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This paper provides empirical evidence on the incentive role of personnel control in China in the twenty-first century. Employing the city-level turnover data of political leaders in China between 2000 and 2018 and utilizing the fixed effects ordered logit model, we find that the likelihood of promotion of local leaders rises with their economic performance. This relationship holds more firmly in the municipal party secretary. The probability is also found to decrease with the economic performance of their immediate predecessors and neighboring cities. This finding is robust to various robustness tests. We interpret the finding as evidence that the relative economic performance (peer effects) also contributes to the local political turnover, in particular within a province. Moreover, after the Third Plenary Session of the 18th CPC Central Committee, a material change in the personnel arrangement within the party arises and this promotion mechanism shows a dynamic change. Our study sheds some light on the growing literature emphasizing the relationship between political turnover and economic performance. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

China's rise as a global power corresponded with a diminution of Taiwanese diplomacy, which has left Central America as the last region to host a continuous bloc of countries that recognize the ROC. In this article, we argue that China's success in gaining diplomatic recognition from Taiwan's former allies has largely resulted from China's economic policy, specifically its promises of large-scale infrastructure projects and the integration of Central American economies with Chinese markets. However, there are limits to how far China has advanced in gaining full recognition from the region. The competing political and economic interests of China, Taiwan, the United States, and the Central American countries themselves, continue to influence patterns of diplomatic switching. More specifically, we argue that the threat of punitive measures from the United States combined with a turn in Taiwanese diplomacy toward assistance efforts to combat Covid-19 may deter future switching in the short to medium-term. Our analysis offers case studies of four Central American countries (Costa Rica, Panama, El Salvador and Nicaragua) to illustrate the multi-year processes by which China's economic strategy leads to diplomatic switching and examine the paths ahead for the remaining holdouts facing the prospect of economic and political penalties by the United States. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The political report given by Xi Jinping at the 19th National Party Congress in late 2017 introduced the concept of "a social governance model based on co-construction, co-governance, and co-sharing." This essay explores the use and interpretations of official discourse on governing society since the late 1980s to understand what is new about this concept. I examine key central documents and scholars' interpretations of their language in order to analyse the changes in the Party's stated thinking on governance, and to demonstrate the importance of central document analysis in understanding Chinese politics. I find that the term social governance does not have one clear, static meaning and that to argue otherwise would be misleading. Rather than developing in a linear way, as is often assumed, the concepts used in official discourse are found to be ambiguous and at times contradictory. This plays two important roles. It creates space for scholars to use official discourse as a channel for political participation, while at the same time facilitating the use of official language as technique for governing its users. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The ideology, propaganda, and political discourse of the Communist Party of China (CPC) have continued to function as key elements of the political system of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in the post-Maoist period since 1978. In the first term of the Xi Jinping leadership (2012-2017), the CPC, for instance, elaborated on its guiding ideological concepts, devised inventive ideational framings of phenomena usually perceived as tangible (such as the “New Normal”), engaged in complex intellectual debates on crucial topics (such as “eco-civilization”), intensified and diversified its argumentation patterns and discursive strategies, and consolidated ideational governance over some citizens’ individual values, beliefs, and loyalties. Furthermore, it is often no longer possible to differentiate between the CPC’s internal and external propaganda, as seemingly exclusively domestic ideational and discursive issues increasingly correlate with international phenomena. However, the trends in the Xi era do not present paradigmatic shifts, but rather an overall reassertion-cum-innovation of previous Maoist and post-Maoist uses of ideology, propaganda, and political discourse, primarily aiming at strengthening one-party rule. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

After 1978, Maoism as a living mass ideological and social force in the People’s Republic of China largely died away. The Party state’s legitimacy since that time has been based on a new pillar of economic competence and the delivery of tangible economic gains. But China is still a place where, at least within the political elite, there is an identifiable ideology and associated language that links the aims of a political force, the Communist Party of China, with national prosperity, historic rejuvenation, and the delivery of the political goals promised when the Communist Party was founded almost a century ago - modernity in Chinese society. Ideology has not disappeared in this interpretation. It has just become more concealed, more nuanced, and in some spaces more flexible. For Chinese contemporary leaders, ideology is partly a body of practices, beliefs, and language which have been bequeathed to them by previous leaders, and which show that they are part of the same historic movement that runs from 1921 to 1949, and through 1978 until today. This body of practices is aimed at maintaining a sustainable system of one party rule, as well as an assertion of discipline and control in the core tactical spaces of political power. Under Xi, a group of twelve keywords maps out the discursive space that matters to the CPC today. These terms exemplify the ways in which the contemporary CPC is willing to use ideas from diverse sources, either from its own past, or from classical Chinese thinking, as a means of achieving emotional as well as intellectual impact, and to assist in the delivery of the major Party goal of the twenty-first century - the creation of a great nation with the CPC at the heart of its governance. Underlying the keywords and the ideological space they define is the larger notion of the Party, not just attending to material but also spiritual needs - and creating not just a wealthy country, but also a spiritual socialist civilization. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

