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China's defense white papers have long been dismissed as lacking substance and offering little useful information on China's real strategic intentions and military capabilities. Nevertheless, since 1998 Beijing has continued to issue defense white papers on a regular two-year frequency. Indeed, in recent years it has accorded greater importance to these documents. This paper argues that China's defense white papers warrant more attention than they have received so far. An examination of the making of the white papers, the functions designated for these documents and their evolving content and structure reveals not only the different nature and purpose of the Chinese white papers compared with their counterparts in Western countries, but also important changes and continuities in China's strategic outlook and its evolving perceptions of the role of the use of force in the context of the country's re-emergence as a major player in international affairs. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper aims to discuss China's behavior in the developing world through the lens of the domestic model of governance. It does so by seeking analogies between three forms of Beijing's political approaches in domestic affairs: generating enthusiasm through slogan politics and promised incentives, informal networks, and coordinated development in China-led multilateralism with Africa and Central and Eastern Europe. By discussing the domestic-foreign policy nexus, the paper introduces the concept of China's vertical multilateralism. Finally, by broaching a new theoretical understanding, the paper decodes China's behavior in the regions mentioned above and provides an alternative model for understanding China's foreign policy in the developing world. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The expanding profile of Chinese international development aid has generated strong academic and policy interests. A growing literature has emerged on Chinese foreign aid's motivations, modalities, and impact. However, a significant lacuna remains in the domestic politics relating to this phenomenon. This gap is especially glaring in public opinion concerning China's growing foreign aid programs. By analyzing empirical data gathered from a variety of sources, including a well-established online forum, social media sites of two influential media organizations, and multi-year surveys of residents of Beijing, this paper presents a nuanced picture of what the Chinese public thinks of Chinese foreign aid and tests two popular explanations of public opposition to foreign aid—perceived budgetary trade-offs and more general dissatisfaction with government policies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

\nPlain Language SummaryThe Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) has evolved from its ambitious beginning into a framework focused on high-quality development (HQD), emphasizing environmental sustainability and people-centered development. This study examines to what extent these new directives are implemented in the context of China’s overseas economic zones (OEZs), employing a multi-actor-influence model to analyze the complex interactions and challenges inherent in these projects. Focusing on the Vientiane Saysettha Development Zone (VSDZ) in Laos, our analysis identifies three primary institutional challenges: fragmentation between the central and local governments in China, structural constraints imposed on Chinese businesses, and inadequate cooperation between Chinese and host country actors. These challenges underscore the complexities of translating Beijing’s top-down policy into effective action on the ground. The paper concludes with a discussion of the broader implications of these findings for the BRI’s future development.This study examines Beijing’s recent strategic shift in the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) towards high-quality development (HQD), focusing on sustainable environmental practices and enhancing local livelihoods. Our policy analysis confirms Beijing’s commitment to these goals. However, challenges arise due to the BRI’s decentralized implementation and the varied influences of multiple actors from both China and the host countries. We explore these challenges through a detailed case study of the Vientiane Saysettha Development Zone (VSDZ) in Laos, identifying three key issues: fragmentation between Chinese central and local governments, constraints on Chinese businesses, and inadequate cooperation between Chinese and host country actors.Our study contributes in three significant ways. First, it adds to the discussion of Beijing’s transition towards HQD and the BRI’s global influence through a review of Chinese policies and an analytical model elucidating the realities of BRI implementation. Second, it theorizes that outcomes of BRI projects are shaped more by local circumstances and stakeholder actions than by policies alone. Finally, it suggests potential measures to help realize HQD within the BRI framework in the future. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper studies the constrained judicialization of environmental governance in China. It starts by quantitatively describing the judicialization of environmental protection in China over the past decade, including both its progresses and the suppressions that it faced, and shows that environmental courts have had virtually no tangible impact on reducing pollution levels. It then attempts to rationalize the observed patterns by answering two questions. First, why does the government choose to empower the courts when it possesses a rich set of other regulatory tools in environmental protection? This choice can be attributed to both the central government’s needs to curb local protectionism, as well as the local governments’ incentives to promote legitimacy. Second, to the extent that courts can contribute to environmental governance, why does the government impose tight controls over environmental litigation? This can be explained by the government’s deep-rooted wariness of class lawsuits and other collective actions, as well as the judiciary’s inherent conflicts with the flexibility required by a regulatory regime. In addition, the judiciary’s limited capacity also impedes the judicialization of environmental governance. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Professor Xia seeks to answer the question of whether or not China will become a 'responsible great power' in the twenty-first century by examining the domestic and foreign factors which will influence that outcome in the decades ahead. Some of the most interesting and useful insights of his work come as much from what the paper does not say as from what it does say. While it does not expressly say so, this paper amply demonstrates two important points about what appears to be an idealistic Chinese worldview. First, we see how the Chinese worldview is 'conflicted' and uncertain. Second, we see how China's current and future situation are said to be determined by what others do to China. Four important policy-related ramifications result from the worldview described in Xia Liping's paper. First, the more Chinese foreign policy promotes a worldview packaged largely in ideals, the more outsiders will suspect that Chinese leaders are trying to hide their actual intentions. Second, it should be recognized that in many ways the views espoused in the paper fundamentally call into question certain principles which others view as critical to their national security (the stabilizing nature of alliances, for example). Third, the worldviews described by Xia Liping portray a largely inward-looking, self-absorbed, vulnerable and aggrieved power that may be prone to 'irresponsibility'. The paper implies that under such circumstances, it is up to the outside world to prevent China from acting on its sense of injured vulnerability. Finally, such an approach to the world may leave the impression that Chinese views are out of touch or unable to operate effectively within the current global structure. Such an impression might lead others to dismiss or discount Chinese points of view as simplistic at best or consciously obstructionist at worst. Either way limits Chinese aspirations to become a 'responsible great power'. In the end, a nuanced and realistic set of understandings about the world, which articulates not only the country's ideals, but acknowledges its contradictions, interests, contributions, and its regional and international impact, would more pragmatically support China's ascendance to responsible great power status. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper describes the current level of human capital in China and seeks to identify a number of education-related challenges that may slow down the nation's economy from transitioning to high-income status. Relying on recent census-based data from OECD for the rest of the world and using data from the 2015 Micro-Census for China, the authors show that the low levels of education of China's labour force is really a problem that has its roots in the past (in the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s). In recent years (since 2000), China has been investing heavily in education as shown by the increasing the share of youth, including rural youth, attending high school. Despite this recent effort to raise the nation's human capital, the education system still faces several challenges in trying to provide high-quality education for all youth. First, the government must figure out a way to overcome the relatively low rates of participation in high school by rural students. Second, there is concern that many vocational schools, especially those in rural areas, cannot deliver quality education. Finally, the paper will show that many rural students may be unprepared due to poor early childhood development outcomes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper unpacks the multi-level efforts to establish, promote and implement China standards in overseas contexts through an examination of corporate social responsibility (CSR) activities of Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in Africa. Drawing upon document analysis of government policies, institutional guidelines and corporate reports from four case companies, as well as field research in Ethiopia, it identifies ways that Chinese corporate actors interpret, incorporate and initiate CSR standards through strategic planning and during overseas business activities. Analysis of both first-hand and secondary data shows the development of Chinese CSR standards is a co-production of international, national and local standards, which involves diverse actors and institutions and is driven by multiple considerations to fulfill commercial, political, social and diplomatic objectives for overseas companies and Chinese government. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In China, the police have been the single dominant player in criminal cases, while the procuracy and the courts have played only complementary roles. More often than not, as long as the police have launched a criminal investigation, the procuracy will prosecute the targeted person and the courts will return a guilty verdict. In the shadow of policing power, the Chinese criminal justice system operates with unique characteristics, with both the procuracy and the courts mostly coordinating with the police to address crime, but rarely practising 'mutual constraint'. If a criminal prosecution encounters an irregularity, the three agencies coordinate with one another first and seek a solution that benefits all. Under this operational mode, both defendants and their lawyers are entirely excluded from the core decision-making process of the criminal justice system, in which they have no choice but to passively accept the result of the coordination between the police, the procuracy and the courts. Through an analysis of courtroom discourses, this paper unfolds the dynamics of criminal trials and the interactions between the defence, prosecutors and judges. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

How does the Chinese government define cybersecurity? Security in the digital realm has gained increasing prominence in recent years, both within China's domestic policy landscape and in its participation with global digital governance. However, the Chinese conception of this term is different from the Western one, and is embedded within the country's distinctive political, economic and technological context. Drawing on Chinese government documents, this paper will trace the evolution of how successive generations of Chinese leaders have identified digital security concerns, and how they have deployed institutional, regulatory and policy tools to respond to them. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines how China has been portrayed in international cinema throughout the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. Using the Internet Movie Database, the authors extract the plot synopses of 4,927 China-related films. The authors apply the word embedding technology and Latent Dirichlet Allocation (LDA) topic model to explore the cinematic plots, as well as achieve the sentiment score and ascertain the socioeconomic factors of score change. The findings indicate that the image of China in international cinema has been associated with gross domestic product (GDP) and foreign direct investment. The image of China changed from the barbarian to the schemer, and finally to the civilized great power, giving the insight into cultural trends that traditional research methods cannot capture. