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We challenge Kruck and Weiss' argument about the regulatory security state on two counts. First, we contest the notion that the regulatory state is a viable alternative to the positive security state. While regulation and epistemic authority are increasingly important means of security provision, they remain critically dependent power resources and political authority that only the positive state provides. The regulatory security state is premised on the positive state and unviable without it. Second, the rise of the regulatory security state over the past three decades reflects highly specific historical conditions rather than a general trend. These conditions include unusually low geopolitical tensions in Europe and the strong regulatory bias of EU integration. Concepts matter: The wider the notion of security, the more relevant the regulatory security state becomes. It is an important reality but the war in Ukraine reminds us of the enduring centrality of the positive state. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Kelemen and McNamara claim that the imbalance between the EU's strong regulatory authority and weak capacity in core state powers reflects its peaceful origins: the EU lacks coercive force, fiscal autonomy and administrative grip because it never had to confront a serious military threat. Will the emergence of such a threat suffice to correct the imbalance? As I argue theoretically, military threats have ambiguous effects on integration. They can fuel center-formation and capacity-building, as Kelemen and McNamara suggest, but also block it. As I show empirically, the military threat posed by the Russian attack of Ukraine in February 2022 has triggered very little EU capacity-building so far. I observe almost no centralization of core state powers but rather a strengthening of national powers with the support of EU institutions: 'bellicist integration' rather than 'bellicist state-building'. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In a recent article, Dan Kelemen and Kathleen McNamara ([4]) examine the political development of the European Union in a comparative historical perspective. The serial crises of the past decade highlighted the EU's weakness in fiscal, coercive, and administrative power that Kelemen and McNamara rightfully stress. He argues that the effect of military threats on EU capacity-building is more ambiguous than Kelemen and McNamara imply. [Extracted from the article]

Postfunctionalism posits a tradeoff between the functional scale of governance and the territorial scope of community: functional scale is large and transnational for efficiency reasons; community is small-scale and (sub-)national for reasons of social trust and collective identification. COVID-19 has turned this tradeoff upside down: it has shrunk functional scale to the (sub-)national level in the name of security, while lifting expectations of community to the grand transnational scale in the name of solidarity. This reversal of scales has resulted in a rapid rebordering of the Single Market and the Schengen area on the one hand, and a significant debordering of fiscal risk and burden sharing on the other. We reconstruct the evolution of this double-movement from January to August 2020, contrast it to historical trends in the scale-community tradeoff of European integration, and discuss implications for postfunctionalist theory. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We map the pattern and extent of the European integration of core state powers (coercive force, public finance and public administration) and analyse causes and consequences. We highlight two findings: First, in contrast to historical examples of federal state-building, where the nationalization of core state powers precipitated the institutional, territorial and political consolidation of the emerging state, the European integration of core state powers is associated with the institutional, territorial and political fragmentation of the European Union. Second, in contrast to European market integration, state élites and mass publics, not organized business interests, are the prime drivers of integration. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Is corporate tax competition a threat to democracy in the European Union (EU)? The answer depends crucially on a positive analysis of the effects of tax competition on national policy autonomy. Most analyses focus on direct effects on corporate tax rates and revenues. We contend that this focus is too narrow. It overlooks the fact that corporate tax competition also has important indirect effects on the progressivity and revenue-raising potential of personal income taxation. We elaborate on these indirect effects theoretically and empirically, and explore the implications for the normative debate on the EU's democratic deficit. Our findings show that European integration can constrain national redistribution in a major way: the democratic deficit is real. Greater political contestation over the EU's policy agenda is desirable in order to mitigate this deficit. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Why does the principle of mutual recognition apply to product regulation but not to product taxation, i.e. to value added tax (VAT)? It is not for lack of trying. The Commission called for mutual recognition of VAT long before the European Court of Justice 'invented' it for product regulation, and the thrust of much of the EU's VAT policy was to implement this principle. I argue that three factors explain the failure of this policy and the comparative success of mutual recognition of product regulation. First, it is economically less beneficial to apply mutual recognition to turnover taxation than to product regulation. Second, it is politically more demanding. Third, in contrast to product regulation, there is no judicial pressure towards mutual recognition of VAT. A review of these factors helps to understand not only the specific problems of mutual recognition of VAT but also the general problems of tax integration in the EU. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

There are basically three stories about the globalization-welfare state nexus. The first story argues that globalization is the cause of the chronic crisis of the welfare state. As national economies open to the international market, governments are forced w adapt to the imperatives of global competition, and this means cutting cost-intensive welfare programmes (globalization theory). The second story argues that, whatever the cause of the welfare state crisis, globalization is not part or it. There is neither theoretical reason nor empirical evidence to believe that national policy autonomy has decreased owing to increasing economic interdependencies (globalization sceptics). The third story holds that globalization, far from causing the welfare states troubles, is a consequence of these troubles, and part of their solution (revisionism). The paper reviews each of these stories, and counterposes them to simple descriptive statistics on Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]