China’s Belt and Road Initiative and its associated domestic industrial policies represent a parallel trade and investment strategy that challenges the Akamatsu principle of the Flying Geese pattern of industrial development in East Asia. This paper is positioned against the dominant orthodox theory of national systems of industrial development in East Asia. It argues that China’s trade and industry policy in the 2012-2017 period has demonstrated that government will expand its industrial policy market intervention rather than retract, moving away from the regional economic integration order by moving industrial production and import trade away from the Asia-Pacific along a Westward axis to the Indian Ocean and Eurasia. Implications are that the emergence of China’s geoindustrial policy will subvert multilateral trade norms as China begins to institutionalise its external trade and industrial policies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Special economic zone (SEZ) programs in China have played a major role in the Chinese political economy. To examine SEZs, I address three questions. Are zones effective? What are the origins of SEZs? How do zones evolve? I argue that the origin of zones is under-theorized. Examining zone enactment is necessary for studying land-use patterns and urbanization. We must also pay closer attention to the level of analysis and evolution of zones over time. Clarifying the level of analysis will improve our understanding of the distribution of preferential policies across China. Understanding zone evolution will help scholars and practitioners assess when and how SEZs are an effective economic policy tool. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Although cross-strait relations have been the most stable in the last eight years under the pro-mainland KMT government, the pro-independence DPP scored a major victory in the 2016 presidential and parliamentary elections. This paper examines ways identity changes in Taiwan have influenced how Taiwanese view and deal with cross-strait relations and reactions from the mainland after the January elections. Using constructivism as the theoretical framework and survey data, we argue that Taiwan's continued democratization has created a different social and political experience. This experience has solidified over time and created a unique Taiwanese identity. As time passes, the KMT, which has a stronger historical and social lineage with the mainland, is being weakened by Taiwan's changing experience and identity. Nevertheless, peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait are not only essential for people on both sides of the strait, they are essential for the region and the world. Both the new DPP government and the mainland government must rethink their strategies and policies in order to construct a new framework to ensure continued peace and stability in the region. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

There have been some debates on Chinese migrant workers' resistances and their rising rights consciousness in the academia. This paper aims to understand the debates and their problems. This paper investigates the extent to which the forms of Chinese migrant workers' resistance have diverse impact on their citizenship rights. The conception of citizenship rights can be analytically understood in the individual/collective form and with the passive/active nature; such a dichotomy is also applicable for that of resistance according to the action theory. Both conceptualizations and their linkages constitute an analytical framework in this paper. Within it, the various cases of migrant workers' resistances and their connections with attainment of rights are discussed comparatively. A main finding in this paper is that the individual resistance, whether passive or active, is almost independent of rights; individuals with the PC model only wait passively for the government's help; and the AC model (e.g. strike) is much more prospective for the attainment of collective rights, which creates a new power to balance those of state and capital in China. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper seeks to present a framework for understanding the impact of China's rise on the established international order with a special focus on the contradictions and dilemmas facing both China and the order around it. It suggests heuristic insights from two Chinese cultural and linguistic metaphysics in order to denote the dynamic and interactive relationship between the rise of China and the existing order in terms of both opportunities and challenges. The authors argue that both China and the existing order have been going through periods of 'sleeping in the same bed with different dreams', and now they are in the stage of 'riding tiger' in which both sides face dilemmas in their complicated and complex relationship. The paper concludes that the rise of China and the existing order will continue to be intertwined in a dialectic of waxing and waning, and flux and reflux. In order for each to find a regional and global role which the other will accept and support both sides will have to go through a considerable period of struggle, tension and adjustment. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article addresses Chinas multilateral diplomacy by identifying four distinct strategies: watching, engaging, circumventing, and shaping. The typology builds on two literatures: power transition theory, and the more recent 'assertiveness' discourse in the West. Drawing from a range of cases in both the economic and security domains, the article argues that China's multilateralism is diverse, and that it cannot be un-problematically characterized as either status-quo or revisionist in nature. However, the general trend appears to be towards engagement, but with an assertive tact as China's interests become further entangled in the business of international institutions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since 2004 China has set up over 700 Confucius Institutes and Confucius Classrooms around the world to promote its language and culture and thereby to shape its image. Despite this impressive number Confucius Institutes are surprisingly understudied, especially in terms of their actual structure, operation mode and activities. This paper uses German Confucius Institutes as a case study to bridge this gap. It first discusses the concepts of public and cultural diplomacy and culture institutes as a conceptual tool to analyze Confucius Institutes. It then turns to the case study to provide empirical data to better understand this instrument of China's image shaping efforts. It argues that Confucius Institutes are connected to the rise of China and a unique member of the family of national culture institutes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

