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We assess the link between corporate social responsibility (CSR) and government ownership using a unique sample of privatized firms (PFs) from 41 countries over the 2002 to 2014 period. We find that PFs have, on average, better CSR intensity than other publicly listed firms. Further tests show a nonlinear relation between residual state ownership and CSR intensity that depends on the trade-off between political objectives of the government and profit maximization objectives of private owners. In addition, country-level institutions affect the state ownership–CSR intensity relation, and PFs benefit from higher valuation and lower equity financing costs through improved CSR.

The debate over how firm stakeholder engagement is tied to preserving shareholder wealth has received growing attention in recent years, especially in the wake of the COVID-19 crisis. Against this backdrop, we examine the relation between corporate social responsibility (CSR) and stock market returns during the COVID-19 pandemic-induced market crash and the post-crash recovery. Using a sample of 1750 U.S. firms and two major sources of CSR ratings, we find no evidence that CSR affected stock returns during the crash period. This result is robust to various sensitivity tests. In additional cross-sectional analysis, we find some supporting evidence, albeit weak, that the relation between CSR and stock returns during the pandemic-related crisis is more positive when CSR is congruent with a firm's institutional environment. We also find that Business Roundtable companies, which committed to protecting stakeholder interests prior to the pandemic, do not outperform during the pandemic crisis. We conclude that pre-crisis CSR is not effective at shielding shareholder wealth from the adverse effects of a crisis, suggesting a potential disconnect between firms' CSR orientation (ratings) and actual actions. Our evidence suggests that investors can distinguish between genuine CSR and firms engaging in cheap talk.

We provide unique firm-level evidence of the relation between state ownership and stock liquidity. Using a broad sample of newly privatized firms (NPFs) from 53 countries over the period 1994–2014, our study identifies a non-monotonic association between state ownership and stock liquidity. The inverse U-shaped relation is consistent with trade-offs between costs and benefits of state ownership and suggests an optimal level of government shareholdings that maximizes stock liquidity of NPFs. We further identify that the inflection point from the cost/benefit trade-off is contingent upon characteristics of the nation's institutional environment., Highlights • We study how state ownership affects stock liquidity. • We identify a non-monotonic relation between state ownership and stock liquidity. • This relation is consistent with trade-offs between costs/benefits of state ownership. • The inflection point from this trade-off depends on the institutional environment.

Motivated by the recent rise of state capitalism, this paper investigates the effects of government ownership on market valuations across a sample of publicly listed corporations from East Asia. We find strong, robust evidence that government-owned firms exhibit higher market valuation than non-government-owned firms, but the relation is not linear. The benefits of government ownership in terms of value premium extend to closely held firms where the government is a second blockholder. These effects stem from the financing decisions of government-owned firms and from the discount rate of cash flows, and hold prior to and during the recent global financial crisis. Additional analyses suggest that the effect of government ownership on valuation is influenced by financial market development and the quality of government and institutions in place. Collectively, our results imply that government involvement in private firms can be valuable.

We examine why environmental and social (E/S) performance vary across countries and firms, and evaluate the value implications. Using a sample of 33,021 firm-year observations representing 4587 firms from 43 countries over the 2003–2015 period and applying hierarchical linear modeling, we find that individualism is positively associated with firm-level E/S performance. We show that two country-level channels—freedom of the press and protection of equal rights—and three firm-level channels—managerial discretion, board diversity, and corporate transparency—link individualism to E/S performance. We find a positive association between firm-level E/S performance and firm value, with three firm-level channels—cash flows, cash flow variability, and cost of equity—linking E/S performance to firm value. This positive association is stronger in more individualistic countries. Finally, we find that internationalization weakens the role of national culture; however, it accentuates the positive association between firm-level E/S performance and firm value.

Using the high-power setting of newly privatized firms from 64 countries, we examine the relationship between ownership type and firm-level capital allocations as captured by the sensitivity of investment expenditure to investment opportunities. Consistent with our predictions that government and foreign institutional owners are associated with different levels of information asymmetry and agency problems, we find strong and robust evidence that government (foreign) ownership weakens (strengthens) investment-Q sensitivity, thereby increasing investment inefficiency (efficiency). Moreover, we find that the relation between foreign ownership and investment efficiency is stronger when governments relinquish control and country-level governance institutions are weaker. Overall, our findings highlight the important role of ownership type in determining firms' investment behavior and efficiency.

This paper investigates the dynamics of cross-listing and corporate social responsibility (CSR). Using a sample of 10,815 firm-year observations from 54 countries over the period 2002–2011, we find that cross-listed firms have better CSR performance than non–cross-listed domestic firms. This result is robust to endogeneity and different types of cross-listing. We also find that CSR increases (decreases) significantly after cross-listing in (delisting from) U.S. markets. The positive impact of cross-listing on CSR performance is stronger for firms from countries with weaker institutions, lower country-level sustainability, and higher liability of foreignness, and for firms operating in industries with high litigation risk. Finally, we find that cross-listed firms with better CSR performance exhibit higher valuations.

We provide the first international evidence on the impact of economic policy uncertainty (EPU) on dividend policy. Using data from 19 countries, we find that a high level of EPU is positively associated with dividend payout. This evidence is robust to using alternative dividend payout measures, to controlling for other sources of uncertainty, and to addressing endogeneity. We further find that the effect of EPU on dividend policy is moderated by firms' free cash flows and governance quality, and by the quality of country-level indicators of shareholder protection, disclosure, enforcement, and creditor protection. Collectively, our novel evidence suggests that dividends help mitigate agency problems during high-EPU periods.

