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The China-ROK boundary disputes in the Yellow Sea and the associated fishing conflict are often neglected in the rich body of literature on China's maritime disputes. This article examines the question of why and how China has persistently pursued a de-escalatory posture in the Yellow Sea in the past decade despite having considerably hardened its posture in the East and South China Seas. I argue that the high stakes China has in its bilateral ties with South Korea create strong incentives for Beijing to deescalate maritime controversies whereas the absence of broad-based hawkish pressure at home creates a permissive domestic political climate for Beijing to pursue de-escalation. This paper also evaluates conditions that may facilitate a hardening Chinese position. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since the beginning of bilateral ties in 1950, the China–Pakistan relationship has grown significantly. Known as Pakistan's 'all-weather friend', bilateral economic cooperation has been advanced by the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) agreement, worth US$62 billion of Chinese investment in Pakistan. Due to its geo-economic and geopolitical importance, the CPEC is considered a 'game changer' by Beijing and Islamabad. However, since its initiation in 2015, the CPEC has also been a source of tension between centre and provincial governments in Pakistan. This paper analyses the impact of the CPEC on nation-building in Pakistan. In the light of nation-building theories, it further argues that the CPEC has provided Pakistan with much-needed opportunities to address inter-provincial and federal–provincial discord through dialogue and compromises. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In Indonesia, Chinese voluntary associations took on a new level of importance after the fall of Suharto’s New Order regime in 1998 that ushered in a revival of Chinese identity politics. At the same time, Sino-Indonesian relations are blossoming, and the rise of China as a global power means that Indonesia can only benefit from stronger ties with China in the future. In this new atmosphere of cooperation, I argue that Chinese Indonesian individuals and voluntary organizations play a crucial function as trade and cultural intermediaries. Drawing on both empirical and qualitative fieldwork data, in this paper, I examine how members of Chinese voluntary organizations view their ethnicity, national belonging, and strategic position in the contexts of post-Suharto Chinese identity politics and Sino-Indonesia relations. More broadly, this paper also offers a critical analysis of the internal dynamics of contemporary Overseas Chinese voluntary organizations and the role they play in building trade and sociocultural relationships between China and other countries. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Future international relations in East Asia are likely to be largely shaped by the maritime strategies and policies of various actors. This paper examines China's policy and behavior in maritime cooperation in the East Asian region in recent years, a topic that has been insufficiently understood. I suggest that while it is necessary and useful to take into account China's naval power, more attention to Chinese intentions and policy on East Asian maritime issues is warranted to arrive at a more balanced, and arguably more accurate, understanding of China's role in East Asian maritime affairs. This paper takes stock of China's changing perceptions, attitudes, and behaviors in maritime cooperation in the region. I describe China's new policy moves in the South China Sea and East China Sea. I also address some of the major Chinese concerns for further maritime cooperation in East Asia. I conclude that while a grand cooperative maritime regime is still not possible from a Chinese perspective, China is likely to agree to more extensive and substantive maritime cooperation in many functional areas, most notably in the non-traditional security arena. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

China's strategic ambition and security strategy have attracted a great deal of international attention lately, and there is disagreement about China's intentions. Clearly, the Chinese could help clear up many misperceptions about their strategic ambitions simply by publishing a national security document like those published by the United States and other powers. Without the presence of such a document, there will always be questions about strategic capabilities and intentions that will lead to unproductive speculation. Fortunately, Wu Baiyi's paper helps us to better understand China's current, and possibly future, security strategy along with its historical context. Colonel Russ Howard generally agrees with Wu Baiyi's findings. He agrees with Wu's interpretation of Beijing's security goals and tasks in the paper's first section, though he differs from Wu on China's ability to achieve them. Colonel Howard also considers Wu's historical analysis in the second section basically correct. Also, Colonel Howard views Wu's description of China's current security challenges to be 'a refreshing departure from other—more homogenous—descriptions'. However, he does not agree with Wu's generally optimistic view of the international security landscape. Finally, Colonel Howard agrees with Wu Baiyi's conclusions: China's security strategy is much more than its diplomatic strategy. A comprehensive security strategy architecture, as Wu correctly points out, includes not only a diplomatic component but defense, political, and economic components as well. At present, Beijing's leaders have in effect adopted the old Clinton campaign slogan, 'it's the economy, stupid', which recognizes that economic growth is more important in achieving China's security strategy than were the diplomatic and military initiatives of the past. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The PLA's role in Beijing's foreign policy-making process is a closed book but it is a key research topic in our study of Chinese diplomacy. This paper argues that generally the PLA abides by a fine division of labor with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MoFA) in managing Beijing's international pursuits. The civilians are in charge of China's generic foreign affairs and daily diplomacy. The Central Military Commission (CMC) is responsible for security/military-related foreign affairs and defines the bottom-line for employing force in conflicts. Institutionally the PLA's role is more directional than detailed and is often behind the scenes. This complicates our research of the subject matter, as the line between this division of labor is thin over many diplomatic issues. Often times it is hard to demarcate where Beijing's normal diplomacy ends and where security/military dynamics begin. This paper adopts a two-layered analysis on civil–military interaction on foreign and security affairs: the broad consensus of CCP–PLA leaders on CCP regime stability at a time of drastic domestic change and world pressure; and the PLA's directional role in China's security/military-related foreign affairs under a generic civilian guidance. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

In the context of the rise of China, Southeast Asian countries and Australia have begun shifting towards an accommodation policy. Robert Ross examines the accommodation policy in South Korea, Mochizuki discusses Japanese accommodationists, and Manicom and O'Neil show some evidence of Australian accommodation of Chinese strategic preferences. The scholarship has, however, narrowly focused on and overestimated the role of security. Through a study of the origin, process, structural conditions and impacts of accommodation policy, this paper broadens the concept of accommodation to capture its multiple meanings and practices. It finds that a selective accommodation policy and strategy toward the rise of China developed in Australia is a sign of the changing power relations under which the mainstream paradigms of containment and engagement, hard balancing or bandwagoning, have proved inadequate to the task of dealing with China, and that economic interdependence has driven the politics of accommodation in Australia and several Asian countries. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

There are claims that China's influence on ASEAN is direct in that she has encouraged more exports to flow into her huge markets and changed trade flows amongst member countries. Demand and supply are deemed to have therefore become more China-centred. This paper looks at the plausibility of China as a 'factor' that influences bilateral intra-ASEAN trade flows through demand (exporting country) and supply (partner country). The key finding of the study is that China's trade association with the region increases intra-ASEAN exports. China is therefore the most practical choice for the ASEAN+1 FTA to initiate deeper trade integration within the region. China, as the 'core' country of the ACFTA can provide complementarities in the export performance of ASEAN. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In recent years, the rise of China as an emerging great power has been widely perceived across the world. How has the rise of China been represented over time in the Western news media? Has the image of China as a rising power had any impact on the country's soft power? These questions remain unanswered but answering them is of great significance in helping us understand the impact of the news media on the transformation of international politics in the information age. This paper conducts a longitudinal study to examine the nature of Chinese coverage and explores how the image of a rising China—economically, politically, regionally and globally—has been represented in three transnational newspapers in Europe. It further argues that the Western media coverage of China's rise is as a soft power, which, to some extent, has an impact upon China's foreign relations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper investigates why some energy decisions are made faster than others in a reformed and globalized China. This investigation uncovers five factors that determine whether a proposal becomes a decision in the Chinese political system: (1) associated benefits of the proposed decision for other policy problems; (2) presence of a consistent 'issue champion'; (3) strength of mobilized and united 'veto players'; (4) vertical and horizontal support; and (5) clear policy preferences of the central leadership. The paper argues that the Chinese decision-making process has become increasingly consultative, iterative, and participatory and that it is also increasingly prone to deadlock, inaction, and paralysis. Thus, the Chinese decision-making process is increasingly similar to that of the United States in the era of reform and globalization. While the capacity of the Chinese state to make and implement distributive policies has remained largely unchanged, reform and globalization has weakened its capacity to make and implement redistributive policies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

China's non-intervention policy has long been criticized for prolonging the rule of many authoritarian regimes. Myanmar has become one of the classic examples. As China is expected to become a responsible great power, her behavioral patterns have aroused many concerns. This paper aims to re-interpret China's non-intervention policy. While explaining various constraints on China's capability to intervene in the Myanmar government, it shows how China is making efforts to seek a new intervention policy in dealing with countries like Myanmar. It argues that China's insistence on a non-intervention policy does not mean that China does not want to influence other countries such as Myanmar. To assess Chinese leverage and its non-intervention policy toward Myanmar as well as to supplement the current limited academic discussion on Sino-Myanmar relations, in this paper we first examine Chinese leverage in Myanmar through Burmese local politics, such as the power struggle between the central government and local rebel governments. Second, we disaggregate the Chinese interests in Myanmar into different levels (regional, geo-strategic and international) and discuss how these interests affect China's non-intervention policy. Third, we argue that China has indeed tried to intervene in Myanmar politics, but in a softer manner that contrasts with the traditional Western hard interventions, such as economic sanctions and military interference. