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AbstractIn this piece I discuss optimal approaches that providers may take when pursuing surrogate decision-making. A potential critical problem here is some providers' approach differing from that of others. To the extent that this occurs, the results may be arbitrary, and the harm from this may be profound since this may affect, of course, even whether some of these patients will live or die. One factor possibly resulting in these differences is the moral weight providers place on what family members want when these outcomes differ from what they think patients would want. Providers now most commonly place greatest moral weight on following what patients would want to maximally respect their autonomy, but this view may clash with the view of others who see autonomy as more relational and thus based on prior and present social relations with others. Giving family members' wants more moral weight is a radical departure from what providers do now and may increase these differences. I discuss here the rationales for and against these competing choices.

AbstractDespite broad ethical consensus supporting developmentally appropriate disclosure of health information to older children and adolescents, cases in which parents and caregivers request nondisclosure continue to pose moral dilemmas for clinicians. State laws vary considerably regarding adolescents' rights to autonomy, privacy, and confidentiality, with many states not specifically addressing adolescents' right to their own healthcare information. The requirements of the 21st Century Cures Act have raised important ethical concerns for pediatricians and adolescent healthcare professionals regarding the protection of adolescent privacy and confidentiality, given requirements that chart notes and results be made readily available to patients via electronic portals. Less addressed have been the implications of the act for adolescents' access to their health information, since many healthcare systems' electronic portals are available to patients beginning at age 12, sometimes requiring that the patients themselves authorize their parents' access to the same information. In this article, we present a challenging case of protracted disagreement about an adolescent's right to honest information regarding his devastating prognosis. We then review the legal framework governing adolescents' rights to their own healthcare information, the limitations of ethics consultation to resolve such disputes, and the potential for the Cures Act's impact on electronic medical record systems to provide one form of resolution. We conclude that although parents in cases like the one presented here have the legal right to consent to medical treatment on their children's behalf, they do not have a corresponding right to direct the withholding of medical information from the patient.

AbstractEmpirical studies of pediatric clinical ethics cases are scant in the biomedical and bioethics literature. In this study, more than 100 detailed records of clinical ethics consultations spanning from 2000 to 2020 at a moderately sized U.S. Mid-Atlantic children's hospital were abstracted and analyzed. Findings of the analysis were generally consistent with other studies in pediatric clinical ethics, with additional insight into aspects of moral distress associated with cases, family engagement with consultations, and other characteristics of interest also documented. Over the 20-year time frame, ethics consults were completed on average twice a year, with a detectable upward trend. Consultations were requested across the spectrum of services and units within the hospital, with critical care environments represented most frequently and genetic and neurological conditions being the most common primary diagnoses. Ethical analysis most commonly related to questions around the principles of autonomy and beneficence.

Respect for autonomy is a key concept in contemporary bioethics and in ethics at the end of life in particular. An individualistic interpretation of autonomy may not incorporate the aspects of consideration that patients may have for their wider construct of personhood, which includes their love and consideration for their families. This anonymous case describes the intricacies of a patient's decision making at the end of life, the choices she made, and how her decisions changed as her situation evolved. The tension this produced within the medical team is unpacked using a lens of compassionate care in the intensive care unit., (Copyright 2022 The Journal of Clinical Ethics. All rights reserved.)

A psychiatric advance directive (PAD) is a communication tool that promotes patients' autonomy and gives capacitated adults who live with serious mental illnesses the ability to record their preferences for care and designate a proxy decision maker before a healthcare crisis. Despite a high degree of interest by patients and previous studies that recommend that clinicians facilitate the completion of PADs, the rate of implementation of PAD remains low. Research indicates that many clinicians lack the necessary experience to facilitate the completion of PADs and to use them, and, as a consequence, do not effectively engage patients about PADs. This study developed practical recommendations for clinicians to improve their ability to communicate and facilitate PADs. We (1) thematically analyzed definitions of PADs published in 118 articles across disciplines, and (2) presented our recommendations for enhanced communication in clinical practice that emphasizes patient-centeredness, usefulness, and clarity, aligned with evidence-based practices that put patients' autonomy and understanding first. While there is no one-size-fits-all script to engage patients in complex conversations, our recommended strategies include an emphasis on patients' autonomy, the adaptation of word choices, the use of metaphor not simile, and checking for patients' understanding as effective methods of clinical communication., (Copyright 2020 The Journal of Clinical Ethics. All rights reserved.)

