Search

Unlike most current academic studies on corruption in China, which focus on the theme of how political, economic and social environments have caused corruption at the macro-level, this paper takes a micro-view. It concentrates on the question of how corruption, notably bribery, takes place between a briber and the bribed. Moreover, it examines what exact role guanxi-practice plays in corrupt exchange and, more importantly, why it constitutes a critical element. Through in-depth case-studies derived from extensive fieldwork, this paper comes to the conclusion that the micro-level operation of corruption in China is not due to some haphazard aggregation of sporadic acts but follows certain rules and codes of conduct, which should be seen as an informal institutional mechanism facilitating the contracting process of corrupt exchange. This paper also demonstrates that guanxi-practice embodies such rules and codes of conduct. Such conduct purports to remove the legal, moral and cognitive barriers impeding the contracting process of corrupt exchange by grafting a corrupt agreement upon a social setting, in which risk of exchange safety is controlled, and moral costs and cognitive dissonance are reduced. Therefore, this paper contends that the causality link between guanxi-practice and corruption is the inverse of the view held by many. It is not that the participants of corruption are compelled to corrupt conduct because of the existence of the guanxi-practice, but on the contrary, these participants adopt guanxi-practice as an alternative operating mechanism that facilitates corruption. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

China's reform of government procurement aims to promote greater prudence in expenditure management through introducing transparency, accountability, and competition into the procurement process. The reform can also be construed as China's effort to fulfill its commitment to the WTO. This paper examines the evolution of the reform and measures the success of the reform against three indicators: the amount of cost reduction, the coverage of procurement activities, and the degree of harmonization with the WTO Agreement of Government Procurement. This paper argues that the success of the reform has been limited by an array of factors, including the misconceptions of certain procurement officials and their malpractices in procurement processes, the poor capacities of some local governments in enforcing reform, structural deficiencies in the budget management system, and the lack of political will of both central and local authorities in spurring trade liberalization. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper assesses Pan Wei's proposal for a 'consultative rule of law system' for China, finding it a potentially important step along the path of political reform. China urgently needs political reform to deal with the rapidly mounting problems of corruption, abuse of power, financial scandals, rising crime and inequality, and declining legitimacy of the Chinese Communist Party. A rule of law, with an independent judiciary and other autonomous institutions of horizontal accountability, is vital if China is to rein in these problems and deliver better, fairer, more transparent and effective governance. However, Pan Wei's proposed system goes only part of the way toward addressing the deficiencies of governance in China, and is therefore best viewed as a transitional framework. To work, horizontal accountability must be supplemented with and reinforced by vertical accountability, through competitive elections, which give local officials an incentive to serve the public good and enable bad officials to be removed by the people. Ultimately, I argue, China can only achieve adequate and enduring political accountability by moving toward democracy. Among the other issues addressed in the paper are the architecture and appointment of a system of horizontal accountability for China; the role of the Communist Party (or its successor hegemon) in a 'rule of law' system; and the timing and phasing of the transition to a rule of law. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Based on materials from local archives and the author's interviews in Shandong Province, this paper uses case studies in the Luzhongnan prefecture to trace how the rural revolutionaries rose to prominence and to discuss their cultural impact on Mao's urban revolution after 1949. The paper begins by examining the intellectual origin of the Chinese revolution in this region, and then moves to a discussion of the end of political urbanism in the anti-Japanese War and the Civil War. As a result of wartime mass mobilization, peasants became the most dynamic forces in the political arena. Peasant cadres were systematically recruited and trained to run local governments. Eventually, they surpassed the revolutionary intellectuals both in number and in importance. When the CCP came to power, the peasant cadres were assigned to take over urban China. These rural revolutionaries were committed to the mission of creating a 'new socialist man', and rural revolutionary culture became the cultural orthodoxy of the People's Republic of China. This paper explores the nature and characteristics of the political and cultural programs, referred to as 'cultural de-urbanization', launched by Mao Zedong and his rural revolutionary followers in order to remold the urban people's mentality by the rural revolutionary tradition and practice. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the process of institutionalizing themselves, the Chinese Provincial People's Congresses (PPCs) have used their power in a more assertive manner and even contested decisions from other more powerful institutions, as shown by cases from the past two decades. By presenting a network mode of governance, this paper argues that institutional linkages and reciprocal strategy have, respectively, featured the institution building of the PPCs and their interaction with other power players, and thus the tension between institutional development and the expansion of power for the PPCs was solved. These two goals were pursued simultaneously in the Chinese legislative development. This was made possible by the way in which the PPCs conducted their activities. In their contestation with other institutions, the leaders within the PPCs conscientiously followed a 'Mohe' strategy, i.e. competition-cum-cooperation, and expanded the legislative power without turning other political players into their stumbling blocks. The paper attributes this unique development to the choice-set defined by the changing environment of the political economy under reform and Deng Xiaoping's ideas, the institutional linkages within the system of the people's congresses, and the astute leadership of the political entrepreneurs within the PPCs. This mixture of consultation and confrontation in the interactions between the PPCs and other major political institutions also indicated a change of political governance in China toward a network mode. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Assessing the prospects for democratization in The People's Republic of China has been a mostly normative exercise over the past 20 years. Newer empirical work has focused on public opinion and the implications for a democratic transition but this literature is still in its infancy. This paper focuses on the distribution of public opinion in Beijing with respect to a direct, close end question about the respondent's most important value. Among the choices were political democracy and individual freedom. We hypothesize that if younger, more educated and wealthier people are more likely to select either of these options as their most important value then, over the next few decades, there would be increasing public pressure for democratization because of generational replacement and the expected increases in both wealth and average levels of education in China over the same time span. While there are some indications that in the future Chinese public opinion will be more favorable to a transition towards democracy, on balance the results of this paper provide scant evidence that the future will lead to increasing public pressure for democratization. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper puts forward the concept of consultative Leninism to describe the political system that has taken shape in China after the death of Deng Xiaoping. It argues that the Communist Party has made its essentially Leninist political machinery more resilient in confronting the huge social and political challenges that the current global financial crisis may unleash in China by incorporating consultative elements. Consultative Leninism has five defining characteristics: an obsessive focus upon staying in power; continuous governance reform designed to pre-empt public demands for democratization; sustained efforts to enhance the Party's capacity to elicit, respond to and direct changing public opinion; pragmatism in economic and financial management; and the promotion of nationalism in place of Communism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