With its rapid economic growth and deepening integration into the global system, Chinese leaders see the first 20 years of the 21st century as an 'important period of strategic opportunity' for China. China under Hu Jintao's leadership has chosen a new path of peaceful rise. To facilitate such a peaceful rise, Chinese Communist Party has gradually adopted a soft power strategy. We see building soft power as a means as well as the end of China's peaceful rise. We argue China has a genuine desire for peace in her rise and China's peaceful rise may not be impossible. Based on existing literature, we expand the sources of soft power to six pillars: cultural attractiveness, political values, development model, international institutions, international image, and economic temptation. We also identify three channels for wielding soft power: formal, economic, and cultural diplomacies. Putting all the basics together, we have proposed an integrative model of soft power. Accordingly, we analyze the sources and limits of China's soft power and suggest how to improve it in these six areas. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article proposes a two-dimensional analytical framework to investigate the impact of local policy implementation on political system stability and legitimacy in China. It combines David Easton's political systems theory with policy analysis and a variant of actor-centered institutionalism known as 'strategic group analysis'. In the second part of the article, this framework is applied to a case study on local implementation of the official 'constructing a new socialist countryside' policy in Qingyuan County, Zhejiang Province. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

One important feature of China’s privatization process is that insider privatization prevailed, and that outsiders could hardly gain access to buying state enterprises. Why was a majority of small- and medium-sized public enterprises sold to the firms’ former managers (and workers)? How did the tightened regulatory environment affect local privatization in China? Building on insights into institutional change, I argue that the choice of a specific privatization strategy results from political compromises among local officials, workers, and managers of public enterprises under specific regulatory constraints. Local officials’ incentives for privatization and their reactions to the changing regulatory environment had a great impact on the dynamics of local privatization. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Analysts oddly have neglected the foreign economic implications of China’s harmonious world and harmonious society doctrines. This article specifies the foreign economic policy effects of both, collectively termed harmonious world plus (HWP). It shows that HWP implies China’s continued integration into the global economic system, acceptance of the extant international economic order, and backing for increased cooperation and exchange, provided it is mutually beneficial. It further demonstrates that HWP implies support for global development, self-reliance, and multilateralism. Beyond this, the study reveals that HWP is likely to influence China’s interactions with international economic institutions, foreign investors, and its international resource dealings. Generally speaking, this article shows that China is making progress adhering to most of the tenets of HWP, though there are some areas for concern. It also reveals that convergences and divergences between HWP and China’s actual policies are attributable to national interests, China’s limited capabilities, and domestic politics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study attempts to answer a new but important question in China’s foreign policy— how Beijing has wielded its soft power to construct its ideal of international order in the age of China’s rise. Before empirical analyses, this study tries to set up a conceptual framework on the relations between the idea of “harmonious world” and China’s soft power wielding in its rising process. Within this framework, this study examines a rising China’s foreign policies towards three targeted regions in the global south—Africa, East Asia, and Latin America. On the one hand, due to Beijing’s carefully-designed and soft power-based foreign policies, the global south has become an increasingly harmonious environment for Beijing to cultivate a favorable national image, exert its political influence on regional affairs, benefit its own domestic economic developments, etc. On the other hand, some problems such as the so-called “China’s New Colonialism” and the increased vigilance from the other powers have already began to challenge Beijing’s harmony in those regions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

China’s distinctive set of stock market institutions was introduced in 1990. Among the characteristics of China’s stock markets was a strict separation between different categories of investors. Listed companies issued different categories of shares to state shareholders, domestic corporate investors, domestic individual investors, and foreign investors. By 2005, the barriers segmenting China’s stock market had been significantly relaxed. Domestic investors were allowed to purchase shares previously reserved for foreign investors, and approved foreign investors were allowed to purchase shares previously earmarked for domestic individuals. Nevertheless, a crucial barrier remained. An ongoing debate among Chinese academics, investors, and policy makers focused on how to resolve the “split share structure” (guquan fen zhi) in which a minority of shares were tradable while the majority of shares (namely those reserved for domestic corporate and state shareholders) were excluded from the market. The split share structure was blamed for distorting prices and inhibiting development of the stock market. This paper analyzes the policy adopted to address the split share structure. To what extent does this policy change reflect new thinking on the part of China’s market regulators? This paper argues that analysis of policy making in China’s capital markets can help to distinguish between two competing assessments of China’s political economy. One account sees China pursuing a gradualist strategy, slowly but steadily expanding the role of markets. Another account sees China trapped in a semi-marketized and increasingly corrupt development pattern. The implementation of the split share structure reform program provides evidence to support the gradualist account of incremental, but persistent, reform. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

China’ economic boom has produced a surging appetite for fossil fuels, particularly oil. To foster and sustain its economic development, China has taken a series of steps to quench its thirst for energy. The most striking measure is its high-profile oil diplomacy, centering on the goal of gaining more secure national control of overseas oil and gas supplies. Why has China chosen oil diplomacy over directly purchasing oil on the international market? And why does one prefer direct control of oil and gas? This paper attempts to address China’s motivations from the perspectives of both the central government and the national oil companies (NOCs). It is argued that China’s oil diplomacy has been driven not only by the government’s learning skill and strategic concerns, but also by the NOCs’ strong commercial motives to expand business abroad and their management’s personal incentive. Although both actors have common stakes in securing oil and gas from abroad, this by no means can guarantee that the NOCs will obediently follow state orders. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]