Search

Realistic credit risk assessment, the estimation of losses due to a debtors failure, is central for maintaining financial stability. Credit risk models focus on the financial conditions of borrowers and only marginally consider other risks from the real economy, supply chains in particular. Recent pandemics, geopolitical instabilities, and natural disasters demonstrated that supply chain shocks can contribute to financial losses large enough to threaten financial stability. Based on a unique nation-wide micro-dataset, containing practically all supply chain relations of all Hungarian firms, together with their bank loans, we develop a multi-layer shock propagation framework to estimate how economic shocks to firms cascade in the supply chain network (SCN), leading to additional financial losses to firms, additional defaults of loans and, hence, losses to banks' equity buffers. First, we estimate the financial systemic risk of individual firms, by quantifying the expected financial losses caused by a firm's own- and all the secondary defaulting loans caused by supply chain network contagion. We find a small fraction of firms carrying substantial financial systemic risk, affecting up to 22% of the banking system's overall equity (assuming a loss given default of 100%). These losses are predominantly caused by SCN-contagion. Second, we calculate for every bank the expected loss (EL), value at risk (VaR) and expected shortfall (ES), with and without SCN-contagion. We find that SCN-contagion amplifies EL, VaR, and ES by a factor of 5.2, 6.7 and 4.4, respectively. Third, we showcase how the new framework can be used to assess the risks of a large real economy shock for financial stability. We simulate the financial losses from a COVID-19 inspired shock calibrated from firm-level employment data in the beginning of 2020. Our simulations show that without any interventions, system-wide bank equity would suffer losses of 6%. The framework can be used to design and test targeted policy interventions, e.g., optimally providing firms with enough liquidity-support to avert their default. By supporting selected illiquid (yet solvent) firms with additional liquidity totalling 0.5% of overall bank equity, the losses can be reduced from 6% to 1% of overall bank equity. These findings indicate that for a more complete picture of financial stability and realistic credit risk assessment, SCN contagion needs to be considered. This now quantifiable contagion channel is of relevance for future systemic risk assessments of regulators. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper compares three methods for assessing the contagion of risk among ten Globally Significant International Banks, known as GSIBs, listed on the New York Stock Exchange with daily and weekly data sets from 2007 to 2020, based on Machine Learning and Network Analysis. In particular we identify the banks which are the largest net sources or transmitters of risk, and net receptors of risk. We also examine the response of regulatory actions, in the form of fines and BIS Bin Classification for capital adequacy. Under alternative risk measures, of Range Volatility (RV) of share prices, Credit Default Swap (CDS) premia, and Conditional Value at Risk (Δ CoVar), there is a stronger and significant connection between Contagion and the BIS Bin classifications relative to the connections between Contagion and banking fines, either in the amount or frequency of the fines. These results show that BIS bin classifications respond positively to underlying signals of increased contagion in the form of Range Volatility (RV) and Δ CoVar measures but not to CDS risk premia. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Financial regulation has introduced bail-ins (i.e. enforced debt-to-equity swaps) as a tool for orderly bank resolution, and hence it is the authorities' task to decide when to apply this tool in a resolution. We present a quantitative framework to support this decision by computing the systemic impact of a bail-in. Our model takes into account systemic feedback effects using state-of-the-art multilayer contagion models, which we extend to include liquidation losses. Using real-world data for the Austrian banking system, we perform an empirical assessment of the systemic risk impact of idiosyncratic and systemic shocks. Our results show that bail-ins have the potential to reduce systemic risk compared to insolvencies for the Austrian banking system. They also incur lower social cost than bail-outs, but only for moderate, idiosyncratic crises. Our findings quantitatively corroborate earlier discussions that bail-ins may be an inadequate tool to deal with systemic crises. This suggests that the bail-in mechanism alone may not be sufficient to rule out future bail-outs. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper we present a methodology of model-based calibration of additional capital needed in an interconnected financial system to minimize potential contagion losses. Building on ideas from combinatorial optimization tailored to controlling contagion in case of complete information about an interbank network, we augment the model with three plausible types of fire sale mechanisms. We then demonstrate the power of the methodology on the euro area banking system based on a network of 373 banks. On the basis of an exogenous shock leading to defaults of some banks in the network, we find that the contagion losses and the policy authority's ability to control them depend on the assumed fire sale mechanism and the fiscal budget constraint that may or may not restrain the policy authorities from infusing money to halt the contagion. The modelling framework could be used both as a crisis management tool to help inform decisions on capital/liquidity infusions in the context of resolutions and precautionary recapitalizations or as a crisis prevention tool to help calibrate capital buffer requirements to address systemic risks due to interconnectedness. • Unified framework for interbank contagion considering solvency and liquidity. • Optimal capital and liquidity infusions to minimize losses derived analytically. • Benefit of infusion non-linear in infusion amounts. • Methodology tested on real euro area interbank network and stress test results. • Motivation for application as crisis prevention or crisis management tool. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper studies the dynamics of contagion across the banking, insurance and shadow banking sectors of 18 advanced economies in the period 2006-2018. We construct Granger causality-in-risk networks and introduce higher-order aggregate networks and higher-order node centralities in an economic setting to capture non-Markovian network features. Our approach uncovers the dynamics of financial contagion as it is transmitted across segments of the financial system and jurisdictions. The calculated higher-order centralities identify sectors in distress as the nodes through which contagion propagates. The banking system emerges as the primary source and transmitter of stress while banks and shadow banks are highly interconnected. The insurance sector is found to contribute less to stress transmission in all periods, except during the global financial crisis. The proposed approach is able to identify clearly the sectors that are critical for the transmission of financial contagion, in contrast to the commonly used memoryless measures of network centrality. • We study financial contagion across banks, shadow banks and insurers of 18 advanced economies in the period 2006–2018. • We show the relevance of higher-order representations of temporal networks and higher-order node centralities. • Banks emerge as the main sources and transmitters of stress and are interconnected with shadow banks. • Contagion from the insurance sector mostly occurs during the global financial crisis. • Higher-order metrics can be used to more accurately identify systemic risk. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the midst of the unprecedented COVID-19 pandemic crisis, the scope of the current study is to outline the channels of shock propagation across sovereigns under these unprecedent conditions. We use a sample of European countries for a period of twelve years that encompasses the COVID-19 as well as the turbulent period of the European debt crisis. We apply Bayesian Vector Autoregressive techniques to show a dramatic increase in sovereign contagion during the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic, even higher than the increase recorded during the European Debt crisis. The result works through government response and containment measures. Extensive and severe detachment from any financial fundamentals is evident. The announcements of fiscal and monetary easing measures have eliminated the tension in the markets. When focusing on the period of the pandemic the impact of the national culture emerges through the channel of collectivism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper studies the country-level reaction of bank credit default swap ("CDS") spreads and stock prices to bailout announcements in the US and five European countries in October 2008. Bailouts announcements are associated with bank CDS spreads narrowing, both for domestic and foreign banks, pointing to an important role for cross-border exposures. Movements in bank stock prices show mixed reactions, both domestically and cross-border, with banks receiving favorable government support outperforming foreign rivals. By January 2010, bank CDS spreads had stabilized at higher levels reflecting greater default risk, while bank stock prices remained significantly below their pre-crisis levels. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Highlights • We incorporate feedback between the real and financial sector when estimating systemic risk. • We model determinants of the real sector that can impact the financial sector. • We find empirical evidence against diversification as a mean to reduce systemic risk. • Our work corroborates the importance of considering other contagion transmission channels besides the traditional interbank market. Abstract We simulate shocks to the real sector and evaluate how the financial system reacts and amplifies these events using unique Brazilian loan-level data between banks and banks and firms. Our analysis considers the feedback behavior that exists between the financial and real sectors through a micro-level financial accelerator. We find a strong "network effect" in which the network structure can either attenuate or amplify shocks from the real sector and thus plays a major role in contagion processes. We also find that government-owned banks are the most susceptible banks to receiving shocks from firms of any economic sector. There is empirical evidence to support the claim that more diversified portfolios of banks contribute to higher sector riskiness levels. Our results suggest that systemic risk models should account for the interconnectedness among economic agents—such as the interbank and real and financial sector linkages—in a multilayer approach. Overall, we show that the feedback between the real and financial sector matters in systemic risk estimation and most models that do not take into consideration could be severely underestimating systemic risk. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

