Adverse selection in health insurance markets leads to two types of inefficiency. On the demand side, adverse selection leads to plan price distortions resulting in inefficient sorting of consumers across health plans. On the supply side, adverse selection creates incentives for plans to inefficiently distort benefits to attract profitable enrollees. Reinsurance, risk adjustment, and premium categories address these problems. Building on prior research on health plan payment system evaluation, we develop measures of the efficiency consequences of price and benefit distortions under a given payment system. Our measures are based on explicit economic models of insurer behavior under adverse selection, incorporate multiple features of plan payment systems, and can be calculated prior to observing actual insurer and consumer behavior. We illustrate the use of these measures with data from a simulated market for individual health insurance. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We examine selection incentives by health plans while refining the selection index of McGuire et al. (2014) to reflect not only service predictability and predictiveness but also variation in cost sharing, risk-adjusted profits, profit margins, and newly-refined demand elasticities across 26 disaggregated types of service. We contrast selection incentives, measured by service selection elasticities, across six plan types using privately-insured claims data from 73 large employers from 2008 to 2014. Compared to flat capitation, concurrent risk adjustment reduces the elasticity by 47%, prospective risk adjustment by 43%, simple reinsurance system by 32%, and combined concurrent risk adjustment with reinsurance by 60%. Reinsurance significantly reduces the variability of individual-level profits, but increases the correlation of expected spending with profits, which strengthens selection incentives. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

