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This article presents a discussion of E. M. Bernstein's paper about the financial problems of economic development. Bernstein discusses five facets of this problem: to decrease the size of the development program, to energize the inflow of foreign capital, to encourage domestic savings, to gather together the available resources, and to allocate the resources available to the private sector in a way that will stimulate the greatest increase in production. The author believes that this analysis leaves no room for argument.

The article presents a discussion of the research paper by Simon Kuznets on the difficulty of making an orderly pattern of long-term change and how it lies in the absence of an effective theory or even of a working hypothesis. The paper deals with economic forecasting. The reviewer presents an analogy to gross national product forecasting. Examined is the rise of the gross national product in 1953 and what it is forecasted to be in 1965. Also commented on is the annual capital increase in real Gross National Product.

The article presents a discussion of papers written by Norris Johnson and John Scanlon. These authors discuss economic forecasting from 1957 to 1967. Particular attention is given to how the demand for capital funds are crowding the supply during most of this period but not in such a manner as to give rise to major capital shortages. The author states that there is no proof positive way of assessing the reliability of the assumptions made in this paper or their implications for the adequacy of funds.

The article focuses on some of the problems developing countries face as it pertains to central banking. This study will briefly survey the role, problems, and the latency of central banks in developing countries, with some discussion of the methodology and techniques of monetary policy that have been utilized. In order to keep the paper's content manageable, no attention will be given to foreign exchange and payment policies, although these are taken care of by the central bank and are a significant aspect of monetary theory.

The author comments on the article "Commercial Banking in the Sixties," by Paul S. Nadler. The article centers on the over-all growth of the commercial banking system in the 1960s as compared with growth in the gross national product (GNP). According to Nadler, that commercial banking deposits will not grow as fast as GNP, which results in the conclusion that other financial institutions will necessarily grow more rapidly than commercial banks. The author explains that he agrees with Nadler's findings.

The purpose of the paper was to provide an objective and systematic appraisal of the capacity of black-owned commercial banks to finance economic development in the black community. This appeared to be a vital task at the time since these institutions were being formed at an accelerated rate with that specific aim in mind. On the basis of the evidence analyzed (virtually all of which was newly generated information available only through Federal bank supervisory agencies), I concluded that black banks were not viable instruments of economic development. However, I also concluded that they could perform some minor services of benefit to their local areas, and they could serve as symbols of black achievement. As an alternative source of financing, I proposed a domestic version of the existing Edge Corporations. These are subsidiaries of U.S. commercial banks formed for the purpose of conducting foreign financial activities. Among the latter, they can have varying amounts of equity investments in non-financial enterprises abroad. It was this feature which I thought offered promise as a means of expanding the availability of risk-bearing funds in black communities. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Given the tempo of this movement and the enormously important economic development role which the black banks are expected to undertake, it appears vital that an objective and systematic appraisal be made of the capacity of these institutions to perform this task. This paper is devoted to such an assessment. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses a financial framework for economic growth in the United States. The article presents a unified financial counterpart to a long-term economic projection. Based on assumptions of varying rates of growth, a set of projections of economic activity in 1970 is presented. A "judgment" model will be selected based on the results of the projections. The article then introduces a theoretical framework that links levels of economic and financial activity. By using the "judgment" model as a reference, the pattern of relationships will be applied to a projection of assets and liabilities for the individual components of the financial network.

The article presents commentary on the address "Long-Term Trends in the Financing of Regulated Industries, 1870-1950," by Melville J. Ulmer, "Trends in Capital Formation and Financing in Agriculture," by Alvin S. Tostlebee, and Sergei Dobrovolsky's "Capital Formation and Financing Trends in Manufacturing and Mining, 1900-1953," all included within the issue addressing the development of the U.S. capital market. The application of the historical data to the development of other countries is discussed, outlining implications of U.S. economic history on general financial theory.

This article presents a discussion about the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission's (SEC) Special Study, "Report of the Special Study of the Securities Markets of the Securities and Exchange Commission," by Irwin Friend, in which he distinguishes between the public interest and the protection of investors aspects of the securities acts. The author here supports Friend's criticism of the report, which is that it does not contain generally acceptable means for judging the performance of the securities markets.

