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Randomized control trials (RCTs) are recognized as the preferred tool of analysis in modern development economics literature/research and policy evaluation. This may lead to methodologies, including case studies, tabular analysis, simple regressions, taking a back seat. This survey explores the implications of such a methodological hierarchy and the implications of preoccupation with a particular evidence/methodology for research and policy. Similar developments in macroeconomic modelling are also discussed. Major advantages and limitations of RCTs and the attempts to address them are highlighted. The article argues that preoccupation with a methodology can sometimes lead to important inquiries for research and policy getting side-lined on methodological considerations. This leads to inferences favouring a particular technique/methodology or issue. Focusing solely on methodologies that emphasize quantifying the 'effect' may not be appropriate to address all questions relevant to development. As policies involve multiple and conflicting social concerns, methodological pluralism may be preferable. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Behavioural welfare economics has lately been challenged on account of its use of the satisfaction of true preferences as a normative criterion. The critique contests what is taken to be an implicit assumption in the literature, namely that true preferences are context-independent. This assumption is considered not only unjustified in the behavioural welfare economics literature but unjustifiable – true preferences are argued to be, at least sometimes, context-dependent. This article explores the implications of this 'critique of the inner rational agent'. I argue that the critique does not support a wholesale shift away from the use of true preferences as an evaluative standard in normative economics; instead, the critique implies that behavioural welfare economists need to inquire into and establish the 'source' of particular context-dependent choices in individuals' decision-making. The source determines the permissibility of correcting individuals' context-dependent choices and can, in some situations, support decisive welfare judgements. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper studies the controversy on Fehr and Schmidt's model of inequity aversion. It borrows insights from disciplines such as philosophy and the sociology of science that have specialized in studying scientific controversies. Our goal is to contribute to the historical and methodological literature on behavioral economics, which happens to have neglected behavioral economists' research on social preferences. Our analysis of the controversy reveals some new insights about the relation of behavioral economics with other sub-fields in economics, as well as with other disciplines. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Designing policy for climate change requires analyses which integrate the interrelationship between the economy and the environment. We argue that, despite their dominance in the economics literature and influence in public discussion and policymaking, the methodology employed by Integrated Assessment Models (IAMs) rests on flawed foundations, which become particularly relevant in relation to the realities of the immense risks and challenges of climate change, and the radical changes in our economies that a sound and effective response require. We identify a set of critical methodological problems with the IAMs which limit their usefulness and discuss the analytic foundations of an alternative approach that is more capable of providing insights into how best to manage the transition to net-zero emissions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Behavioural economics has taught us that human agents don't always display consistent, context-independent and stable preferences in their choice behaviour. Can we nevertheless do welfare economics in a way that lives up to the anti-paternalist ideal most economists subscribe to? I here discuss Sugden's powerful critique of most previous attempts at doing so, which he dubs the 'New Consensus', as appealing to problematic notions of latent preference and inner rational agency. I elaborate on a fundamental rethinking of the normative foundations of anti-paternalist welfare measurement that often remains implicit in the behavioural welfare economics literature Sugden discusses, but which is required to make these accounts minimally plausible. I argue that, if we go along with this rethinking, Bernheim and Rangel's [(2007). Toward choice-theoretic foundations for behavioural welfare economics. American Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings, 97, 464–470. ; (2009). Beyond revealed preference: Choice-theoretic foundations for behavioural welfare economics. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 124(1), 51–104. ] choice-theoretic framework withstands Sugden's criticism. Sugden's own, more radical proposal is thus under-motivated by his critique of the 'New Consensus'. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper provides metaphilosophical reflections on economic methodology by way of discussing the 'Helsinki approach'. This approach combines the study of the practice of economics with an endeavor to retain a normative perspective. It also explains that it is difficult to find explicit espousals of mainstream economics in the methodological literature not because nobody takes a mainstream view, but rather because expressing such a view is inconsistent with the prevalent metaphilosophical approach. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper presents the topic modeling technique known as Latent Dirichlet Allocation (LDA), a form of text-mining aiming at discovering the hidden (latent) thematic structure in large archives of documents. By applying LDA to the full text of the economics articles stored in the JSTOR database, we show how to construct a map of the discipline over time, and illustrate the potentialities of the technique for the study of the shifting structure of economics in a time of (possible) fragmentation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Though the concept of ‘stylized fact’ plays an important role in the economic literature, there is little analysis of the definition and evaluative use of the term. A permissive account of stylized facts is developed which focuses on their mediating role between models and empirical evidence. The mediation relationship restricts stylized facts by requiring concrete empirical targets. On the other hand, there is much legitimate diversity within the permissive account; key dimensions of diversity are argued to be the part of the model targeted (explanans vs. explanandum) and degree of partiality of correspondence. The use of