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To unravel the roots of the relationship between the individualism–collectivism dimension of culture (IC) and market-supporting institutions, we develop a model where the two interact and coevolve. IC and institutions are related indirectly via social organization: agents settle either in the Town, a loose organization where they work independently, or in the Clan, a cohesive organization where they engage in collective work. The town's relative economic potential positively affects the town's size and institutional quality. A larger town then renders society more individualistic, which attracts even more agents to the town and improves its institutional quality. The resulting positive feedback loop drives societies toward different steady states. If the town's relative economic potential is sufficiently high, the society converges to a steady state with a completely individualistic culture, high institutional quality, and a large town. Otherwise, the society converges to a steady state with a completely collectivistic culture, weak institutions, and a large clan. We conclude that contemporary IC and institutions exhibit path dependence and are thus related to the historical exogenous conditions in each region. Using current and historical data, we provide empirical evidence supporting our model. In addition, we apply the model to discuss the historical divergence between China and Europe. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We collect information about more than 5000 Prussian politicians, digitize administrative data on the provision of health-promoting public goods, and gather local-level information on workers' movements to study why elites in industrializing countries implement policies that improve the health of the poor. Using county-level variation in elite structure, we present OLS and IV estimates, suggesting that elites improve access to health services due to pressure exerted by workers' movements. By contrast, policies that prevent disease outbreaks are implemented without such pressure. Analyses of roll- call votes substantiate the findings of the county-level analysis. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We explore the role of elites for development and the spread of industrialized dairying in Denmark in the 1880s. We demonstrate that the location of early proto-modern dairies, introduced by landowning elites from northern Germany in the eighteenth century, explains the location of industrialized dairying in 1890: an increase of one standard deviation in elite influence increases industrialized dairying by 56 percent of the mean exposure in one specification. We interpret this as evidence for a spread of ideas from the elites to the peasantry, which we capture through measures of specialization in dairying and demand for education and identify a causal relationship using an instrument based on distance to the influential first mover. Finally, we demonstrate that areas with cooperatives enjoyed greater wealth by the twentieth century, and that they are today associated with other Danish cultural attributes: a belief in democracy and individualism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since the appearance of the seminal paper of Frankel and Romer (Am Econ Rev 89(3): 379–399, 1999), 'Does trade cause growth?', the impact of aggregate trade openness on income has been controversial. This research shows that the type of product that is traded has first-order effects, while overall trade intensity has second-order effects on per capita income because of (i) the hierarchical structure of learning-by-doing in products with different levels of sophistication of the production processes; and (ii) the fertility and education effects of trade specialization following the quantity–quality tradeoff framework of Galor and Mountford (Am Econ Rev 96(2): 299–303, 2006). Using data on trade disaggregated by the level of technological sophistication of the production process for 223 countries over the period 1962–2019, we find that (1) the effects of foreign trade on income differ widely across technology categories; (2) high-tech trade has permanent growth effects; and (3) a significant fraction of the impact of trade on income is mediated through education and fertility. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We use a unique dataset on Muslim domination between 711-1492 and literacy in 1860 for about 7500 municipalities to study the long-run impact of Islam on human-capital in historical Spain. Reduced-form estimates show a large and robust negative relationship between length of Muslim rule and literacy. We argue that, contrary to local arrangements set up by Christians, Islamic institutions discouraged the rise of the merchant class, blocking local forms of self-government and thereby persistently hindering demand for education. Indeed, results show that a longer Muslim domination in Spain is negatively related to the share of merchants, whereas neither later episodes of trade nor differences in jurisdictions and different stages of the Reconquista affect our main results. Consistent with our interpretation, panel estimates show that cities under Muslim rule missed-out on the critical juncture to establish self-government institutions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This research develops an expanded unified growth theory that incorporates the endogenous accumulation of physical capital, population, human capital, and technology. The model incorporates a complementarity between physical capital and human capital and can be extended to a multi-country setting with international technology diffusion. The analytical characterization of the mechanisms behind the observed patterns of long-run growth and comparative development delivers a consistent explanation for a large set of seemingly unrelated empirical facts. A quantitative multi-country version of the model matches various empirical regularities of long-run growth dynamics and comparative development patterns that have previously been studied in isolation. The findings also shed new light on the role of the demographic transition for convergence patterns, the specification of cross-country growth regressions, technology spillovers, and the secular stagnation debate. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We build a unified model of growth and internal migration and identify its deep parameters using an original set of Swedish data. Our structural estimation and counterfactual experiments suggest that conditions of migration between the countryside and cities have strongly shaped the timing and the intensity of the transition to growth. Mobility cost had to be low enough to enable population movement. Furthermore, initial productivity in rural industries had to be moderate to sustain the first phase of industrialization appearing in the countryside without delaying too much the second phase of industrialization taking place in cities. More than the initial productivity of rural industries or migration costs alone, what truly mattered for the transition to modern economic growth was the interplay between these two elements. By contrast, we evidence a poor role for mortality decline in the whole process. Finally, we discuss why our conclusions on Sweden are exemplary for the rest of Western Europe. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper we argue that a potentially important mechanism by which modernization leads to democratization is a rise in de facto power as more of the population becomes educated. Analyzing a model in which the polity dictates the pace of modernization through its choice of public education expenditures, we first show that (i) an autocrat must eventually fund public education as long as the masses begin with some de facto power even though it lowers the income of the group he represents, and (ii) an autocrat never relinquishes power unless de facto power increases as the economy modernizes. We then present evidence that increases in education and de facto power have very often preceded the transitions of autocratic regimes to democratic ones. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

How did Christianity expand in Africa to become the continent's dominant religion? Using annual panel census data on Christian missions from 1751 to 1932 in Ghana, and pre-1924 data on missions for 43 sub-Saharan African countries, we estimate causal effects of malaria, railroads and cash crops on mission location. We find that missions were established in healthier, more accessible, and richer places before expanding to economically less developed places. We argue that the endogeneity of missionary expansion may have been underestimated, thus questioning the link between missions and economic development for Africa. We find the endogeneity problem exacerbated when mission data is sourced from Christian missionary atlases that disproportionately report a selection of prominent missions that were also established early. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We construct the first consistent series on the long-term distribution of income in Poland by combining tax, household survey and national accounts data. We document a U-shaped evolution of inequalities from the end of the nineteenth century until today: (1) inequality was high before WWII; (2) abruptly fell after the introduction of communism in 1947 and stagnated at low levels during the whole communist period; (3) experienced a sharp rise with the return to capitalism in 1989. We find that official survey-based measures strongly under-estimate the rise in inequality since 1989. Our results highlight the prominent role of capital income in driving the U-shaped evolution of top income shares. The unique inequality history of Poland speaks to the central role of institutions and policies in shaping inequality in the long run. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper we examine the impact of natural resource wealth by focusing on historical coal-mining across European regions. As an exogenous source of variation in coal extraction activities, we rely on the presence of coal-deposits located on the earth's surface, which historically facilitated the discovery and extraction of coal. Our results show that former coal-mining regions are substantially poorer, with (at least) 10% smaller per-capita GDP than comparable regions in the same country that did not mine coal. We provide evidence that much of this lag is explained by lower levels of human capital accumulation and that this human-capital effect is concentrated in men. Finally, we provide suggestive evidence that the persistently lower levels of human capital in coal mining regions that we document result from the crystallization of negative attitudes towards education and lower future orientations in these regions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This research examines the effects of inequality on long-run development within Brazil. I first exploit variation in temperature and precipitation to instrument for the local distribution of land in 1920 using a two stage least squares instrumental variables framework. My instrument is an index quantifying the suitability of local climatic conditions for plantation versus smallholder agriculture. I construct this index using information on the growing conditions of crops within certain plant taxonomies that are more biologically suited for smallholder or plantation production. I argue that this index more fully identifies the optimal environmental conditions for these two types of agricultural production, and I show that it serves as a robust predictor of local land inequality in the year 1920. IV estimates then reveal that greater inequality is associated with less local government spending on welfare and public goods over the 1995-2005 time period, as well as reductions in measures of local government quality and per-child education spending. It is also associated with lower levels of development, as measured by the local Human Development Index (HDI) for the year 2000. Inequality primarily affects the HDI through shorter life expectancies and lower incomes. I argue that the latter is consistent with the agrarian elite obstructing the transition of the local economy from agriculture to industry/services, as historically unequal municipalities contain a greater percentage of workers in the lower-wage agriculture sector, and this sector itself constitutes a larger share of local GDP. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper considers the possible contribution of spatial competition to the Industrial Revolution and the Great Divergence. Rather than exclusively focusing on the incentives of producers to adopt labor-saving technology, we also consider the incentives of factor suppliers' organizations such as craft guilds to resist. Once we do so, industrialization no longer depends on market size per se, but on spatial competition between the guilds' jurisdictions. We substantiate our theory's claim of spatial competition being an important channel for industrialization (i) by providing historical evidence on the relation between spatial competition, craft guilds and innovation, and (ii) by showing that the calibrated model correctly predicts the timings of the Industrial Revolution and the Great Divergence. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper presents evidence on the relationship between traditional farming practices and the emergence of individualistic culture. It hypothesizes that agricultural legacies have a persistent effect on the prevalence of modern-day individualistic traits. Individualism emerged in societies engaged in the farming of less labor-intensive crops, whereas interdependence emerged in societies engaged in the farming of more labor-intensive crops. The empirical analyses establish that agricultural legacies have shaped the formation of individualist traits among individuals, pre-industrial ethnic groups, and countries. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper provides evidence of the causal impact of oil discoveries on local development. Novel data covering the universe of oil wells drilled in Brazil allow us to exploit a quasi-experiment: Municipalities where oil was discovered constitute the treatment group, while municipalities with drilling but no discovery are the control group. The results show that oil discoveries significantly increase local production and have positive spillovers. Workers relocate from informal, low productivity agriculture to higher value-added activities in formal services, increasing urbanization. The results are consistent with greater local demand for non-tradable services driven by highly paid oil workers. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper contributes to the debate on the impact of agricultural productivity on long run economic development. It presents evidence that widespread adoption of clover contributed to local economic development based on a panel of 56 Danish market towns. We adopt a differences-in-differences approach augmented by an instrumental variable and find that the adoption of clover accounts for about 8 percent of the growth in market town population from 1672 to 1901. The analysis suggests that the effect of the adoption of clover on the process of development was mediated by its impact on human capital formation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We investigate the relationship between inequality, redistribution, and growth using a recently-compiled dataset that distinguishes clearly between market (pre-tax and transfer) and net (post tax and transfer) inequality, and allows us to calculate redistributive transfers for a large number of advanced and developing countries. Across a variety of estimation methods, data samples, and robustness checks, we find: (1) lower net inequality is robustly correlated with faster and more durable growth, controlling for the level of redistribution; (2) redistribution appears benign in terms of its impact on growth, except when it is extensive; and (3) inequality seems to affect growth through human capital accumulation and fertility channels. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We find a relationship between geographic factors and numeracy in more than 300 regions of Europe around the year 1900. We argue that the distribution of land ownership is a plausible mechanism, given that it is related to the geographic factors under study. Consistent with theoretical studies in the Unified Growth Theory framework, we find that inequality in land distribution has a negative correlation with human capital formation as landowners did not have incentives to promote educational institutions or were not willing to pay the necessary taxes. This study explains a substantial share of the differences in development gradients between rural European regions in a historical perspective. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper constructs an original database on physical capital, labor, education, GDP, innovations, technology spillovers, and institutions to analyze the proximate determinants of British economic growth since 1270. Several approaches are taken in the paper to tackle endogeneity. We show that education has been the most important driver of income growth during the period 1270-2010, followed by knowledge stock and fixed capital, while institutions have not been robust determinants of growth. The contribution of education has been equally important before and after the first Industrial Revolution. Overall, the results give strong support to the predictions of Unified Growth Theories. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The effect of human capital on growth involves multiple channels. On the one hand, an increase in human capital directly affects economic growth by enhancing labor productivity in production. On the other hand, human capital is an important input into R&D and therefore increases labor productivity indirectly by accelerating technological change. In addition, different types of human capital such as basic and higher education or training-on-the-job might play different roles in both production and innovation activities. We merge individual data on valuable patents granted in Prussia in the late nineteenth-century with county-level data on literacy, craftsmanship, secondary schooling, and income tax revenues to explore the complex relationship between various types of human capital, innovation, and income. We find that the Second Industrial Revolution can be seen as a transition period when it comes to the role of human capital. As in the preceding First Industrial Revolution, 'useful knowledge' embodied in master craftsmen was related to innovation, especially of independent inventors. As in the subsequent twentieth century, the quality of basic education was associated with both workers' productivity and firms' R&D processes. In a final step, we show that literacy had also a negative effect on fertility which increased with innovation. In general, our findings support the notion that the accumulation of basic human capital was crucial for the transition to modern economic growth. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper shows that a historical process that ended more than five centuries ago, the Reconquest, is very important to explain Spanish regional economic development down to the present day. An indicator measuring the rate of Reconquest reveals a heavily negative effect on current income differences across the Spanish provinces. A main intervening factor in the impact the Reconquest has had is the concentration of economic and political power in a few hands, excluding large segments of the population from access to economic opportunities when Spain entered the industrialization phase. The timing of the effect is consistent with this argument. A general implication of our analysis is that large frontier expansions may favor a political equilibrium among the colonizing agents that is biased toward the elite, creating the conditions for an inegalitarian society, with negative consequences for long-term economic development. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This research advances the hypothesis that natural land productivity in the past, and its effect on the desirable level of cooperation in the agricultural sector, had a persistent effect on the evolution of social capital, the process of industrialization and comparative economic development across the globe. Exploiting exogenous sources of variations in land productivity across (a) countries; (b) individuals within a country, (c) migrants of different ancestry within a country, and (d) individuals residing in regions within a country, the research establishes that lower level of land productivity in the past is associated with more intense cooperation and higher levels of contemporary social capital and development. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We document a strong positive relationship between natural resource exports and urbanization in a sample of 116 developing nations over the period 1960-2010. In countries that are heavily dependent on resource exports, urbanization appears to be concentrated in 'consumption cities' where the economies consist primarily of non-tradable services. These contrast with 'production cities' that are more dependent on manufacturing in countries that have industrialized. Consumption cities in resource exporters also appear to perform worse along several measures of welfare. We offer a simple model of structural change that can explain the observed patterns of urbanization and the associated differences in city types. We note that although the development literature often assumes that urbanization is synonymous with industrialization, patterns differ markedly across developing countries. We discuss several possible implications for policy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper revisits the effect of national income on distributional equality. Although the link between the two has featured prominently in the literature, a causal effect has been difficult to pin down due to the endogeneity of these variables. We use plausibly exogenous variations in the incomes of countries' trading partners weighted by the level of trade flows, and international oil price shocks, as instruments for within-country variations in countries' real GDP per capita. Controlling for country and time fixed effects, our instrumental variables regressions show that increases in national income have a significant moderating effect on income inequality: a 1 % increase in real GDP per capita reduces the Gini coefficient by around 0.08 percentage points on average. We document that education is one possible channel that mediates this relationship, and explore the implications of our findings for the welfare effect of national income growth. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper explores the role of state capacity in the comparative economic development of China and Japan. Before 1850, both nations were ruled by stable dictators who relied on bureaucrats to govern their domains. We hypothesize that agency problems increase with the geographical size of a domain. In a large domain, the ruler's inability to closely monitor bureaucrats creates opportunities for the bureaucrats to exploit taxpayers. To prevent overexploitation, the ruler has to keep taxes low and government small. Our dynamic model shows that while economic expansion improves the ruler's finances in a small domain, it could lead to lower tax revenues in a large domain as it exacerbates bureaucratic expropriation. To check these implications, we assemble comparable quantitative data from primary and secondary sources. We find that the state taxed less and provided fewer local public goods per capita in China than in Japan. Furthermore, while the Tokugawa shogunate's tax revenue grew in tandem with demographic trends, Qing China underwent fiscal contraction after 1750 despite demographic expansion. We conjecture that a greater state capacity might have prepared Japan better for the transition from stagnation to growth. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper consolidates two previously disconnected literatures. It integrates R&D-based innovations into a unified growth framework with micro-founded fertility and schooling behavior. The theory suggests a refined view on the human factor in productivity growth. It helps to explain the historical emergence of R&D-based growth and the subsequent emergence of mass education and the demographic transition. The model predicts that the erstwhile positive correlation between population growth and innovative activity turns negative during economic development. This 'population-productivity reversal' explains why innovative modern economies are usually characterized by low or negative population growth. Because innovations in modern economies are based on the education of the workforce, the medium-run prospects for future economic growth-when fertility is going to be below replacement level in virtually all developed countries-are better than suggested by conventional R&D-based growth theories. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We exploit differences in casualties sustained in pre-modern wars to estimate the impact of fiscal capacity on economic performance. In the past, states fought different amounts of external conflicts, of various lengths and magnitudes. To raise the revenues to wage wars, states made fiscal innovations, which persisted and helped to shape current fiscal institutions. Economic historians claim that greater fiscal capacity was the key long-run institutional change brought about by historical conflicts. Using casualties sustained in pre-modern wars to instrument for current fiscal institutions, we estimate substantial impacts of fiscal capacity on GDP per worker. The results are robust to a broad range of specifications, controls, and sub-samples. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article shows, in a two-sector Malthusian model of endogenous population growth, that output per capita, population density, and industrialization depend upon the labor intensity of agricultural production. Because the diminishing returns to labor are less pronounced, high labor intensity (as in rice production) leads not only to a larger population density but also to lower output per capita and a larger share of labor in agriculture. Agronomic and historical evidence confirm that there are distinct, inherent differences between rice and wheat production. A calibration of the model shows that a relatively small difference in labor intensity in agriculture can account for a large portion of the observed differences in industrialization, output per capita, and labor productivity between Asia and Europe prior to the Industrial Revolution. Significantly, these differences can be explained even though sector-level total factor productivity levels and the efficiency of factor markets are held constant in the two regions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper suggests that if parental nurturing is a dominating force in human capital formation then income redistribution may not promote economic growth. In particular, if, consistently with empirical evidence, parental human capital complements investment in a child's education and yields increasing returns in the intergenerational production of human capital, income redistribution may have an adverse impact on the growth rate of average human capital. Redistribution shifts resources towards the less educationally-productive families and thus in the presence of credit markets imperfections and increasing returns, it reduces the aggregate level of investment in human capital. Moreover, if the degree of increasing returns is sufficiently large to produce sustained growth, this adverse effect on human capital formation may outweigh the conventional beneficial effects of redistribution that arises from the interaction between a production technology exhibiting diminishing returns and credit market imperfections. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The trade-off between child quantity and quality is a crucial ingredient of unified growth models that explain the transition from Malthusian stagnation to modern growth. We present first evidence that such a trade-off indeed existed already in the nineteenth century, exploiting a unique census-based dataset of 334 Prussian counties in 1849. Furthermore, we find that causation between fertility and education runs both ways, based on separate instrumental-variable models that instrument fertility by sex ratios and education by landownership inequality and distance to Wittenberg. Education in 1849 also predicts the fertility transition in 1880–1905. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper analyzes the impact of weak contracting institutions on economic development and the wealth distribution in a Ramsey-type growth model. We show that, at low levels of accumulation, weak contracting institutions strongly favor the economic elite: By preventing market entry, such institutions provide the “oligarchs” with cheap access to credit—which is highly beneficial as long as capital is scarce. At the same time, a broad cross-section of society faces only low returns so that capital accumulation is slowed down and the capital stock gets concentrated in the hands of the elite. At higher levels of development, however, weak contracting institutions are harmful to all segments of society and institutional reform becomes unanimously supported. So the model helps to explain the pervasiveness of weak contracting institutions in less-advanced economies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A