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This study examines whether the pacifying effect of foreign direct investment (FDI) on territorial disputes between adversarial dyads is conditional upon the dyads' past experience of military cooperation. I built a political economy model and conducted a logistic regression analysis on the newly coded bilateral FDI data between adversarial dyads and the existing dataset by merging the rivalry data established by Thompson [51] and the territorial disputes data collected by Lee and Mitchell [42]. I found that when bilateral FDI flows between adversarial dyads reach a certain level the pacifying effect of FDI is stronger for adversarial dyads with past military cooperation. I also found that while past military cooperation has a pacifying effect in general, past military cooperation that occurred more recently has a stronger pacifying effect than those that occurred a while ago. Moreover, based upon the theoretical model and empirical findings in this paper, I investigated the political implications for Tsai Ing-wen's "New Southbound Policy" and Taiwan's approach to the territorial dispute issues in the South China Sea. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Latin America is a critical region for analyzing China's economic statecraft. Following the Monroe doctrine, Latin America has long been seen as part of the sphere of U.S. influence. For the purpose of studying the effectiveness of China's economic statecraft I will focus on two countries that stand on opposite extremes: Brazil and Mexico. Both countries happened to be important target states (strategic partners) of China's economic statecraft in the region, albeit for different political and strategic goals. In this paper I will compare the different domestic political and economic conditions, interests and institutions in these two countries to explain why China has made greater progress in projecting its economic power through trade and investment to pursue its political goals with Brazil, but has not succeeded in Mexico. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

China has undoubtedly become an important part of the world economy. While the Chinese market has attracted an increasing number of foreign direct investments, the speed of Chinese firms' internationalization is rather slow. The ultimate competitiveness of nations depends on their ability to achieve economic dominance in other parts of the world, especially in the Triad countries, namely, USA, EU and Japan. Whether China can achieve its ambitions of becoming an economic superpower relies more on the scale of its outward foreign investment than on the number of inward foreign investment it attracts. Little is known as to why Chinese firms are slow to internationalize. This paper intends to explore the barriers faced by Chinese firms to invest abroad. Factors such as lack of ownership advantages, locational advantages, and Chinese cultural values are looked into. Based on the findings, policy implications and recommendations are provided. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article focuses on Chinese-Caribbean relations, which have been marked in the early twenty-first century by an increase in bilateral trade and Chinese foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows to the region. The relationship has been generally positive for both sides. However, at the same time, there are areas of friction including charges of Chinese "neo-colonialism," similar to those leveled against Chinese ventures elsewhere. My study of China's relations entails case studies of Cuba, the Bahamas, and Jamaica, which I supplement with an examination of the Dominican Republic and Haiti's political and economic relations with China. It shows most Caribbean countries have not noticeably changed their foreign or domestic policies because of their economic linkages with China, though there is variation in these countries' specific responses to their economic ties with China, which is a function of diverse international and domestic economic and political variables. Regardless, Beijing's views are given more consideration than previously. As noted in the article, China's push into the Caribbean is increasingly resented by the United States and could play a role in bringing a New Cold War to the region. Rounding out the piece is a review of the diverse challenges facing COFDI in the Caribbean. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Two burning academic and policy questions in the study of Latin American and Caribbean- China ties relate to the effects of China's rising trade, investment and financial presence on Latin American and Caribbean (LAC) country foreign and domestic policies. In this article, we study the case of Ecuador, focusing on Rafael Correa's administration (2007–2016), as a way to delve into these issues. As conventional wisdom about the power of economics suggests, we find that Ecuador's foreign and domestic policies have inclined towards China and Chinese companies. However, this was not solely because of China's economic allure. Ecuador's stance also has something to do with the fact that better ties with China and receptivity to Chinese foreign direct investment (FDI) flows fit the government's international economic and political agenda. Moreover, they also conformed to the social agenda of Ecuadorian leaders, which made it even more logical to pursue warm ties with Beijing and create an open door for Chinese outward FDI (OFDI). As for Correa specifically, his regime sought to bring in Chinese OFDI as a means to promote a new growth model as well as his development philosophy Buen Vivir. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Chinese outward foreign direct investment (FDI) has been one of the economic tools China has used to engage South America. Although Colombia has been attracting inward FDI in quantities similar to other key regional states, its macroeconomic and sectoral features and investment attraction policies positively correlate with many of the factors known to attract Chinese outward FDI (OFDI), and both the Colombia and Chinese governments are committed to increasing Chinese OFDI (COFDI) flows to Colombia, COFDI volumes to the Andean nation have yet to live up to expectations. This puzzling case highlights the need for a better understanding of the political-economic factors that drive COFDI. My case study show that Colombia's political and economic traits have been hindering COFDI. Regarding the former, Colombia's local politics regarding extractive activities and bidding on infrastructure projects and its close relations with the United States function to create an adverse environment for increased COFDI. With respect to the latter, the international economic environment, especially regarding commodities' prices, has impaired Chinese investment in Colombia. Overall, Colombia's case underscores the delicate interplay of international, national, and subnational factors on COFDI flows. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article explores the political economy of Chinese outward foreign direct investment (FDI) in Argentina during the reign of Nestor Kirchner and Cristina Fernandez. Among other things, it contemplates possible links between Chinese outward FDI (OFDI) volumes and Argentina's domestic and foreign policies. It also analyses a mixture of successful and unsuccessful Chinese investment cases in the agricultural, chemical, and banking sectors in order to engage the debate about the drivers of Chinese OFDI (COFDI), with some stressing business and economic factors and others emphasizing the primacy of political factors. In regards to the former, my study shows that Argentine policymakers did not offer special accommodations to Chinese investors despite the pro-China proclivities of Argentine leaders and their country's economic and political need for China. Moreover, at the local level, Argentine politics actually proved to be an obstacle to successful Chinese deals. As for the latter issue, Chinese companies were not inclined to invest in Argentina because of the China stance of the Argentine government, but rather because they saw opportunities to exploit fertile agricultural soil, special tax regimes for investors, and opportunities to integrate into global value chain. My findings have a number of important theoretical and policy implications. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

