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Recent reform proposals call for an elimination of the constant net asset value (NAV) or “buck” in money market mutual funds to reduce the occurrence of runs. Outside the United States, there are several countries that have money market mutual funds with and without constant NAVs. Using daily data on individual fund flows from these countries, this paper evaluates whether the reliance on a constant NAV is associated with higher fund redemptions. The data suggest that funds with a constant NAV experienced more negative net flows during the period of the run on the Reserve Primary Fund, even after controlling for measures of fund risk and risk aversion. However, I do not find convincing support for the hypothesis that the effect of sponsor strength on fund flows was stronger for constant NAV money market funds.

Using a unique dataset, we document that only those closed funds for which no new fund is subsequently launched continuously deliver positive abnormal returns. This suggests the existence of an optimal fund scale. In spite of the potential diseconomies of scale, a non-trivial proportion of closed funds have new funds cloned—the scale motive would not be a complete explanation for the closure. When managers of closed funds clone new funds, they receive greater public attention and thus can attract more fund flows and charge higher fees. Furthermore, better-performing closed fund managers attract more fund flows to their new siblings, making the closure an effective mechanism to extract economic rents. Overall, we find that closing and cloning is an attractive strategy for funds seeking to increase their management fees and funds with more managers in place. Aspects of the closed fund family also affect the launch decision of new siblings.

This study examines the role of reputation stretching in the context of mutual funds. We show that the reputation stretching strategy increases net fund inflows to new funds run by well-performing fund managers and yields a net increase of fund inflows to fund families. Reputable fund managers exhibit one-year performance persistence for managing new funds, which can help investors assess managers when selecting funds. We also find that the decrease in information asymmetry associated with managerial reputation benefits investors by leading to an increase in new fund returns in the short run, compared to those of new funds run by managers without track records. Overall, the reputation stretching strategy benefits both investors, by reducing information asymmetry and improving investment returns, and fund families, by increasing net fund inflows to new equity funds.

Using a comprehensive sample of mutual funds and fund families for the period 1992-2004, this paper examines the impact of fund management companies' organizational forms on the level of agency costs observed within mutual funds. We find that, all else being equal, (1) funds managed by public fund families charge higher fees than those managed by private fund families; (2) public fund families are more likely to be implicated in the recent fund scandals; (3) public fund families acquire more funds than private fund families; and (4) funds of public fund families significantly underperform funds of private fund families. Collectively, these findings suggest that agency costs are higher in mutual funds managed by public fund families. Our results are consistent with the idea that the agency conflict between the fund management company and fund shareholders is more acute for public management companies because of their shorter-term focus.

This paper investigates and compares the determinants of fund flows for socially responsible investment (SRI) funds and conventional funds. We consider the impact of current and past measures of monthly and annual return on fund flow. The results suggest SRI fund flows are less sensitive to returns than conventional funds. Our model also shows that flow is persistent and SRI investors are more likely to invest in a fund they already own relative to conventional investors. These results reflect the difficulty SRI investors face in finding alternative investments that meet their non-financial goals.

We examine how redemption policies affect daily fund flows in open-end mutual funds. Since short-term trading of fund shares, as manifested in daily fund flows, can have an adverse impact on returns to the fund’s shareholders, mutual funds might find it desirable to discourage short-term trading through the use of redemption fees. However, if daily fund flows are due to fund shareholders’ legitimate liquidity demands, the redemption fee would have little effect on daily fund flows and possibly adversely affect fund shareholders by imposing a liquidity cost on them. We find that the likelihood of a fund charging a redemption fee is largely a function of its overall fee structure. We also use a sample of funds that imposed redemption fees to examine whether the distribution of daily fund flows changes after the initiation of the redemption fee. We find that the redemption fee is an effective tool in controlling the volatility of fund flows.

Fund families typically claim that closing a fund protects the fund's superior performance by preventing it from growing too large to be managed efficiently. Even though funds with better performance and larger size are more likely to be closed, there is no evidence that closing a fund can indeed protect its performance. Instead, fund closing decisions are more likely to be motivated by spillover effects – by closing a star fund, the fund family signals its superior performance and also brings investors' attention and investments to other funds in the family. Some evidence exists to suggest that the closing strategy is effective in generating higher inflows into the rest of the family, at least in the short run.