An ethically sound discharge from the hospital can be impeded by a number of factors, including a lack of payor for a patient's care, a lack of appropriate discharge options, and a lack of authority to sign a patient into a long-term facility. In some cases, the primary barrier involves the patient's lack of financial decision-making capacity. When a patient's income comes primarily from government assistance, financial decision making is connected to both the individual's well-being and to fair allocation of resources. Taking away another person's financial independence is a substantial intrusion on autonomy and should not be considered lightly. However, poor management of funds can lead to homelessness, medical noncompliance, vulnerability to financial exploitation, and other threats to human flourishing. As with medical decision-making capacity, poor decisions alone do not invalidate an individual's right to self-determination. And as with medical decision-making capacity, such determinations should not be made ad hoc or be capricious, but should rely on sound assessment criteria. When there are justified concerns that a patient may be vulnerable due to limited financial decision-making capacity, an evaluation should be completed and a surrogate payee be sought, when appropriate., (Copyright 2020 The Journal of Clinical Ethics. All rights reserved.)

An accurate determination of an individual's decision-making capacity is fundamental to obtaining informed consent for medical treatment, as it allows clinicians to balance respect for patients' autonomy with the best interests of patients. Despite the increasing demand for assessments of patients' capacity, healthcare professionals find this task complex and challenging. Currently, assessments are largely based on patients' cognitive ability and do not sufficiently take into account other factors that influence patients' judgment. Furthermore, it is important to assess for and treat modifiable factors that impair decision-making capabilities, and to have guidance on when it is appropriate to delay treatment-related decisions. This article will review current methods for assessing capacity, highlight other factors to consider in the decision-making process, and propose an enhanced framework to guide clinicians in making timely and prudent treatment-related decisions for patients with impaired capacity., (Copyright 2020 The Journal of Clinical Ethics. All rights reserved.)

Should doctors shove their patients to choose in ways that are aligned with the patients' desired goals, when the patients' choices go wrong because of magical beliefs? I argue that doctors should not shove their patients in this way, but push them towards better and more reflective decision making. We can do this by nudging techniques or by more direct advice giving. If patients still choose wrongly, it is their choice, and doctors have fulfilled their professional, ethical duties., (Copyright 2020 The Journal of Clinical Ethics. All rights reserved.)

We reflect on Dr. Iserson's article in this journal, in which he suggests that clinicians must "shove" patients towards appropriate care. While recognizing that overt clinical guidance is part of care, we suggest that its use should be tempered by the guidance's responsiveness to the human and emotional experience of each patient., (Copyright 2020 The Journal of Clinical Ethics. All rights reserved.)

Moral distress is a phenomenon increasingly recognized in healthcare that occurs when a clinician is unable to act in a manner consistent with his or her moral requirements due to external constraints. We contend that some experiences of moral distress are self-inflicted due to one's under-assertion of professional authority, and these are potentially avoidable. In this article we outline causes of self-inflicted moral distress and offer recommendations for mitigation., (Copyright 2019 The Journal of Clinical Ethics. All rights reserved.)

Children's age and developmental capacity leave them incapable of making medical decisions for themselves. Decisions for children are traditionally made under the best interest standard. Ross calls into question whether the best interest standard can function as both a guidance and intervention principle, able to be applied across the spectrum of pediatric decision making. Ross describes constrained parental autonomy as an alternative model, arguing that it affords parents the ability to make decisions within the context of their family while upholding a child's current and future interests. Although the model provides a robust framework for intrafamilial decision making, I question whether it can be broadly applied to children living in non-intimate families., (Copyright 2019 The Journal of Clinical Ethics. All rights reserved.)

While the best interest standard (BIS) enjoys wide endorsement as ethical and decision-making standard in pediatrics, it has been criticized as vague and indeterminate. Alternate decision-making standards have been proposed to replace or augment the BIS, notably the harm principle (HP) and constrained parental autonomy (CPA) model. In this edition of The Journal of Clinical Ethics, Lainie Friedman Ross argues that CPA is a better standard than the BIS or the HP as both guide and limiter in pediatrics. In response, I review the important work done by the BIS in pediatrics, and argue that neither the HP nor the CPA can take over these functions or replace the BIS. Among other things I argue: (1) The BIS provides more robust protections for the moral claims of children. (2) The CPA model and the HP do not resolve the indeterminacy and vagueness present in complex medical situations, and the BIS is better suited to deal with this vagueness and indeterminacy. (3) The BIS is a general principle of medical ethics with special application in pediatrics; it fits seamlessly into the system of medical ethics and fulfills many functions within pediatrics. The HP and the CPA model do not fit in so readily within medical ethics, and are not equipped to take over the functions of the BIS., (Copyright 2019 The Journal of Clinical Ethics. All rights reserved.)

