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Based on a nine-city cell phone survey in 2019, this paper systematically examines which groups showed stronger support for armed unification with Taiwan and what factors and mechanisms might contribute to their support. The bivariate analysis shows the politically, economically, and socially privileged groups and those with stronger national pride and more understanding of Taiwan were more pro-armed unification, while residents of the two coastal cities, Xiamen and Guangzhou, were less supportive. Further analysis indicates education and unfavorable view of the Taiwanese government were the two most powerful factors contributing to the support. Possible contributing mechanisms might include both top-down mechanisms, such as political indoctrination and propaganda, and bottom-up ones, such as the respondents' interest and identity considerations influenced by their city's proximity to Taiwan. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In Taiwan, where relations with China define the major political cleavage, voters have distinct preferences on the issue of independence. Do Taiwanese favor a symbolic or pragmatic approach to the Taiwan independence issue? What are the factors that account for their political preferences? We identify two types of voters, symbolic and pragmatic, according to whether their preferences on independence are conditional or unconditional on China's potential counter actions. Specifically, symbolic voters have unconditional preferences on independence, while pragmatic voters are more agreeable to independence under more favorable conditions. Using multiple wave data from the Taiwan National Security Surveys (TNSS 2002–2022), we investigate the individual- and macro-level factors and find that gender, age, education level, ethnicity, partisan strength, and economic growth rate shape the types of voters in Taiwan. This paper contributes to the study of political attitudes in Taiwan, and have important implications on the regional stability in East Asia. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper reviews the security challenges from several perspectives, the first and perhaps most important being the geo-strategic reality that Taiwan will always be only 90-odd miles from mainland China. This irreversible fact means that Taiwan will always be in the shadow of growing mainland power. The paper then briefly comments on how PLA modernization, largely focused on the 'Taiwan issue' does pose real challenges. The paper addresses some of the issues surrounding how the ROC is addressing its defense, and contrast, unfavorably, the lack of ROC military focus compared to what is going on in the mainland. The paper also makes an attempt to assess opportunities from a security perspective. The key question is opportunities for what? [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper it is argued that Taiwan succeeded in developing by deviating from the currently popular 'Washington Consensus' strategy in specific ways. In particular, it developed investment strategies that have now reached a crucial 'Schumpeterian' phase. This has important implications for high and information technology sectors. Following Schumpeter we assume that innovation in specific firms can have economy-wide effects. Models based on this idea can be shown to have multiple equilibria. The idea of a positive feedback loop innovation system or POLIS is formalized by picking an appropriate sequence of equilibria over time. It is shown that POLIS has empirical relevance by applying the formal model to an actual economy. Recent financial crisis in many Asian countries, most notably South Korea, seems to have reversed the conventional wisdom regarding the East Asian 'miracle'. This paper applies the concept of a POLIS to show that neither the current view that the miracle was a mirage nor the earlier contrarian view that the growth was a result of factor accumulation only is correct. Ultimately technological transformation--in particular the creation of a positive feedback loop innovation system is what makes the difference between sustained growth and gradual or sudden decline. Although various problems remain in both the real and the financial sectors, the successes of Taiwan in building the preconditions for an innovation system are worth examining. Upon careful examination of Taiwan's system of innovation within the above Schumpeterian model it is found that of all the 'miracle' economies Taiwan has the best chance of building a POLIS in the near future. Because of Taiwan's strength in building a POLIS, the PRC can also benefit from continuing contact with Taiwan through trade and FDI from Taiwan. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In recent years the concept of 'soft power', popularized by the work of Joseph Nye, has gained currency in both China and Taiwan. This paper explores how the Chinese and Taiwanese understand soft power and its sources, and how their understanding differs from Nye's formulation. It discusses why this foreign concept has become so salient in the Chinese and the Taiwanese discourse. It also examines the impact of this concept on the external policies of China and Taiwan. The paper concludes by pointing out the limitations of the concept of soft power. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The recent increasing socioeconomic and political interactions between mainland China and Taiwan have resulted in a significant number of marriages between the two societies. Why do people cross the Strait to look for a marriage partner? What are the socioeconomic and demographic characteristics of such marriages? And what impact do these marriages have on society as well as on the individuals involved? These are the issues we explore in this paper. Analyzing a survey on cross-Strait marriages conducted by the authors, this paper concludes that inter-regime marriages between these two societies predominately involve older Taiwanese males and younger mainland females. The general pattern in these marriages represents an exchange between the intrinsic attributes (age, appearance) of the mainland women and the extrinsic attributes (financial status) of the Taiwanese men. In addition, inter-regime marriages provide a means for mainland women to attain geographic and eventually social mobility. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Taiwan's transition from authoritarian to democratic rule has not necessarily resulted in lower levels of perceived corruption on the island. Indeed, many Taiwan citizens have come to view the problem of corruption as worsening in recent years. To understand what these perceptions are and why they have emerged, this study examines Taiwanese attitudes toward corruption and its control from a bottom-up approach. By utilizing data from an original, nationwide public opinion survey, the authors identify the most prevalent corrupt behaviors and the institutions in Taiwanese society that are most susceptible to corruption. The paper then investigates three ‘bottom-up’ factors that help explain variations in the perception of corruption by citizens: encounter with government bureaucracy, party identification, and the effect of media. Analysis of survey data indicates that all three factors influence how Taiwanese people feel about corruption and corruption-related issues. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Although the essence of China's Taiwan policy has not changed from the era of Jiang Zemin to the present, the era of Hu Jintao, Jiang's and Hu's attitudes are different. Jiang was impatient with the delay in the unification of China and Taiwan, talking about timetables for unification; however, Hu has so far been patient, saying that he is not afraid of delaying unification. The purpose of this paper is to explain why their attitudes are different. I argue that two factors combine to result in Jiang's impatience and Hu's patience: conflicting ‘perceptions of Taiwan's domestic politics and Taiwan's China policy’ and differing ‘perceptions of the US behavior and attitude regarding Taiwan’. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Facing the ever-growing interdependence across the Taiwan Strait, Mainland China's strategy towards Taiwan is undergoing a profound change, that is, transcending the staunch realpolitik mentality and turning to an institutional arrangement in policy making. Especially since President Hu Jintao took up his position, the Mainland has endeavored to improve cross-Strait relations through the institutionalization of a series of sensitive issues, such as the proposals and signatures of some long-term accords aiming to advocate economic cooperation, promote social exchanges, weaken political opposition and foster mutual trust. By taking the Mainland's national development strategy shift, Taiwan's domestic reality and 'institution deficit' in cross-Strait relations into consideration, this paper analyzes the reasons, efforts and features of the Mainland's recent institutional-orientated policy transition. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines the work of the Taiwanese troupe Performance Workshop (Biaoyan gongzuofang) under director and playwright Stan Lai, specifically Peach Blossom Land, Strange Tales from Taiwan, and I Me He Him. These plays address the disjunction of space and time through a particular device, namely splitting the stage between 'here' and 'there', 'now' and 'then'. Characters and their alter-egos share the same stage, a situation that results in awkward and fragmented dialogs. The cohabitation of incompatible temporal dimensions gives rise to many comical situations, foregrounds the futility of the characters' search for stable identities, and demonstrates the existence of irreconcilable though mutually resonant temporal planes. The double play often becomes a metaphor for the mirroring existence on the two sides of the Taiwan Straits, as well as for the role of theater itself in teasing out and negotiating between these ambiguous similarities. Lai's plays give the lie to neat distinctions between local Taiwanese and pan-Chinese identities, and stress the heightened sense of dislocation in a globalizing society. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper investigates the dispersion of household income in the course of economic development in Taiwan. Statistics show that inequality of income has increased since the early 1980s as the rate of economic growth has declined from 11.6% in 1986 to 4.1% in 2005. The empirical result on the relationship between economic growth and income distribution also fails to support the conventional inverted-U Kuznets curve. Factors leading to change in income disparity may be attributed to variations in family formation, economic structures, and the recent change in political leadership and institutional policy. Among them, increased single-parent families deteriorate overall income share, although growth in the service sector helps to alleviate inequity. The new political governance and policy reform since 2000 are detected to aggravate income inequality. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper argues against the popular impression that the rise of Taiwan's national consciousness is a result of democratization. Instead, it looks to the world timing of Taiwan becoming an independent reference point internationally for explanation of the changing identity in contemporary politics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Investigating how the PRC responds to democratization in Taiwan and Hong Kong, this paper argues that the Chinese Communist leadership has mainly developed three strategies in managing the complicated crises, including Beijing's own legitimacy crisis and the integration crisis of the Chinese nation, caused by the rise of offshore Chinese democracies. These strategies are: identity politics, sovereignty politics, and economic penetration. With 'identity politics', Beijing identifies 'identification with the Communist leadership' as the sole Chinese national identification, and utilizes the nationalistic passions of mainland and even overseas Chinese people against democrats in Taiwan and Hong Kong, by labeling the latter as 'separatists' or 'national traitors'. Further, Beijing defines 'sovereignty' in a way in which the 'central' government monopolizes all possessions of the nation, and excludes 'people's sovereignty' from the politics of national reunification or the 'one country, two systems' model actualization. While appealing to both 'soft power' based in 'patriotic nationalism' and 'hard power' embedded in national sovereignty, however, the Chinese regime also mobilizes business resources and opportunities provided by China's growing economic power and China's dominance in Greater Chian economic integration for its political purposes of curbing offshore Chinese democracies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Taiwan is a revisionist power. Its independence movement challenges a vital status-quo interest of mainland China's opposition to a dejure Taiwan declaration of independence and maintaining, however ambiguously, Taiwan's commitment to the ‘one-China’ formulation. Why is it that a small and vulnerable island off the coast of a great power has continued to challenge the vital interest of that great power and risk war? Adopting a ‘levels of analysis’ approach to Taiwan's mainland policy, this paper addresses this question by examining four prevalent explanations for Taiwan's revisionist diplomacy: (1) the mainland deterrent is ineffective, reflecting Taiwan doubts about either mainland capabilities or mainland resolve to wage a retaliatory war; (2) in an example of the security dilemma in alliance politics, US commitment to Taiwan, although aimed at deterring PRC use of force, encourages Taiwan to challenge the status quo because the Taiwan leadership is confident of US intervention and US ability to defend Taiwan; (3) because of the development of a ‘Taiwan identity’ and of corresponding domestic political