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Studies focusing on China and Russia, whose relationship is of key importance to the configuration of the international system, have been evolving dynamically in various disciplines. We analyze the evolution of this research by focusing on the fields of International Relations and Area Studies. This novel bibliometric study employs Biblioshiny, AntConc, and VOSviewer to analyze 947 publications collected from the Web of Science Core Collection, focusing specifically on 266 publications in International Relations and Area Studies. While mapping research on China and Russia over the last three decades (1990–2019), we identify the main trends regarding the annual distribution of papers, document types, dominant journals, collaboration networks between countries, and the most productive authors. We also establish prevailing research themes resulting from keyword analysis and their respective growth over time, as well as the density of the most frequently used terms and methods employed in the selected research fields. Finally, we identify fruitful avenues for further research, while also demonstrating how the bibliometric approach can inform and direct developments on China and Russia studies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper links China's pattern of infrastructure lending to Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) with China's own development experience in this regard. It raises the question whether Chinese infrastructure investments in LAC have the potential to promote sustainable development in the region. The paper consists of four parts. Part 1 outlines China's massive domestic infrastructure construction projects as a specific development strategy which has contributed considerably to the country's rapid internal development, but has simultaneously given rise to complex dynamics of social and environmental risk. Part 2 assesses the strategies involved in China's infrastructure investment in LAC. Part 3 identifies key actors involved in China-LAC infrastructure cooperation and how they relate to different ways of financing infrastructure projects. Part 4 focuses on policy guidelines for managing the social and environmental risks of infrastructure projects. The paper concludes that more research, more capacity-building, and new forms of multinational development cooperation are needed to strengthen the social and environmental policies associated with China's infrastructure investment in LAC countries, to help uphold existing social and environmental standards, and to extend project benefits more effectively to local communities and people. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

China is considered as a significant development partner in Nigeria; yet relations between the two countries have been marked by episodes of oscillations. This paper engages three interconnected questions: (i) What is the history of Sino-Nigeria relations? (ii) How has Nigeria’s political elites and ordinary Nigerians reacted to Chinese presence? (iii) To what extent is Sino-Nigeria relations beneficial to Nigeria? This paper while identifying and discussing the benefits and underbellies of Sino-Nigeria relations, draws attention to aspects of the relations less discussed in the literature. It concludes that beyond the more popular yet simplistic Janus-headed explication of Sino-Nigeria relations as positive or negative, significant focus is needed to understand the instabilities capable of impacting on the developmental potential of China in Nigeria. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Latin America is a critical region for analyzing China's economic statecraft. Following the Monroe doctrine, Latin America has long been seen as part of the sphere of U.S. influence. For the purpose of studying the effectiveness of China's economic statecraft I will focus on two countries that stand on opposite extremes: Brazil and Mexico. Both countries happened to be important target states (strategic partners) of China's economic statecraft in the region, albeit for different political and strategic goals. In this paper I will compare the different domestic political and economic conditions, interests and institutions in these two countries to explain why China has made greater progress in projecting its economic power through trade and investment to pursue its political goals with Brazil, but has not succeeded in Mexico. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Chinese foreign policy is still an undertheorized domain of international relations studies. One puzzle that preoccupies international observers is the impact of leadership changes on Chinese foreign behavior. Based on an in-depth reading of official statements made by China's new political leaders and their first actions in office this paper analyses continuity and change in China's foreign strategy. Following a combined multidimensional analytical approach the evaluation focuses on the interrelation between indigenous (leadership changes, subsystemic challenges) and exogenous factors (global crises, critical junctures) on the modeling of China's international strategy. My main conclusion is that shifts and role changes in Chinese foreign policy should not be misread as the outcome of the latest leadership transition. Most 'changes' that are now associated with the fifth generation have originally been introduced by their political ancestors. As a context-sensitive, historical-reflectivist analysis shows, China's 'new' approach to world affairs stands for a continuing, incremental adaptation of the PRC to socio-economic evolutions on the domestic and the global level. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

An analysis of PRC leaders' public communication with respect to Taiwan from 2003 to 2013 shows the presence of three conflict frames: aspiration, process and image. Chinese leaders most often use the process frame to convey the preferred process through which both sides could find a common ground. These messages are reinforced by rhetoric about China's capacity, resolve and sincerity to reach out to Taiwan for peaceful solutions. Communication of China's own aspirations of national unification is usually less visible. However, it becomes more prominent when the Taiwanese are not the intended audience, indicating its utility in rallying internal support. Using these frames as broad parameters, the paper discusses how they may have influenced policy actions toward Taiwan in the early days of the Xi administration. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The dawn of the Sino-US peer competition has broken, denoting a new status quo of instability as Beijing and Washington vie for influence. As leader of the rules-based international order (RIO), Washington under the Trump administration nevertheless adopted an "America first" posture, which triggered a transatlantic discord. Simultaneously, Beijing, having signalled discontent with existing settlements, has sought to alter international arrangements to cement its leadership role. Europe has been identified as a significant theatre for the emerging competition, with Germany and the UK recognized as essential target states for Beijing's efforts, yet are simultaneously major stakeholders in the US-led RIO. As such, this article sets out to operationalize a European narrative of hedging. The article poses the questions, how does the transatlantic discord and Beijing's leadership ambitions impact the hedging strategies of Germany and the UK, and why do such coping behaviors differ in various indices? Utilizing key signals from policy practitioners, policy elites' rhetoric and national strategies, it is contended that while the UK is struggling to formulate a coherent foreign policy and now finds itself aligned with US foreign policy narratives, Germany is unlikely to signal its wishes to become strategically independent, if the US and EU foreign policy imperatives accord with Berlin's political and economic interests. These two case studies reveal that both European powers are decidedly wary about Beijing's signals and intentions, and are likely to retain closer alignment with Washington, foregoing strategic independence and illustrating the temporary nature of the transatlantic discord. Both will not, however, wish to relinquish Beijing, so long as attractive economic benefits can be attained, resulting in an inexplicit strategic hedge. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This piece examines and critiques the massive literature on China's ambitious Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). It details how research currently seems stuck on the road to nowhere. In addition, it identifies a number of the potholes that collective research endeavors are hitting such as that they are poorly synchronized. It also stresses that lines of analysis are proliferating rather than optimizing, with studies broadening in thematic coverage, rather than becoming deeper. It points out that BRI participants are regularly related to the role of a bit player in many analyses and research often is disconnected from other literatures. Among other things, this article recommends analysts focus on the Maritime Silk Road Initiative (MSRI) or Silk Road Economic Belt (SREB) in specific regions or countries. It also argues for a research core that focuses on the implementation issue (i.e., the issue of MSRI and SREB project implementation), project effects (i.e., the economic and political costs and benefits of projects), and the translation issue (i.e., the domestic and foreign policy effects of projects) and does work that goes beyond the usual suspects. On a related note, research need to identify, more precisely, participants and projects, undertake causal analysis, and take into account countervailing factors. Furthermore, studies need to make more extensive use of the Chinese foreign policy literature. Moreover, works examining subjects like soft power need to improve variable conceptualization and operationalization and deliver more nuanced analyses. Finally, studies, especially by area specialists, should take the area, not the China, perspective. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article explores the political economy of Chinese outward foreign direct investment (FDI) in Argentina during the reign of Nestor Kirchner and Cristina Fernandez. Among other things, it contemplates possible links between Chinese outward FDI (OFDI) volumes and Argentina's domestic and foreign policies. It also analyses a mixture of successful and unsuccessful Chinese investment cases in the agricultural, chemical, and banking sectors in order to engage the debate about the drivers of Chinese OFDI (COFDI), with some stressing business and economic factors and others emphasizing the primacy of political factors. In regards to the former, my study shows that Argentine policymakers did not offer special accommodations to Chinese investors despite the pro-China proclivities of Argentine leaders and their country's economic and political need for China. Moreover, at the local level, Argentine politics actually proved to be an obstacle to successful Chinese deals. As for the latter issue, Chinese companies were not inclined to invest in Argentina because of the China stance of the Argentine government, but rather because they saw opportunities to exploit fertile agricultural soil, special tax regimes for investors, and opportunities to integrate into global value chain. My findings have a number of important theoretical and policy implications. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Conventional wisdom would suggest that middle powers, being hyper-attuned to great power politics, can be expected to bandwagon with their traditional allies. In a unipolar world, Canada and New Zealand could thus be expected to play follow-the-leader with the US. However, the rise of China has a confounding effect on the US-led unipolar order and thus on our traditional expectations of American middle power allies as well. In this article, we probe the apparent variation in what we term "strategic value" for China of New Zealand and Canada. While the two hold a great deal in common, we find that the Canadian case is made considerably more complicated by both the range of strategic considerations present, and the potential payoff for China of one in particular—closeness to the US, China's prime geostrategic rival. These higher stakes in the Canadian case not only make strategic inroads in New Zealand relatively easy for China, but also suggest that Chinese economic policy is selectively sculpted to suit the PRC's higher strategic purposes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In recent years, the People's Republic of China has made significant investments in Antarctica and has become an active participant in Antarctic governance. What factors are driving China's interest in the region? Are Antarctic Treaty System institutions, rules and norms influencing Chinese behavior? How does Antarctica fit into larger Chinese foreign policy frameworks, especially those that relate to 'soft power' and engagement in global environmental governance? This study finds that Antarctic governance structures do not seem to pose major barriers to China's pursuit of its larger foreign policy interests and its activities are largely consistent with other major actors on the Continent. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The magnitude of China's energy needs and global energy acquisitions, and their recent emergence as key features of the international system, raise many sensitive questions: will China adapt to or reshape the international system as historically defined by the hegemonic West, and what is the role of its energy policy, politics, and resource nationalism in a possible new Great Game? While much of the current literature posits an either/or approach (China adapts to energy market or tries to redefine them as a part of a wider political plan), our hypothesis is that China is essentially a pragmatic actor who reacts to the forces in presence, rather than a revisionist power with a grand plan to realign the world order to suit its needs and satisfy some kind of pre-established grand vision. We posit that China goes beyond conformity with or resistance to the established energy market and the power relations they underpin: While local circumstances may be considered variables, its fixed objective is a stable international order and the pragmatic satisfaction of its energy needs in order to insure continued economic growth and general stability at home. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]