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This article argues the importance of reconsidering the way that institutionalist-heterodox development discourse has essentialized culture at the expense of acknowledging the need for generalization-based theories of economic development. It points out that such a state of affairs obscures the purposive function of socio-economic development, which is to create or radically reconfigure existing national institutions in order to fit the intended goals of social progress and the universal protection of human rights. In light of this necessity, a convergence hypothesis—whose significance lies in its emphasis on the common humanity and universally shared values in different socio-economic systems— deserves re-reading and re-interpretation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines the theoretical connection between John R. Commons, régulation theory, and convention theory. In institutional economics (Commons 1934), by applying the idea of “multiple causation,” Commons approached macro-dynamics based on the expansion of some key concepts and studies on income distribution and demand growth. It is a prototype of the growth analysis based on the cumulative causation model, with the various forms of coordination later formulated by régulation theory. The two-layered coordination in convention theory attempted to explicitly explain the individuals’ reflexive capacities to change preference endogenously and to evaluate collective and social value, which were implicitly assumed in Commons’s term “intellect.” [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We compare the analytical approach of John R. Common and Ronald H. Coase to institutional analysis and social provisioning. In particular, we examine their similarities in (i) the definition and role of institutions in the economy, (ii) the allocative (social provisioning) role of institutions in the economy, and (iii) the inescapable and unchanging role of institutions in shaping the social provisioning process. We contend that Commons and Coase had more in common than did Coase and many of his followers in the “new institutional economics.” In particular, the two had strong similarities in both (a) their insights into the nature of institutions in the legal-economic nexus that is the foundation of the economy and (b) their methods for conducting economics research. Because this role of institutional evolution is, as Warren Samuels noted, an inescapable and unchanging part of an economy’s social provisioning process, it will remain an integral part of any such work in the future, regardless of the “school of analysis” or methodological approach. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The environmental sustainability of economic growth has been subject to much debate for many decades. Recently, two alternatives to the growth paradigm have been put forward: namely, "a-growth" and "degrowth." The first proposes to ignore GDP information and focus instead on sound environmental, social, and economic policies independently of their effects on economic growth. The second recommends a downscaling of the economy so as to make it consistent with biophysical boundaries. We compare these approaches in the context of the growth paradigm and examine whether they have any merit. We further consider the potential contribution of institutional economics to further develop such alternatives. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article reviews and assesses Elinor Ostrom's Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) framework and Paul A. Sabatier's Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF) to determine their usefulness to institutional economics with regard to the theory of normative criteria and policymaking. The conclusions are that (1) Ostrom's IAD is not of assistance to institutional economics, (2) Sabatier's ACF and institutional economics have four important ideas in common, (3) the different levels of normative beliefs found from ACF studies have not been integrated into institutional economics, and (4) the technological and ecological criteria found in institutional economics have not been integrated into ACF. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Veblen's and Commons's contributions are outlined and related to the approaches to economics and political actions over the years of the author. Commons's philosophy and pragmatic contribution to economic and political institutions in order to help create decent living conditions for wage-earners within capitalism are reflected in the author's rethink in the late 1970s of what was possible for a social democratic government in Australia to achieve. The implication of John Kenneth Galbraith's example and writings on the war in Vietnam are linked to the author's actions in Australia during Australia's involvement in the war. The relevance of Veblen's damning critique of J.B. Clark's views on capital theory for the arguments of the Cambridge - Cambridge controversies in capital theory of the 1950s-1970s, first noted by Joan Robinson, are set out. Veblen's biting analyses of the nature of capitalism in his major writings are argued to be even more relevant now for the modern world of haves, have nots and have lots. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Darwin uses natural selection in two different senses. Struggle for existence refers to rivalry; survival of the fittest refers to surviving environmental changes. The mainstream vision of economic harmony requires casting natural selection as survival of the fittest. There is no struggle, no conflict. Mainstream economics depicts the selector in the evolutionary game as the firm itself. The mainstream vision requires banishing corporate power and the technological basis of power. For Veblen, corporate power is central. The existence of power implies that among firms, selection assumes the form of struggle. Evolutionary game theory breaks with the mainstream vision; firms are rivals. Evolutionary game theory, however, lacks the "stories" that provide a mapping between theory and reality, something institutionalists are well-positioned to provide. Stories are necessary for understanding corporate power, its origins, its use, and its limitations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

An Institutionalist critique that draws from selected contributions of Veblen and Myrdal initiates a convergence debate. Challenged is a Neoclassical interpretation of economic processes expected to lead toward a catching up with respect to per capita output of Germany's poorer eastern region with the richer western region. Economic method is considered, and the Institutionalist School of Thought rooted in contributions of Veblen as well as Myrdal is touted for offering higher levels of explanatory power than the Neoclassical School. We challenge the usefulness of laws in Economic Science, and especially their applicability to the empirical economy. Instead of automatic forces driving a meliorative trend, we seek to establish that human agency and policy play determining roles in affecting economic and societal outcomes in Germany's eastern region. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article features Janet Knoedler, winner of the 2019 Veblen Commons Awards in the U.S. It highlights Knoedler's significant contribution in maintaining the vitality of institutional economics. It also provides overview of Knoedler's career record as professor of economics and her impressive works as an institutional economist.