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines the concept and practice of meritocracy in Chinese national oil corporations' (NOCs) graduate recruitment and selection. It focuses on the post-2008 NOC reform period, which sees NOCs place increasing rhetorical emphasis on meritocratic or 'fair' recruitment and selection. However, this paper argues that, in practice, these sentiments remain unrealized. The NOCs continue to use some sub-optimum applicant assessment measures and misuse or misunderstand the more optimum ones. Likewise, the prioritization of certain criteria, such as elite education, has merely advantaged graduates with strong Bourdieu capitals. Hence, this produces a flawed meritocracy that neither maximizes fairness nor efficiency, but strengthens elitism. Moreover, its capacity to serve political interests is questionable too. These insights, then, enhance existing academic debates over China's engagement with meritocracy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The China-ROK boundary disputes in the Yellow Sea and the associated fishing conflict are often neglected in the rich body of literature on China's maritime disputes. This article examines the question of why and how China has persistently pursued a de-escalatory posture in the Yellow Sea in the past decade despite having considerably hardened its posture in the East and South China Seas. I argue that the high stakes China has in its bilateral ties with South Korea create strong incentives for Beijing to deescalate maritime controversies whereas the absence of broad-based hawkish pressure at home creates a permissive domestic political climate for Beijing to pursue de-escalation. This paper also evaluates conditions that may facilitate a hardening Chinese position. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

China's 'Xi-Li era' is said to be defined by both the concentration of power in the center and the strengthening of Party authority. In this paper, we ask whether these trends have been evident in local appointment practices since Xi Jinping took office in 2013. By comparing the career histories of 3,682 prefectural mayors and Party Secretaries under the Hu-Wen and Xi-Li administrations, we find that while appointment practices have shifted, the observed changes are not wholly consistent with the center- and Party-strengthening narratives. First, developments in the Xi-Li era suggest that while provincial authorities are increasingly using prefectural appointments for their own ends, the center remains high and far away in these decisions. Second, we do not find evidence that cadres with a strong Party background have a particular advantage in the Xi period. Instead, cadres with strong track records in key functional xitong, particularly those with an economic profile, are still the most likely to attain leadership positions. These findings contribute to the current debate on the nature of power reconfigurations unfolding in Xi's China. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Patriotic campaigns and mass mobilization draw on existing xenophobic attitudes of the public, reinforcing the 'us vs. them' dualism between China and 'the West'. However, patriotic campaigns are not always top-down, state-led, nor are they always primarily driven by political ideology. Patriotic content appeals to a growing nationalist audience who consumes a mixed feeling of perceived victimization at the hand of foreign aggression and the pride arising from being a Chinese citizen. This paper argues that the profitability of patriotic content circulating on social media exacerbated the tension between market-driven grassroots patriotism and state-led patriotic campaigns. The tension grows out of, and is manifested in, the online popular debate around economically driven, grassroots 'patriotic' content that can challenge the state state-led patriotic rhetoric. While the state sometimes strategically co-opts some patriotic contents into its own patriotic narratives, it also delegitimises other undesired ones through labels such as 'high-level black' (gaoji hei) or 'low-level red' (diji hong). These labels were initially used to differentiate meticulously crafted political satire and parody from incompetent, illogical and vulgar propaganda pieces that unintendedly blemish the state's patriotic campaigns, but later evolved into an exercise of power to distance the CCP from undesired patriotic content. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since the beginning of bilateral ties in 1950, the China–Pakistan relationship has grown significantly. Known as Pakistan's 'all-weather friend', bilateral economic cooperation has been advanced by the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) agreement, worth US$62 billion of Chinese investment in Pakistan. Due to its geo-economic and geopolitical importance, the CPEC is considered a 'game changer' by Beijing and Islamabad. However, since its initiation in 2015, the CPEC has also been a source of tension between centre and provincial governments in Pakistan. This paper analyses the impact of the CPEC on nation-building in Pakistan. In the light of nation-building theories, it further argues that the CPEC has provided Pakistan with much-needed opportunities to address inter-provincial and federal–provincial discord through dialogue and compromises. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Unlike most current academic studies on corruption in China, which focus on the theme of how political, economic and social environments have caused corruption at the macro-level, this paper takes a micro-view. It concentrates on the question of how corruption, notably bribery, takes place between a briber and the bribed. Moreover, it examines what exact role guanxi-practice plays in corrupt exchange and, more importantly, why it constitutes a critical element. Through in-depth case-studies derived from extensive fieldwork, this paper comes to the conclusion that the micro-level operation of corruption in China is not due to some haphazard aggregation of sporadic acts but follows certain rules and codes of conduct, which should be seen as an informal institutional mechanism facilitating the contracting process of corrupt exchange. This paper also demonstrates that guanxi-practice embodies such rules and codes of conduct. Such conduct purports to remove the legal, moral and cognitive barriers impeding the contracting process of corrupt exchange by grafting a corrupt agreement upon a social setting, in which risk of exchange safety is controlled, and moral costs and cognitive dissonance are reduced. Therefore, this paper contends that the causality link between guanxi-practice and corruption is the inverse of the view held by many. It is not that the participants of corruption are compelled to corrupt conduct because of the existence of the guanxi-practice, but on the contrary, these participants adopt guanxi-practice as an alternative operating mechanism that facilitates corruption. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