I develop a model of insurer price-setting and consumer welfare under risk-adjustment, a policy commonly used to combat inefficient sorting due to adverse selection in health insurance markets. I use the model to illustrate graphically that risk-adjustment causes health plan prices to be based on costs not predicted by the risk-adjustment model ("residual costs") rather than total costs, either weakening or exacerbating selection problems depending on the correlation between demand and costs predicted by the risk-adjustment model. I then use a structural model to estimate the welfare consequences of risk-adjustment, finding a welfare gain of over $600 per person-year. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Medicare beneficiaries are eligible for health insurance through the public option of traditional Medicare (TM) or may join a private Medicare Advantage (MA) plan. Both are highly subsidized but in different ways. Medicare pays for most of costs directly in TM, and subsidizes MA plans based on a "benchmark" for each beneficiary choosing a private plan. The level of this benchmark is arguably the most important policy decision Medicare makes about the MA program. Many analysts recommend equalizing Medicare's subsidy across the options - referred to in policy circles as a "level playing field." This paper studies the normative question of how to set the level of the benchmark, applying the versatile model developed by Einav and Finkelstein (EF) to Medicare. The EF framework implies unequal subsidies to counteract risk selection across plan types. We also study other reasons to tilt the field: the relative efficiency of MA vs. TM, market power of MA plans, and institutional features of the way Medicare determines subsidies and premiums. After review of the empirical and policy literature, we conclude that in areas where the MA market is competitive, the benchmark should be set below average costs in TM, but in areas characterized by imperfect competition in MA, it should be raised in order to offset output (enrollment) restrictions by plans with market power. We also recommend specific modifications of Medicare rules to make demand for MA more price elastic. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In many countries, general practitioners (GPs) are assigned the task of controlling the validity of their own patients' insurance claims. At the same time, they operate in a market where patients are customers free to choose their GP. Are these roles compatible? Can we trust that the gatekeeping decisions are untainted by private economic interests? Based on administrative registers from Norway with records on sick pay certification and GP-patient relationships, we present evidence to the contrary: GPs are more lenient gatekeepers the more competitive is the physician market, and a reputation for lenient gatekeeping increases the demand for their services. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper explores how provider and insurer market power affect which markets an insurer chooses to operate in. A 2011 policy change required that certain private insurance plans in Medicare form provider networks de novo; in response, insurers cancelled two-thirds of the affected plans. Using detailed data on pre-policy provider and insurer market structure, I compare markets where insurers built networks to those they exited. Overall, insurers in the most concentrated hospital and physician markets were 9 and 13 percentage points more likely to exit, respectively, than those in the least concentrated markets. Conversely, insurers with more market power were less likely to exit than those with less, and an insurer's market power had the largest effect on exit in concentrated hospital markets. These findings suggest that concentrated provider markets contribute to insurer exit and that insurers with less market power have more difficulty surviving in concentrated provider markets. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines the effect of choice architecture on Massachusetts' Health Insurance Exchange. A policy change standardized cost-sharing parameters of plans across insurers and altered information presentation. Post-change, consumers chose more generous plans and different brands, but were not more price-sensitive. We use a discrete choice model that allows the policy to affect how attributes are valued to decompose the policy's effects into a valuation effect and a product availability effect. The brand shifts are largely explained by the availability effect and the generosity shift by the valuation effect. A hypothetical choice experiment replicates our results and explores alternative counterfactuals. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Two hospitals compete for the exclusive services of health professionals, who are privately informed about their ability and motivation. Hospitals differ in their ownership structure and in the mission they pursue. The non-profit hospital sacrifices some profits to follow its mission but becomes attractive for motivated workers. In equilibrium, when both hospitals are active, the sorting of workers to hospitals is efficient and ability-neutral. Allocative distortions are decreasing in the degree of competition and disappear when hospitals are similar. The non-profit hospital tends to provide a higher amount of care and offer lower salaries than the for-profit one. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The implications of hospital quality competition depend on what type of quality affects choice of hospital. Previous studies of quality and choice of hospitals have used crude measures of quality such as mortality and readmission rates rather than measures of the health gain from specific treatments. We estimate multinomial logit models of hospital choice by patients undergoing hip replacement surgery in the English NHS to test whether hospital demand responds to quality as measured by detailed patient reports of health before and after hip replacement. We find that a one standard deviation increase in average health gain increases demand by up to 10%. The more traditional measures of hospital quality are less important in determining hospital choice. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We use the rollout of the five-star rating of nursing homes to study how private-pay prices respond to quality rating. We find that star rating increases the price differential between top- and bottom-ranked facilities. On average, prices of top-ranked facilities increased by 4.8 to 6.0 percent more than the prices of bottom-ranked facilities. We find stronger price effects in markets that are less concentrated where consumers may have more choices of alternative nursing homes. Our results suggest that with simplified design and when markets are less concentrated, consumers are more responsive to quality reporting. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We conduct a field experiment in 31 primary schools in England to test the effectiveness of different temporary incentives on increasing choice and consumption of fruit and vegetables at lunchtime. In each treatment, pupils received a sticker for choosing a fruit or vegetable at lunch. They were eligible for an additional reward at the end of the week depending on the number of stickers accumulated, either individually (individual scheme) or in comparison to others (competition). Overall, we find no significant effect of the individual scheme, but positive effects of competition. For children who had margin to increase their consumption, competition increases choice of fruit and vegetables by 33% and consumption by 48%. These positive effects generally carry over to the week immediately following the treatment, but are not sustained effects six months later. We also find large differences in effectiveness across demographic characteristics such as age and gender. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Reference pricing intends to reduce pharmaceutical expenditures by increasing demand elasticity and stimulating generic competition. We develop a novel model where a brand-name producer competes in prices with several generics producers in a market with brand-biased and brand-neutral consumers. Comparing with coinsurance, we show that reference pricing, contrary to policy makers' intentions, discourages generic entry, as it induces the brand-name producer to price more aggressively. Thus, the net effect of reference pricing on drug prices is ambiguous, implying that reference pricing can be counterproductive in reducing expenditures. However, under price regulation, we show that reference pricing may stimulate generic entry, since a binding price cap weakens the aggressive price response by the brand-name producer. This may explain mixed empirical results on the competitive effects of reference pricing. Finally, we show that reference pricing may be welfare improving when accounting for brand preferences despite its adverse effects on entry and prices. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We study gatekeeping physicians’ referrals of patients to specialty care. We derive theoretical results when competition in the physician market intensifies. First, due to competitive pressure, physicians refer patients to specialty care more often. Second, physicians earn more by treating patients themselves, so refer patients to specialty care less often. We assess empirically the overall effect of competition with data from a 2008–2009 Norwegian survey, National Health Insurance Administration, and Statistics Norway. From the data we construct three measures of competition: the number of open primary physician practices with and without population adjustment, and the Herfindahl–Hirschman index. The empirical results suggest that competition has negligible or small positive effects on referrals overall. Our results do not support the policy claim that increasing the number of primary care physicians reduces secondary care. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The effect of consumers’ compliance with nutritional recommendations is uncertain because of potentially complex substitutions. To lift this uncertainty, we adapt a model of consumer behaviour under rationing to the case of linear nutritional constraints. Dietary adjustments are derived from information on consumer preferences, consumption levels, and nutritional contents of foods. A calibration exercise simulates, for different income groups, how the French diet would respond to various nutrition recommendations, and those behavioural adjustments are translated into health outcomes through the DIETRON epidemiological model. This allows for the ex-ante comparison of the efficiency, equity and health effects of ten nutritional recommendations. Although most recommendations impose significant taste costs on consumers, they are highly cost-effective, with the recommendations targeting salt, saturated fat, and fruits and vegetables (F&V) ranking highest in terms of efficiency. Most recommendations are also economically progressive, with the exception of that targeting F&V. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Increasing the adoption of generic drugs has the potential to improve static efficiency in a health system without harming pharmaceutical innovation. However, very little is known about the timing of generic adoption and diffusion. No prior study has empirically examined the differential launch times of generics across a comprehensive set of markets, or more specifically the delays in country specific adoption of generics relative to the first country of (generic) adoption. Drawing on data containing significant country and product variation across a lengthy time period (1999–2008), we use duration analysis to examine relative delays, across countries, in the adoption of generic drugs. Our results suggest that price regulation has a significant effect on reducing the time to launch of generics, with faster adoption in higher priced markets. The latter result is dependent on the degree of competition and the expected market size. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract: This study assesses the impact of competition on quality and price in the English care/nursing homes market. Considering the key institutional features, we use a theoretical model to assess the conditions under which further competition could increase or reduce quality. A dataset comprising the population of 10,000 care homes was used. We constructed distance/travel-time weighted competition measures. Instrumental variable estimations, used to account for the endogeneity of competition, showed quality and price were reduced by greater competition. Further analyses suggested that the negative quality effect worked through the effect on price – higher competition reduces revenue which pushes down quality. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

