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As a vital part of our daily lives, number processing has received much attention in current cognitive research. Most adults perceive with ease the numerical magnitude of a two-digit number and also the individual magnitudes of the component digits, yet the relation between the 2 is poorly understood. Application to two-digit numbers of Garner's speeded classification paradigm (Experiment 1) and of system factorial technology (Experiment 2) jointly reveals phases of independent and of coactive processing within a well-defined time-course. A new model, the interactive race coactive model, explains various facets of two-digit number processing. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2020 APA, all rights reserved).

The authors report the discovery of a new effect of context that modulates human resolving power with respect to an individual stimulus. They show that the size of the difference threshold or the just noticeable difference around a standard stimulus depends on the range of the other standards tested simultaneously for resolution within the same experimental session. The larger this range, the poorer the resolving power for a given standard. The authors term this effect the range of standards effect (RSE). They establish this result both in the visual domain for the perception of linear extent, and in the somatosensory domain for the perception of weight. They discuss the contingent nature of stimulus resolution in perception and psychophysics and contrast it with the immunity to contextual influences of visually guided action., ((c) 2016 APA, all rights reserved).)

We test the hypothesis that naming an object depicted in a picture and reading aloud an object's name are affected by the object's speed. We contend that the mental representations of everyday objects and situations include their speed, and that the latter influences behavior in instantaneous and systematic ways. An important corollary is that high-speed objects are named faster than low-speed objects, although object speed is irrelevant to the naming task at hand. The results of a series of 7 studies with pictures and words support these predictions., ((c) 2015 APA, all rights reserved).)

A series of 8 experiments investigated the association between pictorial and verbal representations and the psychological distance of the referent objects from the observer. The results showed that people better process pictures that represent proximal objects and words that represent distal objects than pictures that represent distal objects and words that represent proximal objects. These results were obtained with various psychological distance dimensions (spatial, temporal, and social), different tasks (classification and categorization), and different measures (speed of processing and selective attention). The authors argue that differences in the processing of pictures and words emanate from the physical similarity of pictures, but not words, to the referents. Consequently, perceptual analysis is commonly applied to pictures but not to words. Pictures thus impart a sense of closeness to the referent objects and are preferably used to represent such objects, whereas words do not convey proximity and are preferably used to represent distal objects in space, time, and social perspective.

A picture-word version of the Stroop task was used to test the automatic activation of psychological distance by words carrying various senses of psychological distance: temporal (tomorrow, in a year), social (friend, enemy), and hypotheticality (sure, maybe). The pictures implied depth, with the words appearing relatively close to or distant from the observer. The participants classified the spatial distance of words faster when the word's implicit psychological distance matched its spatial distance (e.g., a geographically close word was classified faster when it was "friend" than when it was "enemy"). The findings are consistent with the idea that psychological distance is accessed automatically, even when it is not directly related to people's current goals, and suggest that psychological distance is an important dimension of meaning, common to spatial distance, temporal distance, social distance, and hypotheticality.

The role of Stroop processes in the emotional Stroop effect was subjected to a conceptual scrutiny augmented by a series of experiments entailing reading or lexical decision as well as color naming. The analysis showed that the Stroop effect is not defined in the emotional Stroop task. The experiments showed that reading, lexical decision, and color naming all are slower with emotional words and that this delay is immune to task-irrelevant variation and to changes in the relative salience of the words and the colors. The delay was absent when emotional and neutral words appeared in a single block. A threat-driven generic slowdown is implicated, not a selective attention mechanism associated with the classic Stroop effect., (((c) 2004 APA, all rights reserved))

Parameters of the psychophysical function for loudness (a 1000-Hz tone) were assessed for individual subjects in three experiments: (a) binaural loudness summation, (b) temporal loudness summation, and (c) judgments of loudness intervals. The loudness scales that underlay the additive binaural summation closely approximated S. S. Stevens's (1956) sone scale but were nonlinearly related to the scales that underlay the subtractive interval judgments, the latter approximating Garner's (1954) lambda scale. Interindividual differences in temporal summation were unrelated to differences in scaling performance or in binaural summation. Although the exponents of magnitude-estimation functions and the exponents underlying interval judgments varied considerably from subject to subject, exponents computed on the basis of underlying binaural summation varied less. The results suggest that interindividual variation in the exponent of magnitude-estimation functions largely reflects differences in the ways that subjects use numbers to describe loudnesses and that the sensory representations of loudness are fairly uniform, though probably not wholly uniform, among people with normal hearing. The magnitude of individual variation in at least one measure of auditory intensity processing, namely, temporal summation, seems at least as great as the magnitude of the variation in the underlying loudness scale.

Children at three different ages made judgments of physically presented (perceptual estimation) or symbolically represented (memorial estimation) rectangles. Height and width were integrated according to different, age-dependent algebraic rules. Memorial data obeyed the same integration rules that operated in the original perceptual judgments even when younger children and older children used completely different combination models. Valuation operations were the same in perception and memory for the youngest group (6-year-olds) but became discriminably different at older ages (for the 8- and 10-year olds). Three additional experiments on judgments of volume, liquid quantity, and visual length yielded strong cross-validation support for the general invariance claim (with respect to integration rule theory) but less strong support for the specific invariance claim (with respect to valuation function for the 6-year-old subjects). Results are interpreted as demonstrating lawful and long-enduring ecological constraints on internal representation.

A series of five experiments used the method of magnitude estimation to assess how height and width are integrated in perceptual and in memorial judgments of area. Separate groups of subjects estimated the areas of perceived or remembered rectangles produced by a symmetrical 4 X 4 factorial design of height and width. Additional independent groups of observers made area judgments, based on special mixes of perceptual and memorial information referring to the height and width components of the to-be-judged rectangles. Both perceptual and memory data obeyed the bilinear interaction prediction of the normative multiplicative model. The relation between perceived and actual area as well as the relation between remembered and actual area could both be described by a compressive power function, with the exponent being reliably smaller for remembered than for perceived area. These results seem to imply a principle of integration rule invariance across perceptual and memorial estimates of a given set of stimuli, in conjunction with characteristically different valuation operations.