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Although formal childcare is considered a key social investment policy to combat inequality, available research indicates that in most European and other high-income countries parents with lower socio-economic positions are less likely to use formal childcare. As the literature on the underlying causes of this so-called Matthew effect has not yet converged, this article is the first to assess whether educational gradients in formal childcare uptake can be accounted for by micro-level employment potential and work–family attitudes in 14 European countries and Australia. Complementing available research on supply-side factors such as policy design features, this study indicates that a large part of the educational gradients in formal childcare uptake persist after controlling for socio-demographic background variables, employment potential, and work–family attitudes as micro-level predictors. However, this study also shows that a considerable part of the educational differentiation in formal childcare uptake reflects differential employment potential. This finding turns attention to policies other than childcare to enhance labour market outcomes for lower educated groups, which in turn might attenuate the Matthew effect in formal childcare. Furthermore, a positive relation between individual-level work–family attitudes and the uptake of formal childcare is also identified as a partial explanation for educational gradients in formal childcare uptake. Although the explanatory power of work–family attitudes as an underlying determinant of the Matthew effect is more limited compared to employment potential, such variation in the acceptance of maternal employment and formal childcare should also be considered in the design of inclusive work–family policies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines the impact of the two world wars on welfare legislation in 16 western countries. We use Poisson regressions to test our hypothesis that war was a catalyst of welfare legislation, especially in countries that were heavily exposed to the dreadful effects of war. By welfare legislation, we mean the inaugural adoption and major reforms across four programmes (old age and disability benefits, sickness and maternity benefits, unemployment compensation and family allowances). Our findings suggest that both world wars are key factors for explaining the timing of comprehensive welfare reforms and outweigh the significance of other factors such as regime type or level of economic development. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We often hear that the high unemployment rates of low-educated workers in Europe are due to the rigidities of the institutions increasing the labour costs that burden employers. In this article, we challenge this traditional view and offer alternative explanations to the cross-national variation in the employment rate of low-educated workers. Using macro-data and an error correction model, we analyse the determinants of the creation of jobs for low-educated workers in 19 countries between 1997 and 2010. Our findings tend to invalidate the neoliberal view, while also pointing to the positive impact of investing in public employment services and the predominant role of economic growth, which can be weakened by union density and employment protection in the case of male workers. Last but not least, creating low skill jobs has no or little impact on the employment outcomes of low-educated workers, thus indicating job displacement issues. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Measuring the power of the political left with the ‘share of social democratic cabinet seats’ is the gold standard in the literature on partisan effects. We argue that this measure of left power suffers from conceptual ambiguity and propose an alternative approach to measure the ideological orientation of governments based on their power in cabinets and data on party positions. We see several shortcomings of the traditional measure: the social democratic cabinet share neglects the fact that parties’ ideological profiles differ across countries and have significantly changed over recent decades. Also, specific policy measures of party preferences are often more appropriate to gauge the government’s position than relying on highly aggregated left/right measures. In addition, the social democratic cabinet share does not take into account the impact of coalition partners, cabinet decision making and the possibility of minority governments relying on parliamentary support outside the cabinet on the ability of parties to implement the social policies. After discussing the reasons for the conceptual ambiguity of existing indicators for the power of the left, we present alternative measures for the ideological orientation of the government based on the composition of cabinets and different information about party positions. We demonstrate how these measures can be combined to a single indicator that takes into account both the ideological position of governing parties in a particular policy domain and their power to affect cabinet decisions. We critically discuss the availability and merits of data on party positions and cabinet compositions and provide recommendations for constructing measures in welfare state research. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This article provides a detailed analysis of individual preferences towards public financial aid to students from low-income families. Who favours/opposes such aid? What are the determinants of the respective preferences? I argue that three sets of factors jointly shape these preferences: materialistic self-interests, political attitudes, and the status quo of the higher education subsidy systems by generating positive feedback-effects. Results of multilevel ordered logit models utilizing the International Social Survey Program (ISSP) data for up to 22 countries over two decades indicate that self-interest matters: students strongly favour subsidies as do their parents, while those paying for the spending and those not expecting to benefit oppose such aid. Moreover, political attitudes are important: Supporters of redistribution and of increased public education spending in general, as well as leftwing voters, are much more likely to support students. On the macro-level, the findings suggest that positive feedback-effects exist: in countries with generous subsidy systems, public support for subsidies is higher. This article is the first to systematically analyse preferences towards higher education subsidies across countries and time and demonstrates how positive feedback-effects increasingly lock-in countries’ tuition-subsidy paths, making the systems resistant to (radical) change. As such, it speaks to the literature on the political economy of skill formation, the welfare state, public opinion and the public opinion–policy link. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Welfare state spending cuts are effective fiscal consolidation tools, but some policymakers use other fiscal policy tools to address high levels of government debt. I argue that the economic incentive to cut welfare spending when government debt is high is undermined by the political incentive to stay in power when the median voter opposes retrenchment. Using survey data to measure the policy position of the median voter as well as hard figures on government debt and government social spending from 18 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries, I estimate a series of regressions that show that government debt has a negative effect on social spending, but only when the median voter does not oppose retrenchment. This holds true for broad measures of social spending as well as for unemployment spending and old-age pension spending. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]