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A model in oligopoly where firms compete via supply functions equilibria is described. It is identified that the notion of coalition-proof supply function equilibrium is introduced.

The effect of information advantage of a firm on its profits in oligopolistic markets is studied. Under Cournot competition, superior information gives a competitive edge and leads to higher profits only when the firm's technology exhibits constant returns to scale.

The dynamics of trading patterns and market composition are characterized when trading is bilateral, trading partner is costly, bargaining determines the prices, and preferences are private information. Finding reveals that equilibrium is inefficient and exhibits delays as sellers price discriminate between buyers with different values.

Research is presented concerning the relationship which exists between the ex-post core of the economy and the fine core of an atomless exchange economy which contains differential information.

Ljung's theorem, projection algorithm, has been used by economists to establish convergence to rational expectations equilibrium. The study shows that this theorem is not applicable to decentralized learning or forecasting. Ljung's theorem does not apply if the algorithm allows differing information among individuals. Despite the existence of any theorem similar to Ljung's which could provide for differing information, there still exists the requirement that individual beliefs should be closely related to the equilibrium and to one another.