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Rationale, Aims, and Objectives: The disciplinary profile and the quality of production of knowledge on Corona pandemic is studied. This scientific field is called 'Medical Corona Science'. Methods: Criteria of analytical philosophy of science and science studies are systematically applied. Results: It is shown that mainly auxiliary medical disciplines such as virology and epidemiology but not clinical disciplines provide Corona knowledge. We see a laboratory‐centered, technology‐ and data‐driven science, largely ignoring clinical issues. Therefore we call these approaches "Medical Corona Science" (MCS). We see the need to adapt to features of a 'post‐normal science', a 'mode 2 science' and of 'Integration and Implementation Science', especially as clinical knowledge must be integrated. There is also a severe lack of theoretical considerations that could help to frame the pandemic as a complex dynamic system. Conclusions: We suggest a deeper meta‐scientific discussion of the epistemic value of MCS and propose the application of tools from systems science. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Rationale, aims and objectives: McHugh and Walker introduced a model of knowledge to demonstrate that EBM is a form of scientism that ignores important sources of knowledge thereby impairing the practice of medicine. We study the development of this model and explore additional applications. Methods: Review of the relevant literature and identification of possible areas for fruitful application. Results: We show that the McHugh and Walker model is closely related to the model of evidence considered earlier by Upshur et al. We also indicate that the utility of this model is not limited to showing scientism distorts clinical practice. Several representative applications are identified, including psychotherapy, the Salk polio vaccine trial, and the placebo effect. Conclusions: Priority should be given to Upshur et al for the development of a model that has far‐reaching application to medical epistemology. It is shown that all four of the types of evidence considered—qualitative/personal, qualitative/general, quantitative/general, and quantitative/personal—are required to adequately characterize epistemology in medical research and practice. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Making good decisions depends on having accurate information - quickly, and in a form in which it can be readily communicated and acted upon. Two features of medical practice can help: deliberation in groups and the use of scores and grades in evaluation. We study the contributions of these features using a multi-agent computer simulation of groups of physicians. One might expect individual differences in members' grading standards to reduce the capacity of the group to discover the facts on which well-informed decisions depend. Observations of the simulated groups suggest on the contrary that this kind of diversity can in fact be conducive to epistemic performance. Sometimes, it is adopting common standards that may be expected to result in poor decisions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper raises questions about the epistemological foundations of evidence-based medicine ( EBM). We argue that EBM is based upon reliabilist epistemological assumptions, and that this is appropriate - we should focus on identifying the most reliable processes for generating and collecting medical knowledge. However, we note that this should not be reduced to narrow questions about which research methodologies are the best for gathering evidence. Reliable processes for generating medical evidence might lie outside of formal research methods. We also question the notion of the knower that is assumed by EBM. We argue that EBM assumes an enlightenment conception of knowers as autonomous, substitutable individuals. This conception is troubled by the way that clinicians learn the role of anecdote in health care and the role of patient choice, all of which bring into play features of clinicians and patients as situated individuals with particular backgrounds and experiences. EBM's enlightenment conception of the knower is also troubled by aspects of the way evidence is produced. Given these limitations, we argue that EBM should retain its reliabilist bent, but should look beyond formal research methodologies in identifying processes that yield reliable evidence for clinical practice. We suggest looking to feminist epistemology, with its focus on the standpoints of individual situated knowers, and the role of social context in determining what counts as knowledge. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The authors comment on the article by Stephen Henry on the video elicitation study investigating tacit clues in doctor-patient interaction published within the journal. The authors cite two ways in which notion of tacit knowledge may be used, noting their objections on Henry's expression of Tacit Knowing, particularly referring to its semi-mysticism. The significant of trust in the doctor-patient relationship and the risk of assimilating tacit knowledge in clinical practice is examined.

Strand and Parkkinen criticize our dispositional account of causation in evidence-based medicine for failing to provide a proper epistemology of causal knowledge. In particular, they claim that we do not explain how causal inferences should be drawn. In response, we point out that dispositionalism does indeed have an account of the epistemology of causation, including counterfactual dependence, intervention, prediction and clinical decision. Furthermore, we argue that this is an epistemology that fits better with the known fallibility of even our best-informed predictions. Predictions are made on the basis that causes dispose or tend towards their effects, rather than guarantee them. The ontology of causation remains a valuable study for, among other reasons, it tells us that powers do not always combine additively. This counts against the monocausality that is tested by randomized controlled trials. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]