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The study of Chinese foreign policy has long shown that domestic politics and domestic constraints are sources of foreign policy, albeit generally considered less potent than ideology and interests. Domestic political constraints should also be explored as factors in Chinese regional policies toward East Asia, including regional economic institutions. This paper examines three domestic institutional constraints on regional foreign policy in the area of trade and economics: a fragmented decision-making structure that has difficulty with coordination, a relatively heavy reliance on top level decision-makers at a time when issues of Asian economic policy have relatively low priority for these same decision-makers, and the relatively extreme lack of autonomy for negotiators vis-a-vis top decision-makers in Beijing. These constraints are by any means unique to China. However, at a time when many observers and participants are expecting—indeed, often hoping for—Chinese leadership in the region, the paper posits that these constraints hinder the PRC's ability to fill this role. The key empirical focus is regional trade agreements and regional economic organizations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In recent years, at the same time it has pursued multilateral trade negotiations via membership in the World Trade Organization (WTO), China has embraced a regional approach to trade liberalization by negotiating a number of bilateral or regional free trade agreements (FTAs) with its trading partners. This paper examines China's increasingly active FTA diplomacy and seeks to explain China's motives for pursuing expanded FTAs. Specifically, this paper argues that while China's FTA activism reflects considerations about enhancing China's influence in the Asia-Pacific region, capturing the economic gains of FTA participation, and minimizing the trade and investment diversion resulting from the competitive dynamics of regional trade liberalization, the move toward expanded FTAs is also consistent with the desire to create alternative bargaining forums over trade issues that could help to stabilize expectations as well as the need to use FTAs to control the pace of trade liberalization so as to accommodate protectionist pressure emanating from domestic interest groups. In particular, this paper highlights the impact of domestic politics on China's FTA negotiations through a detailed discussion of how pressure from protectionist seeking interests influences the scope and depth of China's FTAs. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

After more than a decade of preparation, China finally passed the Anti-Monopoly Law (AML) on 30 August 2007. This paper examines the debate over whether or not administrative monopoly should be included in the ambit of the AML, which took place throughout the drafting process of this new law. Administrative monopoly refers to the abusive use of administrative power by government agencies to engage in monopolistic activities. Owing to the administrative nature of this type of monopoly, the intent to regulate it by an economic law, such as the AML, has stirred up much controversy. Having analyzed the arguments both in support of and in opposition to the inclusion, this paper suggests the need to adopt a more comprehensive scheme in tackling administrative monopoly. Also, the enforcement mechanism of the AML will have to be strengthened in order to prevent this new law from degenerating into 'a toothless tiger'. Furthermore, the competition law regime of China will benefit from in-depth research in overseas anti-monopoly practices. In particular, the experiences of the former socialist states in Europe should be taken into account, given that they are similarly undergoing the transition from a planned economy to a market economy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The PLA's role in Beijing's foreign policy-making process is a closed book but it is a key research topic in our study of Chinese diplomacy. This paper argues that generally the PLA abides by a fine division of labor with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MoFA) in managing Beijing's international pursuits. The civilians are in charge of China's generic foreign affairs and daily diplomacy. The Central Military Commission (CMC) is responsible for security/military-related foreign affairs and defines the bottom-line for employing force in conflicts. Institutionally the PLA's role is more directional than detailed and is often behind the scenes. This complicates our research of the subject matter, as the line between this division of labor is thin over many diplomatic issues. Often times it is hard to demarcate where Beijing's normal diplomacy ends and where security/military dynamics begin. This paper adopts a two-layered analysis on civil–military interaction on foreign and security affairs: the broad consensus of CCP–PLA leaders on CCP regime stability at a time of drastic domestic change and world pressure; and the PLA's directional role in China's security/military-related foreign affairs under a generic civilian guidance. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This paper aggregates the state of India–China economic relations with a specific focus on trade at the borders. It explicates the potential for economic activity at the border regions to generate self-sustaining and/or externally linked local development for both countries. By an examination of the existing trade and investment policies and practices, it shows how geographical contiguity is yet to be transformed into opportunity along the India–China border, a practice consistent both with the history of these regions as well as with the blueprints being drawn up for the future of these regions. Informed by the Liberal school of IR theory, the paper studies border trade through the paradigmatic optic of being an important, yet underutilized, avenue of dyadic interaction, and makes a case for upgrading the status of border trade in the overall schema of bilateral trade relations between India and China. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