Plain Anabaptists are a small but rapidly growing ethnoreligious society with significant concentrations of population in a number of regions in North America. Among the most widely known of the various groups of Plain Anabaptists are the Amish and the Old Order Mennonites. It is the purpose of this article to provide insight into the culture and values of the Plain Anabaptists so that those who may be called upon to address ethical conflict involving Plain Anabaptists can do so with appropriate knowledge and sensitivity. The discussion of the culture and values of the Plain Anabaptists will be organized as follows: first we will explore the implications of Plain Anabaptist culture and values for applying the ethical principles of respect for autonomy and beneficence/nonmaleficence. Second, a brief description of several elements of Plain Anabaptist culture will be discussed with attention to the potential they create for ethical conflict in the healthcare setting., (Copyright 2018 The Journal of Clinical Ethics. All rights reserved.)

A patient's rights to informed consent and self-determination in psychiatric treatment are well enshrined, but the same rights have not yet been meaningfully extended to patients with regard to psychiatric diagnosis. Andrew Clark's essay entitled "Psychiatric Diagnoses and Informed Consent" in The Journal of Clinical Ethics empowers both psychiatrists and patients to rethink who "owns" the process of clinical assessment and of bestowing diagnostic labels that may have far-reaching consequences. Clark's article represents a noteworthy breakthrough in the field's ongoing journey toward enhancing informed consent, personal dignity, and patients' active involvement in their own care., (Copyright 2018 The Journal of Clinical Ethics. All rights reserved.)

Respect for patients' autonomy has taken a central place in the practice of medicine. Received wisdom holds that respect for autonomy allows overriding a patient's treatment preferences only if the patient has been found to lack capacity. This understanding of respect for autonomy requires a dichotomous approach to assessing capacity, whereby a patient must be found either to have full capacity to make some particular treatment decision or must be found to lack capacity to make that decision. However, clinical reality is more complicated, and, in borderline cases, different physicians may arrive at disparate judgments of capacity. In such cases, when capacity-determination protocols fail to achieve consensus, physicians would benefit from guidance regarding the clinical decision-making process necessary to elucidate the most ethically sound course of action. This article considers one such case and argues that, in a limited number of cases, respect for autonomy may require overriding a patient's stated treatment preference when a capacity determination is equivocal, even though the patient has not clearly demonstrated a lack of capacity., (Copyright 2018 The Journal of Clinical Ethics. All rights reserved.)

What is the responsibility of the physician when a capacitated patient assigns decision-making authority to a surrogate who does not act in the patient's best interest?, (Copyright 2016 The Journal of Clinical Ethics. All rights reserved.)

As medical technology has advanced, the question of medical futility has become a topic of intense debate both within the medical community and within society as a whole. However, a unanimous definition thereof is yet to be decided-some commentators are sceptical as to whether an agreement will ever be reached-and this continues to lead to difficulties, tension, and even legal action when a treating physician disagrees with a patient and/or a patient's family regarding care and treatment options. Although living in a pluralistic society presents one of the major reasons as to why, despite 30 years of intense discussion, no consensus has been made; the issue of medical futility will always be complex as it is, by nature, multifaceted, and numerous elements-including possible risks, evidence of the probability of benefit, the wishes of the patient (and family), professional standards, and cost-interact. Nevertheless, the global medical community has seen the development of two distinctly different approaches to medical futility: one in which the autonomy of patients is of paramount importance in the decision whether or not to pursue a treatment; and one in which beneficence and primum non nocere-first do no harm-are almost entirely the clinician's prerogative, and whereby he/she has a duty to refuse any treatment for which the potential risks outweigh the potential benefits for the patient. Recently, however, there has been a rejection of this dichotomous view of medical futility and the apparent "power struggle" between physician and patient, and a positive movement towards a more collaborative decision-making process that highlights the necessity of communication, aiming to result in the obtainment of the best possible outcome for each patient as an individual., (Copyright 2016 The Journal of Clinical Ethics. All rights reserved.)

As new technologies develop, new ethical paradigms may be needed. This article considers several examples, such as stopping venoarterial extracorporeal membrane oxygenation (VA-ECMO), treating patients who are in a locked-in-like state who have awareness, purposefully deceiving patients who have dementia, meeting the needs of transgender persons, showing loved ones patients' wounds, and doing research on controlled substances. I suggest that clinicians should identify the practices underlying their value assumptions so they can alter their assumptions when this might improve the care they offer to their patients., (Copyright 2016 The Journal of Clinical Ethics. All rights reserved.)