As the 'World's Factory', China now has the biggest worker/employee class in the world. Though this newly emerging social group has captured much attention, relatively few scholars have paid attention to such sociological questions as raised by this paper: rather than referring to such a huge group of almost 500 million people simply as 'Chinese workers' or 'Chinese employees', can this social class be stratified and in what way? What is the current situation of the employee class in China's contemporary industrial relations? This paper attempts to concisely answer the above questions by proposing a three dichotomy segmentation approach and a review of the existing literature on the matter, providing a broader picture to the readers with regards to the current situations of different employee groups in the context of China's unprecedented transitional economy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Shanghai, like other large Chinese cities, has multiple business districts. This paper examines the construction of one of its largest, at Hongqiao in the west of the city. Its specific focus lies in the central role played by one state-owned company, Shenhong, in the financing and construction first of the Hongqiao transport hub and then of the business district that jointly make up this new development pole. The paper examines in detail Shenhong as an organization as well as the tasks it has undertaken and the funding difficulties it has confronted. It argues that Shenhong is representative of the seldom discussed state-owned urban investment and development companies that have led the urbanization of China. Finally, it anchors these companies into theoretical debates, arguing that their ubiquitous involvement in China's property-led process of urban transformation combined with their ambivalence as state companies operating along similar lines to private enterprises means that they can be seen as central players in a form of state corporatist urbanism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Using complementary information from two national surveys conducted in 2008, i.e. the China Survey and the ABS II Mainland China Survey, this paper presents a comprehensive picture of the media channels that Chinese citizens use for political information, as well as their relative importance as assessed by the Chinese people. Moreover, assisted by multiple regressions, this paper also identifies which groups of Chinese are more likely to use each of these channels for political information. This paper contributes to our understanding on (1) the relative significance of various media channels in contemporary China's political communication; and (2) how Chinese citizens select themselves into specific channels for political information, given their increasing autonomy in acquiring such information from China's changing media. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

In Indonesia, Chinese voluntary associations took on a new level of importance after the fall of Suharto’s New Order regime in 1998 that ushered in a revival of Chinese identity politics. At the same time, Sino-Indonesian relations are blossoming, and the rise of China as a global power means that Indonesia can only benefit from stronger ties with China in the future. In this new atmosphere of cooperation, I argue that Chinese Indonesian individuals and voluntary organizations play a crucial function as trade and cultural intermediaries. Drawing on both empirical and qualitative fieldwork data, in this paper, I examine how members of Chinese voluntary organizations view their ethnicity, national belonging, and strategic position in the contexts of post-Suharto Chinese identity politics and Sino-Indonesia relations. More broadly, this paper also offers a critical analysis of the internal dynamics of contemporary Overseas Chinese voluntary organizations and the role they play in building trade and sociocultural relationships between China and other countries. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This paper asks: do most Uyghurs perceive themselves to be middle class or lower class? What are the major determinants of their perceptions? Data are drawn from a 2007 survey (N = 900) conducted in Ürümchi in China. This paper focuses on individualized and subjective hierarchical differentiation and reports three main findings about class identity among Uyghurs. Firstly, class identity is not closely linked to occupational attainment and income among Uyghurs. However, education is a key determinant of Uyghur class identification. Secondly, psychological well-being measures are not predictors of the choice of class label by Uyghurs. Thirdly, ethnic consciousness is closely related to class identification among Uyghurs, holding main background characteristics constant. Uyghurs give more attention to their group concerns (discrimination, prejudices, intergroup inequality, etc.) than to their individual worries (such as unemployment or stress) when choosing a class label. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This paper introduces a special section (in two parts) bridging the study areas of borderland studies and foreign relations contextualizing China. The four other papers in this special section cover China's northeast, northwest and southwest. They offer comprehensive and updated analyses of the ways in which Chinese leaders conceive the issues of the borderlands, which have implications for China's international relations. Meanwhile, the response of Chinese leaders to the challenges arising from the borderlands will be examined. The issues discussed include: sovereignty, state security, energy and resource exploration (the paper on Xinjiang by Yufang Hao and Weihua Liu); the disputes over the interpretation of regional history (the paper on China's northeast by Dingding Chen); online public opinions of China–North Korea relations (the paper by Simon Shen); and regional integration and development (the paper on Yunnan by Tim Summers). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Along with the emergence of the 'three rural issues' and rural crisis, a new co-operative movement has been witnessed in rural China, which is different from the former revolutionary communalist co-operative movement. This social movement can help to understand and rebuild civil society in China, which has, more often than not, been criticized as not genuine, civil nor society-based. Following the debate's background of the juxtaposition of a fast economic reform together with slow social and political reforms in China, the paper addresses a crucial question on the impact of economic development on civil society dynamics in China. By identifying the causal mechanisms of the new co-operative development and the conditions needed for them to develop, the paper presents some implications of the co-operative model in today's society. These causal mechanisms are set within the context of one historical process evolving with a path dependency. Using this theoretical framework, it further presents the empirical observations. Through the findings it is concluded that the new co-operative movement in rural China can be considered as a mild liberalization within civil society's sphere. While questioning a popularly used perspective examining the voluntary/non-profit nature of civil society organizations and excluding the economic aspect within civil society studies in China, the paper suggests an alternative approach representing an inclusive third sector with diverse organizations that combine both economic and social aims. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In recent years, at the same time it has pursued multilateral trade negotiations via membership in the World Trade Organization (WTO), China has embraced a regional approach to trade liberalization by negotiating a number of bilateral or regional free trade agreements (FTAs) with its trading partners. This paper examines China's increasingly active FTA diplomacy and seeks to explain China's motives for pursuing expanded FTAs. Specifically, this paper argues that while China's FTA activism reflects considerations about enhancing China's influence in the Asia-Pacific region, capturing the economic gains of FTA participation, and minimizing the trade and investment diversion resulting from the competitive dynamics of regional trade liberalization, the move toward expanded FTAs is also consistent with the desire to create alternative bargaining forums over trade issues that could help to stabilize expectations as well as the need to use FTAs to control the pace of trade liberalization so as to accommodate protectionist pressure emanating from domestic interest groups. In particular, this paper highlights the impact of domestic politics on China's FTA negotiations through a detailed discussion of how pressure from protectionist seeking interests influences the scope and depth of China's FTAs. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The study of Chinese foreign policy has long shown that domestic politics and domestic constraints are sources of foreign policy, albeit generally considered less potent than ideology and interests. Domestic political constraints should also be explored as factors in Chinese regional policies toward East Asia, including regional economic institutions. This paper examines three domestic institutional constraints on regional foreign policy in the area of trade and economics: a fragmented decision-making structure that has difficulty with coordination, a relatively heavy reliance on top level decision-makers at a time when issues of Asian economic policy have relatively low priority for these same decision-makers, and the relatively extreme lack of autonomy for negotiators vis-a-vis top decision-makers in Beijing. These constraints are by any means unique to China. However, at a time when many observers and participants are expecting—indeed, often hoping for—Chinese leadership in the region, the paper posits that these constraints hinder the PRC's ability to fill this role. The key empirical focus is regional trade agreements and regional economic organizations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Future international relations in East Asia are likely to be largely shaped by the maritime strategies and policies of various actors. This paper examines China's policy and behavior in maritime cooperation in the East Asian region in recent years, a topic that has been insufficiently understood. I suggest that while it is necessary and useful to take into account China's naval power, more attention to Chinese intentions and policy on East Asian maritime issues is warranted to arrive at a more balanced, and arguably more accurate, understanding of China's role in East Asian maritime affairs. This paper takes stock of China's changing perceptions, attitudes, and behaviors in maritime cooperation in the region. I describe China's new policy moves in the South China Sea and East China Sea. I also address some of the major Chinese concerns for further maritime cooperation in East Asia. I conclude that while a grand cooperative maritime regime is still not possible from a Chinese perspective, China is likely to agree to more extensive and substantive maritime cooperation in many functional areas, most notably in the non-traditional security arena. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper is an introduction to the special issue. It provides an overview of the major environment-related health risks China faces, and a review of some of the responses currently being made by the government and societal actors. The paper concludes with a discussion of the contributions that the social sciences might make to our understanding of these issues. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Chinese pollution victims have increasingly started to resort to political and legal action to protect their interests. This paper analyzes such activism by studying how citizens identify the necessity to initiate action against pollution and by investigating the obstacles they meet when attempting to take action. The paper highlights the importance of state and intermediary institutions to aid citizens in understanding the seriousness of pollution and overcoming the obstacles they face. It shows, however, that often such aid is not available, and that state institutions when aligned with industrial interests restrict rather than support citizen action. When this occurs, citizen activism becomes an isolated affair, resulting in adversarial relations with state and industry, sometimes escalating to violence and repression of activists. The paper concludes that isolated activism forces a new look at concepts such as 'embeddedness' and 'rightful resistance' to capture citizen activism and contentious politics in China. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

After more than a decade of preparation, China finally passed the Anti-Monopoly Law (AML) on 30 August 2007. This paper examines the debate over whether or not administrative monopoly should be included in the ambit of the AML, which took place throughout the drafting process of this new law. Administrative monopoly refers to the abusive use of administrative power by government agencies to engage in monopolistic activities. Owing to the administrative nature of this type of monopoly, the intent to regulate it by an economic law, such as the AML, has stirred up much controversy. Having analyzed the arguments both in support of and in opposition to the inclusion, this paper suggests the need to adopt a more comprehensive scheme in tackling administrative monopoly. Also, the enforcement mechanism of the AML will have to be strengthened in order to prevent this new law from degenerating into 'a toothless tiger'. Furthermore, the competition law regime of China will benefit from in-depth research in overseas anti-monopoly practices. In particular, the experiences of the former socialist states in Europe should be taken into account, given that they are similarly undergoing the transition from a planned economy to a market economy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper attempts to address an imperative topic in Asian economic development: the relationship between China's economic expansion and Asian economic growth. It tries to answer the all important query, whether China's economic ascent is a threat or an opportunity for the Asian economies. Due to the size of its economy, its openness and the rapidity of its GDP growth, China is swaying the individual Asian economies as well as the regional economy. When a significant-size economy is growing almost three times as rapidly as the global economy, the neighboring economies cannot possibly expect to remain impervious. Various issues are analyzed in the paper, including foreign direct investment inflows and impacts, regional production networks, plausible scenarios for China and the remaining Asian economies, and strategy for coping with China's rapid development. Although some Asian economies and some sectors will face adverse effects—short- or long-term—of China's rapid growth, the apocalyptic predictions are grossly overdone. For the most part, the impact of China's rapid growth can be mutually beneficial. This is the conclusive idea of this paper. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The interaction between two perspectives—China as a world factory and Chinese business knowledge—has been complicated by the ever greater tensions generated from the national—China—and the transnational actors—Chinese—in understanding the economic driving force behind the real meanings of the rise of China. The construction process of the rise of Chinese economic power puts the state in direct contact with regional and global economic/political changes. On the one hand, Chinese business knowledge, identities, economic and political interactions also give rise to the notion of network building and sub-regional development, which help transcend country-specific relations. On the other hand, the notion of the rise of China is still being re-constructed through the interplay between regional and global political economy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

There is now a substantial literature on various aspects of contemporary Chinese urbanization. There are, however, few recent studies of Chinese cities which examine social change and social interaction at the level of the urban neighbourhood. This paper seeks to fill some of this gap in current knowledge. It draws on a social survey of three contrasting neighbourhoods undertaken in Guangzhou in the Pearl River Delta, one of the most economically dynamic and rapidly urbanizing areas in the world. The paper explores inter alia the meaning of neighbourhood, sense of local belonging and community, and patterns and incidence of mutual assistance. The paper reflects on the extent to which market reforms are transforming patterns of local social interaction. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines the political economy of making China's exchange rate policy, with a focus on the post-Deng reform period. First it analyses the structure of elite economic policymaking, especially on exchange rate policy, pinpointing core policymakers in that structure. Second, the paper analyses the roles and responsibilities of key economic ministries, and explains how the ministries' changing roles and responsibilities in the transforming economic environment of the reform period have affected their relative influence and the positions they pursue on exchange rate policy. Results of the analyses are then applied to explain the RMB devaluation policy in 1989 and the no-devaluation policy during the Asian financial crisis. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The fifteenth congress of the Chinese Communist Party inaugurated a sweeping reform that has been transforming the ownership of state-owned enterprises (SOEs). Though a term 'common ownership' was the official name given to the scheme, it was regarded as a coded reference to privatization. If this is true, given the size of China's economy, this is probably the most ambitious privatization plan ever in the world. Bearing in mind that for nearly half a century the Chinese economy has remained based on the dominance of the state sector, it is understandable that the scheme had a shocking psychological effect at home and abroad the moment it was officially declared. For some people, China's privatization foretold a crusade. As a matter of fact, it ignited political debate at home and also sparked speculation abroad about the political tendency in China. From the academic perspective, it is of interest to figure out whether the scheme is privatization; if yes, how a decision could be made to privatize in the context of one of the few remaining socialist countries. One aim of this paper is to give an explanation to the paradox from the political-legal point of view. The paper argues that privatization is a natural result of the strategy for modernizing enterprises. However, the paper observes that the political and particularly the legal climates are not prepared for the privatization scheme, which poses a substantial restriction on the scheme. Then, the paper argues that the worth of the privatization scheme that has been proceeding in China does not lie in the novelty of its common ownership suggestion, but in its representing a near consensus on the Chinese leadership to push forward the experiment already undertaken over the preceding years. Finally the paper ends by predicting briefly what can be expected of the scheme and how meaningful it will be. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

'Guangdong is the province one step ahead in China and Guangzhou is the city one step ahead in Guangdong.' Being one of the most economically active cities in China, Guangzhou citizens have generally experienced improved living standards and a better quality of life since the economic reform started in the late 1970s. What is also true is that economic modernization has changed the social structure, allowing far more social mobility in the post-Mao society. Nowadays, people living in Guangzhou have more job choices in a relatively free labour market. This paper is set in such a socio-economic context to examine the job preferences and work ethics of Guangzhou citizens, with particular reference to what changes have taken place in people's work values after the adoption of a market economy in the mainland. The paper is based on our current research projects conducted in the Guangzhou area to examine how socio-economic changes have affected people's value orientations and is confined to discussion of whether people living in Guangzhou have changed their attitudes towards work in the 1990s. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