There are claims that China's influence on ASEAN is direct in that she has encouraged more exports to flow into her huge markets and changed trade flows amongst member countries. Demand and supply are deemed to have therefore become more China-centred. This paper looks at the plausibility of China as a 'factor' that influences bilateral intra-ASEAN trade flows through demand (exporting country) and supply (partner country). The key finding of the study is that China's trade association with the region increases intra-ASEAN exports. China is therefore the most practical choice for the ASEAN+1 FTA to initiate deeper trade integration within the region. China, as the 'core' country of the ACFTA can provide complementarities in the export performance of ASEAN. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In recent years, the rise of China as an emerging great power has been widely perceived across the world. How has the rise of China been represented over time in the Western news media? Has the image of China as a rising power had any impact on the country's soft power? These questions remain unanswered but answering them is of great significance in helping us understand the impact of the news media on the transformation of international politics in the information age. This paper conducts a longitudinal study to examine the nature of Chinese coverage and explores how the image of a rising China—economically, politically, regionally and globally—has been represented in three transnational newspapers in Europe. It further argues that the Western media coverage of China's rise is as a soft power, which, to some extent, has an impact upon China's foreign relations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper investigates macro-level sources of variations across countries regrading China's national image, as measured by the proportion of the public in each of 35 countries that expressed a favorable view of China in the 2007 Pew Global Attitudes Survey. It turns out that several expected factors have no significant measurable impact on China's image: not the extent of strategic ties between China and a given country; not the political system of that country; not the extent of Chinese investment in the country; and not the number of Confucius institutes and classrooms in that country. The only macro-level factor we find to affect China's image in a country is that country's level of economic and social development, as measured by the UN Human Development Index. Controlling for the other factors, publics in poor or developing countries are much more likely to have a favorable image of China than publics in economically advanced countries. Some implications of our findings are discussed. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This paper revisits the debate about foreign policy implications of Chinese nationalism in the context of China's increasingly confrontational and assertive behavior in recent years. It argues that while the Chinese government made effective efforts to control popular nationalism and Chinese foreign policy was therefore not dictated by emotional nationalistic rhetoric before 2008, it has become more willing to follow the popular nationalist calls to take a confrontational position against the Western powers and to adopt tougher measures in maritime territorial disputes with its neighbors. This strident turn is partially because the government is increasingly responsive to public opinion, but more importantly because of the convergence of Chinese state nationalism and popular nationalism calling for a more muscular Chinese foreign policy. Enjoying an inflated sense of empowerment supported by its new quotient of wealth and military capacities, and terrified of an uncertain future due to increasing social, economic and political tensions at home, the communist state has become more willing to play to the popular nationalist gallery in pursuing the so-called core national interests. These developments have complicated China's diplomacy, creating a heated political environment to harden China's foreign policy. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

It is argued in our paper that current studies of civil society in China, which place too much emphasis on its ‘independence’, are neither practical nor conducive to the sound development of China's civil society, because an adversarial intensification is likely to arise between the state and society. As is shown in our empirical study, despite the fundamental control imposed by the government, Wenzhou Business Association is actively involved in industry governance, constantly empowered by the government, and thus gradually achieves growth and development. This leads to a conclusion that it appears to be a rather more realistic developmental path for China's civil society for associations to make full use of the government's expanding space and to actively participate in public governance. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This paper uses an institutional perspective to examine the changing monetary policy operations in China since the 1978 reform. It shows that the establishment of money markets has enabled the central bank to shift its policy approach of direct control over credits to a set of indirect monetary tools. Under the constraint of exchange rate stability and other institutional factors, the effectiveness of these indirect tools is limited. Establishing an interbank money market policy rate through SHIBOR will provide a means of signaling the cost of funds to banks and the public. Its success in China is conditional on improved corporate governance and the competitive structure of banks, increased flexibility in its exchange rate determination, and a more cost-conscious state sector. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