As the population in the United States gets older, more people suffer from dementia, which often causes neuropsychiatric symptoms such as agitation and paranoia. This can lead patients to refuse medications, prompting consideration of covert administration (that is, concealing medication in food or drink). While many condemn this practice as paternalistic, deceptive, and potentially harmful, the end result of assuming the "moral high ground" can be increased suffering for patients and families. This article addresses common criticisms of covert medication and presents a detailed algorithm by which to determine whether the practice is ethically permissible in specific cases. It also explores why so little attention has been paid in the U.S. to this presumably common practice, and reviews professional statements from Europe that endorse the practice. Finally, it presents a compelling argument for the role of Ulysses clauses in advance care planning, not only for patients with psychiatric illness but also for those who may suffer from dementia, which is far more common., (Copyright 2016 The Journal of Clinical Ethics. All rights reserved.)

The literature, although sparse, reports that covert administration of all types of medications is prevalent in nursing homes. Whether it is ever ethically defensible, however, to administer medications covertly to persons with significant dementia is a complex and contentious question. Some scholars contend that deception is inherently wrong and is never acceptable, while others believe that deception is intrinsic to providing care to persons with dementia. With an aim to begin to reconcile these polarized positions and to objectively study this contentious issue, the authors undertake an ethical analysis of the covert administration of medications by utilizing the principles of respect for autonomy, nonmaleficence, beneficence, and justice. Our approach examines covert administration within the context of all persons with significant dementia who are administered medications, and is aimed at providing ethical and practical guidance to clinicians who, when confronted with a patient who refuses medication, must choose the "least bad" option from among various courses of action, all of which have ethical implications. Components of a possible guideline for practice are proposed., (Copyright 2016 The Journal of Clinical Ethics. All rights reserved.)

Examining to what extent physicians are, or ought to be, defined by the profession when giving advice to patients, this commentary seeks to offer a better understanding of the potential conflicts that the American Medical Association's (AMA's) "Opinion 1.1.7, Physician Exercise of Conscience," addresses. This commentary conceptualizes the professions as knowledge communities, and situates the physician-patient relationship within this larger conceptual framework. So doing, it sheds light on how and when specialized knowledge is operationalized in professional advice-giving. Physicians communicate the knowledge community's insights to the patient. Thus, departures from professional knowledge as a matter of the professional's personal conscience are appropriately circumscribed by the knowledge community., (Copyright 2016 The Journal of Clinical Ethics. All rights reserved.)

The American Medical Association's (AMA's) "Opinion 1.1.7, Physician Exercise of Conscience" attempts to help physicians strike a reasonable balance between their own conscientious beliefs and their patients' medical interests in an effort to minimize harms to both. However, some ambiguity still remains as to whether the severity of harms experienced by physicians and patients is to be assessed externally (by policy makers or by a professional body like the AMA), or internally by the subjects of those harms. Conflicts between conscientious physicians' self-assessments of the moral harm associated with various actions and the AMA's external assessments of such harms are likely to lead to challenges in the implementation of some provisions of its opinion. This commentary argues, however, that provisions (b) and (e) of the opinion, which describe the information physicians should provide about their own scope of practice and about the existence of controversial procedures, are less likely to conflict with physicians' subjective assessments of moral harm, and therefore will face fewer challenges in implementation., (Copyright 2016 The Journal of Clinical Ethics. All rights reserved.)

Conscience can influence physicians' interactions with patients in myriad ways and, by extension, can influence the interactions and internal dynamics of a health care team. The AMA's opinion around physicians' exercise of conscience appropriately balance the obligations physicians have to their patients and profession, and the rights of physicians as moral agents to exercise their conscience. While the opinion is an effective starting point, further guidance is necessary to clarify the process by which physicians should identify, manage, and, if necessary, report their conscientious refusals to patients, supervisors, or colleagues. In addition to laying out a proposed process for identifying and managing issues of conscience, this article will use relevant and timely examples to help clarify how a physician could apply this process in an instance of conscientious refusal., (Copyright 2016 The Journal of Clinical Ethics. All rights reserved.)

