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Since the late 1990s, populist discourse based on anti-immigration sentiments has been on the rise in Britain. This phenomenon reached a peak during the EU Referendum (ER) campaign and shortly thereafter. The ER has been linked to the upsurge in racially and religiously aggravated offences recorded post-July 2016. Polish nationals, who constitute the largest group of EU nationals in the UK, were targeted by many of these incidents. It could therefore be argued that, in the last years, and particularly, since the ER, EU nationals living in the UK have become more 'vulnerable'. To test this hypothesis, this contribution is based on an interdisciplinary project that collected socio-legal evidence to compare the vulnerability of the Polish community in Southampton before and after the ER. The paper draws on vulnerability and psychology literature to differentiate between 'objective' and 'subjective' vulnerability. Our study deploys mixed methods (qualitative and quantitative) to test changes in objective and subjective vulnerability among Southampton-based Poles before and after the ER. Our findings suggest that, following the ER, Poles felt significantly more vulnerable, especially in terms of subjective vulnerability, even if they had never experienced overt hate incidents or discrimination (objective vulnerability) before. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper reformulates classical questions regarding the plans and strategies of Polish migrants in the UK-such as decisions to leave or remain in the host country, or be 'deliberately indeterminate' about future plans-from a sociologically situated 'rights-based' perspective. This approach considers migrant's attitudes towards specific 'civic integration' measures in a medium-term time frame, as well as in the new context created by the UK's vote to leave the EU. Based on the quantitative analysis of original survey data, we investigate the factors behind Polish migrant's migration strategies and we argue that basic socio-economic and demographic factors are inadequate, on their own terms, to explain future migration and civic integration plans. Instead, we find that aspects such as interest in and awareness of one's rights, as well as anxieties about the ability to maintain one's rights in the future are stronger determinants. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In 2012, new and restrictive spousal reunification laws were implemented in the UK. EU free movement rules, however, have enabled British citizens to circumvent those restrictions by residing for a period in another Member State, and then returning with their family member to the UK. The article examines the resulting tension between national and EU law. It explores use of the Surinder Singh route (named after the court case which established the rule) against a background in which a much wider group of British citizens than previously are now ineligible for family reunification under national laws. The route is perceived as a threat to government authority in a critical area of national sovereignty, as demonstrated by its invocation in the Brexit process. The article draws on interviews with twenty families who used or planned to use the route and discusses how it provides a safety valve for those with high cultural, but insufficient economic, capital to fulfil the domestic rules. It provides insight into how legal categories are fluid and contingent, demanding analytical flexibility and awareness of their dynamic effect on the lives of marriage migrants and sponsors. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The United Kingdom faces demographic uncertainty, as negotiations for leaving the European Union (Brexit) proceed. Brexit has implications for international migration into and out of the UK, dependent on future immigration policy and on how attractive the UK will be as a labour market. At the same time, the UK population is experiencing ethnic diversification, consequent on past immigration. To explore the UK's future ethnic diversity, we run four projection scenarios. Three international migration scenarios, varying by the extent of the break with the EU, are implemented together with a reference projection assuming zero international migration. Ethnic groups are differently affected by these migration scenarios, depending on the contribution of international migration to population growth and the extent of demographic momentum. The White British and Irish lose population under all Brexit scenarios and the Black Caribbean population declines in all but one scenario. The White Other, Indian, Chinese, Other Asian and Other groups will show much lower growth under Soft and Hard Brexit scenarios. The growth of the Mixed, Pakistani, Bangladeshi, Black African and Black Other groups will only be affected marginally. Under every scenario, however, the UK's population is projected to continue to grow, age and diversify. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]