China's government launched the Western Region Development Strategy in 2000 with the aim of boosting economic development in 12 provinces, municipalities and autonomous administrative regions in the western part of the country. This paper presents the results of an assessment of the progress made so far and makes suggestions for better performance in the future. We conclude that although the western region has experienced impressive rates of economic growth, regional disparities in China have continued to widen in spite of the western regional strategy. We also develop a regional growth model to determine the major drivers of regional economic growth in the western region of China. Furthermore, the sources of regional disparities are examined using Morduch and Sicular's regression-based decomposition approach. These models are used for suggesting a more targeted package of regional development policies for the period beyond 2010. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In March 2008, Tibet erupted in the biggest challenge to Chinese rule since 1959. While Beijing and Dharamsala engaged in their familiar battle of representations, pundits speculated on the causes of the uprising, ranging from conspiracy theories to informed policy analysis. Applying the framework of the insecurity dilemma, this article argues that Tibetan identity insecurity on account of the post-1989 hard-line Chinese policies was the chief cause of the uprising. Largely peaceful protests and occasionally violent riots in Tibet have been integral to Tibetan efforts to mitigate their societal insecurities provoked by Chinese migration, 'assimilationist' policies and 'cultural imperialism'. However, Tibetan protests and riots heighten Chinese insecurities and harden Beijing's policies both inside Tibet and towards the Dalai Lama. This paper reveals the dynamic cycle of hard-line Chinese policies provoking Tibetan uprisings; the resulting hardening in Chinese policies feeds back into Tibetan insecurities and protests. The 2008 uprising was the most recent cycle in the long-running saga of the Sino-Tibetan insecurity dilemma. The article warns that unless the Tibetans and the Chinese find a way to break out of the insecurity dilemma, Tibet could explode into another frenzy of violence and counter-violence in the near future. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

China's post-Mao reforms have devolved significant economic and fiscal power from central to local governments. However, decentralization from above involves political risks: weakened central control and increased local discretion may allow local governments to engage in self-interested activities with negative externalities to other regions and even the whole nation. A crucial question thus arises: how can the national government enjoy the benefits of decentralization while at the same time keeping the undesirable local behaviors in check? Through analysis of China's fiscal reforms, this paper suggests that the institutional advantageous position of the central government and its shrewd bargaining strategies played an important role in helping the central government maintain control over the fiscal system, inducing mutually acceptable outcomes for both the center and localities. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Through the lens of securitization theory, this article looks at the significant impact that non-traditional security has had over Chinese foreign policy. Over time, non-traditional security has changed from being understood as an opportunity to boost China's international standing, to being seen as an important category within security threats. China's security and diplomatic behavior has changed accordingly. In particular, China has become more confident in using and authorizing force. This article pinpoints this process started in the 1990s by looking at the debate within the government and the legal, institutional and military response against those new threats. It also prompts important considerations about the drivers and the direction of Chinese foreign policy, and the general approach of studying the same subject. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Despite persistent skepticism towards the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), many countries have signed on to the program and even more countries have come to believe in its transformative potential to development finance and the global order. How has the illiberal Chinese government succeeded in convincing the world, particularly the Global South, about its commitment and BRI's future success? Exploring the credibility puzzle, this article argues that the Xi Jinping administration has relied on an all-in strategy tying the BRI to China's national development and foreign policy, promoting the BRI through select international institutions, and launching a series of flagship mega-projects. With mounting sustainability challenges on both economic and geopolitical fronts, however, the BRI now has to scale back its ambitions while China reevaluates its strategic opportunity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article aims to investigate mutual impacts between China's global investment and maritime transportation system as a primary means for trading since the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) has been launched. This study collected China's global investment data categorized by independent economy entities with featured data, including investment capital, industrial field, and the maritime flows generated from the previous study. The country-level mutual relations in the context of the BRI are formulated and investigated by data-driven geographical visualization methods. The test results reveal both the degree and tendency of China's initiative impacting the global investment and the possible patterns and inertial power of investment on a globally regional initiative, primarily focusing on the concerns and contributions of the maritime transportation system in promoting investment and the BRI. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The People's Bank of China (PBC)has played an important role in China's sustained economic growth. Despite its limited formal independence, PBC has developed considerable de facto authority and autonomy, referered to here as central bank discretion (CBD). This article offers a detailed historical account of how PBChas gained growing CBD in areas such as monetary policy, financial stability, foreign exchange and financial regulation. It also analyzes the main underlying forces that have contributed to PBC's authority and autonomy.This study of CBD in China seeks to enrich the existing literature on the political economy of central banking, which has so far focused heavily on the concept of central bank independence (CBI). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) evolved from promotion of Eurasian connectivity into a catchall for Chinese foreign policy and infrastructure investments worldwide. Although usually portrayed as a top-down geopolitical project of the Chinese central government, this article argues the BRI is actually shaped by converging and diverging interests of a wide variety of actors within and outside China. In order to conceptualize the relational, contingent, and unstable emergence of the BRI in Latin America, the article emphasizes the process of co-production as a theoretical framework. It first analyzes how the BRI incorporated Latin America through policy and discourse analysis, then examines the multi-scalar and multi-sited co-production of Chinese-funded port and railroad infrastructures through interviews and public documents in Brazil. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Washington-Beijing rivalry of the early twentieth century was neither pre-ordained nor an aberration. It was constructed as domestic constituencies in each country were socialized toward confrontation. Pro-cooperation coalitions, which had emerged in each country to support alignment against a mutually perceived Soviet threat, were undermined by the final chapter of the Cold War. Yet a simmering U.S.-China rivalry was subsumed by an unsustainable accommodation of mutual self-interest by Washington and Beijing during the first two decades of the post-Cold War era. By the 2010s, the rivalry had become quite visible as pro-cooperation coalitions in the United States and China had splintered and been supplanted by pro-confrontation coalitions. U.S. and Chinese geostrategic reassessments also contributed to the emerging rivalry. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Unlike the common view that sees FOIP as a containment strategy against China, this article argues that Japan's FOIP vision seeks to maintain an open and inclusive regional order that incorporates all regional countries into a common framework. To realize such a vision, Japan has strengthened its regional order-building efforts with other regional like-minded countries. However, such efforts have limitations in terms of the resource shortage, legal constraints, and the lack of regional consensus. Unless Japan can address these challenges, the FOIP would end up being a mere utopian dream, rather than a meaningful vision or strategy that can prevent the emergence of a Cold War and maintain an inclusive and rules-based order in the region. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Within the Belt and Road Initiative literature, as well as in the media more broadly, geopolitical and geostrategic analyses have largely undervalued a role for domestic politics analyses. This article seeks to redress this deficiency, and supplements geopolitical analyses with a domestic politics perspective. It brings back the centrality of domestic politics. The domestic politics approach pays attention to the influence of personal leadership on the BRI and focuses on the political mobilisation and control mechanisms of the BRI, their impact and the various entanglements of international relations and domestic politics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Development of ‘16 + 1’ framework substantially depends on how Central and Eastern European countries understand their fast-evolving relationship with China. This article investigates and analyses related perceptions and discusses their implications for ‘16 + 1’. Focusing on the Sino-Serbian relationship, the study reveals that the understanding of China and its growing involvement in the region oscillates between the extremes, yet that both positive and negative evaluations are not supported by the available empirical evidence and informed by a proper understanding of the context within which the relationship takes place. This is likely to result in a sense of disillusionment, as well as heightened concerns about the relationship with China, casting shadow over the prospects of the China-CEE relations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines the network of Chinese-led regional platforms, established throughout the developing world in the twenty-first century. It seeks to identify the common features of Chinese-led regional multilateralism: its normative basis, institutionalization patterns and the scope of cooperation. A comparative study of three selected platforms established in Central and Eastern Europe (16 + 1), Africa (FOCAC), and Latin America (CCF) is provided. These comprehensive dialogue mechanisms are based on Chinese-backed norms of non-binding agreements, voluntarism and consensus, derived from the tradition of South-South cooperation. This translates into a flexible and loose institutional structure that enables China to combine multilateral and bilateral approaches, creating a highly adaptable blueprint for managing foreign relations on a regional scale. The article evaluates the outcomes of the Chinese-led regional model and discusses the implications of the findings for the understanding of China’s evolving foreign policy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

