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Keywords Tax evasion; Socio-economic networks; Game theory Abstract This paper builds on recent insights from network theory and on the rich dataset made available by the Panama Papers in order to investigate the micro-economic dynamics of tax-evasion. We model offshore financial entities documented in the Panama Papers as links between jurisdictions in the global network of tax evasion. A quantitative analysis shows that the resulting network, far from being a random collection of bilateral links, has key features of complex networks such as a core-periphery structure and a fat-tail degree distribution. We argue that these structural features imply that policy must adopt a systemic perspective to mitigate tax evasion. We offer three sets of insights from this perspective. First, we identify through centrality measures tax havens that ought to be priority policy targets. Second, we show that efficient tax treaties must contain exchange information clauses and link tax-havens to non-haven jurisdictions. Third, we show that the optimal deterrence strategies for a social-planner facing a strategic tax-evader in a Stackelberg competition can be characterized using the notion of Bonacich centrality. Author Affiliation: (a) Ca Foscari University of Venice and Paris 1 Pantheon-Sorbonne, France (b) Paris School of Economics and Paris 1 Pantheon-Sorbonne, France * Corresponding author. Article History: Received 3 November 2020; Revised 10 January 2022; Accepted 26 March 2022 (footnote)[white star] This project has received funding from the ITN ExSIDE European Union's Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme under the Marie Sklodowska-Curie grant agreement No 721846 and from the ITN EPOC European Union's Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme under the Marie Sklodowska-Curie grant agreement No 956107. Byline: Garcia Alvarado Fernando [fernando.garcia@unive.it] (a), Mandel Antoine [antoine.mandel@univ-paris1.fr] (*,b)

Keywords Household finance; Individual investor; Financial advice; Inducements; Consumer financial protection Highlights * German brokerage introduces a flat-fee alongside a commission-based scheme. * Comparison of switchers to the flat-fee to matched commission-based clients. * Adopters seek and follow (unchanged) financial advice more. * Adopters increase portfolio values and trade more. * Adopters improve portfolio efficiency through higher fund shares. Abstract Using a field study at a German brokerage, we investigate advised individual investors' behavior and outcomes after self-selecting into a flat-fee scheme (percentage of portfolio value) for mutual funds. In a difference-in-differences setting, we compare 699 switchers to propensity-score-matched advisory clients who remained in the commission-based scheme. Switchers increase their portfolio values, improve portfolio diversification, and increase their portfolio performance. They also demand more financial advice and follow more advisor recommendations. We argue that switchers attribute a higher quality to the unchanged advisory services. Author Affiliation: (a) Aarhus University, Fuglesangs Allé 4, DK-8210 Aarhus V, Denmark (b) University of New South Wales, UNSW Business School, Sydney, High St, Kensington NSW 2052, Australia (c) Goethe University Frankfurt, Theodor-W.-Adorno Platz 3, 60323 Frankfurt am Main, Germany * Corresponding author. Article History: Received 24 January 2022; Revised 14 March 2023; Accepted 16 March 2023 (footnote)â° This research could never have been accomplished without the collaboration and support of a German bank. We are grateful to the bank for providing the data. We would like to acknowledge the contributions of the bank and its employees who helped us. Financial support from the Think Forward Initiative research grant and the Danish Finance Institute (DFI) is also gratefully acknowledged. For useful comments and discussions, we thank Sascha Baghestanian, Holger Kraft, Roman Inderst, Martin Weber, Laura Lindsey, Alessandro Previtero, and Mikael Paaso. Conference and seminar comments at the AFA meetings in San Diego, AEA meetings in San Francisco, the 1st CEPR Household Finance workshop in London, the FIRS meetings in Lissabon, the DGF meetings in Leipzig, Goethe University Frankfurt, Leibniz University Hanover, University of Mannheim, and University of Tübingen significantly improved the paper. Please note that the paper previously circulated under the title 'fee-only advice' Byline: Steffen Meyer [steffen.meyer@econ.au.dk] (a,*), Charline Uhr (a), Benjamin Loos (b), Andreas Hackethal (c)