stylized fact in model evaluation points to the downside of stylization: decreased ability to support strong claims about particular targets. In the final analysis, the role of stylized facts in model-based explanation depends on the view taken of the relative importance of generality and empirical adequacy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Gul and Pesendorfer provide the best-known and most strident of a set of recent backlashes by economists against methodological revolutions promoted by some behavioural economists and neuroeconomists. Philosophers are likely to read these responses as merely reactionary, especially as their rhetoric goes beyond what their explicit argumentation validly supports. The present paper identifies the accurate insight on Gul and Pesendorfer's part that explains the impact of their philosophically ragged polemic. This centers on importantly different concepts of choice in the psychological and economic literatures. The psychologist's idea of choice descends from a culturally familiar folk construct generally thought to lie within everyone's unreflective personal acquantance. By contrast, the economist's concept of choice refers to abstract sensitivity of behavioral patterns to changes in incentives, typically at the statistical level of populations. It is reasonable to regard this abstract idea as the basic subject matter of economics, just as Gul and Pesendorfer assert. Appreciating the difference between psychological choice and economic choice is crucial for understanding the methodologically schizophrenic character of neuroeconomics. Much of it merely identifies neural correlates of elements from models in the psychology of valuation. However, the neuroeconomics worthy of the name, as constructed by Glimcher and his collaborators, aims to unify economics and neuroscience. It so far fails to do so in an entirely satisfactory way because it falsely assumes that the conception of choice in psychology and economics is already shared. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The reader subscription pricing mechanism is the dominant method by which the publication of scholarly journals in economics is funded. This occurs despite the fact that the use of an author charge pricing mechanism, when used in conjunction with a reader charge pricing mechanism, is described in the neoclassical economics literature as a more efficient method for financing journals. The division between the actual financing of economics journals and the theoretical understanding of how journals should be financed highlights deficiencies within the neoclassical economists' understanding of the financing of scholarly journals. In this paper I discuss this divergence in theory and practice in how economists finance their scholarly communication process and the brief attempt by some neoclassical economists to bridge this divide. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Keynesian concepts of probability and uncertainty emphasize the basis of knowledge available to economic decision makers. Conditions of uncertainty, which involve missing evidence or doubtful arguments, are distinguished from probable risk. Beyond this, on the basis of the claim that the future is yet to be created, some authors argue for further distinctions among different kinds of uncertainty. The paper reviews this particular argument, distinguishing it from Keynesian uncertainty theory generally, and provides a critique of its implication that, due to innovation, objective distributions of possible events do not generally exist at the time of economic decisions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The purpose of the paper is to explore the potential for using fuzzy logic to analyse economic decision-making under Keynesian uncertainty, and in particular in circumstances where variety of opinion is important. Fuzzy logic is shown to apply where expectations may differ because the nature of the subject matter impedes any 'crisp' way of describing the underlying variables. The particular case of the speculative demand for money is considered, since it explicitly reflects variety of opinion as to whether interest rates are 'high' or 'low'. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper discusses issues to do with the empirical basis of modern economics and points towards the need to look more closely at the 'homogeneity assumption' that underpins much economic theory. It argues that severe problems currently prevent economics from becoming more persuasive to both students of economics and those outside the discipline. The issue involves the management of disciplinary boundaries, and excessive use of the 'homogeneity assumption.' Three areas of concern are explored. First is the literature on causes of growth, and the role of policy. The paper documents reasons to doubt the existence of robust relationships between growth and policy variables. Second is the 'homogeneity assumption' that different countries are usefully viewed as members of a single population. Third is evidence suggesting that an assumption of 'normal' maximizing behaviour has to be justified, not just assumed, and that regular deviations from the usual maximizing assumptions occur with gender and culture. The paper argues that a central issue in economic methodology and pedagogy should be, as North implicitly argues, the negotiation of disciplinary boundaries: what economics can versus cannot explain. It suggests more explicitly basing the choice of explanatory models on empirics identifying where the model applies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Provides information on submission of manuscripts to the 'Journal of Economic Methodology.' Format; Language; Abstract.

Rosenberg claims that economics must use the 'intentional idiom' for its explanatory strategies. We examine whether scientific articles in financial economics do in fact ascribe propositional attitudes to economic agents. We look at articles in the Journal of Finance, volume 54 (1999), where we find a total of 250 502 words in 29 articles. The total number of ascriptions of the intentional states of belief, desire, expectation or preference to economic agents is 137, with 26 of 29 articles making 10 or fewer ascriptions. We propose other areas where intentionality might be found in these articles. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Presents the authors of articles published in June 2004 issue of "Journal of Economic Methodology". Kurt Dopfer; Geoffrey M. Hodgson; Steven Horwitz; Matthias Klaes; Jack Vromen; Jason Potts.

Presents information on contributors of articles to the journal 'Journal of Economic Methodology,' dated June 1, 2003.

Provides information on contributors in the March 2003 issue of the 'Journal of Economic Methodology.' Andre Clark; Steven Cook; Nicola Giocoli; Arjo Klamer; James Ladyman.