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In recent years the concept of 'soft power', popularized by the work of Joseph Nye, has gained currency in both China and Taiwan. This paper explores how the Chinese and Taiwanese understand soft power and its sources, and how their understanding differs from Nye's formulation. It discusses why this foreign concept has become so salient in the Chinese and the Taiwanese discourse. It also examines the impact of this concept on the external policies of China and Taiwan. The paper concludes by pointing out the limitations of the concept of soft power. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper offers a comprehensive analysis of China bills introduced and passed in Congress in 1973-2005. Three important findings emerge. First, many more punitive China bills were introduced and passed in the House than in the Senate. Second, the two congressional parties agreed with each other most of the time on roll call votes related to China. Third, the major events in US-China relations largely determined the ebb and flow of China bills. Negative binomial regression analysis sheds further light on the dynamic of China policymaking on Capitol Hill. A Republican majority in the House facing off with a Democratic president brought about many more China bills. Also, there appears to be a significant gap between public opinion and congressional attitudes on China policy. Finally, the Tiananmen Incident has had a profound impact on Congress, making it much more active and punitive in China policy since then. I conclude the paper by briefly discussing the policy implications of my findings. Only in the case of Communist China has the Congress played a major role over a long period of time to confine narrowly the president's means of maneuver.1 [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines the extent to which China's 'Fourth generation' leadership might be inclined to place a greater emphasis on nationalist rhetoric both in China's international relations and in domestic policy. It explores two different views of nationalism, namely state-centred and popular. With the decline in the public impact of official ideology, the Party-state has given tacit recognition to nationalism as one potential source of regime legitimisation. However, this article argues that by placing the Party at the centre of the official discourse the state-centred view of nationalism restricts the extent to which the Party-state can mobilise nationalist symbolism in support of its leadership and makes the Party vulnerable to criticism from more popular conceptions of nationalism. The priority given to developing the economy means China's leaders must downplay popular criticism which can focus on the negative consequences of China's growing interaction with the wider world. Under China's 'Fourth generation' leadership this tension may deepen. China's new leadership are unlikely to resort to 'wrapping themselves in the flag' as some commentators have suggested. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper starts with some observations about developments of the post-Cold War era and their impact on Sino–ASEAN and Sino–Singaporean relations. It then surveys the relations between Singapore and China in the 1990s. The focus is on the establishment of official ties in 1990 and the economic interactions between the two sides in the last decade. Having surveyed the relations, the paper examines some of the problems for the promotion of closer cooperation. It notes the difference in the working style of both sides. In this regard, it deals specifically with the Suzhou Industrial Park and highlights the lessons that could be drawn from such a joint venture. The paper concludes by noting that Sino–Singaporean cooperation has been broadened to include defence, cultural and educational exchanges and the relationship will be more realistic and mature in the twenty-first century. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The recent increasing socioeconomic and political interactions between mainland China and Taiwan have resulted in a significant number of marriages between the two societies. Why do people cross the Strait to look for a marriage partner? What are the socioeconomic and demographic characteristics of such marriages? And what impact do these marriages have on society as well as on the individuals involved? These are the issues we explore in this paper. Analyzing a survey on cross-Strait marriages conducted by the authors, this paper concludes that inter-regime marriages between these two societies predominately involve older Taiwanese males and younger mainland females. The general pattern in these marriages represents an exchange between the intrinsic attributes (age, appearance) of the mainland women and the extrinsic attributes (financial status) of the Taiwanese men. In addition, inter-regime marriages provide a means for mainland women to attain geographic and eventually social mobility. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper investigates macro-level sources of variations across countries regrading China's national image, as measured by the proportion of the public in each of 35 countries that expressed a favorable view of China in the 2007 Pew Global Attitudes Survey. It turns out that several expected factors have no significant measurable impact on China's image: not the extent of strategic ties between China and a given country; not the political system of that country; not the extent of Chinese investment in the country; and not the number of Confucius institutes and classrooms in that country. The only macro-level factor we find to affect China's image in a country is that country's level of economic and social development, as measured by the UN Human Development Index. Controlling for the other factors, publics in poor or developing countries are much more likely to have a favorable image of China than publics in economically advanced countries. Some implications of our findings are discussed. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This paper revisits the debate about foreign policy implications of Chinese nationalism in the context of China's increasingly confrontational and assertive behavior in recent years. It argues that while the Chinese government made effective efforts to control popular nationalism and Chinese foreign policy was therefore not dictated by emotional nationalistic rhetoric before 2008, it has become more willing to follow the popular nationalist calls to take a confrontational position against the Western powers and to adopt tougher measures in maritime territorial disputes with its neighbors. This strident turn is partially because the government is increasingly responsive to public opinion, but more importantly because of the convergence of Chinese state nationalism and popular nationalism calling for a more muscular Chinese foreign policy. Enjoying an inflated sense of empowerment supported by its new quotient of wealth and military capacities, and terrified of an uncertain future due to increasing social, economic and political tensions at home, the communist state has become more willing to play to the popular nationalist gallery in pursuing the so-called core national interests. These developments have complicated China's diplomacy, creating a heated political environment to harden China's foreign policy. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

In this paper I address the question of how Chinese scholars participate in scientific knowledge production by appropriating Western IR theories, primarily by examining interactions between North American theories that claim universality and China-specific IR efforts. Drawing on post-Mao era publications and books, I discuss how increasingly independent Chinese IR scholars are portraying their country's rising status in international politics and identifying China's national interests, while still emphasizing socialist concepts such as anti-hegemonism. The result is a form of Chinese IR scholarship that combines Western IR language with a worldview that emphasizes a modern China within the context of traditional socialist foreign policy norms. I will argue that Chinese scholarly discussions about IR theory building reflect efforts to present ‘their rising China’ (as individually perceived) in the study, research, and development of IR theory in response to the appearance of modern IR methods that require new definitions and new roles for old socialist forms. In this context, identity concerns are more important than the actual theories being established or appropriated. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

China has rapidly re-emerged as a major regional power in East Asia. Although this represents a return to a long-established historical pattern, the ability of China's political elites to reassure nervous neighbours about the implications of its rise will be a major test of its evolving and increasingly sophisticated foreign policies. In this paper we focus primarily on China's regional engagement strategies, detailing the way such initiatives are understood in China, and the way they are received elsewhere. We focus primarily on the political and economic impacts of China's policies, and briefly consider their reception in Northeast Asia and Southeast Asia. We highlight the different dynamics and issues that China's policymakers must consider in each area, and suggest that despite some difficulties and tensions, on balance, China's policies are proving surprisingly effective. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This paper examines how growing insecurity in Pakistan-affecting the security of Chinese expatriates and neighboring Xinjiang-impacts China's policy towards its 'all-weather' friend. It argues that managing the terrorist risk in a changing regional environment has led to a double adjustment in China's policy towards Pakistan. First, counterterrorist cooperation has moved up the policy agenda, albeit with a peculiar modus operandi, focused on sustaining a pro-Chinese 'United Front' in Pakistan. Second, Beijing has positively reassessed Pakistan's strategic value and moved towards strategic reassurance, although the construction of a trade-and-energy corridor between Gwadar and Xinjiang has been negatively affected by the risk of violence. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper explores how China's strategic motivations and calculations have both motivated and constrained its participation in East Asian regional cooperation. It argues that China's participation in regional economic and security cooperation is motivated first of all by the calculation of China's domestic interests to create a peaceful peripheral environment for its economic growth and political stability, particularly its frontier security and prosperity. The realist interests to enhance China's position in power competition with other major players in the region, particularly Japan and US, also play an important part in China's strategic calculation. These interest calculations, however, also set limits on China's participation in regional cooperation. These interest calculations have also shaped China's preference for an informal approach, emphasizing voluntarism and consensus building rather than legally binding resolutions, toward regional cooperation. This soft approach is a major barrier for many regional institutions to move beyond the stage of talking shops to effectively resolve conflicts in the region. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In charting the water of the post-Cold War world, one of the most prominent questions touches upon the likely effects of China's rise. Echoing more or less explicitly power transition theory's assumptions, the rapid and multifaceted ascent of China has popularized the idea of a likely overtaking of the American dominant power by the rising challenger. Sceptics have, however, pointed out that by most standards China remains far from being on a par with the United States. This paper argues that though a global power transition lies far beyond the horizon, the relevant level at which the transition should be considered is the East Asian region, or the Asian 'super-region'. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The rapid ascendency of China has attracted considerable attention from American scholars, policymakers, and media. Yet what does the American public think about the rise of China as a world power? In this paper we use survey data collected by the Chicago Council on Global Affairs and other organizations to explore the nature and causes of Americans' views. It turns out that most Americans are well aware of the rise of China. Some are apprehensive about that rise, chiefly for national security (rather than economic) reasons, and many favor a degree of off-shore 'balancing' of the sort that realists recommend. But few Americans want to actively work to limit the rise of China. Very few favor the use of troops to defend Taiwan. Very few favor a nuclear-armed Japan. Large majorities of Americans take stands more akin to those of neo-liberals than realist theorists, favoring cooperation and peaceful engagement with China. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Facing the ever-growing interdependence across the Taiwan Strait, Mainland China's strategy towards Taiwan is undergoing a profound change, that is, transcending the staunch realpolitik mentality and turning to an institutional arrangement in policy making. Especially since President Hu Jintao took up his position, the Mainland has endeavored to improve cross-Strait relations through the institutionalization of a series of sensitive issues, such as the proposals and signatures of some long-term accords aiming to advocate economic cooperation, promote social exchanges, weaken political opposition and foster mutual trust. By taking the Mainland's national development strategy shift, Taiwan's domestic reality and 'institution deficit' in cross-Strait relations into consideration, this paper analyzes the reasons, efforts and features of the Mainland's recent institutional-orientated policy transition. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

For the last four centuries, under the policy of the Portuguese Padroado1454, the Macau Catholic Church has been closely associated with the Portuguese rulers of Macau in governing this 'Chinese territory under the Portuguese rule'. This church-state relationship in Macau before the Chinese takeover (1999) and after has become a client-patron relationship under the shadow of the Portuguese appeasement policy. In the context of the appeasement policy, this paper aims at discussing: (1) the close alliance between the Portuguese government and the Catholic Church in Macau, offering special privileges and convenience to the Church but weakening church capacity in evangelization and spiritual leadership; and (2) the interactions of the three actors in the triangular relationship among the Vatican, China and Macau. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The crippled economic and political reform in China has come with two schools of thought: the new-left and nationalism. The new-left focuses on domestic issues, while nationalism tackles more international relationships. This paper explores the effects of radical nationalism on China's democratization process. It argues that if nationalism takes the dominant position in China's political process, Chinese reform will go astray. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The composition of Greater China among the PRC, Hong Kong and Taiwan entails an emerging form of micro governance where an ecological evolution of sub-group interaction and crossover of economic and social activities has been generating a dynamic of change within the East Asian region. The constitution of Greater China by social, economic, political, business and even daily commuting creates some soul searching questions about the possible outcomes of their intense interaction. To what extent has integration been made within Greater China through these interactions? Is China the economic linchpin or does China need to cooperate in one way or another to facilitate the modes of economic development? What are the attitudes and strategies used by Hong Kong or Taiwan when confronted with such an economic cum social entity? More importantly, where, and, under what conditions, will the interactions among the PRC, Taiwan and Hong Kong lead to? In this paper, I am going to use a conceptual model which includes four interactions: integration, interdependence, identity and independence (Four Is) to capture the catalyst of change that collectively entails these intermingled economic, social and cultural elements. People who live in the vast context of this geographical region experience the change. Through daily interaction, they help write the context of change through business activities, investment, migration, trade, culture, academic exchange, political and social development along the Four Is. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper occupies a middle ground in the debate between regional area specialists in foreign policy analysis and international relations theorists in international studies. Based on balance of power and balance of threat theories, a 'dynamic balancing' model is introduced to explain states' foreign policy strategies. Its claims are: (1) the polarity of the international system shapes whether a state's strategic choices should be balancing with external efforts or balancing with internal efforts; (2) leaders' perceptions of external threats determine when and how a state pursues different balancing strategies. The application of the dynamic balancing model to China's balancing strategies towards the United States suggests that the future of Sino-American relations depends on the strategic interactions and mutual threat perceptions between the two nations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