We study the strategic relationship between hospital investment and provision of service quality. We use a spatial competition framework and allow investment and quality to be complements or substitutes in patient benefit and provider cost. We assume that each hospital commits to a certain investment before deciding on service quality, and that investment is observable and contractible while quality is observable but not contractible. We show that, under a fixed DRG-pricing system, providers' lack of ability to commit to quality leads to under- or overinvestment, relative to the first-best solution. Underinvestment arises when the price-cost margin is positive, and quality and investments are strategic complements, which has implications for optimal contracting. Differently from the simultaneous-move case, the regulator must complement the payment with one more instrument to address under/overinvestment. We also analyse the welfare effects of different policy options (separate payment for investment, higher per-treatment prices, or DRG-refinement policies). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract: Increasing evidence shows that hospital competition under fixed prices can improve quality and reduce cost. Concerns remain, however, that competition may undermine socio-economic equity in the utilisation of care. We test this hypothesis in the context of the pro-competition reforms of the English National Health Service progressively introduced from 2004 to 2006. We use a panel of 32,482 English small areas followed from 2003 to 2008 and a difference in differences approach. The effect of competition on equity is identified by the interaction between market structure, small area income deprivation and year. We find a negative association between market competition and elective admissions in deprived areas. The effect of pro-competition reform was to reduce this negative association slightly, suggesting that competition did not undermine equity. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