What does human rights mean to the Chinese government in the post- Tiananmen era? Has the way by which Beijing conceptualizes human rights changed over time? What policies and practices have Beijing's human rights conception privileged or delegitimized? The article takes on these intriguing questions by analyzing human rights stories in the People's Daily. The research applies the methods of text analytics and discourse analysis to shed light on the Party-state's effort of incorporating and reformulating the idea of human rights. It is found that, since 1989, the Chinese government has developed two major conceptions of human rights. Throughout the 1990s, human rights had been understood mainly as a source of regime threat and insecurity, hence requiring containment and rejection. Beginning in the early 2000s, an alternative argument was constructed that conceptualizes human rights as the governing capacity of the Party-state, hence deserving reception and acclamation. The rights-as-capacity argument has developed side-by-side with the rights-as-threat conception, resulting in an illiberal and dualistic rights regime in Chinese politics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article explores the motivations and calculations behind China's Belt and Road Initiative. It argues that China's efforts to enhance regional multilateral cooperation across the Eurasian space through the BRI are strongly motivated by a multifaceted grand strategy. First, China makes use of the BRI as a vehicle of soft balancing to frustrate the US containment and encirclement of China, and undermine its dominance in Eurasia and beyond. Second, China intends to promote alternative ideas and norms and build its role as a normative power through the BRI for fostering the legitimacy of its rising power. Third, China seeks to form a bargaining coalition through the BRI and AIIB to reshape global governance and transform the existing international system in a way that reflects its values, interests and status. Overall, the BRI serves as a decisive strategic maneuver for China to ensure security and promote power status in the international order, moving from a rule-taker to rule-maker. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

After the Chinese central government announced a policy of raising retirement benefits in 2005, there ensued a race to the top in pension benefit growth among its 31 provincial units. This study seeks to explain how this seemingly unusual nationwide social welfare expansion came about in authoritarian China. It helps to open up the black box of mysterious Chinese politics. The study highlights the roles of sub-national governments in decentralized Chinese social welfare policymaking. Instead of treating authoritarian rulers as unitary actors, this study looks into the interplay of center and provinces in a decentralized authoritarian political system. Compared with the center, provinces have traditionally been more reluctant to devote economic resources to social welfare. To motivate provincial governments to implement a policy of increased benefits, the center granted fiscal subsidies to certain provinces. This special subsidy program had three effects: (1) it reduced the provincial costs of the benefit increase; (2) it elevated the center's annual fiscal transfer base for subsidized provincial governments beyond the current year, into the future; and (3) it increased disposable personal income, a key indicator of local government officials' political merits in the cadre evaluation system. Inter-provincial competition in raising retirement benefits is explained, first, by provinces' desires to earn greater fiscal subsidies from the center; and, second, by the efforts of those provinces which did not receive the subsidies to keep their benefit levels up with the levels of those which did. The result of the center's subsidy program was not only a rise in pension levels, but also an increase in inter-regional social welfare disparities. The central government, perhaps alarmed by the consequences of its policy, acted to bring the rapid expansion of pension levels to an apparent end in 2016. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article discusses the rationale for, and progress to date of, creating a National Security Commission in China, a move first announced in late 2013. Central impulses for the Commission's establishment are to help better coordinate a very fragmented bureaucracy and to advance Xi Jinping's drive to consolidate his personal power over the internal and external coercive and diplomatic arms of the governing structure. The Commission is a work in progress and its full institutional maturation will take a protracted period. In the midst of the Commission's construction, there is considerable confusion among subordinates in the foreign policy and security areas about lines of authority and ultimate objectives. Beyond Xi Jinping, it is difficult to discern an authoritative voice. It is an open question as to whether this institutional attempt to achieve coordination will improve, or further complicate, China's long-standing coordination problem, some recent foreign policy achievements notwithstanding. The Commission's focus is heavily weighted toward internal and periphery security, but it also is an institution-building response to new global and transnational issues. It is not self-evident that Xi, or any single individual, can effectively manage the span of control he is constructing. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Policy experimentation has been widely considered a ‘magic bullet’ of policy improvement and key to economic prosperity in China. This article, however, argues that policy experimentation in China does not always seek policy efficiency. Rather, it can be manipulated as a political symbol without actually affecting practices. By taking a case study on Wenzhou's financial reform, this article illustrates that local policy experimentation can serve as a mechanism for the central government to legitimately delay reform practices—in the case of Wenzhou's financial reform in 2012, out of a desire to maintain socio-economic stability during the power succession at the 18th Party Congress. In this reform, socio-economic stability was deemed more important than developing a sustainable and effective long-term policy. This article provides a new perspective on understanding policy experimentation in China by proposing the idea of ‘symbolic reforms’. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This article examines China's response to the 2011 Libya crisis and the emergence of a new diplomatic imperative: overseas citizen protection. Over a 12-day period in February and March 2011, China evacuated more than 35,000 Chinese nationals from civil war torn Libya, testing the overseas crisis management capacity of the Chinese government. Because of increasing domestic pressure to protect the growing population of Chinese citizens abroad, Beijing is developing its diplomatic and military capabilities to manage and mitigate crises overseas. The large-scale Libya evacuation served as a wake-up call for Beijing, that conducting business in high risk countries around the world comes at a price; as a consequence, Beijing will be compelled to reassess its global strategic posture and foreign policy principles. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Entering the twenty-first century, particularly under the reign of Hu Jintao, China began to pursue an increasingly pro-active diplomacy in Africa. Most analysis on China's offensive diplomacy in Africa focuses on Beijing's thirst for energy and raw materials, and for economic profits and benefits. That is why it is often called ‘energy diplomacy’ or ‘economic diplomacy’ as if China, just like Japan in the 1980s, became another ‘economic animal’. But if one looks at the history of the PRC's foreign policy, Beijing has seldom pursued its diplomacy from purely economic considerations. Is this time any different? This article exams China's diplomacy in Africa from a strategic and political perspective such as its geo-strategic calculations, political and security ties with African countries, peacekeeping and anti-piracy efforts in the region, support for African regionalism, etc. It argues that China's diplomatic expansion in Africa, while partially driven by its need for economic growth, cannot be fully understood without taking into consideration its strategic impulse accompanying its accelerating emergence as a global power. Africa is one of China's diplomatic ‘new frontiers’ as exemplified by new Chinese leader Xi Jinping's maiden foreign trip to Africa in 2013. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Over the past few decades, China has accumulated over US$3.4 trillion of official foreign exchange reserves as it rises to become a global power. Do China's financial assets increase its ability to pursue its national interests internationally? With the globalisation and rising influence of Chinese state-owned enterprises, state-owned banks and sovereign wealth fund, as well as China's growing clout in several regional groupings, it is clear that China does possess the necessary mechanisms to assert its financial power. This article examines the efficacy and limitations of these mechanisms in Africa and Latin America, in the economic and political domains. In the economic domain, China has consistently used foreign oil contracts and acquisitions to secure direct oil flow from developing nations. An analysis of recent cases shows that while China is able to successfully harness its financial power in its pursuit of oil, it needs to fulfil its promises to the satisfaction of the recipient countries in order to maintain the value of its offers. In the political domain, China has used its financial assets to purchase diplomatic allegiance from various African and Latin American countries in support of its One-China policy. Studying both successful and unsuccessful cases reveals that while China is generally able to use its financial power in third-world countries against Taiwan successfully, its national goals have, in recent years, shifted to the economic realm, even with countries that still recognise the Taipei government. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The role of Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in Africa is puzzling: they pioneered China's inroads into Africa and shouldered the responsibilities of building and expanding cooperation with African countries, while these very activities and engagement, according to many scholars, often contradict or even undermine the political and diplomatic objectives adopted by the central government. To understand this puzzle, this article unpacks China's engagement in Africa, by examining large central SOEs in the resources and infrastructure sectors. It concludes that the commitment of large SOEs in Africa relies on small public and private contractors. The paradox therefore is, that while the central government encourages and supports the large SOEs to ‘go global’, it has limited capacity to control and regulate the small contractors. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The Investment Development Path (IDP) model has been widely accepted for illustrating the relationship between the inward and outward foreign direct investment (FDI) positions of a country and its economic status based on the data from developed economies. In recent years, however, outward FDI from developing economies has increased dramatically and it has been argued that institutions are ‘forefront’ factors in addition to the economic index. In this article, we use statistical data from China, which has gone through dramatic regulation reform and FDI development, to test the validity of the IDP model. We also trace the history of Chinese FDI regulation development to answer the following question: in what way are regulations important for FDI in different periods? We use Lenovo as a case study to show how a Chinese firm ‘avoids’ and ‘adapts to’ regulation changes. We find that the FDI development of China still follows the IDP model; however, the Chinese government has accelerated the whole process through active regulation reform. In a transition economy such as China, FDI co-evolves with the regulation, and the firms which can influence or foresee the policy changes can prosper considerably. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