As practicing clinicians, physicians are expected to uphold the ethical norms of their profession, including fidelity to patients and respect for patients' self-determination. At the same time, as individuals, physicians are moral agents in their own right and, like their patients, are informed by and committed to diverse cultural, religious, and philosophical traditions and beliefs. In some circumstances, the expectation that physicians will put patients' needs and preferences first may be in tension with the need to sustain the sense of moral integrity and continuity that grounds a physician's personal and professional life. This article examines the implications for patients, physicians, and the medical profession when tensions arise between a physician's professional commitments and his or her deeply held personal moral beliefs. It offers guidance on when a physician's professional commitments should outweigh personal beliefs as well as when physicians should have freedom to act according to the dictates of conscience while still protecting patients' interests., (Copyright 2016 The Journal of Clinical Ethics. All rights reserved.)

The MedStar Washington Hospital Center clinical ethics team became involved in a case when the family requested the posthumous removal of a patient's ovaries for future reproductive use. This case presents a novel question for clinical ethicists, since the technology for posthumous female reproduction is still in development. In the bioethics literature, the standard position is to refuse to comply with such a request, unless there is explicit consent or evidence of explicit conversations that demonstrate the deceased would have wanted this option pursued. Ms D's case, we suggest, offers an exception to this default position; complying with the family's request could have been ethically permissible in this case, had it been medically feasible., (Copyright 2016 The Journal of Clinical Ethics. All rights reserved.)

This commentary considers the viability of ovarian tissue cryopreservation (OTC) in the case of an adult who qualified for brain death. Although there has been some success with OTC in achieving pregnancy when the tissue is reimplanted in the original donor, attempting OTC in the case under discussion would have not been medically feasible., (Copyright 2016 The Journal of Clinical Ethics. All rights reserved.)

Clinicians and patients and their families may disagree about a course of treatment, and the ensuing conflict may seem intractable. The parties may request mediation, or use mediation-based approaches, to help resolve the conflict. In the process of mediation, and at other times, parties in conflict may feel so pressured to accept a resolution that they acquiesce unwillingly--and such resolutions often unravel. In this article I investigate how "bullied acquiescence" might happen, and how to avoid it., (Copyright 2016 The Journal of Clinical Ethics. All rights reserved.)

This commentary summarizes the uncertain state of the law regarding consent for posthumous gamete retrieval. The emergence of a legal framework will be aided by the kind of ethical analysis prompted by this family's request for removal and preservation of a deceased patient's ovaries., (Copyright 2016 The Journal of Clinical Ethics. All rights reserved.)

Ovarian salvage from a patient with brain death is not available and will not preserve viable ova for future reproduction. Previous interest in assisted reproductive technology is only the first step in this process, which requires careful assessment of maternal risks and potential for recurrent genetic disease., (Copyright 2016 The Journal of Clinical Ethics. All rights reserved.)

A 62-year-old female with Huntington's disease presented after a suicide attempt. Her advance directive stated that she did not want intubation or resuscitation, which her family acknowledged and supported. Despite these directives, she was resuscitated in the emergency department and continued to state that she would attempt suicide again. Her suicidality in the face of a chronic and advancing illness, and her prolonged consistency in her desire to take her own life, left careproviders wondering how to provide ethical, respectful care to this patient. Tension between the ethical principles of autonomy and beneficence is central in this case. The patient's narrative demonstrated that her suicide was an autonomous decision, free from coercion or disordered thinking from mental illness. Beneficence then would seem to necessitate care aligned with the patient's desire to end her life, which created ethical uneasiness for her family and careproviders. The case highlights several end-of-life ethical considerations that have received much recent attention. With ongoing discussions about the legalization of aid in dying across the country, caregivers are challenged to understand what beneficence means in people with terminal illnesses who want a say in their death. This case also highlights the profound moral distress of families and careproviders that arises in such ethically challenging scenarios., (Copyright 2016 The Journal of Clinical Ethics. All rights reserved.)

Patients rely on, benefit from, and are strongly influenced by physicians' recommendations. In spite of the centrality and importance of physicians' recommendations to clinical care, there is only a scant literature describing the conceptual process of forming a clinical recommendation, and no discrete professional standards for making individual clinical recommendations. Evidence-based medicine and shared decision making together are intended to improve medical decision making, but there has been limited attention to how a recommendation is discretely formulated from either of those processes or how patients' preferences ought to be considered and how much weight they should hold. Moreover, physicians' bias has been reported to strongly influence how a recommendation is derived, thereby undermining the quality of healthcare decisions and patients' trust. To demonstrate a potential for improving the quality of decisions, this article proposes a conceptual framework for how physicians should reach a clinical recommendation and apply the process in practice. For preference-sensitive clinical decisions-that is, clinical decisions when patients' values and preferences are relevant-the process for reaching a recommendation should be transparent to patients and should be based solely on the medical evidence and patients' values and preferences. When patients' preferences for care do not prioritize health, physicians decide whether their recommendation will prioritize a welfare-enhancing versus an autonomy-enhancing approach. When there are gaps in understanding how physicians derive their clinical recommendations and how to further improve the quality of the decisions, the author calls for further empiric research., (Copyright 2016 The Journal of Clinical Ethics. All rights reserved.)