U.S. supervisory stress tests to date have focused on the resilience of large banks to withstand the direct effects of credit and trading shocks. Using data from Depository Trust & Clearing Corporation (DTCC), we apply the Federal Reserve's Comprehensive Capital Analysis and Review (CCAR) supervisory scenarios to evaluate the default of a bank's largest counterparty. We find that indirect effects of this default, through the bank's other counterparties, may be larger than the direct impact on the bank. Further, when taken as a whole, the core banking system has a higher exposure concentration to a single counterparty than does any individual bank holding company. We find that the U.S. banking system's counterparty exposure concentration has risen over the 2013–2015 period. Under the 2015 CCAR this corresponds to a market diversity with just over three counterparties under stress. Our results are the first to evaluate the U.S. credit derivatives market under stress and underscore the importance of a macroprudential perspective on stress testing. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

An interdependent network coupling financial institutions’ multiplex (i.e. multi-layer) and financial market infrastructures’ single-layer networks gives a more accurate picture of a financial system's true connective architecture. We examine and compare the main properties of Colombian multiplex and interdependent financial networks. Coupling financial institutions’ multiplex networks with financial market infrastructures’ networks removes modularity, which augments financial instability because the network then fails to isolate feedbacks and limit cascades while it retains its robust-yet-fragile features. Moreover, our analysis highlights the relevance of infrastructure-related systemic risk, corresponding to the effects caused by the improper functioning of financial market infrastructures or by financial market infrastructures acting as conduits for contagion. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Financial networks have shown to be important in understanding systemic events in credit markets. In this paper, we investigate how the structure of those networks can affect the capacity of regulators to assess the level of systemic risk. We introduce a model to compute the individual and systemic probability of default in a system of banks connected in a generic network of credit contracts and exposed to external shocks with a generic correlation structure. Even in the presence of complete knowledge, we identify conditions on the network for the emergence of multiple equilibria. Multiple equilibria give rise to uncertainty in the determination of the default probability. We show how this uncertainty can affect the estimation of systemic risk in terms of expected losses. We further quantify the effects of cyclicality, leverage, volatility and correlations. Our results are relevant to the current policy discussions on new regulatory framework to deal with systemic events of distress as well as on the desirable level of regulatory data disclosure. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper analyzes sovereign risk shift-contagion, i.e. positive and significant changes in the propagation mechanisms, using bond yield spreads for the major eurozone countries. By emphasizing the use of two econometric approaches based on quantile regressions (standard quantile regression and Bayesian quantile regression with heteroskedasticity) we find that the propagation of shocks in euro's bond yield spreads shows almost no presence of shift-contagion in the sample periods considered (2003–2006, Nov. 2008–Nov. 2011, Dec. 2011–Apr. 2013). Shock transmission is no different on days with big spread changes and small changes. This is the case even though a significant number of the countries in our sample have been extremely affected by their sovereign debt and fiscal situations. The risk spillover among these countries is not affected by the size or sign of the shock, implying that so far contagion has remained subdued. However, the US crisis does generate a change in the intensity of the propagation of shocks in the eurozone between the 2003–2006 pre-crisis period and the Nov. 2008–Nov. 2011 post-Lehman one, but the coefficients actually go down, not up! All the increases in correlation we have witnessed over the last years come from larger shocks and the heteroskedasticity in the data, not from similar shocks propagated with higher intensity across Europe. These surprising, but robust, results emerge because this is the first paper, to our knowledge, in which a Bayesian quantile regression approach allowing for heteroskedasticity is used to measure contagion. This methodology is particularly well-suited to deal with nonlinear and unstable transmission mechanisms especially when asymmetric responses to sign and size are suspected. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We analyze the time varying behavior of pure contagion effects between Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) government bond spreads before and during the subprime mortgage crisis and the EMU debt crisis. By conducting a rolling window analysis, we are able to monitor the evolution of pure contagion effects and the changing influence of exogenous factors over time. Importantly, this is done without an ex-ante specification of the contagion window. Hence, we are able to determine the exact timing of the start and end for the different contagion periods. In contrast to related studies, we use a slightly different definition of contagious events and show that this approach leads to different conclusions about the progression of the EMU debt crisis. First, the main sources of pure contagion in the later phase of the EMU debt crisis appear to be Italy and Spain and not Greece, Ireland and Portugal. Furthermore, we find that substantial contagion effects among EMU government bond spreads (caused by Ireland and Portugal) already arise during the subprime mortgage crisis and not only during the EMU debt crisis, as one might expect. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Banks are typically exposed to spirals between liquidity scarcity and solvency risk. We build a network model of optimizing banks featuring contagion on both sides of balance sheets: runs on short term liabilities and banks’ liquidity hoarding induce liquidity freezes; fire sale externalities and interconnected debt defaults produce asset risk. We use the model, which is calibrated to European data via simulated method of moments, to study the effects of phase-in increases of liquidity coverage ratios. Interestingly we find that the systemic risk profile of the system is not improved and might even deteriorate. Based on those insights we propose an alternative approach: differential (across banks) application of coverage ratios based on a systemic importance ranking help to mitigate the externalities and deliver a much more stable system. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We propose an algorithm to model contagion in the interbank market via what we term the “credit quality channel”. In existing models on contagion via interbank credit, external shocks to banks often spread to other banks only in case of a default. In contrast, shocks are transmitted also via asset devaluations and deteriorations in the credit quality in our algorithm. First, the probability of default (PD) of those banks directly affected by some shock increases. This increases the expected loss of the credit portfolios of the initially affected banks’ counterparties, thereby reducing the counterparties’ regulatory capital ratio. From a logistic regression we estimate the increase in the counterparties’ PD due to a reduced capital ratio. Their increased PDs in turn affect the counterparties’ counterparties, and so on. This coherent and flexible framework is applied to the bilateral interbank credit exposure of the entire German banking system in order to examine policy questions. For that purpose, we propose to measure the potential cost of contagion of a given shock scenario by the aggregated regulatory capital loss computed in our algorithm. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Using an integrated model to control for simultaneity, as well as new risk measurement techniques such as Adapted Exposure CoVaR and Marginal Expected Shortfall (MES), we show that the aggregate systemic risk exposure of financial institutions is positively related to sovereign debt yields in European countries in an episodic manner, varying positively with the intensity of the financial crisis facing a particular nation. We find evidence of a simultaneous relation between systemic risk exposure and sovereign debt yields. This suggests that models of sovereign debt yields should also include the systemic risk of a country's financial system in order to avoid potentially important mis-specification errors. We find evidence that systemic risk of a country's financial institutions and the risk of sovereign governments are inter-related and shocks to these domestic linkages are stronger and longer lasting than international risk spillovers. Thus, the channel in which domestic sovereign debt yields can be affected by another nation's sovereign debt is mostly an indirect one in that shocks to a foreign country's government finances are transmitted to that country's financial system which, in turn, can spill over to the domestic financial system and, ultimately, have a destabilizing effect on the domestic sovereign debt market. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The contagion potential of mark-to-market accounting rules interacting with regulatory constraints is compared to that of funding constraints in a network of banks. The fair value accounting rules were amended at the height of the crisis to break the vicious link between allegedly irrational market prices and regulatory constraints. Anecdotal evidence from the recent crisis suggests that funding constraints posed more serious problems to banks than regulatory constraints. Simulation results show that, for low equity and high levels of short-term debt relative to liquid asset holdings, the contagion potential arising due to funding constraints is higher than the one due to accounting induced regulatory constraints. Allowing balance sheet valuation to affect the expectations about future insolvency, and implicitly, the roll-over decision of short-term creditors, can mitigate or amplify systemic risk depending on which contagion channel is dominating. These results could be interesting for a regulator wishing to achieve a trade-off between transparency, the main goal of fair value accounting, and financial stability. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this study, we test for the possible contagion effects of the 10-year Greek government bond yield. We first employ the well-documented adjusted correlation coefficient of Forbes and Rigobon (2002) and then we estimate an exponential generalized autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity model extended for volatility spillovers. Finally, we propose an extension of the corrected Dynamic Conditional Correlation (cDCC) model, which allows for structural breaks in the correlation dynamics. The suggested cDCC specification provides a natural testing framework for the correlation contagion hypothesis. Compared with other similar approaches, the proposed structural break cDCC approach allows for consistent inferences. The results do not confirm any contagious effects stemming from the 10-year Greek sovereign bond. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We study the connection between the global liquidity crisis and the severe credit crunch experienced by finance companies (SOFOLES) in Mexico using firm-level data between 2001 and 2011. Our results provide supporting evidence that, as a result of the liquidity shock, SOFOLES faced severely restricted access to their main funding sources (commercial bank loans, loans from other organizations, and public debt markets). After controlling for the potential endogeneity of their funding, we find that the liquidity shock explains 64 percent of SOFOLES’ credit contraction during the recent financial crisis (2008–2009). We use our estimates to disentangle supply from demand factors as determinants of the credit contraction. After controlling for the large decline in loan demand during the financial crisis, our findings suggest that supply factors (such as nonperforming loans and lower liquidity buffers) also played a significant role. Finally, we find that financial deregulation implemented in 2006 may have amplified the effects of the global liquidity shock. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper builds a network model to study the relation between financial stability and interconnectedness among banks. In the model, banks adopt a Value-at-Risk rule to determine capital ratios. It is shown that interconnectedness may hurt financial stability by amplifying the banks' mistakes of underestimating risk, and that interconnectedness increases systemic risk. The results in the paper suggest that financial integration may hurt financial stability, and that bank interconnectedness is more harmful when the economy turns abruptly from boom to recession. In addition, banks should be given incentives to reduce interconnectedness if systemic risk is a serious concern for regulators. • Bank interconnectedness amplifies the banks' mistakes of underestimating risk in capital decisions. • Bank interconnectedness increases systemic risk. • Financial integration may hurt financial stability. • Bank interconnectedness is more harmful when the economy turns abruptly from boom to recession. • Regulators should adopt policies to reduce bank interconnectedness if systemic risk is a serious concern for them. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We examine the connective architecture of the main Colombian payment and settlement systems in order to update what we know about local financial networks, and to elaborate on the main consequences for financial stability. Evidence suggests that local financial networks display a modular (i.e. clustered) scale-free (i.e. inhomogeneous) architecture. Results concur with other real-world networks, and propose new insights and challenges for authorities contributing to financial stability. For instance, (i) traditional reductionist assumptions for modeling financial systems (e.g. homogeneity) may be particularly misleading; (ii) the observed modular scale-free architecture favors robustness and resilience; (iii) the generating process of such architecture overlaps with literature on trading relationships; (iv) carelessly reducing inhomogeneity in financial systems may backfire in the form of a less robust and less resilient financial system; and (v) financial authorities should understand and take advantage of the existing architecture by means of designing and implementing macro-prudential regulation and system-calibrated requirements. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Highlights: [•] We use stock market and CDS data to examine the reaction to Lehman's collapse. [•] The most affected institutions were the surviving “non-bank” financial firms. [•] The negative effect was correlated with financial conditions of the surviving FIs. [•] We also detect significant abnormal jumps in the CDS spreads. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

Abstract: Carrying out interbank contagion simulations for the German banking sector for the period from the first quarter of 2008 to the second quarter of 2011, we obtain the following results: (i) The system becomes less vulnerable to direct interbank contagion over time. (ii) The loss distribution for each point in time can be condensed into one indicator, the expected number of failures, without much loss of information. (iii) Important determinants of this indicator are the banks’ capital, their interbank lending in the system, the loss given default and how equal banks spread their claims among other banks. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