pressures, the Democratic Progressive Party has been compelled to adopt a pro-independence policy; (4) Chen Shui-bian has a personal commitment to Taiwan independence and has been willing to challenge the mainland's interest in one-China, despite risk of heightened conflict and regardless of domestic political considerations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines the changing role of the state and private enterprise in Taiwan's electronics industry as the industry responds to growth of intra-firm capabilities and the rise of China as a manufacturing base. The industry has a sharp dichotomous outcome between the technologically strong IC sector, which has been able to create interdependence with global lead firms, and the systems manufacturing firms, which find themselves trapped in a dependent position vis-à-vis the global lead firms. Due to different positions in global value chains, the IC industry firms have been better able to create advantages out of the opportunities of new firm capabilities and China than the systems firms even as the balance of policy has shifted somewhat away from the state and towards private enterprise. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines recent modifications in American policy toward the Republic of China (ROC or Taiwan). It contends that, while the George W. Bush Administration may have carried out a significant readjustment of US policy, available evidence suggests that it will not endorse any major upgrades in ties with Taipei during the foreseeable future. Like previous administrations, the Bush Administration now recognizes the value of engaging the People's Republic of China (PRC). This development holds important implications for the future trajectory of America's relations with Taiwan and the PRC and for peace and stability in the Western Pacific. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Despite the presence of new presidents in Taiwan and the US, the basic dynamics of the US–China–Taiwan triangle and the dilemmas faced by leaders on all three sides have remained largely intact. This paper looks at how Chen Shui-bian and George W. Bush have tried to change the policies and practices they inherited from their predecessors. Chen has shown himself to be a less provocative president, and Bush has adopted more supportive and sympathetic policies toward Taiwan. Despite their personal inclinations, they have been able to make only marginal changes in their relations with the other, and with China. Domestic political conflicts and competing strategic interests prevent a fundamental change in relations between the US, China, and Taiwan. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The research results given here show that Taiwanese local elites, in terms of breadth of political participation, support the common people's right of participation more than those in Mainland China. In terms of depth, local elites on neither side support having people with special family backgrounds as leaders, but the Taiwanese do not narrowly define the qualifications of leaders or managers, requiring, for example, a certain degree of capability. Mainland Chinese local elites are more conservative in this respect. On the issue of economic equality, the concept of establishing a limit on income varies greatly on the two sides. The percentage of those in favor of such a limit is lower in Taiwan, yet the Taiwanese endorse more the idea of taking care of the poor and correcting unequal income distribution. The overall perspective on conflict resolution is quite the same for both sides' local elites. That is, they all strive to maintain harmony and avoid conflict, even at a price of sacrificing plans for local development. The most probable factor behind these trends is the great difference between the two sides' politico-economic systems, the process of their development and the status quo. Thus, there are differences between the two sides, either on certain perspectives on the three dimensions of the concept of democracy, or on other possible factors, which affect these perspectives. Elites on both sides are especially similar in their efforts to avoid conflict and their tendency to respect experts, showing the effect of a relatively homogeneous culture as we compare such attitudes internationally, but such cultural tastes might hinder future democratization on both sides. Other possible inferences, including the prospects for the development of democracy on both sides, will be dealt with briefly in this paper. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The search for status, or more correctly, the desire to maintain status, lies at the heart of the Republic of China on Taiwan's (ROC) foreign policy. This is particularly so vis-à-vis its official state-to-state relations. In this regard, the ROC has been constrained by a conscious policy by the People's Republic of China (PRC) to try and marginalize Taiwan on the international stage. Due to objective realities, Taiwan has had to become satisfied with maintaining official state relations with small states only. All, with the exception of the Vatican, are in the developing world, with a number in Africa. This paper examines Taiwanese foreign policy and its diplomatic initiatives, with particular reference to its use of 'dollar diplomacy' in its activities in Africa. The constraints and limitations of such policies are drawn out. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

So far as Taiwan's foreign relations are concerned, in parallel to the state's diplomacy and state-blessed Track-II maneuvering, there has emerged a more natural and meaningful phenomenon: i.e. grassroots solidarity between Taiwanese activist NGOs and their foreign counterparts, as a result of the joint pursuit of common social justice goals. It is high time that voluntary transnational activism was studied for a more comprehensive understanding of Taiwan's foreign relations in the era of democratization and surging activism of transnational social movement campaigns. This paper discusses the internationalization of Taiwan's social movement NGOs: their background, motivations, activities, and roles in transnational politics. Special attention is paid to the fact that while Taiwanese NGO activities in the transnational NGO community by nature ignore and disregard the state's diplomatic interests, both the quality and quantity of such activities have been severely restricted by Taiwan's poor diplomatic status in the inter-state community. This is a unique paradox not studied in the mainstream discourse on transnational civil society. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Cross-Strait relations between Taiwan and mainland China are of great importance to the development of China and peace in East Asia. However, this subject has not been sufficiently dealt with in a theoretical manner. This paper takes stock of the analytical approaches in the field in an effort to present to the academic world the existing intellectual instruments that interested researchers can take advantage of in cross-Strait studies. Nine approaches are identified. They are: the divided-nation model, integration theory, the power asymmetry model, the vote-maximizing model, the developmental state paradigm, strategic triangle theory, systems theory, political psychology theory, and the cognitive approach. The intellectual roots of these approaches are traced and their applicability to cross-Strait relations examined. Their strengths and weaknesses are also compared. Finally, a synthetic analytical framework is proposed. It is believed that a literature review of this kind is a prerequisite to a theoretical understanding of the cross-Strait relations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Amid U.S.-led efforts to "internationalize and multilateralize" support for Taiwan in response to mounting pressure from China, the 2021 U.S.-South Korea presidential statement's unprecedented reference to "peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait" made global headlines. This study analyzes contemporary Korea-Taiwan relations in historic and comparative perspective, focusing especially on Seoul's official 1992 position on "One China" and its implications for Korea's Taiwan policy. It demonstrates that Seoul has never recognized Beijing's self-defined "One China principle" concerning its essential claim of PRC sovereignty over Taiwan. Comparative analysis of Korea's position and subsequent policies with the U.S.', Japan's, and others' further reveals significant (potential) flexibility in Korea's approach to Taiwan. The relatively distant state of Korea-Taiwan relations today is the collective political choice of Korea's democratically-elected leaders—not the legacy of some (non-existent) putative commitment made to Beijing 30 years ago. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Regardless of the continued stalemate in the political arena, trade and economic interactions between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait have increased steadily. Both aggregate data and the results of survey research have testified to the existence of functional integration of the two societies across the Taiwan Strait. In addition to functional integration, structural readjustments have also been made by political authorities both in Taipei and Beijing so as to facilitate continuity of trade and economic relations. These types of mutual accommodations include: establishing proper 'unofficial' agencies on both sides to serve as instruments of practical contacts and negotiation; the more flexible definition of 'One China' by Beijing; and the opening of 'small links' between Quemoy and Amoy by Taipei. Beijing's refusal to grant Taipei any official diplomatic status and Taipei's reluctance to accept the 'One China' principle remain major obstacles to cross-Taiwan Strait relations. The United States will continue playing a key role in future cross-Strait relations. Beijing seems to be content, at least temporarily, to maintain cordial relations with the United States in exchange for the latter's adherence to the 'One China' principle and rejection of the option of Taiwan independence. Whether Taipei will use enhanced US commitment to Taiwan's security to strike a better deal with Beijing for gradual cross-Strait integration or to utilize increased American protection to move onto the separatist road will be affected by domestic politics in Taiwan, future US policy toward to the island, and Beijing's response to Taipei's demand for security and international recognition. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

War has been a prominent theme in cultural productions of the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Repeated representations by the socialist cinema and beyond have produced a revolutionary imagination of war that glorifies death and sacrifice, subsuming individual experience of pain and loss under the discourse of the Communist nation-building. This article focuses on a revisionist reading of the revolutionary imagination of war in Feng Xiaogang’s 2007 New Year Film The Assembly. It has a dual focus. First, it discusses the genre practice of war film in the mainland cinema and the relation among war film, representation of violence, heroism, and nation building. Then it examines how Feng’s visceral depiction of combat redirects the focus from the master narrative of nation-building to the individual. Second, focusing on the main character’s quest for honor for his fallen soldiers, this article explores how the film critiques the power structure of the revolutionary honor system that valorizes the revolutionary imagination of war. Ultimately, the discussion proves that the film is as much a confirmation of the revolutionary nation-building as a poignant critique and subversion of the official vision of honor and history. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Though the PLA elite perceptions of the United States have fluctuated over time, there has been some regularity in the evolution of their perceptions. Comparing the dominant perceptions of the United States among different generations of Chinese military elites in the PRC, we find that the PLA elite perceptions of US intentions have been foremost influenced by China's strategic interest in a certain period, rather than the level and intensity of bilateral exchanges at the time. Using the case of US arms sales to Taiwan and the case of the South China Sea and the Diaoyu Islands, we try to assess how consistent and persistent PLA elite perceptions of the US have been in recent years. While we agree that these outspoken military men cannot be taken on the surface as indicative of China's national policies, we will also point out several important dimensions that are likely to allow the PLA to play a more influential role in setting the agenda for China's strategic interest in the era of Xi Jinping. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Economic integration in the Taiwan Strait has become increasingly stronger recently. Economic integration should have led to stronger political convergence. Why hasn't it occurred? I argue that democracy in Taiwan and the continuation of the single-party rule in China have created two very different social experiences. These different social experiences have formed two different identities. People in Taiwan are increasingly thinking of themselves as Taiwanese rather than Chinese. The growing level of popular nationalism in China has also altered the political identity of mainland Chinese. Such change could force Beijing to accommodate citizens' demand to act more toughly towards Taipei. Further political integration is still possible, but it would require another norm change, perhaps already in the making. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Over the last two decades, Taiwan has weathered two global financial crises: the Asian financial crisis of 1997–1998 and the sub-prime loan crisis of 2008–2009. Each time the island's economy emerged from the crisis relatively unscathed. Many of the elements that constitute Taiwan's economic resilience have been fostered through entrenched institutional arrangements and established policy orientations over a long period. Taiwan managed to retain the bulk of these long-running sources of economic resilience despite the tremendous external pressures exerted by neo-liberal policy advocates to dismantle these ‘out-dated’ policy thinking and practices in the name of reform during the decade-long interval between the two crises. Taiwan was able to cope with the 2008–2009 global financial crisis thanks also to a more enabling regional environment created through stronger cooperation among Asian economies and under a new awakening among the East Asian policy makers. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Mainstream views in China tend to believe that lower popular support for the DPP shown in the 2008 presidential election indicates parallel declining support for the Taiwan Independence Movement (TIM). However, this study shows that during the DPP administration of 2000–2008, popular support for the DPP and the TIM has become divergent: at the aggregate level, popular support for the DPP has generally declined since 2000, but that for the TIM has actually increased and then remained stable; at the individual level, Taiwanese people's dissatisfaction with the DPP administration significantly reduced their support for the DPP in 2008, but had no independent effect on their nationalist sentiment. Further analysis of the TIM's support base shows that the supposedly pro-status-quo pan-blue camp actually provided an increasing number of Taiwanese nationalists, which stabilized popular Taiwanese nationalism and weakened the DPP's monopoly of it. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Relations across the Taiwan Strait have experienced several cycles over the last 60 years. Tension and crisis seem to come and go, followed by periods of peace and stability. What explains the cyclical pattern of change and stability? How can we explain the sources of change and stability in the relationship? This article examines the last 60 years of cross-Strait relations in light of an interpretative framework of ‘punctuated equilibrium’. Cross-Strait relations are complex, consisting of actors at the domestic, cross-Strait, and international levels. With a high degree of economic interaction, the cross-Strait relationship can be characterized as economic integration cum political impasse. This article analyzes the cyclical changes through three causal factors: (a) the role of issue cycles in cross-Strait relations; (b) the impulsive drivers for change; and (c) the structural constraints dampening change. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This article examines US policy toward the improving relations between the Republic of China on Taiwan and the People's Republic of China. It also analyzes several policy options that the Barack Obama administration may wish to consider. In conclusion, the author suggests that, despite some arguments to the contrary, continuing the current policy supporting the growing rapprochement between Beijing and Taipei is in the best interest of the US. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

While much is to be celebrated since Taiwan President Ma Ying-jeou's inauguration in 2008, cross-Strait relations are not without challenges. One such crucial test is Ma's call for Chinese leaders to stop isolating Taipei in the world community and give Taiwan adequate 'international space'. Because the issue strikes at the heart of the fundamental differences between Taipei's and Beijing's positions regarding the island's sovereignty, it needs to be handled carefully by both governments for better cross-Strait relations. This study analyzes the approaches adopted by both Beijing and Taipei regarding Taiwan's status in the international community. Utilizing discussion with Chinese scholars and government officials and the analysis of several waves of survey data conducted in Taiwan, it argues that Beijing's flexibility in its application of the 'one China' principle and the Ma administration's practicality in making its requests are critical to the realization of Taipei's demand for international space and hence cross-Strait stability. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article argues that how President Chen Shui-bian's provocative initiatives have impacted cross-strait stability since 2003 generates crucial lessons, not available in the past, for understanding the propelling and constraining dynamics of a cross-strait military conflict in the long run. The lessons are grounded in three interrelated sets of interactive logic: between the Chen Administration and the Taiwan electorate; between Taiwan people's aspiration for an exclusive national identity and their risk-averse proclivity in the face of China's military threat; and between Washington's and Beijing's acts of signaling toward Taipei. Specifically, this article demonstrates that Taiwan's voters at first backed the Chen Administration's provocative initiatives in order to seek a national identity instead of de jure independence, and that such popular support receded dramatically once such initiatives came to be perceived, amidst domestic and international developments, by the voters as drifting away from the identity quest and toward evoking their choice between the status quo and independence. The risk-averse voters turned away from the altered character of the initiatives and thus restrained the reckless politicians, largely because of both Washington's signaling which highlighted the change and the ensuing risk of war, and Beijing's refraining from saber rattling toward Taiwan. The voters' decisions foiled the 2004 and 2008 referenda, and forestalled the DPP in 2004 from acquiring a parliamentary majority necessary for legislating its provocative initiatives such as renaming the country and creating a new constitution. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Campaign advertising in Taiwan, particularly at the presidential level, has increased in importance as the political and media contexts in which campaigns are fought has evolved. To further our understanding of this increasingly prevalent campaign tool, the article analyses a large number of television and newspaper advertisements for six presidential candidates across three campaigns. Extending prior research on Taiwan the analysis incorporates three dimensions of campaign advertising: the distribution, composition and tone of appeals. The findings suggest that, for better or worse, many elements of broader political competition in Taiwan are equally present in candidates' campaign advertising. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