On 1 July 2003, over half a million Hong Kong people staged a mass protest against the poor governance of the post-handover Hong Kong government. The grievances of the marchers quickly snowballed into a widely backed movement for democracy. The subsequent record-breaking support for pro-democratic candidates during the local elections held on 23 November 2003 unnerved Beijing over its possible loss of control over Hong Kong. Beijing swiftly shifted to a hard-line approach, attempting to dampen the local democracy movement. This paper will expound the five fundamental causes of Hong Kong's broad-based demand for full democracy, analyse its type of democratic transition to illuminate its political dynamics, and highlight the parameters impacting its democratic development. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

With the rise of China, the importance of understanding Chinese nationalism increases. Assessing Chinese nationalism, many people claim that it has grown stronger and more intense in recent years. Some believe that this is the case because the Chinese Government deliberately promotes nationalism to serve its own purposes. This paper argues that the reality with Chinese nationalism is much more complicated than many assume. It has grown stronger in some respects but weaker in others. The role of the Chinese Government is at best mixed. In explaining the development of Chinese nationalism, one needs to look at external as well as internal and historical causes. Only by doing so can one gain a fuller and more balanced understanding of this intriguing phenomenon. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper is a response to Pan Wei's rule of law regime reform proposal. It agrees with Pan that the direction of political reform taken and discussed inside China is indeed different from the democratization that has been pushed by outside pro-democracy activists, including Chinese dissidents. While some Chinese scholars and think-tank analysts talk about political reform, they are not proposing to democratize the polity but to make the single party rule of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) more efficient or to provide it with a more solid legal base. They have looked upon political liberalization without democratization as an alternative solution to many of China's problems related to the extant authoritarian system. Pan Wei's proposal for building a rule-of-law regime is a representative work of this group of Chinese intellectuals. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]