Abstract: We present a Hotelling model of price and advertising competition between prescription drugs that differ in quality/side effects. Promotional effort results in the endogenous formation of two consumer groups: brand loyal and non-brand loyal ones. We show that advertising intensities are strategic substitutes, with the better quality drugs being the ones that are most advertised. This positive association stems from the higher rents that firms can extract from consumers whose brand loyalty is endogenously determined by promotional effort. The model''s main results on advertising and pricing strategies are taken to the data. The latter consists of product level data on prices and quantities, product level advertising data, as well as the qualitative information on drug quality contained in the Orange Book compiled by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA). The empirical results provide strong support to the model''s predictions. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

Abstract: The literature on mergers between private hospitals suggests that such mergers often produce little benefit. Despite this, the UK government has pursued an active policy of hospital mergers, arguing that such consolidations will bring improvements for patients. We examine whether this promise is met. We exploit the fact that between 1997 and 2006 in England around half the short term general hospitals were involved in a merger, but that politics means that selection for a merger may be random with respect to future performance. We examine the impact of mergers on a large set of outcomes including financial performance, productivity, waiting times and clinical quality and find little evidence that mergers achieved gains other than a reduction in activity. Given that mergers reduce the scope for competition between hospitals the findings suggest that further merger activity may not be the appropriate way of dealing with poorly performing hospitals. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

Abstract: This article investigates the determinants of the prices of pharmaceuticals and their impact on the demand for prescription drugs in the context of Taiwan''s pharmaceutical market where medical providers earn profit directly from prescribing and dispensing drugs. Based on product-level data, we find evidence that the profit-seeking behavior of the medical providers in the prescription drug market transfers the force of competition from the unregulated wholesale market to the regulated retail market and hence market competition still plays an important role in the determination of the regulated price. We also find that the profit-seeking behavior plays a similar role to advertising in that it increases the brand loyalty and hence lowers price elasticity. An important implication of our study is that the institutional features in the pharmaceutical market matter in shaping the nature of pharmaceutical competition and the responsiveness of pharmaceutical consumption with respect to changes in price. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

Abstract: In this paper, we examine the role of insurance coverage in explaining the generic competition paradox in a two-stage game involving a single producer of brand-name drugs and n quantity-competing producers of generic drugs. Independently of brand loyalty, which some studies rely upon to explain the paradox, we show that heterogeneity in insurance coverage may result in higher prices of brand-name drugs following generic entry. With market segmentation based on insurance coverage present in both the pre- and post-entry stages, the paradox can arise when the two types of drugs are highly substitutable and the market is quite profitable but does not have to arise when the two types of drugs are highly differentiated. However, with market segmentation occurring only after generic entry, the paradox can arise when the two types of drugs are weakly substitutable, provided, however, that the industry is not very profitable. In both cases, that is, when market segmentation is present in the pre-entry stage and when it is not, the paradox becomes more likely to arise as the market expands and/or insurance companies decrease deductibles applied on the purchase of generic drugs. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

Abstract: A necessary condition for competition to promote quality in hospital markets is that patients are sensitive to differences in hospital quality. In this paper we examine the relationship between hospital quality, as measured by publicly available quality ratings, and patient hospital choice for angioplasty using individual claims data from a large health insurer. We find that Dutch patients have a high propensity to choose hospitals with a good reputation, both overall and for cardiology, and a low readmission rate after treatment for heart failure. Relative to a mean readmission rate of 8.5% we find that a 1%-point lower readmission rate is associated with a 12% increase in hospital demand. Since readmission rates are not adjusted for case-mix they may not provide a correct signal of hospital quality. Insofar patients base their hospital choice on such imperfect quality information, this may result in suboptimal choices and risk selection by hospitals. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