Keywords Relative performance information; Relative performance evaluation; Rank feedback; Social incentives; Social and self-image; Knowledge-sharing; On-the-job help; Collaboration; Experiment Abstract Social comparisons are known to increase individual work morale, but because they could foster competition, they may also negatively impact how well co-workers work together. This paper uses a novel experiment to explore this potential tradeoff. The experiment varies whether members of a reference group receive relative performance information on a knowledge task and measures how this affects the willingness to subsequently help the productivity of others by sharing knowledge with them. The findings reveal that relative performance information spurs competition between members of a reference group when compared to the baseline with no such information. Yet, there is no evidence that relative performance information substantially lowers group morale, that is, the willingness to help the productivity of others in the group. These findings advance our understanding of how relative performance concerns among co-workers affect the way they work together. Author Affiliation: Department of Economics, Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München, Kaulbachstraße 45, 80539 München Article History: Received 15 July 2022; Revised 2 March 2023; Accepted 7 March 2023 (footnote)â° I am grateful to Roberto Weber and Ernst Fehr for their guidance and support in the development of this project. I thank Björn Bartling, Yves Breitmoser, Dirk Engelmann, Yiming Liu, Eva Ranehill, Ernesto Reuben, Karl Schlag, Florian Schneider, Anja Schöttner, Julien Senn, Vanessa Valero, Georg Weizsäcker, Florian Zimmermann and two anonymous referees for their comments. This paper also benefited from discussions with the audience in numerous conference and seminar presentations. Financial support from the Excellence Foundation Zurich, the Zurich Graduate School of Economics through their Director's Grant program and by Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft through CRC TRR 190 (project number 280092119) is gratefully acknowledged. All remaining errors are my own. Byline: Lea Heursen [lea.heursen@econ.lmu.de]

Keywords contest; all-pay auction; stochastic abilities; bid cap; disclosure Abstract In this paper, we study the optimal disclosure of bidders' types in a two-bidder all-pay auction in the presence of a common and exogenously given bid cap. We focus on the set of disclosure policies that are contingent on realizations of bidders' types and fully characterize the unique symmetric equilibrium under each of them. We find that, allowing only for full disclosure and full concealment, the ex ante expected revenue is higher under full disclosure only for intermediate levels of the bid cap. Allowing also for partial disclosure policies: (i) the ex ante expected revenue under full disclosure is higher than under partial disclosure to low-type bidders but lower than under partial disclosure to high-type bidders, regardless of the bid cap; (ii) full concealment could rank from the highest to the third highest, depending on the bid cap, the prior type distribution, and the type values. These results are due to the different sensitivities of bidders' bids across bidders' types and disclosure policies. Author Affiliation: (a) School of Economics, Shenzhen University, China (b) Department of Economics, Shenzhen MSU-BIT University, China (c) Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance, Germany * Corresponding author. Article History: Received 3 December 2020; Revised 23 September 2022; Accepted 2 October 2022 (footnote)[white star] We thank Bo Chen, Jingfeng Lu, Kai Konrad, Dmitriy Knyazev, Tsz-Ning Wong, and Lily Yang for comments and discussions. This work was supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China [No. 72203148 and No. 71973040] and the Department of Education of Guangdong Province [No. 2021WQNCX085]. The authors have equal contribution to the paper. Byline: Bo Chen [bochenbonn@gmail.com] (a,b,*), Marco Serena [marco.serena85@gmail.com] (c)