China's attitude towards UNPKOs has experienced two shifts since the 1980s. One is about changing from non-financial-support, non-voting, and non-participation concerning peacekeeping to financial-support, voting, and participation in 1981. The other shift concerns China's gradual change in its attitude toward non-traditional peacekeeping over the 1990s. This paper provides a norm perspective on the issue. Specifically the author argues that China's attitude toward UNPKOs changed as a result of the change in international norm from prioritizing sovereignty to prioritizing human rights, and the diffusion of the norm of human rights into China through a variety of agents such as foreign policy elites and two special groups of PLA officers. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

China has adopted a state-centered approach towards energy security to deepen political and commercial relationships with all energy producing nations and to aggressively invest in oil fields and pipelines around the world. Applying this approach to its relations with its Asia-Pacific neighbors has produced mixed results. While China's energy diplomacy has brought about opportunities for cooperation with some of its neighbors, notably some countries in Central Asia and continental Southeast Asia, it has become a source of conflict with some other neighbors, especially those with border disputes over maritime territories which may have rich natural resources. This paper examines China's state-led search for energy security and its implications for China's relations with Asia-Pacific countries. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study examines the Chinese media's coverage of the Iraq War and SARS in 2003, that of CCTV in particular, and discusses the 'citizen's right to know' which became popularised in China during these two breaking news events. After delineating the moves that CCTV has been making, the paper argues that in the face of globalisation of information the party-state is actively involved in pursuit of image reconstruction both at home and internationally, and of having a voice in the new world order. Findings show that although the Chinese media do not lack the capacity to honor the 'citizen's right to know', the coverage of breaking news is determined by the state's perception of a given situation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The deepening rapprochement between China and Russia, those two formidable continental powers, constitutes one of the most noteworthy phenomena in post-Cold War world affairs. Through detailed investigation of this vital bilateral relationship over a variety of issue areas, we characterize the current Sino-Russian relations as a limited defensive strategic partnership, with strategicness constituting the core of the Sino-Russian relationship. More than that, we further argue that the Sino-Russian rapprochement is externally-driven rather than internally-driven. More specifically, realism's balance of power theory, or its variety balance of threat theory, provides a relatively convincing explanation regarding the increasingly strengthened Sino-Russian strategic partnership. In a roughly chronological way, this paper will demonstrate how America's increasing unilateralism in its foreign policy approaches was correlated with, and thus contributed to, the deepening rapprochement between China and Russia. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

North Korea looms large as a challenge for the United States and China. US-China cooperation in working to deal with the challenge of North Korea is often held up as an example of constructive engagement between Washington and Beijing. Nevertheless, North Korea has the potential to generate discord or even conflict between the United States and China. This paper considers several possible scenarios for North Korea and evaluates the implications of each for the US-China relationship. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper is designed to review China's efforts to adapt to the post-Cold War world dominated by the United States and to analyze the underlying factors that have shaped such efforts. It attempts to make three points: (1) the adaptation process has been an eventful and difficult one; (2) China's gradual appreciation of the new international reality, the daunting domestic challenges China faces, and China's growing awareness of the implications of its rise for its developmental prospects have helped shape its efforts of adaptation; and (3) in the foreseeable future, if the US does not treat China as an enemy and if the two countries can effectively manage the Taiwan problem, China is likely to continue its efforts to accommodate and cooperate with the US. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

With the rise of China, the importance of understanding Chinese nationalism increases. Assessing Chinese nationalism, many people claim that it has grown stronger and more intense in recent years. Some believe that this is the case because the Chinese Government deliberately promotes nationalism to serve its own purposes. This paper argues that the reality with Chinese nationalism is much more complicated than many assume. It has grown stronger in some respects but weaker in others. The role of the Chinese Government is at best mixed. In explaining the development of Chinese nationalism, one needs to look at external as well as internal and historical causes. Only by doing so can one gain a fuller and more balanced understanding of this intriguing phenomenon. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

