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This paper examines the concept of green nationalism in the authoritarian context of China, where the ruling Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has adopted the rhetoric of ecological civilization as a means of promoting environmental protection and securing global legitimacy. The authors argue that the CCP's performance legitimacy is closely linked to its ability to address environmental concerns in the context of climate change, and that the development of green nationalism is a rational choice for leaders seeking to maintain this legitimacy. However, the authors also highlight the role of actors such as social entrepreneurs, academics, and environmental NGOs in promoting green nationalism from the bottom-up. Using constructivist political theory, the paper explores how the intersection of different green narratives at various levels can be used to rethink the nation and make claims to legitimacy. Overall, the paper contributes to theory-building by providing a framework for understanding the complex relationship between environmental protection, nationalism, and authoritarian politics in China. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper studies the constrained judicialization of environmental governance in China. It starts by quantitatively describing the judicialization of environmental protection in China over the past decade, including both its progresses and the suppressions that it faced, and shows that environmental courts have had virtually no tangible impact on reducing pollution levels. It then attempts to rationalize the observed patterns by answering two questions. First, why does the government choose to empower the courts when it possesses a rich set of other regulatory tools in environmental protection? This choice can be attributed to both the central government’s needs to curb local protectionism, as well as the local governments’ incentives to promote legitimacy. Second, to the extent that courts can contribute to environmental governance, why does the government impose tight controls over environmental litigation? This can be explained by the government’s deep-rooted wariness of class lawsuits and other collective actions, as well as the judiciary’s inherent conflicts with the flexibility required by a regulatory regime. In addition, the judiciary’s limited capacity also impedes the judicialization of environmental governance. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]