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People tend to underestimate how much income inequality exists. Much research has attributed this widespread underestimation to differential access to information, variance in exposure to inequality, or motivated attention to different aspects of inequality. In our research, we suggest that the motivation to believe that the current socioeconomic system is fair and legitimate (i.e., system justification) can shape how much inequality people see in the first place, leading them to perceive otherwise identical income gaps as smaller in magnitude. Across eight studies (N = 4113, including a pre-registered sample representative of the U.S. population on key benchmarks), we provide correlational and experimental evidence for a causal association between system justification and perceptions of the magnitude of income gaps. We examine the mediating role of fairness judgments and test this mechanism against other mediators. We also manipulate system justification mindset to test for its causal effect on perceptions of the magnitude of identical income gaps. We contrast the predictive ability of system justification with that of a related motive—social dominance orientation, showing preliminary evidence that system justification is a better predictor of how much inequality people perceive in contexts that do not overlay the economic inequality with intergroup inequality (e.g., racial inequality). Finally, across three of these studies, we assess policy related downstream consequences of the effect of system justification on perceived magnitude of inequality, providing evidence that this effect uniquely contributes to decreased support for redistributive policies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

When negative events occur (e.g., a breakup, a mass shooting), people naturally ask themselves why such things happen. Recent research has shown that more abstract thinking about negative events fosters less uncertainty about why those events happened. The present research examined a downstream consequence of this effect, namely, whether causal uncertainty activates a goal to think more abstractly. We drew on principles of goal activation, to show that after leading participants to feel more uncertain about a negative event, they were more likely to resume an experience that afforded an opportunity to think more abstractly (i.e., focusing on similarities rather than differences; Experiments 1A and 1B). In further support of our motivational framework, we also show that after leading participants to feel more uncertain about a negative event, they no longer exhibited a more positive attitude toward an experience that afforded an opportunity to think more abstractly once they had the opportunity to actually engage in more abstract thinking (Experiment 2). Theoretical and practical implications are discussed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract: Sexual orientation can be thought of as encompassing both actual sexual experience (e.g., behavior, attraction, fantasy) and beliefs about those experiences. We refer to those beliefs as self-perceived sexual orientation. We report the first experimental evidence that manipulating situational cues directly impacts self-perceived sexual orientation among heterosexually identified men and women. Across three studies that used distinct manipulations (both explicit and implicit), measured different outcomes, and sampled different ages, we found that cues of support for same-sex sexuality lead to self-perceived sexual orientation containing more same-sex sexuality than did cues of stigma against same-sex sexuality. We discuss the implications for understanding the role of factors outside of actual sexual experience in the development and maintenance of sexual orientation. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

Abstract: We examined whether people might distort and selectively remember the past in ways that enable them to sustain a belief in a just world (BJW; Lerner, M. J. (1980). The belief in a just world: A fundamental delusion. New York: Plenum Press). In Study 1, recall of a lottery prize reflected participants’ justice concerns, such that the average lottery amount recalled was lowest when a “bad” versus “good” person won. In Study 2, an unrelated experience of just world threat (versus affirmation) enhanced biased recall of the lottery prize when the winner was undeserving. In Study 3, participants who experienced a fortuitous bad break selectively remembered more bad deeds from their recent past, whereas participants who experienced a good break selectively remembered more good deeds. Study 4 demonstrates that such selective memory biases specifically serve to portray chance outcomes as more fair. Taken together, these findings offer support for the notion that reconstructing and selectively recalling the past can serve to sustain a BJW. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

Abstract: People are often motivated to reach self-serving conclusions during judgment. This article examines how such self-serving judgment outcomes are influenced by preferences for different judgment strategies. Two studies tested how preferences for eager (promotion-oriented) versus vigilant (prevention-oriented) judgment strategies affected self-serving explanations for success or failure. Regardless of their performance, those preferring vigilant strategies selectively endorsed a few explanations above others, whereas those preferring eager strategies more evenly endorsed multiple explanations. Furthermore, although the explanations selected by those preferring vigilant strategies were indeed self-serving (emphasizing personal responsibility for success and external circumstances for failure), the more balanced endorsement of multiple explanations by those preferring eager strategies was associated with attenuated self-serving tendencies. Finally, those preferring eager strategies were also less self-serving in their generalization from explanations of current performance to predictions of future performance. The larger implications of these findings for the role of strategic preferences in judgment are discussed. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

Abstract: Interpreting ambiguous situations is not a purely data-driven process but can be biased towards positive interpretations by top-down influences. The present study tries to identify the underlying processes of these top-down influences. There are two separable types of processes that can be influenced by motivational biases: A perceptual bias affects information uptake whereas a judgmental bias affects acceptance criteria for positive and negative outcomes. In the present study, motivated influences on perception and judgment were investigated with a simple color discrimination task in which ambiguous stimuli had to be classified according to their dominating color. One of two colors indicated a financial gain or a loss, whereas a third color was neutral. To separate perceptual and judgmental biases, Ratcliff’s [Ratcliff, R. (1978). A theory of memory retrieval. Psychological Review, 85, 59–108] diffusion model was employed. Results revealed motivational influences on perception and judgment. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]