China's GATT/WTO accession process has been dynamic and complex, affected by the broad political and economic factors at both the international and the domestic levels, and by a complex intertwining of bilateral and multilateral negotiations. This paper attempts to review this 15-year-long negotiation by focusing on the correlation and interaction between three variables—international factors, bureaucratic politics, and societal factors—and the negotiation process. Among them, the author identifies the first two variables as the primary factors shaping negotiation positions, strategies and outcomes, while societal factors such as Congress, interest groups and the public media are also worth noting. They played a minor but growing role in China to affect the ebb and flow of the negotiation process. Furthermore, they functioned differently in the West and in China and these differences themselves also contributed to influencing the negotiation process. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The search for status, or more correctly, the desire to maintain status, lies at the heart of the Republic of China on Taiwan's (ROC) foreign policy. This is particularly so vis-à-vis its official state-to-state relations. In this regard, the ROC has been constrained by a conscious policy by the People's Republic of China (PRC) to try and marginalize Taiwan on the international stage. Due to objective realities, Taiwan has had to become satisfied with maintaining official state relations with small states only. All, with the exception of the Vatican, are in the developing world, with a number in Africa. This paper examines Taiwanese foreign policy and its diplomatic initiatives, with particular reference to its use of 'dollar diplomacy' in its activities in Africa. The constraints and limitations of such policies are drawn out. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In examining the Hong Kongers' participation in the social development of China, I suggest that China-development provides an important local site for the study of Chinese postcoloniality. Not only does it disclose the multiple and contradicting effects of colonial power, it also embodies the conflicting visions of modern China between the official Grand Narrative of modern Chinese nationhood and the local narratives of modern Chineseness. It became a site that created discursive possibilities for individual Hong Kongers to negotiate their ambivalent identification with and resistance to China. In this paper, I show how Hong Kongers were constructed as 'free subjects' under the British colonial discourse of liberalism which in turn shaped the Hong Kong discourse of China-development. Circulating in China-development was the image of China as the oppressive and corrupt 'inside' and Hong Kong as a free 'outside' space of accountability and equality of opportunities. Vacillating between East and West, Hong Kongers came to represent themselves as modern Chinese towards which they worked to develop their mainland compatriots. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The common view is that China is North Korea's ally. The two countries share a similar political system and considerable strategic interest in regional international relations. Indeed, this is true to a large extent. This paper, however, analyses the problems in the bilateral relations that are gradually eroding the strategic ties the two countries formed 50 years ago. Its central argument is that, in reality, beneath the surface of the alliance relations the two countries share very few common interests. In fact, the two countries can hardly agree to any matters between them, be it historical ties, ideological stance, political and economic programs, or diplomatic interactions. This heralds an uncertain future for the bilateral relations and thus may further complicate the security situation in the Korean Peninsula. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper argues that now, more than at any other time, the way that China–US relations evolve will shape each country's interests and affect the development of global politics. Thus, at this critical point, it is important that the two countries develop a mutually beneficial relationship. In this respect Chinese views of US intentions matter because these views translate into policies; policies that influence US domestic politics and shape relations between the two countries. It is ironic, then, that while Chinese understanding of US domestic politics has never been better and its response to it has never been more sophisticated, the criticisms of China in the US have never been stronger than at any time since rapprochement in the early 1970s. And, pointing specifically to the debate in the US since 1994 over the Clinton Administration's engagement policy, Jia analyzes this as a key source of current Chinese frustrations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Cross-Strait relations between Taiwan and mainland China are of great importance to the development of China and peace in East Asia. However, this subject has not been sufficiently dealt with in a theoretical manner. This paper takes stock of the analytical approaches in the field in an effort to present to the academic world the existing intellectual instruments that interested researchers can take advantage of in cross-Strait studies. Nine approaches are identified. They are: the divided-nation model, integration theory, the power asymmetry model, the vote-maximizing model, the developmental state paradigm, strategic triangle theory, systems theory, political psychology theory, and the cognitive approach. The intellectual roots of these approaches are traced and their applicability to cross-Strait relations examined. Their strengths and weaknesses are also compared. Finally, a synthetic analytical framework is proposed. It is believed that a literature review of this kind is a prerequisite to a theoretical understanding of the cross-Strait relations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Through the lens of securitization theory, this article looks at the significant impact that non-traditional security has had over Chinese foreign policy. Over time, non-traditional security has changed from being understood as an opportunity to boost China's international standing, to being seen as an important category within security threats. China's security and diplomatic behavior has changed accordingly. In particular, China has become more confident in using and authorizing force. This article pinpoints this process started in the 1990s by looking at the debate within the government and the legal, institutional and military response against those new threats. It also prompts important considerations about the drivers and the direction of Chinese foreign policy, and the general approach of studying the same subject. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In China, too many leadership positions are assigned to the same broad administrative levels, creating difficulty in distinguishing their specific political rankings. Pinpointing their exact political significance, this study proposes an index using the common joint appointments of party and government positions in the Chinese Nomenklatura. After coming up with the index, to demonstrate applicability, this article uses it first to assess China's provincial-level positions and then extend it down to prefecture-level and up to Central ministerial positions. The authors believe that this new index enables better observation and interpretation of China's leadership transfers and, consequently, improves researchers' understanding of the prospects of Chinese politicians and the dynamics of the Chinese polity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The origins and role of the concepts of peaceful coexistence and active defense in Chinese foreign policy are investigated and applied to China’s policy toward the Diaoyu/Senkakus. The dominant moderate conceptual strategic thinking encourages Beijing to aim for the establishment of amodus vivendiwith Washington and Tokyo that involves ade factopresence of China alongside both the US and Japan. However, Beijing’s signaling is complicated by radical voices that undercut coexistence. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The rise of Chinese capabilities relative to those of the United States has received widespread attention. Some argue that a transition in relative capabilities has already occurred, others that it is unlikely within this century. This article presents a new multidimensional measure of relative national capabilities and forecasts using the International Futures model across 29 alternative scenarios. This article finds that Chinese capabilities surpass the United States in 26 scenarios before 2060, with the most frequent period of power transition being the early 2040s. This analysis offers an opportunity for leaders to reconcile national images with reality, potentially reducing the risk of conflict associated with great power transition. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Corrupt officials fleeing abroad with ill-gotten proceeds constitute a special challenge for the Chinese government. International cooperation to seize these fugitives often encounters roadblocks due to countries' legal-political differences. By observing China's burgeoning extraterritorial anti-corruption regime, this article proposes that an anti-money laundering (AML) mindset is being embraced to 'seize the fugitives' by 'tracing the money'. This approach has three advantages: 1) de-complication by standardizing states' practices and bypassing complexities inherent in orthodox means, 2) de-politicization by circumventing sensitive political concerns through pursuing fugitives and corrupt proceeds separately, and 3) leveling the playing field by rebalancing power between requested and requesting states. In-depth case studies combined with elite interviews reveal that this AML-oriented tactic has facilitated China's capture of fugitives on foreign soils. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article proposes an analytical framework to address why implemented autonomy outcomes may differ across ethnically-defined autonomous regions in China. The framework consists of a structural explanatory variable, inter-ethnic boundary-making processes, and an agential intervening variable, titular elites' representation in the ethno-regional state. It is applied to a synchronic comparison of four ethno-regions with differing autonomy outcomes for 2010–2015, Xinjiang, Tibet, Inner Mongolia, Ningxia. Titular elites' representation in the ethno-regional state is used as a proxy for titular elites' bargaining capacity with the central state. This article argues that an 'integration-distinction balance,' or rather, higher inter-ethnic integration combined with robust consciousness of inter-ethnic distinction, can contribute to titular elites' representation in the ethno-regional state, which can lead to greater autonomy outcome for the ethno-region. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This research offers a timely examination of the functioning of China's National Supervisory Commission (NSC) in Dr. Li Wenliang's case. Based on the normative analysis and empirical study, this research identifies two flaws of the NSC preset by particular features of a Leninist state, which make it vulnerable to politicization in the initiation and the course of this investigation: (i) Overreliance on certain factional power distribution; (ii) Twofold identity as an anti-corruption agency and a party disciplinarian concurrently. By challenging both the institutionalization and deinstitutionalization arguments with a critical case, this research advances new theoretical knowledge on the self-defeating mechanisms compromising institutionalization in the Leninist regime and highlights the significance of differentiating subtypes of authoritarianism in the comparative study of institutionalization. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Sino-Kazakh negotiations concerning water distribution of cross-border rivers have reached an impasse for the past six years. This article hypothesizes that China's stance on Sino-Kazakh cross-border river issues is fundamentally driven by China's assessment of separatism/terrorism in Xinjiang and its national policy concerning domestic water conservation. The argument is developed using the process-tracing method. The major finding of this research is that Sino-Kazakh cross-border river cooperation is facilitated by China's reliance on Kazakhstan as an anti-separatist/counter-terrorist partner and thwarted by China's national securitization of domestic water resources. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]