Abstract: By introducing n (>1) firms with infinite cross-price elasticity (i.e. generic drugs), we explore the effects of competition on the optimal pricing strategies under a Reference Pricing Scheme (RPS). A two-stage model repeated infinite number of times is presented. When stage 1 is competitive, the equilibrium in pure strategies exists and is efficient only if the reference price (R) does not depend on the price of the branded product. When generics collude, the way R is designed is crucial for both the stability of the cartel among generics and the collusive prices in equilibrium. An optimally designed RPS must set R as a function only of the infinitely elastic side of the market and should provide the right incentives for competition. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

Abstract: New regulation of health insurance markets creates multiple levels of health plans, with designations like “Gold” and “Silver.” The underlying rationale for the heavy-metal approach to insurance regulation is that heterogeneity in demand for health care is not only due to health status (sick demand more than the healthy) but also to other, “taste” related factors (rich demand more than the poor). This paper models managed competition with demand heterogeneity to consider plan payment and enrollee premium policies in relation to efficiency (net consumer benefit) and fairness (the European concept of “solidarity”). Specifically, this paper studies how to implement a “Silver” and “Gold” health plan efficiently and fairly in a managed competition context. We show that there are sharp tradeoffs between efficiency and fairness. When health plans cannot or may not (because of regulation) base premiums on any factors affecting demand, enrollees do not choose the efficient plan. When taste (e.g., income) can be used as a basis of payment, a simple tax can achieve both efficiency and fairness. When only health status (and not taste) can be used as a basis of payment, health status-based taxes and subsidies are required and efficiency can only be achieved with a modified version of fairness we refer to as “weak solidarity.” An overriding conclusion is that the regulation of premiums for both the basic and the higher level plans is necessary for efficiency. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

Abstract: Income motivation among general practitioners (GPs) is frequently discussed in the health economics literature. The question addressed in the present study on reimbursement drugs and addictive drugs is whether increased competition among GPs, which is part of a declared health policy to improve efficiency, contributes to more prescriptions for the elderly. The dataset comprises registered data of all prescribed drugs dispensed at pharmacies from the Norwegian Prescription Database merged with data on GPs. In choosing a method, particular attention is given to the fact that patients tend to be attracted to GPs who fit their preferences. Hence, we treat the composition of the patient list as endogenous. The results indicate that the stronger competition a GP faces, the more drugs are prescribed, which implies that GPs’ prescription style may conflict with their role as gatekeepers, and even worse, it may be a hazard to patients’ health. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

Abstract: This paper estimates the effect of ambulatory surgical centers (ASCs) on hospital surgical volume using hospital and year fixed effects models with several robustness checks. We show that ASC entry only appears to influence a hospital''s outpatient surgical volume if the facilities are within a few miles of each other. Even then, the average reduction in hospital volume is only 2–4%, which is not nearly large enough to offset the new procedures performed by an entering ASC. The effect is, however, stronger for large ASCs and the first ASCs to enter a market. Additionally, we find no evidence that entering ASCs reduce a hospital''s inpatient surgical volume. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

Abstract: We examine the implications of policies to improve information about the qualities of profit-seeking duopoly hospitals which face the same regulated price and compete on quality. We show that if hospital costs of quality are similar then better information increases the quality of both hospitals. However, if the costs are sufficiently different improved information will reduce the quality of both hospitals. Moreover, even when quality increases, better information may increase or decrease patient welfare depending on whether an ex post or ex ante view of welfare is taken. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

Abstract: We investigate the effect of competition on quality in health care markets with regulated prices taking a differential game approach, in which quality is a stock variable. Using a Hotelling framework, we derive the open-loop solution (health care providers set the optimal investment plan at the initial period) and the feedback closed-loop solution (providers move investments in response to the dynamics of the states). Under the closed-loop solution competition is more intense in the sense that providers observe quality in each period and base their investment on this information. If the marginal provision cost is constant, the open-loop and closed-loop solutions coincide, and the results are similar to the ones obtained by static models. If the marginal provision cost is increasing, investment and quality are lower in the closed-loop solution (when competition is more intense). In this case, static models tend to exaggerate the positive effect of competition on quality. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

