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The predominant position in the reproductive rights literature argues that access to assisted reproductive technologies (ART) forms part of an individual's right to reproduce. On this reasoning, refusal of treatment by clinicians (via provision) violates a hopeful parent's reproductive right and discriminates against the infertile. I reject these views and suggest they wrongly contort what reproductive freedom entitles individuals to do and demand of others. I suggest these views find their origin, at least in part, in the way we define "reproduction" itself. This paper critically analyses two widely accepted definitions of human reproduction and demonstrates that both are fundamentally flawed. While the process of reproduction includes the biological acts of begetting and bearing a child, I argue that it does not extend to include rearing. This reworked definition has little impact in the realm of sexual reproduction. However, it has significant ethical implications for the formulation and assignment of reproductive rights and responsibilities in the non-sexual realm in two important ways. First, a claim to access ART where one has an intention to rear a child (but does not beget or bear) cannot be grounded in reproductive rights. Second, lacking an intention to rear does not extinguish the reproductive rights and responsibilities for those who collaborate in the process. I conclude that clinicians collaborate in non-sexual reproduction at the point of triggering conception (begetting) and therefore have the right to refuse to be involved in non-sexual reproduction, in some instances, as do all reproductive collaborators. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In 2003 and 2004, Aotearoa New Zealand enacted two key laws that regulate two very different ways in which the female body may be commodified. The Prostitution Reform Act 2003 (PRA) decriminalized prostitution, removing legal barriers to the buying and selling of commercial sexual services. The Human Assisted Reproductive Technology Act 2004 (HART Act), on the other hand, put a prohibition on commercial surrogacy agreements. This paper undertakes a comparative analysis of the ethical arguments underlying New Zealand's legislative solutions to prostitution and commercial surrogacy. While the regulation of prostitution is approached with a Marxist feminist lens with the aim to ensure the health and safety of sex workers, commercial surrogacy is prohibited outright for concerns of negative impacts on present and future persons. I ground the principles of each Act in their ethical foundations and compare these two against one another. I conclude that New Zealand's legislative approach to regulating the commodification of the female body is ethically inconsistent. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Qualitative studies on assisted reproductive technology commonly focus on the perspectives of participants living in major metropolises. In doing so, the experiences of those living outside major cities, and the unique way conditions of spatiality shape access to treatment, are elided. In this paper, we examine how location and regionality in Australia impact upon access and experience of reproductive services. We conducted twelve qualitative interviews with participants residing in regional areas across Australia. We asked participants to discuss their experience with assisted reproduction services and the impacts of location on access, service choice, and experience of care, and analysed the data using reflexive thematic analysis, as outlined by Braun and Clarke (2006, 2019). Participants in this study reported that their location impacted the services available to them, required considerable time in travel, and reduced continuity of care. We draw on these responses to examine the ethical implications of uneven distribution of reproductive services in commercial healthcare settings which rely on market-based mechanisms. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Egg freezing has led to heated debates in healthcare policy and bioethics. A crucial issue in this context concerns the distinction between "medical" and "social" egg freezing (MEF and SEF)—contrasting objections to bio-medicalization with claims for oversimplification. Yet such categorization remains a criterion for regulation. This paper aims to explore the "regulatory boundary-work" around the "medical"–"social" distinction in different egg freezing regulations. Based on systematic documents' analysis we present a cross-national comparison of the way the "medical"–"social" differentiation finds expression in regulatory frameworks in Austria, Germany, Israel, and the Netherlands. Findings are organized along two emerging themes: (1) the definition of MEF and its distinctiveness—highlighting regulatory differences in the clarity of the definition and in the medical indications used for creating it (less clear in Austria and Germany, detailed in Israel and the Netherlands); and (2) hierarchy of medical over social motivations reflected in usage and funding regulations. Blurred demarcation lines between "medical" and "social" are further discussed as representing a paradoxical inclusion of SEF while offering new insights into the complexity and normativity of this distinction. Finally, we draw conclusions for policymaking and the bioethical debate, also concerning the related cryopolitical aspects. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Recently, Australia became the second jurisdiction worldwide to legalize the use of mitochondrial donation technology. The Mitochondrial Donation Law Reform (Maeve's Law) Bill 2021 allows individuals with a family history of mitochondrial disease to access assisted reproductive techniques that prevent the inheritance of mitochondrial disease. Using inductive content analysis, we assessed submissions sent to the Senate Committee as part of a programme of scientific inquiry and public consultation that informed drafting of the Bill. These submissions discussed a range of bioethical and legal considerations of central importance to the political debate. Significantly, submissions from those with a first-hand experience of mitochondrial disease, including clinicians and those with a family history of mitochondrial disease, were in strong support of this legislation. Those in support of the Bill commended the two-staged approach and rigorous licencing requirements as part of the Bill's implementation strategy. Submissions which outlined arguments against the legislation either opposed the use of these techniques in general or opposed aspects of the implementation strategy in Australia. These findings offer a window into the ethical arguments and perspectives that matter most to those Australians who took part in the Senate inquiry into mitochondrial donation. The insights garnered from these submissions may be used to help refine policy and guidelines as the field progresses. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Mitochondrial replacement technology (MRT) is an emerging and complex bioethical issue. This treatment aims to eliminate maternal inherited mitochondrial DNA (mtDNA) disorders. For Muslims, its introduction affects every aspect of human life, especially the five essential interests of human beings—namely, religion, life, lineage, intellect, and property. Thus, this technology must be assessed using a comprehensive and holistic approach addressing these human essential interests. Consequently, this article analyses and assesses tri-parent baby technology from the perspective of Maqasidic bioethics—that is, Islamic bioethics based on the framework of Maqasid al-Shariah. Using this analysis, this article suggests that tri-parent baby technology should not be permitted for Muslims due to the existence of third-party cell gametes which lead to lineage mixing and due to the uncertain safety of the therapy itself and because the major aim of the technology is to fulfil the affected couples interest to conceive their own genetically healthy child, not to treat and cure mtDNA disorders sufferers. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]