When patients are not able to speak for themselves, surrogate decision makers are asked to guide treatment decisions and formulate a plan of care in accordance with what the patients would have wanted. This necessitates an exploration into the patients' views about life and how it should be lived, how the patients constructed their identity or life story, and their attitudes towards sickness and suffering. When an individual appoints a surrogate, such as a healthcare power of attorney, a common presumption is that this designation evinces merit. This obscures the possibility of multiple other considerations that influence individual choice. This article presents a clinical case in which the claim to know someone best created a controversy that brought treatment decisions to a standstill. Further, it illuminates how the question, "Given the current medical condition, what would this person want?" risks presuming that a singular, unambiguous preference exists and that one person can provide the answer. Clinical ethicists can play a vital role in situations when there is a dispute among a designated surrogate and family members over a patient's preference. By embracing the complexity of the desire to synthesize seemingly irreconcilable perspectives about identity, uncovering the reasons that underlie disagreement, and guiding inquiry in such a way that allows stakeholders to move beyond the conflict, clinical ethicists can facilitate decision making that honors the patient and may mitigate moral distress., (Copyright 2015 The Journal of Clinical Ethics. All rights reserved.)

While ethical conflicts in the provision of healthcare are common, the current third-party mediator model is limited by a lack of expert ethical mediators, who are often not on site when conflict escalates. In order to improve clinical outcomes in situations such as conflicts at the end of life, we suggest that clinicians-physicians, nurses and social workers-be trained to prevent and de-escalate emerging conflicts. This can be achieved using a mediation model framed by a communication-training approach. A case example is presented and the model is discussed. The implication of this preventative/early intervention model for improving clinical outcomes, in particular end-of life conflict, is considered., (Copyright 2015 The Journal of Clinical Ethics. All rights reserved.)

Background: Stroke is a worldwide problem with a limited number of approved treatments. Obtaining informed consent for acute stroke therapy is complicated by the breadth of information that must be communicated in a short period of time, the hectic nature of the emergency environment, the possible lack of understanding by the patient and/or family, and the critically time-sensitive nature of treatment for stroke. Complicating matters even further, patients are often unable to consent for themselves, placing the burden on surrogates to infer patients' wishes regarding treatment, and potentially limiting acute treatment by practitioners., Innovation: An advance directive for acute stroke therapy was created, entitled COAST (Coordinating Options for Acute Stroke Therapy). This clinical initiative is being piloted at a large comprehensive stroke center, including the development of the advance directive form, integration of the form with electronic medical records, training healthcare providers, and outreach to patients., Conclusions: COAST is an advance directive for stroke designed to make stroke care more efficient, optimize patients' autonomy, improve the quality of healthcare, and streamline the ethical management of complex care decisions in acute stroke. The inherent benefit of COAST is in providing patients and their families with more information regarding stroke and its treatment options, allowing them to take a more active role in their care., (Copyright 2015 The Journal of Clinical Ethics. All rights reserved.)

Although there has been significant attention in clinical ethics to when physicians should follow a parent's wishes, there has been much less discussion of the obligation to solicit viewpoints and decisions from all caregivers who have equal moral and legal standing in relation to a pediatric patient. How should healthcare professionals respond when one caregiver dominates decision making? We present a case that highlights how these problems played out in an ethical bargain. Ethical bargaining occurs when the parties involved choose not to pursue a morally preferable option for the sake of coming to a resolution. This case is not one of parental disagreement; rather, the medical team agreed to exclude the patient's mother from decision making if the patient's father promised to bring their son back to the hospital for necessary medical tests. We argue that there is an obligation to notice and acknowledge power asymmetries in the family unit, which, in this case, was manifested as the marginalization of the female decision maker by the male decision maker. In these scenarios, clinicians should be careful to avoid treating parents as one homogenous unit, and they should take action to enable caregivers' autonomy and voice. While there are moral and practical limits to how and when physicians should intervene in family dynamics, we discuss the steps that the medical team should have taken in this case to avoid undermining the parental authority of the mother. We conclude by offering recommendations to address and enable caregivers' autonomy at an institutional level, and we discuss the importance of tracking and responding to damaging family dynamics to prevent ethically impermissible bargaining., (Copyright 2015 The Journal of Clinical Ethics. All rights reserved.)