China's strategic ambition and security strategy have attracted a great deal of international attention lately, and there is disagreement about China's intentions. Clearly, the Chinese could help clear up many misperceptions about their strategic ambitions simply by publishing a national security document like those published by the United States and other powers. Without the presence of such a document, there will always be questions about strategic capabilities and intentions that will lead to unproductive speculation. Fortunately, Wu Baiyi's paper helps us to better understand China's current, and possibly future, security strategy along with its historical context. Colonel Russ Howard generally agrees with Wu Baiyi's findings. He agrees with Wu's interpretation of Beijing's security goals and tasks in the paper's first section, though he differs from Wu on China's ability to achieve them. Colonel Howard also considers Wu's historical analysis in the second section basically correct. Also, Colonel Howard views Wu's description of China's current security challenges to be 'a refreshing departure from other—more homogenous—descriptions'. However, he does not agree with Wu's generally optimistic view of the international security landscape. Finally, Colonel Howard agrees with Wu Baiyi's conclusions: China's security strategy is much more than its diplomatic strategy. A comprehensive security strategy architecture, as Wu correctly points out, includes not only a diplomatic component but defense, political, and economic components as well. At present, Beijing's leaders have in effect adopted the old Clinton campaign slogan, 'it's the economy, stupid', which recognizes that economic growth is more important in achieving China's security strategy than were the diplomatic and military initiatives of the past. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Assessing the prospects for democratization in The People's Republic of China has been a mostly normative exercise over the past 20 years. Newer empirical work has focused on public opinion and the implications for a democratic transition but this literature is still in its infancy. This paper focuses on the distribution of public opinion in Beijing with respect to a direct, close end question about the respondent's most important value. Among the choices were political democracy and individual freedom. We hypothesize that if younger, more educated and wealthier people are more likely to select either of these options as their most important value then, over the next few decades, there would be increasing public pressure for democratization because of generational replacement and the expected increases in both wealth and average levels of education in China over the same time span. While there are some indications that in the future Chinese public opinion will be more favorable to a transition towards democracy, on balance the results of this paper provide scant evidence that the future will lead to increasing public pressure for democratization. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The PLA's role in Beijing's foreign policy-making process is a closed book but it is a key research topic in our study of Chinese diplomacy. This paper argues that generally the PLA abides by a fine division of labor with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MoFA) in managing Beijing's international pursuits. The civilians are in charge of China's generic foreign affairs and daily diplomacy. The Central Military Commission (CMC) is responsible for security/military-related foreign affairs and defines the bottom-line for employing force in conflicts. Institutionally the PLA's role is more directional than detailed and is often behind the scenes. This complicates our research of the subject matter, as the line between this division of labor is thin over many diplomatic issues. Often times it is hard to demarcate where Beijing's normal diplomacy ends and where security/military dynamics begin. This paper adopts a two-layered analysis on civil–military interaction on foreign and security affairs: the broad consensus of CCP–PLA leaders on CCP regime stability at a time of drastic domestic change and world pressure; and the PLA's directional role in China's security/military-related foreign affairs under a generic civilian guidance. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This article explores the magnitude, motivations, and mechanisms of the globalization of Chinese finance for energy. Like the national development banks and export-import banks of industrialized countries before them, China's policy banks have provided large amounts of financing to Chinese energy companies to enter global energy markets. What is more, China's two global policy banks, the China Development Bank and the Export-Import Bank of China, now provide as much energy finance to foreign governments as do all the multilateral development banks combined. This paper outlines the extent to which Chinese energy finance has become globalized and examines the state priorities and institutional pathways that drive the globalization of Chinese energy finance. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper depicts the transnational ethnic and religious ties between China and Southeast Asia and examines the cultural, political and economic implications for state–minority relations in Southwest China. It documents how transnational ethnic and religious ties facilitate cultural revival among the ethnic Dai people in Southwest China and examines the impact of Buddhist networks on local governance. In particular, it portrays the cooperative relationship between the Chinese state and the Buddhist Sangha on social issues such as HIV/AIDS prevention and care. The paper argues that the Chinese state is more willing to cooperate with transnational ethnic and religious groups when the latter can help improve local governance and generate economic development, under the condition that they do not challenge the state's ultimate legitimacy and authority. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Based on first-hand field research data, this paper explores the construction of a ‘Farmers’ City’ in Wenzhou in the early 1980s. It studies the actors, their relationships, and the institutions, and proposes a ‘state–society interdependence model’. It concludes that the spontaneous, bottom-up urbanization process initiated by farmers as described in the texts was actually the win–win result of an interactive and interdependent relationship between the farmers and local government. The reasons are: (1) the actors, including the local government, the specialized farmers (zhuanye hu), and the other farmers, collectively owned, controlled, and obtained the resources; (2) in terms of the mobilization-response process, the close patron–client ties between the farmers and local government formed a strong interdependent relationship; and (3) in terms of the institutional reforms, the folk interests and demands were always a reference point for the local government. The farmers and their government were partners, participants, and practitioners in grassroots institutional reform. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Decentralized governance is often viewed as an effective way to improve public services and government accountability. Many also document the negative dimensions of fiscal decentralization, especially in transition economies; thus, the combination of decentralization and centralized control has gained currency in some countries in recent years. Based on first-hand data and other documentary sources, and using civil service remuneration as an example, this paper attempts to explore how decentralized governance works in China and what hinders decentralization from performing better. The findings show that Chinese centralized control over expenditure in public sector remuneration primarily serves to enhance ministry control. Local bureaucrats, meanwhile, exploit better remuneration to boost their personal interests. This paper argues that political commitment rather than central transfer is greatly needed for utilizing the benefits of decentralized governance. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

