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In the social responsibility environment, this paper considers the impacts of credit support, government subsidy and the internal cost subsidy on corporate social responsibility (CSR) behavior of supply chain members. By constructing a differential game model consisting of a single manufacturer and a single retailer, the equilibrium results of the supply chain are studied under four game situations and the validity of the theoretical derivation is verified by numerical examples. The results show that credit support only motivates the manufacturer to increase the CSR effort and government subsidy can simultaneously increase the enthusiasm of the manufacturer and the retailer to fulfill their social responsibility. Under credit support and government subsidy, when π < 2/3 is satisfied, compared with the Nash non-cooperative game situation, the internal CSR cost subsidy can improve the profits of both parties in the Stackelberg game situation. So we can draw a conclusion that the supply chain members should take full advantage of credit support, government subsidy and the internal CSR cost subsidy to strengthen CSR management. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]