salient feature of developing economies is the coexistence of a modern commercial sector alongside a traditional subsistence sector—the dual economy. The apparent differences in productivity between sectors imply substantial losses in aggregate productivity. Existing theories of the dual economy rely on exogenous price distortions, and cannot explain why or if these distortions evolve over the course of development. This paper provides a model of the dual economy in which the productivity differences arise endogenously because of a non-separability between the value of market and non-market time in the traditional sector. Incorporating endogenous fertility, the model then demonstrates how a dual economy will originate, persist, and eventually disappear within a unified growth framework. An implication is that traditional sector productivity growth will exacerbate the inefficiencies of a dual economy and produce slower overall growth than will modern sector productivity improvements. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We examine how the interaction between education and corruption affects institutional reform and economic development. While corruption reduces average income and education, education increases not only output and hence potential corruption rents, but also produces more informed electorates that better monitor government actions. We find that economies with intermediate levels of education remain in a poverty trap since the level of skills creates sufficient corruption rents but not enough monitoring. Economies with low or high levels of education can escape the poverty trap, and inequality plays a key role in determining whether this occurs through a change in institutions or an expansion of education. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Economic historians have debated the relative labor productivity of the United States agricultural and nonagricultural sectors during the nineteenth century. David (Discussion papers in economic and social history, University of Oxford, 1996) offers a reconciliation of the opposing views by suggesting that while productivity per hour worked in agriculture was comparable to productivity in other sectors, the number of hours worked per year was relatively low, creating a large gap in annual output per worker across sectors. We model and extend a version of Davis’s reconciliation within a unified growth theory that makes connections between the decline in traditional agriculture and several other features of United States development. The dynamic general equilibrium model is consistent with the structural transformation having minor direct and indirect effects on aggregate labor productivity per hour, but substantial effects on aggregate labor productivity per worker. The model also provides a close match to the trends in schooling, fertility, rates of return to physical capital, and labor productivity growth in the nineteenth century. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The classic narrative of economic development—poor countries are caught in poverty traps, out of which they need a Big Push involving increased investment, leading to a takeoff in per capita income—has been very influential in foreign aid debates since the 1950s. This was the original justification for foreign aid. The narrative lost credibility for a while but has made a big comeback in the new millennium. Once again it is invoked as a rationale for large foreign aid programs. This paper applies very simple tests to the various elements of the narrative. Evidence to support the narrative is scarce. Poverty traps in the sense of zero growth for low-income countries are rejected by the data in the whole period 1950–2001 and for most sub-periods. The poorest quintile also does not have significant negative growth of the relative income ratio to the world’s richest country over 1950–2001, nor is relative growth for the lowest quintile significantly different than other quintiles. The claim that “well-governed poor nations” are caught in poverty traps is rejected by simple regressions that control for both initial income and quality of government (instrumenting for the latter). The idea of the takeoff also does not garner much support in the data. Takeoffs are rare in the data, most plausibly limited to the Asian success stories. Even then, the takeoffs are not associated with aid, investment, or education spending as the standard narrative would imply. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper develops empirical growth models suitable for dual economies, and studies the relationship between structural change and economic growth. Changes in the structure of employment will raise aggregate productivity when the marginal product of labor varies across sectors. The models in the paper incorporate this effect in a more flexible way than previous work. Estimates of the models imply sizeable marginal product differentials, and indicate that the reallocation of labor makes a significant contribution to the international variation in productivity growth. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We study the connection between inheritance systems and the historical evolution of the relationship between a society’s economic structure and its political system, with a focus on Europe from feudal times. The model predicts that, in an early agrarian phase, aristocratic political systems prevail, while democracies tend to emerge with industrialization. At the same time, as indivisible landed estates are replaced by capital as the primary source of wealth, the inheritance system evolves endogenously from primogeniture to partition. The dynamics of output, distribution, class structure and political participation are in turn reinforced by the system of intergenerational wealth transmission, with primogeniture tending to concentration and partition to equalization. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]