In this paper we provide an overview of China's human capital strategy and educational achievements over the last two decades. While everyone acknowledges China as an economic superpower, very few are aware of or realize China's notable achievements in education as well as its internationalization of education. Since 1978, the landmark for the foundation of the Chinese modern higher education system, China has made tremendous strides in education both domestically and internationally. While China maintains 10% growth in GDP, albeit with a GDP per capita at a low level for a developing country, it is also producing serious scholars and a tremendous amount of scholarly output; more and more Chinese students are seeking higher education abroad; and international students are showing a rising interest in receiving education in China. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The paper argues that China's global expansion and calls for its use of soft power are provoking an ideological crisis which is becoming one of the most critical challenges of the present time. Revolutionary ideology legitimated the rule of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) for 60 years, but it has become increasingly at odds with the rapid socio-economic development that began 30 years ago. This paper examines four aspects of contemporary Chinese culture: first the discrepancy between the CCP's ideological rhetoric and its pragmatic policies; second, the fragmentation of the state, the intellectual elite, and the grassroots population in terms of cultural expressions and values; third, the consumer culture which has unleashed materialistic desires; and finally, the emergence of a ‘post-80s’ generation urban youth culture amidst these tension and contradictions. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This paper examines how debates in the media are providing the discursive conditions for, and thereby giving impetus to, diverse strategies of ‘so-called primitive accumulation’ in China. Taking as its empirical referent Chinese news and journal articles on land enclosure, the paper analyzes three frames in which policy entrepreneurs craft varying class positions for land-losing villagers. Grounded in different ontological premises, problem diagnoses and recommendations centering on the adoption of either a statist, neo-collective or liberal rural land regime, and backed up by evaluations of local policy experiments, the frames illustrate the diversity of ideational, political and institutional configurations that could facilitate the separation of peasant producers from the land, place land-losing villagers in different relationships with the state and capital, and sustain accumulation. In foregrounding these debates over land-losing villagers' future class positioning, the paper aims to offer a corrective to the historical determinism implicit in contemporary analyses that characterize enclosure in China as simply one national manifestation of homogenous, global neo-liberal projects of ‘accumulation by dispossession’ or ‘gangster capitalism’. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This paper studies the market reactions to corporate philanthropic giving in response to the 12 May 2008 Wenchuan earthquake in Sichuan, China. Based on a sample of 136 Chinese listed companies, our results indicate a significant and positive seven-day cumulative abnormal rise in the share prices of those companies making donations compared to those not making donations. Both timeliness and the amount of philanthropic giving generate significant market reactions, confirming Godfrey's assertion that corporate philanthropy can be perceived as a genuine manifestation of firms' underlying desire to raise their market values. However, when the sample firms are divided into two groups, government controlled and non-government controlled, Godfrey's assertion is challenged by our empirical results which show different market responses to the two different types of companies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The 5 July event in Urumqi inspired rethinking about Beijing's policy towards Xinjiang. This paper will examine Beijing's interests in Xinjiang from historical, political, economic and security perspectives, and the challenges Beijing faces in pursuing and protecting its interests. By examining the tensions between the Han and ethnic minorities, especially the Uyghurs in Xinjiang, the paper argues that the Xinjiang issue involves China's core interests and the most serious challenge Beijing faces is how to cope with ethnic tension in a highly sensitive region surrounded by big powers. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper investigates the role that children play in the migration decisions of Chinese women. The presence of children of various ages is hypothesized to affect the timing of migration, the length of migration, and the nature of migration in terms of who goes along. In addition, we also investigate whether the sex of the children affects migration decisions. Results indicate that whether one's husband ever migrated has a positive effect on migrating before childbirth. Return timing is strongly linked to the age of the child. Many mothers return to rural areas around the time that the child begins formal schooling. We also find that women who have given birth to a boy are significantly less likely to migrate after childbirth but more likely to take the boy with her if she does migrate. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The central government's pouring of money into the Tibetan Autonomous Region (TAR) or other Tibetan autonomous areas is apparently not really easing the tension in these regions. In response to Western criticism of the Chinese government policy in Tibet, President Hu Jintao says that the Tibetan problem is not about ethnicity, religion, or human rights, but about national unity or integrity. In fact, the Tibetan problem is about all of these things, and they are intertwined with one another. This paper attempts to understand each of them from an institutionalist perspective and to see in what way such an understanding of the problems may help solve them. Specifically, I first explain new institutionalism. Then I analyze the following problems from mainly a sociological new institutionalist perspective: (1) sovereignty and autonomy; (2) ethnicity and human rights; and (3) culture and religion. Finally I look at the possibility of social change under the institutionalist constraints. It is true that much research has been done on the Tibetan issue and the solution of it, but rarely do we see an institutionalist analysis. I hope that such an analysis will shed light on the understanding of the problem and help avoid the scene we see in the quote at the start of this paper. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]