There are many who expect China's rising foreign direct investment (FDI) in, exports to, and economic collaboration with Latin American countries will drive such countries to adopt foreign and domestic politics friendly to China as well as China-favored policies. This article tests the power of such arguments by examining the impact of Chinese outward FDI (OFDI) in Brazil, Brazil's trade with China, and Chinese loans to Brazil on Brazil's China policy. It finds that broad and deep economic ties indeed have pushed Brazil in the direction of China. However, the magnitude of such changes has been limited. The reasons for bounded change include differing interests and positions at the system and state-levels. Also relevant are domestic political factors such as pressures from special interest groups in Brazil. Finally, the political power of Brazilian leaders plays a role in bounding the positive political effects expected to flow from Brazil's deep economic interconnections with China. It must be noted that many putatively China-friendly Brazilian policies had roots long before Brazil's economic ties with China exploded. This article calls into question the presumption that significant economic links with China and/or the prospect of such automatically will produce the China-favorable political policies some expect. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

There are three positions about the impact of outward foreign direct investment (FDI) from China on the policies of Latin American and Caribbean (LAC) countries: the "Wealth is Power" camp, which associates political power with Chinese economic lures; the "Conditionalist" camp, which contends the international and domestic economic and political context determines the specific political effect of Chinese outward FDI (OFDI); and the "Politics is Power" camp, which believes no dramatic political changes have resulted from the economic stimuli of Chinese OFDI (COFDI) and associated economic lures. Case studies herein on Brazil and China, Argentina and China, Ecuador and China, and the Caribbean and China support the Conditionalist camp, albeit to differing degrees and for different reasons. Case studies herein on COFDI in Argentina and in Colombia also deepen our knowledge about the drivers of COFDI. They challenge those asserting that COFDI in LAC is driven purely by political motives. This piece also reviews and critiques the state of the literature on COFDI in LAC and suggests a pathway for moving to the next level. It specifically recommends researchers work to cumulate knowledge by asking similar kinds of questions across cases, exploit theory, and work on variable conceptualization and operationalization. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Chinese Outward Foreign Direct Investment (COFDI) in the European Union (EU) has recently increasingly drawn attention because of the opacity of state-sponsored Chinese firms, COFDI targeting of sectors including technology and infrastructure, the suddenness of COFDI, and sensitivity in the EU to China's continuing political rise. This article focuses on how China uses OFDI as a tool of economic statecraft, and how the fact that OFDI is a tool of economic statecraft influences the reception of Chinese investment in European host countries. Proceeding through case studies of the high profile KUKA and Aixtron cases, it analyzes the conditions in the host country under which economic statecraft facilitates or complicates the completion of an acquisition, and demonstrates the challenges that Chinese firms are facing when investing in the EU due to their inseparable or suspected connections with the Chinese party-state. It finds that besides political or private party and stakeholder support, the sector and the lack of reciprocity, there is a critical role for legal frameworks, which is reflected in various calls for legal bases and screening mechanisms to block state-backed moves on strategic industries. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Compares the determination of foreign direct investment and World Bank loans in China. Question whether the government has the power to direct foreign capital into its preferred regions; Results produced by the statistical analysis performed; Description of the state-centered approaches to politics.

Assesses the post-Mao economic transformation in China. Growth of capitalist and entrepreneurial class accompanied by large-scale privatization and foreign investment in the urban areas of the country; Aspects of the economic change in post-Mao era.