Susan D. McCammon and Nicole M. Piemonte offer a thoughtful and thorough commentary on our manuscript entitled "Expanding the use of Continuous Sedation Until Death." In this reply we attempt to clarify and further defend our position. We show how continuous sedation until death is not a "first resort" but rather a legitimate option among many that should available to terminally ill patients whose life expectancy is less than six months. We also attempt to show that we do not equivocate the meaning of palliative care as the commentators suggested. We argue that the traditional notion of palliative care should move beyond relief of "experienced suffering" to relief of potential suffering for those whose life expectancy is less than six months. Lastly, we challenge the commentator's position that the realm of ordinary medicine" should be the guide to care, by showing how the notion of ordinary medicine has been successfully challenged in both bioethical scholarship and the courts in a way that shows ordinary medicine to be an evolving concept rather than a static, universal guide., (Copyright 2015 The Journal of Clinical Ethics. All rights reserved.)

The hymen is a structure of the female genitalia that is poorly understood even by many medical professionals. Despite the significant anatomical variation in the hymen and no guarantee that rupture or bleeding will occur at first coitus, it has come to hold major cultural significance around the world as a perceived biological indicator of virginity. The persistence of such myths around the hymen causes real harm, including the increase in so-called revirgination surgical procedures., (Copyright 2015 The Journal of Clinical Ethics. All rights reserved.)

As currently practiced, the use of continuous sedation until death (CSD) is controlled by clinicians in a way that may deny patients a key choice in controlling their dying process. Ethical guidelines from the American Medical Association and the American Academy of Pain Medicine describe CSD as a "last resort," and a position statement from the American Academy of Hospice and Palliative Medicine describe it as "an intervention reserved for extreme situations." Accordingly, patients must progress to unremitting pain and suffering and reach a last-resort stage before the option to pursue CSD is considered. Alternatively, we present and defend a new guideline in which decisionally capable, terminally ill patients who have a life expectancy of less than six months may request CSD before being subjected to the refractory suffering of a treatment of "last resort.", (Copyright 2015 The Journal of Clinical Ethics. All rights reserved.)

The discourse among medical and scientific communities on hymen restoration is largely missing the voice of women affected. This article calls for a more nuanced reflection on women's real life experiences and the complexities inherent in the negotiation process about the surgery going beyond "ideologies" and the extremes of rape and threats to life. By taking the clinical experience of a woman who requests restoration surgery before her arranged marriage, this article illuminates the grey zone beyond these extremes and explores an individual woman's options for making her own choices., (Copyright 2015 The Journal of Clinical Ethics. All rights reserved.)

Hymenoplasty is a practice that must be judged from within its cultural confines and not only from outside. It offers women who have grown up within the sexual norms of a Western society the chance to return to their parental culture, with its female-specific virginity expectations. Hymenoplasty allows women to be sexually active prior to marriage, which equalizes the discrepancy between gender norms on premarital sexual experience. Caution is needed when comparing hymenoplasty to female genital mutilation. However, comparing hymenoplasty to other cosmetic genital modification procedures raises unique ethical, social, and medical quandaries that highlight the importance of patient's autonomy., (Copyright 2015 The Journal of Clinical Ethics. All rights reserved.)

It is a clinician's cliché that a physician only challenges a patient's capacity to make a treatment decision if that decision is not what the physician wants. Agreement is proof of decisional capacity; disagreement is proof or at least evidence of capacity's absence. It is assumed that this asymmetry cannot be justified, that the asymmetry must be a form of physicians' paternalism. Instead what is at issue when patient and physician disagree are usually two laudable impulses. The first is physicians' commitment to patients' well-being: physicians have a professional obligation as well as, ideally, a personal commitment to take care of patients--to do their best to bring about a positive medical outcome. The second impulse is common to much of human life, namely, the urge to find and to understand the source of our disagreements with one another. In this article we argue that, jointly, these impulses justify the asymmetry with regard to examining patients' capacity., (Copyright 2015 The Journal of Clinical Ethics. All rights reserved.)