Keywords Cheating; Dishonesty; Misreporting in teams; Real effort Highlights * We analyze the impact of information and communication on misreporting of performance in teams of two. * Both team members get the same payoff but report independently. * Informing players 2 about the reports of players 1 reduces misreporting. * Letting players 1 send messages to players 2 reduces misreporting by players 2. * Information transmission and communication thus reduce misreporting. Abstract We extend the experimental analysis of misreporting performance in real effort tasks (cheating) to situations where two members of a team perform the task sequentially and decide independently on their potentially inflated reports. We vary three factors in our experiment: whether no players, only players 2, or both players can misreport; whether players 2 learn the report of players 1; and whether players 1 can send a message to players 2 requesting honest or dishonest behavior. Our data yield two main insights. First, higher reports by players 1 lead to higher reports by players 2, i.e. misreporting is reinforcing. Second, allowing players 1 to send a message suggesting that players 2 either report honestly or a minimum number of correct solutions reduces misreporting by players 2. There are two channels for this. First, most players 1 request an honest report. Second, players 2 misreport far less when they receive the honest message, but, compared to the treatments without messages, hardly change their reports when they are asked to report a minimum number of correct solutions. We find a similar, though less pronounced, asymmetric response when players 2 learn the reports of players 1. These findings suggest that communication and information transmission can reduce cheating, and that there are notable spillover effects of honesty even in anonymous environments. Author Affiliation: (a) Victoria University of Wellington, Pipitea Campus, Lambton Quay, Wellington, New Zealand (b) Trier University, Universitätsring 15, Trier, D-54296, Germany (c) Graduate School of Business, HSE University, Shabolovka Ulitsa 26--28, Moscow, Russia * Corresponding author. Article History: Received 26 April 2022; Revised 20 March 2023; Accepted 26 March 2023 (footnote)[white star] Paper presented at the University of Auckland, the University of Bern, Victoria University of Wellington, Otto Beisheim School of Management, and European Business School. We are grateful to Frauke von Bieberstein, Steffen Lippert, Gerd Muehlheusser, and Ronald Peeters for helpful comments. We are very grateful to two anonymous referees and the Associate Editor, whose comments improved the paper very much. This study was supported by grants of the Russian Science Foundation (Project No. 20-78-00023) and Wellington School of Business and Government (Project No. FSRG 225754). Byline: Eberhard Feess [eberhard.feess@vuw.ac.nz] (a), Thomas Schilling [dudek@uni-trier.de] (b), Yuriy Timofeyev [y.timofeyev@hse.ru] (*,c)

Keywords Intervivos transfers; Bequests; Coresidency; Parental altruism Abstract This paper uses 1996--2014 longitudinal HRS data to establish the relative importance of intervivos transfers, bequests and coresidency in the United States. We find that when computing the relative importance of intervivos transfers versus bequests, the aggregate perspective that pools all data into a single cross-section is very different than the parent-level longitudinal perspective, highlighting the special value of panel data. This difference reflects the fact that large bequests are highly concentrated and play an influential role at the aggregate level, while at the micro parent-level, intervivos transfers constitute the main form of financial support for most parents. Regarding coresidency, we find that although older children and parents tend to coreside when the child is helping the parent, coresidency tends to be more prevalent among poorer, younger parents and their children. Children who ever coreside with parents also receive larger total intervivos transfers. Author Affiliation: (a) Center for Transnationals' Studies & Laboratory for Economic Behaviors and Policy Simulation, Nankai University, Tianjin, China (b) Department of Economics, University of Pittsburgh, United States * Corresponding author. Article History: Received 27 July 2021; Revised 31 December 2022; Accepted 6 February 2023 (footnote)1 A previous version of this paper circulated under the title 'The Patterns of Intervivos Transfers to Adult Children.' We thank the editor and two anonymous referees for insightful comments. Siqiang Yang acknowledges financial support from Tianjin Philosophy and Social Science Planning Foundations (TJYJQN22-003) and the Fundamental Research Funds for the Central Universities (No. 63202020). Byline: Siqiang Yang [siy10@nankai.edu.cn] (a), Marla Ripoll [ripoll@pitt.edu] (*,1,b)

