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An equilibrium exists between strategies which are noisy and have bounded recall and considering this equilibrium the sufficiently greater recall enjoys an advantage that is increasing in the original level of recall and so capturing the Red Queen effect. Strategic rationality is under natural selection and the selection pressure to reduce a small amount of noise is less than that to increase recall.

The Pareto-superior equilibrium has been chosen in the key class of 2x2 coordination games. Using the KMR approach, the Pareto-superior equilibrium was adopted even if not risk-dominant. Convergence to the invariant distribution has been shown to be relatively fast. Sensitivity of the major properties of the KMR model has been investigated to the exact specification of the mechanism that matches individuals in each stage of play.

A biological model used in maximizing expected offspring is used in evaluating the gambling attitudes toward commodities. The model indicates that the biological and economic requisites are similar in a fixed environment while the biological model is less susceptible to individual attitude towards risks. This deviation implies the importance of risk evaluation in determining the maximum utilities in gambling over commodities.

Criticisms on the work of Gul and Pearce regarding the small effect of forward induction as an equilibrium refinement failed to consider the effect of forward induction on subgame perfect equilibrium. This subgame perfect equilibrium exists especially when a continuous payoff irrelevant public signal exists.