The feasibility of posthumous reproduction when the surviving partner is female has brought to light many ethical, moral, social, and legal issues. This review aims to summarize these issues and to assist clinicians who may be faced with such requests. A question list, used for health technologies assessment, was utilized in a question-answer approach as the review methodology. Of the 1,208 publications identified through a comprehensive literature search in biomedical, psychological, and ethical databases, 31 articles included arguments related to one or more questions from the predefined question set. Key stakeholders identified include the deceased, the requesting party, the resultant child, the physician, and society. Key ethical issues relevant to posthumous reproduction include the four traditional pillars of medical ethics--autonomy, beneficence, nonmaleficence, justice--as well as the stakeholders' rights and sociocultural attitudes. The ethical framework formulated by these issues has been incorporated in a clinical ethics decision-making tool that could prove useful to clinicians and decision makers., (Copyright 2015 The Journal of Clinical Ethics. All rights reserved.)

Hymenoplasty is a minor surgical procedure requested by women who, for cultural or religious reasons, need to remain a virgin until marriage. In this article I assess whether the public healthcare system of a liberal state should provide it as part of a policy of multicultural accommodation. I conclude that, in order to remain loyal to certain ethical ideals linked to the rule of law, liberal states should give access to hymenoplasty only to women for whom premarital virginity is a precondition for their flourishing within their community and who say they are victims of sexual assault., (Copyright 2015 The Journal of Clinical Ethics. All rights reserved.)

Some traditional cultural practices assure expected wedding night bleeding, to help preserve the honor of all parties., (Copyright 2015 The Journal of Clinical Ethics. All rights reserved.)

Doctoring the genitals is compatible with a recognizable conception of social medicine. This commentary critically examines the distinction between medical and nonmedical procedures; presents an alternative account of Sohaila Bastami's personal reaction to the anonymous caller's request for referral information concerning hymen reconstruction surgery; and makes use of Yelp to simulate the caller's procedure for locating a helpful practitioner. Yelp is a very useful informational search engine that does not subject its users to a moral examination., (Copyright 2015 The Journal of Clinical Ethics. All rights reserved.)

A young woman called me to ask for a referral to a physician who provided hymen reconstruction surgery. She had had premarital intercourse and came from a cultural background in which it was very important to "prove virginity" on the wedding night. This article deals with my internal struggle whether or not to provide the referral. I felt that providing it would have made me complicit in supporting gender inequality, as men are not required to "prove virginity" to get married. At the same time, I was concerned about the repercussions of not being able to "prove virginity" would have on the caller. I had no explicit guidance on what to do in such a situation--it was not covered by the professional responsibilities I had as a research assistant., (Copyright 2015 The Journal of Clinical Ethics. All rights reserved.)

How might clinicians best try to retain the trust of patients and family members after clinicians oppose giving a treatment? If clinicians can maintain the trust of patients and families in these situations, this may soften what may be the greatest possible loss--the death of a loved one. I discuss what clinicians seeking to retain trust should not do--namely impose their values and reason wrongly--and introduce strategies that clinicians may use to reduce both. I present five principles that clinicians can follow to try to retain trust, with examples that illustrate each. I suggest specific interventions that clinicians can make, especially when they anticipate that a patient and/or family may, in time, want a treatment that is futile., (Copyright 2015 The Journal of Clinical Ethics. All rights reserved.)

Samuel H. LiPuma and Joseph P. DeMarco argue for a positive right to continuous sedation until death (CSD) for any patient with a life expectancy less than six months. They reject any requirement of proportionality. Their proposed guideline makes CSD an option for a decisional adult patient with an appropriate terminal diagnosis regardless of whether suffering (physical or existential) is present. This guideline purports to "empower" the patient with the ability to control the timing and manner of her death. This extends even to the option to "opt out" of the awareness and experience of dying and to avoid suffering altogether, even if one's symptoms and suffering could be effectively treated. We respond first with a critique of their terminology. We then turn to some purely practical considerations of how this guideline might be enacted in the current atmosphere of American hospice and palliative care medicine. We close with a consideration of one philosophical concern that might ground the discussion of risks, benefits, and alternatives necessary for informed consent., (Copyright 2015 The Journal of Clinical Ethics. All rights reserved.)

Does the practice of questioning the decision-making capacity of patients who disagree with recommended medical interventions amount to paternalism on the part of physicians who would not have raised questions about competence had these patients accepted the recommendation? Brudney and Siegler provide a nuanced argument why the practice can be both pragmatically and ethically justifiable, particularly if physicians follow a "decision tree" that they recommend for cases where disagreements occur. Nonetheless, the history of this subject shows that bioethicists have long been worried that the "outcome approach" (challenging patient's capacity because of substantive disagreements with their choices) undermines respect for autonomy, and the more refined version from Brudney and Siegler still creates some further concerns about the resulting inadequacies in communication and comprehension in the physician-patient relationship., (Copyright 2015 The Journal of Clinical Ethics. All rights reserved.)