Keywords Optimal currency denominations; Cash transactions; Burden of exchanging cash; Penny elimination Highlights * We describe a model of optimal consumer-merchant exchange of cash payments. * Diary data are used to quantify the burden of exchanging currency notes and coins. * The model and data are used to analyze the effects of eliminating the one-penny coin. * Penny elimination would reduce the burden of exchanging cash. * Penny elimination would result in little or no inflationary consequences. * Elimination of the penny and the nickel would not reduce this burden relative to penny elimination only. Abstract This article quantifies the burden of exchanging currency notes and coins using a model of optimal consumer-merchant exchange of cash payments and consumer payment choice diary data. The model is then applied to analyze a policy debate whether to eliminate the penny coin from circulation. We find that penny elimination would reduce the burden of exchanging cash and will not have any significant inflationary consequences caused by price rounding. Surprisingly, a removal of both the penny and nickel coins from circulation would slightly increase (not decrease) the burden relative to penny elimination only. Author Affiliation: (a) Department of Economics, Washington University in St. Louis. 1 Brookings Dr, St. Louis, MO, 63130, United States (b) Research Department, Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta. 1000 Peachtree St. NE, Atlanta, GA, 30309, United States * Corresponding author. Article History: Received 15 February 2022; Revised 25 January 2023; Accepted 27 January 2023 (footnote)[white star] We thank Marcin Hitczenko and two anonymous reviewers for most helpful comments and suggestions. This paper was formerly circulated as 'The Burden of Cash and the Penny Policy Debate.' Part of the work on this paper was conducted while Brian Prescott was at the research department of the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta. The views expressed here are the authors' and not necessarily those of the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta or the Federal Reserve System. Byline: Brian C. Prescott [b.prescott@wustl.edu] (a), Oz Shy [oz.shy@atl.frb.org] (*,b)

Keywords Preference; Decision-making autonomy; Willingness-to-pay Highlights * Spouses in low-income societies engage in division of labor. * Improved cookstoves benefit women more than men. * Women are willing to pay more for improved cookstoves than men. * Men dominate household decision-making. Abstract We use a field experiment to identify how differences in preferences and spousal influence result in low willingness to pay (WTP) for technologies that can benefit all household members. We create income-earning opportunities to empower households and conduct an actual stove purchase experiment to elicit their WTP for fuel, time, and indoor air pollution-reducing improved cookstoves. The decision to buy the stove was randomly assigned to either wives, husbands, or couples using either individually or jointly earned income. Experimental results suggest that wives, who often are responsible for cooking and collecting fuelwood, are willing to pay 57% more than husbands and 39% more than couples. Wives who made the stove purchase decision alone using the income they earned alone are willing to pay 67% more than husbands who made the purchase decision alone. We also find that couples' WTP is similar to that of husbands, implying that husbands dominate joint decisions. A follow-up survey conducted 15 months after the stove purchase shows that the treatments do not affect stove use. Our findings highlight the importance of considering the division of labor, preference difference, and spousal influence within the household when promoting the adoption of new household technologies. Improving access to cash for poor women would likely enable them to make decisions consistent with their preferences. Author Affiliation: (a) University of Gothenburg, Vasagatan 1, Box 600 405 30, Gothenburg, Sweden (b) ECRC, Vasagatan 1, Box 600 405 30, Gothenburg, Sweden * Corresponding author. Article History: Received 19 March 2021; Revised 16 January 2023; Accepted 24 January 2023 (footnote)[white star] Yonas Alem (Lead Author) is a Senior Research Fellow and Director of Academic Programs at the Environment for Development (EfD), School of Business, Economics and Law, University of Gothenburg; his email address is yonas.alem@gu.se. Sied Hassen is a post-doctoral researcher at the Environment and Climate Research Center of the Policy Studies Institute (PSI), Addis Ababa, Ethiopia; his email address is seidy2004@gmail.com. Gunnar Köhlin is Director of EfD at the School of Business, Economics, and Law at the University of Gothenburg; his email address is gunnar.kohlin@gu.se. We thank the editor (Laura Schechter), an anonymous associate editor, and two anonymous reviewers for helpful inputs, which significantly improved the paper. We also extend our gratitude to Cyndi Berck, the late Peter Berck, Randall Bluffstone, Fredrik Carlsson, Haileselassie Medhin, Alemu Mekonnen, Subhrendu Pattanayak, Dale Whittington, Thomas Sterner, Simon Schürz, Måns Söderbom, Roberto Weber, seminar participants at the Department of Economics, University of Gothenburg (Gothenburg, Sweden), participants in the Economic Sciences Association annual conference (Bergen, Norway), and participants at the Nordic Conference in Development Economics (Copenhagen, Denmark) for helpful comments on earlier versions of the paper. Financial support from the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (Sida) through the Environment for Development (EfD) is gratefully acknowledged. All correspondence to Yonas Alem, yonas.alem@gu.se. All errors and omissions are ours. Byline: Yonas Alem [yonas.alem@economics.gu.se] (*,a), Sied Hassen (b), Gunnar Köhlin (a)