Abstract: Rankings and report cards have become a popular way of providing information in a variety of domains. I estimate the response to rankings in the hospital market and find that hospitals that improve their rank are able to attract significantly more patients. The average hospital in my sample experiences a 5% change in non-emergency, Medicare patient volume from year to year due to rank changes. These findings have implications regarding the competitiveness of hospital markets and the effect that the dissemination of quality information in hospital markets can have on individual choice. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

We investigate whether pairwise hospital consolidation leads to cost savings. We use a unified empirical methodology to assess both systems and mergers. Our comparison group for each consolidation consists of 10 ‘pseudo-mergers’ chosen based on propensity scores. Cost function estimates reveal that consolidation into systems does not generate savings, even after 4 years. Mergers in which hospitals consolidate financial reporting and licenses generate savings of approximately 14%: 2, 3, and 4 years after merger. The system consolidation and merger results are very robust to changes in the specification and the sample. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

The textbook model of monopsony that is typically employed in analyzing health insurer monopsony power does not adequately describe the supply decision of physicians confronting a dominant health insurer. Rather than restricting purchases in order to extract a lower price for provider services, monopsonistic insurers are able to obtain discounts from providers without experiencing a decrease in quantity when physicians are forced to operate along their "all-or-none" supply curve. The welfare effects of the all-or-none model of monopsony are compared to those implied by the traditional model. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Using the Grossman equilibrium concept, Neudeck and Podczeck [Journal of Health Economics 15 (1996) 387] show that imposing a minimum standard on a perfectly competitive insurance market can result in anti-competitive effects: decreased welfare with some insurers earning positive profits. However, the Grossman concept precludes an insurer from offering two separating, cross-subsidizing health plans. When an insurer can offer multiple plans (as under both the Nash and Miyazaki-Wilson equilibrium concepts), I show that minimum standards result in a doubleton equilibrium, never allow positive total profits, and increase welfare. This is of interest since in 1997 more than half of establishments in the US offering choice of multiple plans did so through a single insurer. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper traces the evolution of economists' views about risk segmentation in health insurance markets. Originally seen as a desirable goal, risk segmentation has come to be viewed as leading to abnormal profits, wasted resources, and inefficient limitations on coverage and services. We suggest that risk segmentation may be efficient if one takes an ex post view (i.e., after consumers' risks are known). From this perspective, managed care may be a much better method for achieving risk segmentation than limitations on coverage. The most serious objection to risk segmentation is the ex ante concern that it undermines long-term insurance contracts that would protect consumers against changes in lifetime risk. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A competitive market for individual health insurance tends to risk-adjusted premiums. Premium rate restrictions are often considered a tool to increase access to coverage for high-risk individuals in such a market. However, such regulation induces selection which may have several adverse effects. As an alternative approach we consider risk-adjusted premium subsidies. Empirical results of simulated premium models and subsidy formulae are presented. It is shown that sufficiently adjusted subsidies eliminate the need for premium rate restrictions and consequently avoid their adverse effects. Therefore, the subsidy approach is the preferred strategy to increase access to coverage for high-risk individuals. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We present a model of the physician-patient relationship extending on the model by Farley [Farley, P.J., 1986. Theories of the price and quantity of physician services. Journal of Health Economics 5, 315-333] of supplier-induced demand (SID). First, we make a case for the way this model specifies professional ethics, physician competition, and SID itself. Second, we derive predictions from this model, and confront them with the neoclassical model. Finally, we stress the importance of considering how SID affects patient welfare in providing an example where physicians' ability to induce makes patients better off. To evaluate patient welfare, we derive approximations of the patients' welfare loss due to physician market power in both the neoclassical model and the inducement model. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]