Abstract: We explore the dynamics of default cascades in a network of credit interlink-ages in which each agent is at the same time a borrower and a lender. When some counterparties of an agent default, the loss she experiences amounts to her total exposure to those counterparties. A possible conjecture in this context is that individual risk diversification across more numerous counterparties should make also systemic defaults less likely. We show that this view is not always true. In particular, the diversification of credit risk across many borrowers has ambiguous effects on systemic risk in the presence of mechanisms of loss amplifications such as in the presence of potential runs among the short-term lenders of the agents in the network. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

Abstract: We analyse the effect of failing reinsurance cover on the stability of Dutch insurers. As insurers often reinsure themselves with other (re)insurers, a firm''s loss could spread contagiously through the sector. Using a unique and confidential data set on reinsurance exposures, we gain insight into the reinsurance market structure and perform a scenario analysis to measure contagion risks. Considering entities on a standalone basis, we find no evidence of systemic risk in the Netherlands, even if multiple reinsurance companies fail simultaneously. At group level our analysis points to the contagion risk of in-house reinsurance structures, given that such in-house reinsurance parties are generally not higher capitalised than other group members. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

Abstract: Researchers increasingly turn to counterfactual simulations to estimate the danger of contagion owing to exposures in the interbank loan market. This paper summarises the findings of such simulations, provides a critical assessment of the modelling assumptions on which they are based, and discusses their use in financial stability analysis. On the whole, such simulations suggest that contagious defaults are unlikely but cannot be fully ruled out, at least in some countries. If contagion does take place, then it could lead to the breakdown of a substantial fraction of the banking system, thus imposing high costs to society. However, when interpreting these results, one has to bear in mind the potential bias caused by the very strong assumptions underlying the simulations. Robustness tests indicate that the models might be able to correctly predict whether or not contagion could be an issue and, possibly, also identify banks whose failure could give rise to contagion. They are, however, less suited for stress testing or for the analysis of policy options in crises, primarily due to their lack of behavioural foundations. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

Abstract: This paper develops a new methodology for allowing researchers outside central banks to test the extent of payment system risk, and applies this methodology to an investigation of the impact that the introduction of real time gross settlement (RTGS) had on systemic risk in the Australian payments system. System-specific ratios are first developed to extract bilateral payment obligations from aggregate payments data in the Australian RTGS system. This synthetic data is then used to generate a deferred net settlement (DNS) system of similar dimensions to those the Australian system would have had, had RTGS not been introduced. Standard default simulation methodology is then applied to test the levels of systemic risk in both this system and the corresponding RTGS system to ascertain the degree to which the introduction of RTGS is likely to have reduced the level of risk. We find that while the level of systemic risk is likely to have been reduced in the Australian case, the size of the effect is small, a finding consistent with the results of payments system studies in other countries. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

Abstract: The Russian bond default in August 1998 and the long-term capital management (LTCM) recapitalization announcement in the following month represent an unusual period of volatility in international bond markets with bond spreads increasing dramatically across the globe. Using a latent factor model and a new data set spanning bond markets across Asia, Europe and the Americas, we quantify the contribution of contagion to the spread of these two crises. The maximum amount of contagion experienced by any of the countries investigated is about 17% of total volatility in bond spreads, with the main effects due to the Russian crisis. The results also show that both emerging and developed markets experienced contagion during the period. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

This paper analyses the evolution of the safety and soundness of the European banking sector during the various stages of the Basel process of capital regulation. We document the evolution of various measures of systemic risk as the Basel process unfolds. Most strikingly we find that the exposure to systemic risk as measured by SRISK has been steeply rising for the highest quintile, moderately rising for the second quintile, and remaining roughly stationary for the remaining three quintiles of listed European banks. This observation suggests that during the Basel process, systemic risk has been contained for the majority of European banks, but not for the largest and riskiest institutions. When analyzing the sources of systemic risk we find compelling evidence that the increase in exposure to systemic risk (SRISK) is tied to the implementation of internal models for determining credit risk, as well as market risk. Based on this evidence, the sub-prime crisis found especially the largest and more systemic banks ill-prepared and lacking resiliency. This condition has been aggravated during the European sovereign crisis. The Banking Union has not restored aggregate resiliency to pre-crisis levels. Finally, low-interest rates considerably affect the contribution to systemic risk, particularly for the riskier banks. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Systemic risk is a multi-layer network phenomenon. Layers represent various types of direct financial exposure of various types, including interbank liabilities and derivative- or foreign exchange exposures. An important layer of systemic risk emerges through common asset holdings of financial institutions. Strongly overlapping portfolios lead to similar exposures that are caused by price movements of the underlying financial assets. Based on the knowledge of individual portfolio holdings of financial agents, we quantify the systemic risk of overlapping portfolios. We then present an optimization procedure whereby we minimize the systemic risk in a given financial market by optimally rearranging overlapping portfolio networks. The optimization is performed under the constraints that the expected returns and risk of the individual portfolios are unchanged. We explicitly demonstrate the power of the method on the overlapping portfolio network of sovereign exposure between major European banks, using data from the European Banking Authority stress test of 2016. Systemic risk can be reduced by more than a factor of two, without any detrimental effects for the individual banks. These results are confirmed by a simple simulation of fire sales in the government bond market. In particular, we show that the contagion probability is dramatically reduced in the optimized network. We comment on the efficiency of the network optimization approach in comparison to equity-injection-based ways to reduce systemic risk. To obtain the same risk levels that are obtained in the network optimization, it would be necessary to increase the actual available capital by two thirds. This shows the immense potential of network-based systemic risk management. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

• New measure of banks' unfunded exposure to European sovereign debt ("missing capital"). • Co-movement between sovereign CDS spreads amplified by "missing capital". • Non-domestic sovereign risk spillovers to safer countries increasing bank risk. • Sovereign risk spillover lower if banks fund sovereign bond exposures with capital. European banks are exposed to a substantial amount of risky sovereign debt. "Missing capital" in the banking system resulting from the zero-risk weight exemption for European sovereign debt amplifies the co-movement between sovereign CDS spreads and facilitates cross-border crisis spillovers. Risks spill over from risky peripheral sovereigns to safer core countries, but not in the opposite direction nor for exposures to countries not exempted from risk-weighting. Unfunded non-domestic sovereign bond exposures primarily affect CDS spreads of non-GIIPS banks, while domestic sovereign-to-bank linkages are particularly important for GIIPS banks. Spillovers are attenuated when banks fund their sovereign bond exposures with capital. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Although the global financial crisis of 2008 took root in advanced economies, its shocks spread through emerging economies, reflecting the increasingly interconnected global financial system. In this paper, we test the contagion effect at the country level using bilateral data on bank claims between countries. Direct and indirect exposures of emerging economies to crisis countries are empirically measured by using bilateral foreign claims from the Bank for International Settlements, and whether these exposures matter for capital outflows from emerging economies is tested. The findings show that emerging market economies more exposed to banks in the crisis-affected countries, both directly and/or indirectly, suffered more capital outflows during the global financial crisis. We also find that an emerging economy's financial vulnerability can be influenced by its region's overall exposure to crisis countries, indicating contagion effects at the regional level. Evidence also suggests that same-region lenders exhibited more favorable behavior toward the regional borrowers during the crisis, with important policy implications. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

• Bail-in effectiveness looking at systemic risk and welfare costs to society. • Bail-in loss mitigation compared to that from bank liquidation. • Liquidation of D-SIBs: effects on credit lending to economic sectors. We investigate the effectiveness of bail-in mechanisms in mitigating systemic risk and welfare costs to society during resolution processes. To perform this study, we define a network model of mutually exposed banks and use it to simulate the effects of shocks to these banks using granular data of the Brazilian banking system, its interbank exposures and credit register operations. In the simulations, we compare the outcomes of these initial shocks after resolution processes with and without bail-ins. The simulations show that by avoiding the liquidation of banks and the resulting interruption in their credit provision, bail-ins would be effective in preventing the amplification of losses imposed on the real sector. Analyzing the effects that the liquidation of Brazilian Domestic Systemically Important Banks (D-SIBs) would cause to credit provision to economic sectors, we find bailing in these banks would produce a relevant decrease in credit crunches. However, in our sample, only a few banks could benefit from bail-ins due to insufficiency of bail-inable instruments. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]