One of the outstanding features of China's domestic politics is the prominence of the bureaucracy in the policy-making process. Arguably, bureaucracy is the next major player in the policy-making process in China after the top leaders. In this article, the three following aspects of the role of bureaucracy in the Chinese foreign policy-making process are examined: (1) the structure of the bureaucracy, especially the main agencies of the bureaucracy involved in foreign policy making; (2) the respective responsibilities of these agencies and their roles in the process; and (3) inter-agency coordination including the resolution of conflict among them. It observes that while the Ministry of Foreign Affairs plays a key role in the process, other ministries and bureaucratic agencies have significant and even growing input in an increasing number of functional areas, such as trade, finance, economy, climate change, soft power and military affairs. In addition, coordination among these agencies has become a key in the policy-making process. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Comparing China's 2012 anti-Japan protests against three previous rounds of anti-Japan protests in 1985, 1996 and 2005 reveals a cyclical pattern, best characterized as a wave of popular mobilization. In each case, external events sparked a swell of public anger and activism which Chinese leaders initially tolerated before cooling. This pattern of contained contention has not led to Beijing loosening control over its foreign policy. However, the 2012 protests did feature one new element: a consumer boycott augmented by China's more assertive economic statecraft. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO)—an organization interpreted in various ways—officially announced that it intended to ensure regional security by countering international terrorism, ethnic separatism and religious extremism. This article discerns the motivations of the SCO members, arguing that they have their respective, albeit occasionally mutual, interests and priorities. There is generally asymmetry of interests—the principal reason why the SCO's strategic situation is largely a suasion game between China and the members—with China demonstrating a greater interest in the SCO; moreover, the power asymmetry between China and the Central Asian members and the power equality between China and Russia further complicates the situation. This sophisticated relationship implies that despite some measurable results, the SCO faces tremendous challenges in becoming a well-established regional organization. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The state sector still plays an important role in China's economy. One of the key development phenomena characterizing the Chinese economy is the rapid ascendency of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and the resurgence of the state. The strength of China's SOEs is projected in the centrally administrated state-owned enterprises (CSOEs). They are the backbone of the national economy, spearheading national economic development and Beijing's ‘going-out’ strategy. The CSOEs have expanded their reach and increased their power, domestically and globally. In seeking to boost local GDP growth, the eastern provinces in China have joined the western provinces in a fierce contest to attract investment from SOEs. Nevertheless, the rapid ascendency of the SOEs has brought many negative consequences for China's economic, social and political development by causing conflict with the market-oriented development direction of Chinese economic reform and hindering fair competition between state-owned and non-state-owned enterprises. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Starting from 2004, China's trading partners, in particular the United States, have increasingly utilized the World Trade Organization (WTO) dispute settlement system (DSS) to challenge China's trade-related measures. As a major player in world trade, how China responds to adverse rulings is not only important to its trading partners, but also for the future of the international trade regime. China has thus far held a relatively good compliance record when facing adverse panel and/or Appellate Body rulings, except for the recent delay in full compliance in China—Publications and Audiovisual Products. Through examining the factors affecting China's decision making when targeted in a WTO dispute, this article finds that, in general, China is highly motivated to comply with the WTO DSS due to the reputational costs of noncompliance. Nevertheless, the recent delay in compliance in China—Publications and Audiovisual Products also demonstrates that successful implementation could be impeded by certain politically influential interest groups, especially when the measure at dispute is politically sensitive. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Asymmetric growth in foreign policy dynamics and power posture between China and India at the regional level is the new contour of current Asian politics. One vital aspect of it is the multilateral power politics or engagement through which rising powers connect and integrate with regional vis-à-vis global conditions in order to contend and compete with each other's strategic interests and primacy. This Asian rendezvous is part and parcel of the rhetoric of liberalist sentiments, which realistically do not work in favor of the developing countries' relationships. The history of the China–India bilateral discourse suggests that. In today's context, the increasing multilateral engagement between the two countries is a potential medium for denying space and holding an edge over each other's priority of acquiring assorted global resources, forming an Asian and a global identity, and notably in securing respective national strategic objectives. Current foreign policy contours of both countries are quite different from the previous order and politics. The boundary will continue to be the fundamental problem in their bilateral discourse, while the Asian discourse of Sino–Indian multilateral politics will be decided by their competition and power rivalry in resources and identity. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The rapid economic development of the People's Republic of China has not only been spectacular since 1978 but also suggests that there is a specific China Model of the relationship between the state, society and the market. In particular, this model would seem to have particular application to the less developed economies of the world. Certainly the emergence of a Beijing Consensus to replace the democratic capitalist Washington Consensus of the 1990s would seem to suggest the purchase that China's rise has brought in many parts of the world. An examination of six prominent different accounts of China's growing economic and political importance suggests that there are distinct limits to the conceptualisation of China's development in terms of a model, though there may be lessons about the interaction of public and private to be learnt more widely. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This article examines recent trends in the evolution of elite Chinese foreign policy discussions about the normative organizing principles that should ground contemporary international politics. It finds that a pragmatic emphasis on sovereignty, albeit as a right which is flexible and far from sacrosanct, still maintains a core position within Chinese thinking in this regard. However, at the same time, a surprising reconstitution of an old world view has begun to take shape in China. More specifically, the tianxia (all-under-heaven) concept has emerged as a new reference point for some Chinese deliberations on the normative structure of international relations. While such a perspective is still of secondary importance within Chinese international relations circles, its emergence suggests that a potentially far-reaching, if still inchoate, reconsideration of international order is underway in China. Moreover, such a development may have broad ranging implications for the security dynamic that takes shape in Asia in the coming years. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The common prediction in media and specialist commentary during much of the past decade was that Asia was adjusting to an emerging China-centered order and US influence was in decline. Over time, it became clearer that developments in the region showed a more complex reality. A growing contingent of scholars and specialists looked beyond accounts that inventoried China's strengths and US weaknesses and carefully considered other factors, including Chinese limitations and US strengths, before making their overall judgments. These more comprehensive and balanced assessments tempered sometimes alarming implications of earlier predictions of China's rise and decline in US leadership. This article reviews the evolution over the past decade of media and specialist assessments of China's rise and its implications for US leadership in Asia in order to draw lessons from this evolution in analysis and what the lessons might mean for future assessments of China's increasing role in Asian and world affairs. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Similarities between the US, the UK and the Chinese housing markets, including the movements of interest rates and house prices, and the exposure of some Chinese banks to the US mortgage securitization market, have triggered concern about whether China could experience a US-style credit and housing market crisis. Significant differences between China and Western economies make that unlikely in the near future. China's booming house market has been supported by fast economic growth, rapid urbanization and high domestic savings. Chinese banks have also been less exposed to mortgage defaults than their Western counterparts. However, the relative underdevelopment of the financial system—credit monitoring and asset securitization—may expose China to domestic mortgage lending-related crises. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A rising power has traditionally been considered as a revisionist power in realist international relations theories. However, a preliminary analysis of the rising China's foreign policy behavior doesn't uphold such conventional wisdom. Through the case study of China's rise, this article investigates whether the soft power concept provides a new approach in analyzing a rising power. Firstly, empirical connections between soft power and the rise of China are established by discussing the Chinese idea of soft power. This is followed by an examination of how China adopts a soft power-based global strategy and wields soft power in its rise to a status quo power. The findings suggest that the soft power concept can be applied to analyze a rising power. Moreover, when a rising power tries to develop its soft power resources and wield its soft power, its revisionist policy orientation will greatly decrease. This in turn allows for a smoother transition to a status quo power. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The acceptance and promotion of partnerships among major countries reflect an attempt on the part of China to re-define its position in the new international strategic pattern. They also reveal a strategic idea offered by China in the post-Cold War era in which it is emerging as a major power. The key questions are as follows. (a) What are the contents of such partnerships among major powers? (b) What are the differences between this partnership model among major powers and the Chinese foreign policy of independence and peace in the 1980s? (c) What are the motivations behind China's promotion of this model of partnerships among major powers? (d) Does the new model of partnerships among the major powers provide an important innovation in the management of relations among the major powers in the coming century? This article attempts to answer these questions so as to better understand China's international strategic behaviour patterns in the post-Cold War era, the inner logic of partnership relationships, and the trends of China's international strategy in the coming century. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]