When Chen Shui-bian won the presidency in 2000 and the Democratic Progressive Party became the 'ruling party', many observers said Taiwan experienced democratic consolidation. Nevertheless Chen and his supporters continued to talk of democratization in the ensuing years. But political reform, advances in civil liberties, and ridding the system of corruption must be considered essential to that process. Reform failed due to the fact that Chen's party did not have a majority in the legislature and the president showed poor leadership. Civil liberties deteriorated owing to Chen playing ethnic politics as well as his administration's lack of respect for democratic values. The view that money ruled in politics and the prevalence of personal greed caused corruption to worsen. These three factors suggest the devolution of Taiwan's democracy during the Chen era rather than its consolidation and explain the new administration's loss of public support. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Primarily relying on the Kuomintang Party archives recently available to scholarship at the Hoover Institution Archives, this article examines the roles of the Kuomintang Central Reform Committee and the party reform under it between 1950 and 1952. The Committee became a crucial contributing factor in terms of the survival of the once defeated and demoralized Kuomintang as a ruling party. While the Kuomintang under the Committee created a variety of direct or indirect controls over the government and society that gave it unquestioned dominance, it also began to interact closely with the people on Taiwan as a result of the party recruitment and the implementation of local-level political reforms, two salient agendas that had never taken place in the mainland. For the sake of revitalizing a party capable of responding to challenges in a new environment, the Kuomintang during its reform period promulgated new rules and regulations, set up new agendas and implement new policies, and instituted various party local branches in different social stratum and vocational categories. These measures, in turn, helped Kuomintang undergo an institutional and cognitional change that was totally unimaginable in the past. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

For emerging democracies, how to reach state-society equilibriums conducive to both democratization and effective governance has been a most challenging issue. Illustrating such a predicament, in present-day Taiwan a situation of 'divided government' has been widely regarded in the literature as implying frequent legislative-executive stalemate and ineffective governance. In this article, we argue that while power games among the three conventional branches of government - the executive, legislature, and judiciary - may continue to produce a governmental stalemate equilibrium, the entry of increasingly important media and interest group players into the policy-making arena in Taiwan has shown strong potential to make up for the institutional failing of divided government. Drawing on the adoption process of the 2001 Financial Holding Company Law, we examine the conditions under which effective governance can still be achieved in Taiwan. Our analysis shows that concerted media pressure can succeed in forcing Taiwan's major parties to jointly pursue beneficial legislation. The analysis also suggests that interest group involvement in Taiwanese policy-making does not necessarily lead to crippling 'regulatory capture' but, on the contrary, can entail welfare enhancing change. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

While Taiwan continues to enjoy a liberal, consolidated democratic regime, citizen discontent continues to be directed at regime, government, and the governing. Identifying the scope and degree of dissatisfaction is an initial step in ascertaining whether discontented citizens might be more or less amenable to destabilizing change at the regime level or more procedural changes at the government levels. Taiwan's 2004 elections topped off four years of mud slinging, legislative gridlock, and a number of serious battles over constitutional jurisdictions and powers. This research note compares survey items from the Taiwan Election and Democratization Study (TEDS) surveys taken in 2001 and 2003 to measure levels of support for a democratic regime and governance within this environment. As party and ethnic identification are key cleavages on Taiwan, this study seeks to establish the relative strengths of the association between partisan and ethnic identification and attitudes towards regime and government. The main findings are: (1) dissatisfaction with regime and governance are more strongly associated with partisan identification than ethnic identification; (2) there exists a surprisingly low satisfaction and commitment to democracy; and (3) alienation from government exists at a moderate level. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study analyzes several of the major challenges that the Taiwanese government will confront during President Chen Shui-bian's second term of office. These include serious strains in relations with the US, a continued deterioration in ties with the People's Republic of China (PRC) and increased political polarization, ethnic division and gridlock at home. The author suggests that, while these problems are certainly formidable, they should not he exaggerated. Nor should they be attributed solely to one politician or political camp. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The behavior of Taiwan leaders and people in 2003–2004 raised the salience of Taiwan's assertive movement toward permanent independence for US policy makers. No longer did US officials responsible for assessing cross-Strait relations and their implications for US policy take it for granted that such assertiveness and moves toward independence would be held in check by the mainstream Opinion in Taiwan, previously but no longer viewed as pragmatic by US decision makers. In response to the new situation, US policy makers intervened in Taiwan politics, trying to channel Taiwan assertiveness along lines less likely to lead to war with China. US interventions were widely seen to have had a moderating effect on the Taiwan elite and public opinion in the lead-up to the December 2004 legislative election that resulted in a significant setback for President Chen Shui-bian's push toward greater independence. Taiwan's political opposition leaders pursued high-level contacts with China. Chinese leaders warmly welcomed the Taiwan opposition leaders who renounced Taiwan independence. However, Taiwan politics remained sharply divided over cross-Strait issues, with President Chen unwilling to renounce Taiwan independence or accept a version of the so-called one China principle seen by China as a prerequisite for improved relations with the Taiwan government. President Bush and other US officials encouraged both governments to show greater flexibility in order to promote dialogue that would reduce misunderstanding and ease tensions. The uncertain outlook for cross-Strait relations included the possibility of talks, improved relations, and agreements on managing cross-Strait tensions between the Taiwan and Chinese governments. On the other hand, the impasse between China and Taiwan could deepen. The Bush administration appeared to have settled on a policy that endeavored to deter China from using force against Taiwan and deter Taiwan from taking provocative steps toward independence. The main alternatives to this approach seemed less acceptable to US policy makers under prevailing conditions, suggesting that US policy is likely to persist with a dual deterrence policy for the rest of President Bush's term in office. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines the advocacy of overseas Taiwanese, particularly those in the United States, and their influence on US foreign policy and subsequently upon democratization in Taiwan. It concentrates particularly on the work of a Taiwanese non-governmental, non-profit advocacy group in the US—the Formosan Association for Public Affairs (FAPA). This article first composes an organizational history of FAPA by investigating the questions and processes of why and how FAPA was formed at the local level in the US. Further, it analyzes how the organization mobilized its relatively modest local resources in the US through grassroots diplomacy to promote Taiwan's visibility in the US, to influence the US government on Taiwan-related issues, and to attempt to impact upon Taiwan's democratization. Through the presentation of FAPA's organizational history, this article ultimately tries to answer the question of whether a non-governmental organization such as FAPA and its grassroots diplomacy has had an impact on US foreign policy and Taiwan's democratization. Besides adding to the existing scholarly literature on the causes of Taiwan's democratization, this study on the formation and effectiveness of FAPA seeks to contribute to studies on NGOs' or non-state actors' grassroots diplomacy and lobbying efforts on governmental policies. Because FAPA functioned as an important diplomatic channel for the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), Taiwan's first opposition party in the post-World War II era, before it matured into a fully-developed national opposition party in the 1990s and consequently unseated the Kuomintang (KMT) in 2000, this article is also an examination of an opposition movement's informal diplomacy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article describes the motives behind the making of the current status-quo and risk-averse Chinese foreign policy. It identifies a three-P incentive structure that is based on the political preservation of the CCP regime, China's economic prosperity, and Beijing's pursuit of power and prestige. These three motives are stable and overlapping, featuring Taiwan and the relationship with the United States as the key issues. Beijing is expected to be motivated by these peculiar motives over the next two decades; but new internal and external developments may greatly change these motives and generate new impetus for China's foreign policy. Although the official line in Beijing is still the mild ‘peaceful development’, after a fling with the more majestic idea of ‘peaceful rise’, the rise of nationalist emotions and demands in the PRC continues. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Chinese leaders in recent years have been following a coherent policy toward Asia that emphasizes mode ration and accommodation while preserving core PRC interests. China `s prevailing `good neighbor' policy approach-backed by improvement in US-China relations-provides important opportunities and challenges for Taiwan. it clearly inclines the PRC leaders to avoid more aggressive or harder-line tactics in the mix of carrots and sticks that makes up China `s recent approach toward Taiwan. To follow a more disruptive course would undermine the influence and advantage Beijing has been seeking with its ongoing moderate approach toward the United States and other Asian powers. The main challenge for Taiwan is how to deal with the current balance of carrots and sticks in China `s policy. Much depends on the ability of Taiwan `s leaders and populace to turn the prevailing balance in PRC policy to Taiwan `s advantage. This presumably will involve reviving their economy, promoting effective governance and prudent defense, while consolidating relations with the United States and managing tensions in cross-Strait relations to the advantage of Taiwan `s future security and development. Unfortunately, there is no political consensus on Taiwan to mobilize domestic resources and opinion in a concerted effort to protect Taiwan `s future as an entity independent of PRC control Those outsiders who have followed with positive interest Taiwan `s remarkable development over the past decades hope that Taiwan makes good use of the opportunities posed by China `s good neighbor policy to adopt prudent and concrete measures beneficial to Taiwan `s long range prospects. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Taiwan `s controversial 2004 presidential election has drastically changed the political landscape of the island. The balance of power is turning greatly in favor of the pro-independence DPP and TSU coalition. China now focuses its energy on building up a well-off society in an all-round way. China will try its best to solve the Taiwan question peacefully. As Chen Shui-bian has made up his mind to carry out his timetable for independence, Beijing is being driven into a corner. Chen Shui-bian `s victory not only constitutes a big challenge to China, but also a big challenge to the US. At the moment US-China relations are in one of the best stages of all time, but of the Taiwan issue goes out of control, US-China relations would be devastated, leading to a serious confrontation which might trigger a disastrous war between the two countries. In order to avoid such a worst-case scenario, the two countries should coordinate to manage the situation and take effective measures to keep the issue under control. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article explores the ideas, institutions, and interests in which Taiwan `s economic policy toward China is embedded. The authors indicate that the ideas behind Taiwan `s economic policy toward China are as vibrant as ever, the political foundation for a coherent and feasible policy is eroding, and commercial interests are digressing from the Taiwan government's policy goals. Political forces around ideas have strong hearing on the formation of Taiwan `s economic policy toward China. The truthfulness or falseness of the security argument is of intrinsic value to Taiwan `s decision makers. The authors also point out that in order to have a complete picture of cross-Strait economic relations, we need to specify how trade and investment with China influence Taiwan `s distribution of political interests. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Having finished its first term, the Chen Shui-bian Administration has found itself in deep water in the troubled cross-Strait relations. Not only has Chen himself been making contradictory remarks, the Cabinet has been indecisive over issues related to China. The most difficult and irritating case for the DPP government has been the handling of the call made by high-tech industries to allow them to invest in the mainland. The controversy seems to highlight a dilemma for Taiwan: while it needs the mainland market to save it from the current economic doldrums and create yet another potential `miracle' of becoming a global economic powerhouse, it is worried that further economic engagement with its former rival may pose new kinds of threats to its national security. The debate over whether to allow an eight-inch wafer foundry, the crown jewel of Taiwan `s economy, to invest in the mainland market is but one case, albeit a highly significant one, of the difficult relations between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Taiwan is a mildly divided society--divided essentially along the lines of national identity. Indeed, there is no doubt that national identity is the dominant factor affecting Taiwan's mainland China policy. Other factors such as business interests and security concerns may enter the picture from time to time, but they often get bogged down in the national identity controversies. As a matter of fact, there is high correlation between people's attitudes toward business and security concerns and their positions on the national identity issue. The key to understanding Taiwan's mainland China policy is thus the distribution of voters on the national identity issue and how it is translated into the political fortunes of various political parties in the electoral game. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The most notable feature of the public 'dialogue of the deaf' taking place across the Strait separating Taiwan and China is its zero-sum logic. This logic of one-upmanship in political and security matters dictates that whatever benefits Taipei is detrimental to Beijing and vice versa. Commercial interaction between Taiwan and China, particularly in the broadly defined sector of information technology (IT), is arguably the more powerful driver of cross-Strait interaction today. Two characteristics of this accelerating dynamic of commercial interaction across the Taiwan Strait are paramount: (1) its tight integration into a global IT supply chain; and (2) the extent of symbiosis by which all participants in this global supply chain depend on the worldwide vitality of this economic ecosystem. In interpreting what cross-Strait economic integration in IT portends, political logic may be leading Taipei and Beijing along opposite paths to the same end-point: the presumption that economic integration is undermining, and destabilizing, the cross-Strait economic and political status quo. As a dominant player in global IT, the US has its own stake in a clear understanding of this globalization dynamic and in astutely maintaining its interests as the global IT supply chain continues to extend across the political fault-line of the Taiwan Strait. Non-partisan analysis of the logic of globalization suggests a different outcome for the cross-Strait commercial dynamic than either Taipei or Beijing has publicly credited: its potential to mutually enhance economic prosperity and contribute long-term to stabilizing cross-Strait political interaction. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

China and Taiwan, as well as the US, have failed to adapt new practices in response to the paradigmatic changes in the sources and nature of the China­Taiwan conflict. Reflecting the tremendous political and social changes in Taiwan, China, and the world that have occurred during the past 10–15 years, the most prominent source of the China­Taiwan conflict has shifted from power to identity. This article discusses the change of social identity in Taiwan and the re-emergence of nativistic nationalism in the PRC identity. The authors suggest that policymakers on all three sides could begin to re-think the Taiwan issue by taking advantage of the ideas and methods pioneered by experts in the rapidly growing field of conflict analysis and resolution. In this article, the authors apply concepts related to identity used by practitioners in the field of conflict resolution to look at the deeper cultural issues of identity and suggest some more appropriate methods for intervention and resolution of this deeply rooted conflict. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Many security analysts believe advances in information technologies are producing changes in economy, government, and society that make information warfare an important aspect of the conflict between China and Taiwan. This study introduces the concept of information warfare and finds that Chinese and, to a lesser extent, Taiwanese strategists have developed distinctive approaches to it. Despite limited technological resources and a reputation for political constraints on innovation, China made early efforts to adopt technologies, organizational forms, and strategies to facilitate information warfare. In the event of war, Beijing hopes to disrupt advanced Taiwanese and American network-dependent economies, governments, and militaries while protecting access to the more limited information it requires. Taiwan is building information warfare capabilities by drawing on both its advanced information technology firms and US assistance. American policymakers should take steps to prevent the emergence of information warfare in the context of the cross-strait rivalry from undermining deterrence and crisis stability. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article analyses trends in election campaigning in Taiwan with particular reference to the landmark 2000 presidential election, when the Kuomintang's 50-year monopoly on power finally ended. It examines the growing professionalism in election campaigning that stands alongside, and is shaped by, the systemic and institutional features of Taiwan's electoral landscape, such as the path dependency of the parties and the electoral system used. The article challenges us to reconsider the notion of how identity is shaped and communicated; globalisation has given birth to a spurious catch-all notion of 'Americani sation' that is invoked by many modern election observers. It is said to describe a trend towards a global convergence of electoral practices based on the adoption of election campaign techniques developed in the United States. The discourse on Americanisation resonates with the pejorative vocabulary more associated with cultural imperialism, suggesting the displacement of the indigenous by the foreign. The article is a warning against using this discourse too liberally. The flows of influence and information are in fact multi-directional, with the United States absorbing cultural effects as well as supplying them. Newly democratising systems have not undergone a blanket Americanisation because, as the Taiwan example clearly demonstrates, traditional methods of voter mobilisation remain important; the foreign coexists with the indigenous. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]