Keywords Cooperation; Social identity; Noisy identity; Pure altruism; Prisoners' Dilemma Highlights * This paper studies a model where players want to cooperate only with ingroups due to pure altruism. * Identity is noisy, so players may end up benetting an outgroup or hurting an ingroup. * When players interact at least twice, there is more cooperation with more noise than without, even if cost is high. * With noisy identity, repetition unlocks welfare gains that are not pos- sible without noise. * Making outgroups easier to recognize can make interactions more unso- ciable. Abstract When meeting a random stranger, it can be difficult to recognize who is like you (ingroup) and who is not (outgroup). I construct a model to explore how noise in detecting whether the other player is an ingroup or an outgroup impacts overall cooperation in strategic interactions. When the game is repeated, noisy identity can generate welfare gains that are not possible with perfect recognition by encouraging players to cooperate in all periods except the last one, regardless of how they identified the opponent. Importantly, noisy identity can sustain additional cooperation even when the potential cost of doing so is high. This result is largely driven by the level of noise in detecting who is an outgroup, whereas the role in recognizing an ingroup is less prominent. Author Affiliation: Department of Economics, University of Memphis, 427 Fogelman Admin Building, Memphis, Tennessee 38152, United States * Corresponding author. Article History: Received 29 April 2022; Revised 2 January 2023; Accepted 8 January 2023 (footnote)1 The author has benefited from insightful comments from John Nachbar, David Levine, Yuri Khoroshilov and three anonymous referees. This research did not receive any specific grant from funding agencies in the public, commercial or not-for-profit sectors. The current version of this work stems from an earlier presented working paper entitled Kin Targeted Altruism with Noise. All errors are my own. Byline: Carmen Astorne [cmstrnfg@memphis.edu] (*,1)

Keywords artificial intelligence; big data; Cyber-Communism; economic calculation; Ludwig von Mises Abstract In his 1920 essay 'Economic Calculation in the Socialist Commonwealth,' Ludwig von Mises argued that economic calculation is impossible in a socialist system absent private property and exchange in the means of production. Without the social appraisement process by which the actions of consumers and entrepreneurs produce a money price structure, the commensurate cardinal numbers necessary to engage in capital accounting are not available. We argue that any claims regarding how advances in computer technology can solve the problem of economic calculation are based on an insufficient understanding of Mises' original argument. We restate Mises' argument in consideration of recent developments in big data and artificial intelligence and argue that Mises' original argument concerning the impossibility of economic calculation absent the institutional prerequisites of private property and monetary exchange in goods of all orders remains unrefuted. Author Affiliation: (a) George Mason University (b) Montreat College * Corresponding author: Article History: Received 13 July 2022; Revised 8 December 2022; Accepted 13 December 2022 (footnote) The authors would like to thank participants of the February 2022 Modern Computing and Economic Calculation Online Papers Workshop, generously hosted by the Institute for Humane Studies, as well as two anonymous referees for valuable feedback. Karras would also like to thank Daniel B. Klein, Erik W. Matson, and participants of the spring 2022 George Mason University Adam Smith Program Research Workshop for their helpful comments on an earlier version of this paper. Byline: Karras J. Lambert [klamber7@gmu.edu] (a,*), Tate Fegley [tate.fegley@montreat.edu] (b)