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This paper examines the consequence of affirmative action for a "middle" ranked group on equity and the leader's overall performance or "efficiency." The literature on electoral quotas is invested in the equity question for disadvantaged groups, but is mostly silent on this issue. We use a randomized electoral quota for an intermediately ranked caste group (OBCs) in a large state in India to show that overall, such a quota does not affect delivery of public projects, or redistribute projects away from disadvantaged groups (SC/STs). Moreover, we show that when the group is large, the quota may in fact improve leader's performance. The improvement in overall performance does not come at a cost of lower allocation to the most disadvantaged group. We argue and provide suggestive evidence that when the group is large, such a quota for the group increases within-group electoral competition in villages. The result highlights that "efficiency" concerns regarding affirmative action may need reevaluation. It further justifies the targeting of electoral quota policy in India towards jurisdictions where the group is numerous. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]