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This paper sheds light on an unexplored phase and a neglected actor in EU constitutional politics: the preparation of Treaty reform by the Group of Government Representatives. Striving to explain whether and under which conditions constitutional decisions in Europe were de facto taken by officials, the paper proceeds in three steps. First, possible functions of preparation in complex negotiations are conceptualized and two conditions for effective preparation are proposed: a preparatory body's issue and process resources as well as consensual pre-agreement. A second section introduces the role of government representatives in preparing EU reform, checks their collective resources against the criteria developed in section 1 and assesses their preparatory agency as strong. Third, I analyse the effectiveness of preparing for Amsterdam, using the negotiations on free movement and flexibility as plausibility probes. The analysis demonstrates that officials play a key role even in the bastion of high politics that is Treaty reform, where the final European Council is only the 'tip' of a long-term negotiation process. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The growing uneasiness about the democratic deficit of the European Union (EU) has incited politicians and academics alike to look for remedies other than institutional reforms and giving more powers to the European Parliament. Strategies of 'good governance' shifted centre stage and the governance turn initiated a lively discourse on the democratic credentials of involving civil society. This article presents the changing views on the role of civil society in EU discourse. Al though the Commission and even the Constitutional Convention put high hopes on the legitimacy input of civil society, a representation discourse is conspicuously absent. The article introduces an analytical framework to assess the contributions and limitations of civil society to democratic representation in EU governance. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This research note re-examines the evidence for the claim that political group cohesion has risen over time in the European Parliament. We first demonstrate that political group cohesion has always been high in the EP and one of the principal reasons for this is owing to the large number of lopsided votes that take place. We next demonstrate that on votes in which the main political groups are opposing, intra-party cohesion is lower than conventional wisdom would have us believe and, furthermore, cohesion on such votes has not systematically increased over time. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This contribution revisits the question of the alleged consensual and deliberative nature of comitology proceedings on new conceptual and empirical bases. On the conceptual plane, we argue that it is important to separate the analysis of decision-making from that of outcomes: the fact that committees generally end up ratifying Commission proposals does not mean the latter are never contested. Consensus and deliberation being closely related concepts, we propose to focus on dissent within committees, which we regard as an indicator of a non-deliberative process or an imperfect deliberation. Applying this approach to data from the comitology register, we show the existence of a sizeable rate of contestation in various fields, and offer a first analysis of the factors that may influence dissensus. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

We start with two puzzles: first, how to explain the European Union (EU)'s decline as a climate change leader at the Copenhagen summit? Second, how to understand the partial revival of its leadership position at the Durban climate summit? We advance a twofold explanation, focusing on changes in relative power relations among major powers but also on negotiation strategies and coalition building. In Copenhagen, the EU had a normative agenda and unrealistic expectations and thereby failed to forge any bridge-building coalitions. In Durban, it had moved towards a pragmatic strategy, attuned to the realities of changing power constellations. The EU approached developing countries that shared its desire for a legally binding regime covering all major emitters and probed compromises with veto players, such as China and the US. This bridge-building strategy was combined with a conditional pledge to agree to an extension of the Kyoto Protocol. In sum, the EU acted as a ‘leadiator’, a leader-cum-mediator. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The processing of the advanced therapies regulation is of particular interest to scholars of the European Union's (EU) legislative process and students of the European Parliament (EP) because it provides a case study which throws light upon assumptions commonly made about the role of the EP's 'relais actors', the promotion of consensus-building within and between parliamentary committees, and the development of intraorganizational rules in response to early agreements in the co-decision procedure. An examination of the EP's processing of the advanced therapies dossier provides an 'unusual' but vivid illustration of how the identification of committee rapporteurs as the most important parliamentary 'relais actors' fails to capture the increasingly important roles performed by shadow rapporteurs. Significantly, the 'unusual' occurrences associated with the processing of the advanced therapies regulation came at a crucial juncture in the reconsideration of the EP's intraorganizational rules in relation to early agreements and the subsequent adoption of new Rules of Procedure in 2009. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

How do the character and distribution of issues (i.e., issue linkage) affect the choice of bargaining strategies in the European Union (EU)? I argue that despite several important steps taken in the current literature, the theoretical and empirical evaluation of the impact of issue characteristics and issue linkage on bargaining strategies in the EU remains an important path for future research. I briefly review this literature and highlight gaps in our current understanding of these effects. I then build on this discussion to develop empirically testable hypotheses for future work in this research programme. After deriving these hypotheses, I highlight several difficulties related to conceptualization, measurement and research design that future research must overcome in order to empirically test these hypotheses in a rigorous and systematic way. I then conclude by arguing that overcoming these difficulties, though challenging, is a worthwhile endeavor in the study of EU bargaining. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Council of the European Union (EU) is a crucial actor in EU legislative decision-making. However, how it reaches decisions is subject to considerable debate. Constructivists argue that the dominant mode is norm-guided behaviour and deliberation, pointing to the informal 'culture of consensus'. Scholars working in a rational choice tradition assume that member states strive to maximize their utility and move outcomes as close as possible to their ideal positions, either by using their power in bargaining or by arranging beneficial exchanges of votes. Several bargaining and exchange models have been advanced by this literature. This contribution explores the logics underlying these different conceptualizations of negotiations in the Council of the EU. Furthermore, it discusses the interpretation of the existing empirical results and tasks for future research. Due to observational equivalence empirical findings are often inconclusive. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]