Theoretical work on money and growth is a major forward step in the development of monetary theory as a part of economic theory. From these developments, we can expect to obtain a firmer foundation for social policy. Meanwhile, I believe we can accept some of the main policy conclusions--the advantages of permitting competitive banking, removing the prohibition against interest payments on demand deposits, and steady, or at least steadier, growth of money--on the basis or analysis that is much less restrictive and better validated than the theory used to establish the set of propositions we now call optimal monetary policy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In summary, the experience of the Credit Crunch of 1966 shows: 1. The Federal Reserve was trying to operate under a broad target of furthering economic growth by restricting overheated areas and aiding depressed ones, rather than maintaining a narrow target such as free reserves or money supply alone would have provided. 2. The Federal Reserve recognized that quantitative credit controls have qualitative impact and it was moving to more selective intervention to offset this. 3. The Federal Reserve was working to maintain the status quo in banking structure so that liability management by the major banks would not help the large banks grow larger while the small stagnated. Allowing the Credit Crunch of 1966 thus was no blunder on the part of the Reserve Authorities. Rather it was a new direction in monetary policy. For the large banks were trying to become immune to credit restraint through the new technique of liability management, and the Federal Reserve responded by developing new, broader, and more selective tools of its own. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The reception accorded the S.E.C. Special Study ranged from the vituperative to the lyrical. Interestingly enough, some of the more deprecatory comments came from academicians while some of the more glowing came from the financial community. On a previous occasion, together with a colleague, I indicated in some detail that perhaps the best-known of these criticisms--that by Professor Stigler attacking the ineptitude of the Special Study and the ineffectiveness of the S.E.C.--was without much foundation. As pointed out at that time, I consider the Special Study a competent and useful document and the S.E.C. a valuable and effective agency. Since the justification for this view has already been set forth at some length, it will not be necessary to repeat it here. The Special Study has already had a major and I think generally beneficial impact on the securities markets through new legislation, new regulations, and the intensified attention given both by the securities industry and the S.E.C. to the solution of both old and new problems. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article assesses financial innovation and structural change in the early stages of industrialization based on the experience of the financial sector in Mexico from 1945-1959. A description of a traditional economy is included as is the transformation by which such an economy can become a developing economy through alterations in the production function. There are five ways, the article states, for financing innovation in developing economies, including self-financing, tax increases, direct financing, government securities, and indirect financing.

The article discusses the policy acceptance in the U.S. of reliance on automatic fiscal stabilizers. The author provides a history of previous fiscal stabilizer studies. The author states that it is necessary to illustrate the potential incompatibility of an annually balanced budget that has economic stability. The article also discusses institutional changes which made automatic fiscal stabilizers more important and the acceptance of automatic fiscal stabilizers as part of government policy. An analysis of how the U.S. executive and legislative branch is involved is also provided.

The article discusses the method of control of capital issues adopted by Great Britain. The author states that an increasing number of economists have focused their interest on the problems associated with secular acceleration. These problems include a long-run tendency for planned investment to exceed planned savings, rather than on the main concern of the 1930's, which was secular stagnation. The article also discusses the scope of controls, the argument of the "bonus-issue," and problems with hiring and purchasing.

The article examines financial problems in underdeveloped countries and various conflicts associated with financing development programs in these regions. Developing an economy is more complex than simply incorporating a few businesses using modern methods of production. If economic development is to be meaningful, it must also have a change in attitudes towards production, consumption, saving and investment. Economic development needs social values that encourage business and technological innovations, while simultaneously causing expansion and growth. The author states that a major conflict for improved development is sociological.

The article discusses the promotion of economic growth for underdeveloped areas of the world through international co-operation. It is explained that the economic growth of underdeveloped nations of the world is stated to depend upon the fulfillment through international action of two conditions, which includes the provision of technique or know-how, and, second, the supplying of capital funds to the underdeveloped nations. The article focuses on the economic growth and assistance occurring in Venezuela.

This article focuses on investment prospects in the U.S. The article is the result of early research conducted by the Committee for Economic Development, but not a product of that body. The author discusses the immediate prospect of high employment and successful investment, then addresses concerns that the form of financing of investment may lead to depression and unemployment, and finally, addresses possible forms of investment financing that will successfully avoid depression and stagnation. The author presents strategies that will facilitate the flow of cash into equity as opposed to debt, including fiscal policy recommendations relative to tax structure and state and local regulations.