A key issue in the finance-growth nexus literature is endogeneity – economic growth may drive finance as well as finance driving growth. Some research addresses endogeneity using relatively exogenous shocks from U.S. bank geographic deregulation, often documenting favorable economic effects. We connect deregulation shocks for the first time to individual firm growth in a model that differentiates sources of external financing – short-term debt, long-term debt, and equity. Our results suggest that deregulation increases firm growth overall and this growth is fueled by all three external funding sources. However, benefits accrue only to relatively financially unconstrained firms, while relatively constrained firms lose.

Using staggered board reforms as a quasi-natural experiment and a difference-in-differences approach, this study examines the impact of corporate governance on cash holdings in 41 countries. We find that board reforms are followed by significant reductions in cash holdings. This effect is more pronounced for firms with weaker pre-reform corporate governance and for firms from countries with weaker institutional environments. Analysis of cash spending suggests that, following board reforms, firms are more likely to use cash to increase R&D expenditures, dividend payouts, and share repurchases, but not to increase capital or acquisition expenditures. Finally, the results indicate that enhanced corporate governance following board reforms leads to higher (lower) cash (dividend payouts) values, consistent with the view that board reforms strengthen corporate governance.

Motivated by recent research on the link between geographic proximity and information risk, we examine the impact of geographic location on a firm's ownership structure and cost of equity capital using a large sample of newly privatized firms from 47 countries. We find that the greater the firm's distance from domestic financial centers, the lower foreign investors' participation and ownership. We also find that strong country-level institutions governing investor protection mitigate the information disadvantage of foreign investors. In additional analyses, we find that investors require higher cost of equity capital for distant privatized firms, especially in countries with weak governance institutions. We conclude that geographic location is an important determinant of post-privatization ownership structure and cost of equity capital. Our results are robust to alternative explanations and suggest that improving country-level governance institutions can mitigate the adverse effect of location in remote areas.

We examine the relation between state residual ownership and bank risk-taking for privatized banks from 45 countries. Applying propensity score matching, we find that privatized banks tend to exhibit higher levels of risk-taking post-privatization than their publicly listed non-privatized counterparts. Moreover, partially privatized banks exhibit higher levels of risk-taking than fully privatized banks. We also observe a positive and significant relation between the level of residual state ownership and risk-taking. These findings are consistent with the distorted objectives associated with government control, as suggested by the political benefits of control, and with the soft budget constraint views of state ownership. The distortion can be mitigated by the quality of a country's institutional and regulatory environments. Finally, our results show that the effect of state ownership on risk-taking is more pronounced in countries with a higher dominance of state-owned enterprises, and it was more prevalent during the global financial crisis.

For a large sample of 48 countries, we find robust evidence that strong creditor rights are associated with low long-term leverage across countries. We further find that strong creditor protection lowers long-term debt issuance, the extent to which investments are financed with long-term debt, and target leverage ratios. Finally, we find that firm and country characteristics influence the link between creditor protection and long-term leverage. Our results support the demand-side view that strong creditor protection discourages firms from making long-term cash flow commitments to service debt because managers and shareholders avoid the risk of losing control in the case of financial distress.

Motivated by recent research on the costs and benefits of political connection, we examine the cost of equity capital of politically connected firms. Using propensity score matching models, we find that politically connected firms enjoy a lower cost of equity capital than their non-connected peers. We find further that political connections are more valuable for firms with stronger ties to political power. In additional analyses, we find that the effect of political connection on firms' equity financing costs is influenced by the prevailing country-level institutional and political environment, and by firm characteristics. Taken together, our findings provide strong evidence that investors require a lower cost of capital for politically connected firms, which suggests that politically connected firms are generally considered less risky than non-connected firms.

To investigate the control structure of newly privatized firms, we use a unique database of 221 privatized firms operating in 27 emerging countries over the 1980-2001 period. Specifically, we examine the determinants of residual state ownership after privatization over a window of up to six years after divestiture. We find that the residual state ownership is largely influenced by the size of the firm, the level of investor protection and the extent of corruption in the country. Controlling for the political institutions in place shows that government tenure (stability), the political system and political cohesion are important determinants of the residual state ownership in newly privatized firms. This result confirms that privatization is politically shaped and constrained by a dynamic that will differ between countries.

In this paper, we examine whether the presence of multiple large shareholders alleviates a firm's agency costs and information asymmetry manifested in the cost of equity financing. Using data for 1165 corporations from 8 East Asian and 13 Western European countries, we find evidence that the implied cost of equity decreases with the presence, number, and voting size of large shareholders beyond the controlling owner. We also find that the identity of the second largest shareholder is important in determining the risk of corporate expropriation in family-controlled firms. Our regional analysis reveals that, mainly in East Asian firms, multiple large shareholders structures exert an internal governance role in curbing private benefits and reducing information asymmetry, perhaps to sidestep deficiencies in the external institutional environment.

This paper seeks to provide an answer to the following question: when and how does privatization work? Using a sample of 230 firms headquartered in 32 developing countries, we document a significant increase in profitability, efficiency, investment and output. Our analysis shows that the changes in performance vary with the extent of macro-economic reforms and environment, and the effectiveness of corporate governance. In particular, economic growth is associated with higher profitability and efficiency gains, trade liberalization is associated with higher levels of investment and output, while financial liberalization is associated with higher output changes. Further, control relinquishment by the government is a key determinant of profitability, efficiency gains and output increases. Finally, we find higher improvements in efficiency for firms in countries in which stock markets are more developed and where property rights are better protected and enforced. These results for a sample of developing countries differ from those reported in a contemporaneous study by D'Souza et al. [D'Souza, J., Megginson, W.L., Nash, R.C., 2001. Why do privatized firms improve performance? Evidence from developed countries. Unpublished working paper. University of Oklahoma] which focuses on developed countries. These diverging findings suggest that privatization in developing countries indeed obeys to particular constraints and has a dynamic of its own.